§7Πῶς δὲ νοῶν ὁτὲ μὲν πράττει ὁτὲ δʼ οὐ πράττει, καὶ 7 κινεῖται, ὁτὲ δʼ οὐ κινεῖται;
But how does it happen that a thinking person sometimes acts and sometimes does not act, and sometimes moves and sometimes does not move?
ἔοικε παραπλησίως συμβαίνειν καὶ περὶ τῶν ἀκινήτων διανοουμένοις καὶ συλλογιζομένοις.
It seems to happen in a very similar way to those who think and syllogize about changeless objects.
ἀλλʼ ἐκεῖ μὲν θεώρημα τὸ τέλος (ὅταν γὰρ τὰς δύο προτάσεις νοήσῃ, τὸ συμπέρασμα ἐνόησε καὶ συνέθηκεν), ἐνταῦθα δʼ ἐκ τῶν δύο προτάσεων τὸ συμπέρασμα γίνεται ἡ πρᾶξις, οἷον ὅταν νοήσῃ ὅτι παντὶ βαδιστέον ἀνθρώπῳ, αὐτὸς δʼ ἄνθρωπος, βαδίζει εὐθέως, ἂν δʼ ὅτι οὐδενὶ βαδιστέον νῦν ἀνθρώπῳ, αὐτὸς δʼ ἄνθρωπος, εὐθὺς ἠρεμεῖ· καὶ ταῦτα ἄμφω πράττει, ἂν μή τι κωλύῃ ἢ ἀναγκάζῃ. ποιητέον μοι ἀγαθόν, οἰκία δʼ ἀγαθόν· ποιεῖ οἰκίαν εὐθύς. σκεπάσματος δέομαι, ἱμάτιον δὲ σκέπασμα· ἱματίου δέομαι. οὗ δέομαι, ποιητέον· ἱματίου δέομαι· ἱμάτιον ποιητέον. καὶ τὸ συμπέρασμα, τὸ ἱμάτιον ποιητέον, πρᾶξίς ἐστιν.
But there the end is a theoretical proposition (for when one thinks the two premises, one immediately thinks and compounds the conclusion), whereas here the conclusion arising from the two premises becomes the action, for instance, when one thinks that every man ought to walk, and that he himself is a man, he walks immediately; but if he thinks that no man ought to walk now, and that he himself is a man, he immediately remains at rest; and in both cases he acts, unless something prevents or compels him. “I ought to make a good thing, and a house is a good thing”; he makes a house immediately. “I need a covering, and a cloak is a covering”; “I need a cloak.” “What I need, I ought to make; I need a cloak”; “I ought to make a cloak.” And the conclusion, “I ought to make a cloak”, is an action.
πράττει δʼ ἀπʼ ἀρχῆς. εἰ ἱμάτιον ἔσται, ἀνάγκη εἶναι τόδε πρῶτον, εἰ δὲ τόδε, τόδε· καὶ τοῦτο πράττει εὐθύς.
And he acts from a starting-point. “If there is to be a cloak, this must be first, and if this, then this”; and this he does immediately.
ὅτι μὲν οὖν ἡ πρᾶξις τὸ συμπέρασμα, φανερόν· αἱ δὲ προτάσεις αἱ ποιητικαὶ διὰ δύο εἰδῶν γίνονται, διά τε τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ καὶ διὰ τοῦ δυνατοῦ.
That the action, then, is the conclusion, is clear; but the premises that lead to action are of two kinds, through the good and through the possible.
ὥσπερ δὲ τῶν ἐρωτώντων ἔνιοι, οὕτω τὴν ἑτέραν πρότασιν τὴν δήλην οὐδʼ ἡ διάνοια ἐφιστᾶσα σκοπεῖ οὐδέν· οἷον εἰ τὸ βαδίζειν ἀγαθὸν ἀνθρώπῳ, ὅτι αὐτὸς ἄνθρωπος, οὐκ ἐνδιατρίβει.
And just like some of those who ask questions, so the mind does not even stop to consider at all the other premise which is obvious; for instance, if walking is good for a man, it does not linger over the fact that he himself is a man.
διὸ καὶ ὅσα μὴ λογισάμενοι πράττομεν, ταχὺ πράττομεν.
Hence, whatever we do without calculating, we do quickly.
ὅταν ἐνεργήσῃ γὰρ ἢ τῇ αἰσθήσει πρὸς τὸ οὗ ἕνεκα ἢ τῇ φαντασίᾳ ἢ τῷ νῷ, οὗ ὀρέγεται, εὐθὺς ποιεῖ ἀντʼ ἐρωτήσεως γὰρ ἢ νοήσεως ἡ τῆς ὀρέξεως γίνεται ἐνέργεια.
For when one has active exercise, either by perception towards the end or by imagination or by intellect, of that which one desires, one immediately acts; for the activity of the desire comes in place of the question or the thinking.
ποτέον μοι, ἡ ἐπιθυμία λέγει· τοδὶ δὲ ποτόν, ἡ αἴσθησις εἶπεν ἢ ἡ φαντασία ἢ ὁ νοῦς· εὐθὺς πίνει.
“I must drink,” says appetite; “this is drink,” says perception or imagination or intellect; he immediately drinks.
οὕτως μὲν οὖν ἐπὶ τὸ κινεῖσθαι καὶ πράττειν τὰ ζῷα ὁρμῶσι, τῆς μὲν ἐσχάτης αἰτίας τοῦ κινεῖσθαι ὀρέξεως οὔσης, ταύτης δὲ γινομένης ἢ διʼ αἰσθήσεως ἢ διὰ φαντασίας καὶ νοήσεως.
In this way, then, animals are impelled to move and act, the proximate cause of their movement being desire, and this arising either through perception or through imagination and thought.
τῶν δʼ ὀρεγομένων πράττειν τὰ μὲν διʼ ἐπιθυμίαν ἢ θυμὸν τὰ δὲ διʼ ὄρεξιν ἢ βούλησιν τὰ μὲν ποιοῦσι, τὰ δὲ πράττουσιν.
And of those that desire to act, some make things and others do actions, some through appetite or passion, others through desire or wish.
ὥσπερ δὲ τὰ αὐτόματα κινεῖται μικρᾶς κινήσεως γινομένης, λυομένων τῶν στρεβλῶν καὶ κρουόντων ἀλλήλας τὰς στρέβλας, καὶ τὸ ἁμάξιον, ὅπερ ὀχούμενον αὐτὸ κινεῖ εἰς εὐθύ, καὶ πάλιν κύκλῳ κινεῖται τῷ ἀνίσους ἔχειν τοὺς τροχούς (ὁ γὰρ ἐλάττων ὥσπερ κέντρον γίνεται, καθάπερ ἐν τοῖς κυλίνδροις), οὕτω καὶ τὰ ζῷα κινεῖται.
And just as automatic puppets move when a small motion occurs, as the pegs are released and strike against one another, and the toy carriage, which the child riding in it moves straight forward, and yet it moves in a circle because it has unequal wheels (for the smaller wheel becomes as it were a center, just as in cylinders), so also animals move.
ἔχει γὰρ ὄργανα τοιαῦτα τήν τε τῶν νεύρων φύσιν καὶ τὴν τῶν ὀστῶν, τὰ μὲν ὡς ἐκεῖ τὰ ξύλα καὶ ὁ σίδηρος, τὰ δὲ νεῦρα ὡς αἱ στρέβλαι· ὧν λυομένων καὶ ἀνιεμένων κινοῦνται.
For they have organs of this kind in the nature of sinews and bones, the bones being like the wood and iron in the toy, and the sinews like the pegs; and when these are released and slackened, they move.
ἐν μὲν οὖν τοῖς αὐτομάτοις καὶ τοῖς ἁμαξίοις οὐκ ἔστιν ἀλλοίωσις, ἐπεὶ εἰ ἐγίνοντο ἐλάττους οἱ ἐντὸς τροχοὶ καὶ πάλιν μείζους, κἂν κύκλῳ τὸ αὐτὸ ἐκινεῖτο·
Now in automatic puppets and toy carriages there is no alteration; since if the inner wheels became smaller and again larger, even so the same thing would move in a circle.
ἐν δὲ τῷ ζῴῳ δύναται τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ μεῖζον καὶ ἔλαττον γίνεσθαι καὶ τὰ σχήματα μεταβάλλειν, αὐξανομένων τῶν μορίων διὰ θερμότητα καὶ πάλιν συστελλομένων διὰ ψύξιν καὶ ἀλλοιουμένων.
But in the animal, the same part can become both larger and smaller, and change its shape, as the parts increase through heat and again contract through cold and are altered.
ἀλλοιοῦσι δʼ αἱ φαντασίαι καὶ αἱ αἰσθήσεις καὶ αἱ ἔννοιαι.
And imaginations, perceptions, and thoughts produce alterations.
αἱ μὲν γὰρ αἰσθήσεις εὐθὺς ὑπάρχουσιν ἀλλοιώσεις τινὲς οὖσαι, ἡ δὲ φαντασία καὶ ἡ νόησις τὴν τῶν πραγμάτων ἔχουσι δύναμιν· τρόπον γάρ τινα τὸ εἶδος τὸ νοούμενον τὸ τοῦ θερμοῦ ἢ ψυχροῦ ἢ ἡδέος ἢ φοβεροῦ τοιοῦτον τυγχάνει ὂν οἷόν περ καὶ τῶν πραγμάτων ἕκαστον, διὸ καὶ φρίττουσι καὶ φοβοῦνται νοήσαντες μόνον.
For perceptions are immediately present as being certain alterations, while imagination and thought have the power of the actual things; for in a way the thought-of form of the hot or cold or pleasant or fearful happens to be of such a nature as each of the actual things, which is why people shudder and feel fear merely by thinking of them.
ταῦτα δὲ πάντα πάθη καὶ ἀλλοιώσεις εἰσίν.
And all these are affections and alterations.
ἀλλοιουμένων δʼ ἐν τῷ σώματι τὰ μὲν μείζω τὰ δʼ ἐλάττω γίνεται.
And when alterations occur in the body, some parts become larger and others smaller.
ὅτι δὲ μικρὰ μεταβολὴ γινομένη ἐν ἀρχῇ μεγάλας καὶ πολλὰς ποιεῖ διαφορὰς ἄποθεν, οὐκ ἄδηλον· οἷον τοῦ οἴακος ἀκαριαῖόν τι μεθισταμένου πολλὴ ἡ τῆς πρώρας γίνεται μετάστασις.
And that a small change occurring at the starting-point produces great and numerous differences at a distance is not unclear; for instance, when the rudder is shifted a tiny bit, the shift of the prow becomes great.
ἔτι δὲ κατὰ θερμότητα ἢ ψύξιν ἢ κατʼ ἄλλο τι τοιοῦτον πάθος ὅταν γένηται ἀλλοίωσις περὶ τὴν καρδίαν, καὶ ἐν ταύτῃ κατὰ μέγεθος ἐν ἀναισθήτῳ μορίῳ, πολλὴν ποιεῖ τοῦ σώματος διαφορὰν ἐρυθήμασι καὶ ὠχρότησι καὶ φρίκαις καὶ τρόμοις καὶ τοῖς τούτων ἐναντίοις.
And further, when an alteration occurs around the heart in respect of heat or cold or some other such affection, even if it is in an imperceptibly small part of it in size, it produces a great difference in the body by blushes, pallor, shudders, tremblings, and their opposites.