§75ΣΩ. τί ποτε οὖν τοῦτο οὗ τοῦτο ὄνομά ἐστιν, τὸ σχῆμα;
SOC. What then is this thing of which 'shape' is the name?
πειρῶ λέγειν.
Try to say.
εἰ οὖν τῷ ἐρωτῶντι οὕτως ἢ περὶ σχήματος ἢ χρώματος εἶπες ὅτι
ἀλλʼ οὐδὲ μανθάνω ἔγωγε ὅτι βούλει, ὦ ἄνθρωπε, οὐδὲ οἶδα ὅτι λέγεις,
ἴσως ἂν ἐθαύμασε καὶ εἶπεν· οὐ μανθάνεις ὅτι ζητῶ τὸ ἐπὶ πᾶσιν τούτοις ταὐτόν; ἢ οὐδὲ ἐπὶ τούτοις, ὦ Μένων, ἔχοις ἂν εἰπεῖν, εἴ τίς σε ἐρωτῴη· τί ἐστιν ἐπὶ τῷ στρογγύλῳ καὶ εὐθεῖ καὶ ἐπὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις, ἃ δὴ σχήματα καλεῖς, ταὐτὸν ἐπὶ πᾶσιν; πειρῶ εἰπεῖν, ἵνα καὶ γένηταί σοι μελέτη πρὸς τὴν περὶ τῆς ἀρετῆς ἀπόκρισιν.
If, then, you said to the questioner, either about shape or color, 'But I don't even understand what you want, my good man, nor do I know what you are saying,' he would perhaps have wondered and said, 'Do you not understand that I am seeking that which is the same in all of these?' Or would you not even be able to say in these cases, Meno, if someone should ask you: 'What is that which is the same in all of them, in the round and the straight and the others which you call shapes?' Try to answer, so that you may also get practice for your answer about virtue.
ΜΕΝ. μή, ἀλλὰ σύ, ὦ Σώκρατες, εἰπέ.
MEN. No, but you, Socrates, tell me.
ΣΩ. βούλει σοι χαρίσωμαι;
SOC. Do you want me to gratify you?
ΜΕΝ. πάνυ γε.
MEN. By all means.
ΣΩ. ἐθελήσεις οὖν καὶ σὺ ἐμοὶ εἰπεῖν περὶ τῆς ἀρετῆς;
SOC. Will you then also be willing to tell me about virtue?
ΜΕΝ. ἔγωγε.
MEN. I will.
ΣΩ. προθυμητέον τοίνυν· ἄξιον γάρ.
SOC. We must then make an effort; for it is worth it.
ΜΕΝ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν.
MEN. Very much so.
ΣΩ. φέρε δή, πειρώμεθά σοι εἰπεῖν τί ἐστιν σχῆμα.
SOC. Come then, let us try to tell you what shape is.
σκόπει οὖν εἰ τόδε ἀποδέχῃ αὐτὸ εἶναι· ἔστω γὰρ δὴ ἡμῖν τοῦτο σχῆμα, ὃ μόνον τῶν ὄντων τυγχάνει χρώματι ἀεὶ ἑπόμενον.
Consider then if you accept this as being it: let shape be for us that which alone of existing things happens always to accompany color.
ἱκανῶς σοι, ἢ ἄλλως πως ζητεῖς;
Is this sufficient for you, or do you seek it in some other way?
ἐγὼ γὰρ κἂν οὕτως ἀγαπῴην εἴ μοι ἀρετὴν εἴποις.
For my part, I would be content if you would tell me about virtue even in this way.
ΜΕΝ. ἀλλὰ τοῦτό γε εὔηθες, ὦ Σώκρατες.
MEN. But this is simple-minded, Socrates.
ΣΩ. πῶς λέγεις;
SOC. How do you mean?
ΜΕΝ. ὅτι σχῆμά πού ἐστιν κατὰ τὸν σὸν λόγον ὃ ἀεὶ χρόᾳ ἕπεται.
MEN. That, according to your definition, shape is that which always accompanies color.
εἶεν· εἰ δὲ δὴ τὴν χρόαν τις μὴ φαίη εἰδέναι, ἀλλὰ ὡσαύτως ἀποροῖ ὥσπερ περὶ τοῦ σχήματος, τί ἂν οἴει σοι ἀποκεκρίσθαι;
Very well; but if someone should say he does not know color, but is in the same difficulty as about shape, what do you think would be your answer to him?
ΣΩ. τἀληθῆ ἔγωγε·
SOC. The truth, for my part.
καὶ εἰ μέν γε τῶν σοφῶν τις εἴη καὶ ἐριστικῶν τε καὶ ἀγωνιστικῶν ὁ ἐρόμενος, εἴποιμʼ ἂν αὐτῷ ὅτι
ἐμοὶ μὲν εἴρηται· εἰ δὲ μὴ ὀρθῶς λέγω, σὸν ἔργον λαμβάνειν λόγον καὶ ἐλέγχειν. εἰ δὲ ὥσπερ ἐγώ τε καὶ σὺ νυνὶ φίλοι ὄντες βούλοιντο ἀλλήλοις διαλέγεσθαι, δεῖ δὴ πρᾳότερόν πως καὶ διαλεκτικώτερον ἀποκρίνεσθαι.
And if the questioner were one of the wise and eristic and contentious men, I would say to him: 'What I have to say has been said; but if I am not speaking correctly, it is your business to take up the argument and refute it.' But if, just as you and I now being friends should want to converse with each other, one must answer in a somewhat gentler and more dialectical way.
ἔστι δὲ ἴσως τὸ διαλεκτικώτερον μὴ μόνον τἀληθῆ ἀποκρίνεσθαι, ἀλλὰ καὶ διʼ ἐκείνων ὧν ἂν προσομολογῇ εἰδέναι ὁ ἐρωτώμενος.
And the more dialectical way is perhaps not only to answer what is true, but also to do so through those things which the person questioned confesses that he knows.
πειράσομαι δὴ καὶ ἐγώ σοι οὕτως εἰπεῖν.
I will try to speak to you in this way.
λέγε γάρ μοι· τελευτὴν καλεῖς τι;
For tell me: do you call something 'end'?
τοιόνδε λέγω οἷον πέρας καὶ ἔσχατον—πάντα ταῦτα ταὐτόν τι λέγω· ἴσως δʼ ἂν ἡμῖν Πρόδικος διαφέροιτο, ἀλλὰ σύ γέ που καλεῖς πεπεράνθαι τι καὶ τετελευτηκέναι—τὸ τοιοῦτον βούλομαι λέγειν, οὐδὲν ποικίλον.
I mean something like 'limit' or 'boundary'—I mean the same thing by all of these; perhaps Prodicus would disagree with us, but you surely call something 'to have been limited' and 'to have been ended'—that is the sort of thing I want to say, nothing complicated.
ΜΕΝ. ἀλλὰ καλῶ, καὶ οἶμαι μανθάνειν ὃ λέγεις.
MEN. Yes, I call it so, and I think I understand what you mean.
§76ΣΩ. τί δʼ;
SOC. What about this?
ἐπίπεδον καλεῖς τι, καὶ ἕτερον αὖ στερεόν, οἷον ταῦτα τὰ ἐν ταῖς γεωμετρίαις;
Do you call something 'surface', and again another thing 'solid', such as those in geometry?
ΜΕΝ. ἔγωγε καλῶ.
MEN. Yes, I do.
ΣΩ. ἤδη τοίνυν ἂν μάθοις μου ἐκ τούτων σχῆμα ὃ λέγω.
SOC. Now, then, from these you might understand what I mean by shape.
κατὰ γὰρ παντὸς σχήματος τοῦτο λέγω, εἰς ὃ τὸ στερεὸν περαίνει, τοῦτʼ εἶναι σχῆμα· ὅπερ ἂν συλλαβὼν εἴποιμι στερεοῦ πέρας σχῆμα εἶναι.
For in the case of every shape, I say this: that into which the solid limits, this is shape; which very thing I might say, putting it in a nutshell, is the limit of a solid.
ΜΕΝ. τὸ δὲ χρῶμα τί λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες;
MEN. And what do you say color is, Socrates?
ΣΩ. ὑβριστής γʼ εἶ, ὦ Μένων· ἀνδρὶ πρεσβύτῃ πράγματα προστάττεις ἀποκρίνεσθαι, αὐτὸς δὲ οὐκ ἐθέλεις ἀναμνησθεὶς εἰπεῖν ὅτι ποτε λέγει Γοργίας ἀρετὴν εἶναι.
SOC. You are quite outrageous, Meno; you command an old man to answer your questions, but you yourself are unwilling to remember and tell me what on earth Gorgias says virtue is.
ΜΕΝ. ἀλλʼ ἐπειδάν μοι σὺ τοῦτʼ εἴπῃς, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐρῶ σοι.
MEN. But when you have told me this, Socrates, I will tell you.
ΣΩ. κἂν κατακεκαλυμμένος τις γνοίη, ὦ Μένων, διαλεγομένου σου, ὅτι καλὸς εἶ καὶ ἐρασταί σοι ἔτι εἰσίν.
SOC. Even if someone were blindfolded, Meno, he would know from your conversation that you are handsome and still have lovers.
ΜΕΝ. τί δή;
MEN. Why so?
ΣΩ. ὅτι οὐδὲν ἀλλʼ ἢ ἐπιτάττεις ἐν τοῖς λόγοις, ὅπερ ποιοῦσιν οἱ τρυφῶντες, ἅτε τυραννεύοντες ἕως ἂν ἐν ὥρᾳ ὦσιν, καὶ ἅμα ἐμοῦ ἴσως κατέγνωκας ὅτι εἰμὶ ἥττων τῶν καλῶν·
SOC. Because you do nothing but command in discussions, which is what spoiled beauties do, acting like tyrants as long as they are in their bloom; and at the same time you have perhaps detected that I am helpless against the beautiful.
χαριοῦμαι οὖν σοι καὶ ἀποκρινοῦμαι.
I will therefore gratify you and answer.
ΜΕΝ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν χάρισαι.
MEN. By all means, do so.
ΣΩ. βούλει οὖν σοι κατὰ Γοργίαν ἀποκρίνωμαι, ᾗ ἂν σὺ μάλιστα ἀκολουθήσαις;
SOC. Do you want me, then, to answer you in the manner of Gorgias, which you would most easily follow?
ΜΕΝ. βούλομαι· πῶς γὰρ οὔ;
MEN. I do; of course.
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν λέγετε ἀπορροάς τινας τῶν ὄντων κατὰ Ἐμπεδοκλέα;
SOC. Do you not say, then, according to Empedocles, that there are certain effluences of things?
ΜΕΝ. σφόδρα γε.
MEN. Very much so.
ΣΩ. καὶ πόρους εἰς οὓς καὶ διʼ ὧν αἱ ἀπορροαὶ πορεύονται;
SOC. And pores into which and through which the effluences travel?
ΜΕΝ. πάνυ γε.
MEN. Certainly.
ΣΩ. καὶ τῶν ἀπορροῶν τὰς μὲν ἁρμόττειν ἐνίοις τῶν πόρων, τὰς δὲ ἐλάττους ἢ μείζους εἶναι;
SOC. And of the effluences, some fit into some of the pores, while others are too small or too large?
ΜΕΝ. ἔστι ταῦτα.
MEN. That is so.
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν καὶ ὄψιν καλεῖς τι;
SOC. And do you also call something 'sight'?
ΜΕΝ. ἔγωγε.
MEN. Yes, I do.
ΣΩ. ἐκ τούτων δὴ
σύνες ὅ τοι λέγω,
ἔφη Πίνδαρος.
SOC. From these, then, 'comprehend what I tell you,' as Pindar said.
ἔστιν γὰρ χρόα ἀπορροὴ σχημάτων ὄψει σύμμετρος καὶ αἰσθητός.
For color is an effluence of shapes, commensurate with sight and perceptible.
ΜΕΝ. ἄριστά μοι δοκεῖς, ὦ Σώκρατες, ταύτην τὴν ἀπόκρισιν εἰρηκέναι.
MEN. You seem to me, Socrates, to have given this answer excellently.
ΣΩ. ἴσως γάρ σοι κατὰ συνήθειαν εἴρηται·
SOC.
καὶ ἅμα οἶμαι ἐννοεῖς ὅτι ἔχοις ἂν ἐξ αὐτῆς εἰπεῖν καὶ φωνὴν ὃ ἔστι, καὶ ὀσμὴν καὶ ἄλλα πολλὰ τῶν τοιούτων.
For perhaps it was spoken in a way familiar to you; and at the same time, I think you realize that you would be able to say from it also what sound is, and smell, and many other such things.
ΜΕΝ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν.
MEN. Quite so.
ΣΩ. τραγικὴ γάρ ἐστιν, ὦ Μένων, ἡ ἀπόκρισις, ὥστε ἀρέσκει σοι μᾶλλον ἢ ἡ περὶ τοῦ σχήματος.
SOC. For the answer is high-sounding, Meno, so it pleases you more than the one about shape.
ΜΕΝ. ἔμοιγε.
MEN. Yes, to me.
ΣΩ. ἀλλʼ οὐκ ἔστιν, ὦ παῖ Ἀλεξιδήμου, ὡς ἐγὼ ἐμαυτὸν πείθω, ἀλλʼ ἐκείνη βελτίων·
SOC.
οἶμαι δὲ οὐδʼ ἂν σοὶ δόξαι, εἰ μή, ὥσπερ χθὲς ἔλεγες, ἀναγκαῖόν σοι ἀπιέναι πρὸ τῶν μυστηρίων, ἀλλʼ εἰ περιμείναις τε καὶ μυηθείης.
But it is not so, O son of Alexidemus, as I convince myself, but that other one is better; and I think it would not even seem so to you, if you were not compelled to leave before the mysteries, as you were saying yesterday, but if you would stay and be initiated.