§5Πότερον δʼ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ αὐτὸ κινοῦντι κατὰ τόπον μόνῳ δεῖ 5 τι μένειν, ἢ καὶ ἐν τῷ ἀλλοιουμένῳ αὐτῷ ὑφʼ αὐτοῦ καὶ αὐξανομένῳ;
But must something remain at rest only in that which moves itself in place, or also in that which is altered and increased by itself?
περὶ δὲ γενέσεως τῆς ἐξ ἀρχῆς καὶ φθορᾶς ἄλλος λόγος· εἰ γάρ ἐστιν ἥνπερ φαμὲν πρώτην κίνησιν γενέσεως καὶ φθορᾶς, αὕτη αἰτία ἂν εἴη, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων δὲ κινήσεων ἴσως πασῶν.
But concerning generation from the beginning and destruction, there is another discussion; for if there is that which we call the first movement of generation and destruction, this would be the cause, and perhaps of all other movements as well.
ὥσπερ δʼ ἐν τῷ ὅλῳ, καὶ ἐν τῷ ζῴῳ κίνησις πρώτη αὕτη, ὅταν τελεωθῇ· ὥστε καὶ αὐξήσεως, εἴ ποτε γίνεται, αὐτὸ αὐτῷ αἴτιον καὶ ἀλλοιώσεως, εἰ δὲ μή, οὐκ ἀνάγκη.
And just as in the whole, so also in the animal this is the first movement, when it is perfected; so that also of increase, if it ever occurs, it is itself the cause of itself, and of alteration; but if not, it is not necessary.
αἱ δὲ πρῶται αὐξήσεις καὶ ἀλλοιώσεις ὑπʼ ἄλλου γίνονται καὶ δί ἑτέρων· γενέσεως δὲ καὶ φθορᾶς οὐδαμῶς οἷόν τε αὐτὸ αἴτιον εἶναι αὑτῷ οὐδέν.
But the first increases and alterations occur by another and through other things; and of generation and destruction, it is in no way possible for anything to be the cause of itself.
προϋπάρχειν γὰρ δεῖ τὸ κινοῦν τοῦ κινουμένου καὶ τὸ γεννῶν τοῦ γεννωμένου αὐτὸ δʼ αὐτοῦ πρότερον οὐδέν ἐστιν.
For that which moves must pre-exist that which is moved, and that which generates must pre-exist that which is generated, and nothing is prior to itself.
§6Περὶ μὲν οὖν ψυχῆς, εἴτε κινεῖται εἴτε μή, καὶ εἰ κινεῖται,6 πῶς κινεῖται, πρότερον εἴρηται ἐν τοῖς διωρισμένοις περὶ αὐτῆς.
Concerning the soul, then, whether it is moved or not, and if it is moved, 6 how it is moved, has been said before in the discussions defined concerning it.
ἐπεὶ δὲ τὰ ἄψυχα πάντα κινεῖται ὑφʼ ἑτέρου, περὶ δὲ τοῦ πρώτου κινουμένου καὶ ἀεὶ κινουμένου, τίνα τρόπον κινεῖται, καὶ πῶς κινεῖ τὸ πρῶτον κινοῦν, διώρισται πρότερον ἐν τοῖς περὶ τῆς πρώτης φιλοσοφίας, λοιπόν ἐστι θεωρῆσαι πῶς ἡ ψυχὴ κινεῖ τὸ σῶμα, καὶ τίς ἡ ἀρχὴ τῆς τοῦ ζῴου κινήσεως.
And since all inanimate things are moved by another, and concerning the first moved and ever-moved thing, in what manner it is moved, and how the first mover moves, has been defined before in the discussions concerning first philosophy, it remains to examine how the soul moves the body, and what is the principle of the movement of the animal.
τῶν γὰρ ἄλλων παρὰ τὴν τοῦ ὅλου κίνησιν τὰ ἔμψυχα αἴτια τῆς κινήσεως, ὅσα μὴ κινεῖται ὑπ᾿ ἀλλήλων διὰ τὸ προσκόπτειν ἀλλήλοις.
For of other things, besides the movement of the whole, those that have souls are the causes of movement, except as many as are moved by one another through colliding with one another.
διὸ καὶ πέρας ἔχουσιν αὐτῶν πᾶσαι αἱ κινήσεις· καὶ γὰρ καὶ αἱ τῶν ἐμψύχων.
Therefore also all their movements have a limit; for indeed those of things with souls do too.
πάντα γὰρ τὰ ζῷα καὶ κινεῖ καὶ κινεῖται ἕνεκά τινος, ὥστε τοῦτʼ ἔστιν αὐτοῖς πάσης τῆς κινήσεως πέρας, τὸ οὗ ἕνεκα.
For all animals both move and are moved for the sake of something, so that this is to them the limit of all movement, namely, that for the sake of which.
ὁρῶμεν δὲ τὰ κινοῦντα τὸ ζῷον διάνοιαν καὶ φαντασίαν καὶ προαίρεσιν καὶ βούλησιν καὶ ἐπιθυμίαν.
And we see that the things that move the animal are thought, imagination, choice, wish, and appetite.
ταῦτα δὲ πάντα ἀνάγεται εἰς νοῦν καὶ ὄρεξιν.
And all these are reduced to intellect and desire.
καὶ γὰρ ἡ φαντασία καὶ ἡ αἴσθησις τὴν αὐτὴν τῷ νῷ χώραν ἔχουσιν· κριτικὰ γὰρ πάντα, διαφέρουσι δὲ κατὰ τὰς εἰρημένας ἐν ἄλλοις διαφοράς.
For both imagination and perception hold the same place as intellect; for they are all critical, though they differ according to the differences mentioned in other works.
βούλησις δὲ καὶ θυμὸς καὶ ἐπιθυμία πάντα ὄρεξις, ἡ δὲ προαίρεσις κοινὸν διανοίας καὶ ὀρέξεως· ὥστε κινεῖ πρῶτον τὸ ὀρεκτὸν καὶ τὸ διανοητόν.
And wish, spiritedness, and appetite are all desire, while choice is common to thought and desire; so that what moves first is the object of desire and the object of thought.
οὐ πᾶν δὲ τὸ διανοητόν, ἀλλὰ τὸ τῶν πρακτῶν τέλος.
But not every object of thought, but the end of things practicable.
διὸ τὸ τοιοῦτόν ἐστι τῶν ἀγαθῶν τὸ κινοῦν, ἀλλʼ οὐ πᾶν τὸ καλόν· γὰρ ἕνεκα τούτου ἄλλο, καὶ τέλος ἐστὶ τῶν ἄλλου τινὸς ἕνεκα ὄντων, ταύτῃ κινεῖ.
Therefore, such of goods is that which moves, but not every noble thing; for in so far as another thing is for the sake of this, and it is the end of things that are for the sake of something else, in this way it moves.
δεῖ δὲ τιθέναι καὶ τὸ φαινόμενον ἀγαθὸν ἀγαθοῦ χώραν ἔχειν, καὶ τὸ ἡδύ· φαινόμενον γάρ ἐστιν ἀγαθόν.
And we must also posit that the apparent good holds the place of a good, and so does the pleasant; for the pleasant is an apparent good.
ὥστε δῆλον ὅτι ἔστι μὲν ὁμοίως κινεῖται τὸ ἀεὶ κινούμενον ὑπὸ τοῦ ἀεὶ κινοῦντος καὶ τῶν ζῴων ἕκαστον, ἔστι δʼ ἄλλως, διὸ καὶ τὰ μὲν ἀεὶ κινεῖται, ἡ δὲ τῶν ζῴων κίνησις ἔχει πέρας.
So it is clear that on the one hand the ever-moved thing is moved by the ever-moving thing and each of the animals is moved in a similar way, but on the other hand it is in a different way, which is why the former are ever moved, whereas the movement of animals has a limit.
τὸ δὲ ἀΐδιον καλόν, καὶ τὸ ἀληθῶς καὶ τὸ πρώτως ἀγαθὸν καὶ μὴ ποτὲ μὲν ποτὲ δὲ μή, θειότερον καὶ τιμιώτερον ἢ ὥστʼ εἶναι πρότερόν 〈τι〉.
But the eternal noble, and that which is truly and primarily good and not at one time so and at another not, is more divine and more honorable than that there should be anything prior to it.
τὸ μὲν οὖν πρῶτον οὐ κινούμενον κινεῖ, ἡ δʼ ὄρεξις καὶ τὸ ὀρεκτικὸν κινούμενον κινεῖ.
So the first mover moves without being moved, but desire and the desiring faculty move while being moved.
τὸ δὲ τελευταῖον τῶν κινουμένων οὐκ ἀνάγκη κινεῖν οὐδέν.
But the last of the moved things need not move anything.
φανερὸν δʼ ἐκ τούτων καὶ ὅτι εὐλόγως ἡ φορὰ τελευταία τῶν γινομένων ἐν τοῖς κινουμένοις· κινεῖται γὰρ καὶ πορεύεται τὸ ζῷον ὀρέξει ἢ προαιρέσει, ἀλλοιωθέντος τινὸς κατὰ τὴν αἴσθησιν ἢ τὴν φαντασίαν.
And it is clear from these things also that it is with good reason that locomotion is the last of the things that occur in those that are moved; for the animal moves and proceeds by desire or choice, when something has been altered according to perception or imagination.