§77ΜΕΝ. ἀλλὰ περιμένοιμʼ ἄν, ὦ Σώκρατες, εἴ μοι πολλὰ τοιαῦτα λέγοις.
MEN. But I would stay, Socrates, if you would tell me many such things.
ΣΩ. ἀλλὰ μὴν προθυμίας γε οὐδὲν ἀπολείψω, καὶ σοῦ ἕνεκα καὶ ἐμαυτοῦ, λέγων τοιαῦτα· ἀλλʼ ὅπως μὴ οὐχ οἷός τʼ ἔσομαι πολλὰ τοιαῦτα λέγειν.
SOC. Well, I will certainly not lack any eagerness, both for your sake and my own, to say such things; but I fear that I may not be able to say many such things.
ἀλλʼ ἴθι δὴ πειρῶ καὶ σὺ ἐμοὶ τὴν ὑπόσχεσιν ἀποδοῦναι, κατὰ ὅλου εἰπὼν ἀρετῆς πέρι ὅτι ἐστίν, καὶ παῦσαι πολλὰ ποιῶν ἐκ τοῦ ἑνός, ὅπερ φασὶ τοὺς συντρίβοντάς τι ἑκάστοτε οἱ σκώπτοντες, ἀλλὰ ἐάσας ὅλην καὶ ὑγιῆ εἰπὲ τί ἐστιν ἀρετή.
Come now, you too try to fulfill your promise to me, by telling me about virtue as a whole what it is, and stop making many out of one, as the jokers say of those who break something each time, but leave it whole and sound and tell me what virtue is.
τὰ δέ γε παραδείγματα παρʼ ἐμοῦ εἴληφας.
You have received the patterns from me.
ΜΕΝ. δοκεῖ τοίνυν μοι, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀρετὴ εἶναι, καθάπερ ὁ ποιητὴς λέγει,
χαίρειν τε καλοῖσι καὶ δύνασθαι· καὶ ἐγὼ τοῦτο λέγω ἀρετήν, ἐπιθυμοῦντα τῶν καλῶν δυνατὸν εἶναι πορίζεσθαι.
MEN. It seems to me then, Socrates, that virtue is, as the poet says, "to rejoice in beautiful things and to have power"; and I say this is virtue: to desire beautiful things and be able to acquire them.
ΣΩ. ἆρα λέγεις τὸν τῶν καλῶν ἐπιθυμοῦντα ἀγαθῶν ἐπιθυμητὴν εἶναι;
SOC. Do you say that he who desires beautiful things is a desirer of good things?
ΜΕΝ. μάλιστά γε.
MEN. Most certainly.
ΣΩ. ἆρα ὡς ὄντων τινῶν οἳ τῶν κακῶν ἐπιθυμοῦσιν, ἑτέρων δὲ οἳ τῶν ἀγαθῶν;
SOC. Is it because you think there are some who desire bad things, and others who desire good things?
οὐ πάντες, ὤριστε, δοκοῦσί σοι τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἐπιθυμεῖν;
Do not all men, my good sir, seem to you to desire good things?
ΜΕΝ. οὐκ ἔμοιγε.
MEN. Not to me.
ΣΩ. ἀλλά τινες τῶν κακῶν;
SOC. But some desire bad things?
ΜΕΝ. ναί.
MEN. Yes.
ΣΩ. οἰόμενοι τὰ κακὰ ἀγαθὰ εἶναι, λέγεις, ἢ καὶ γιγνώσκοντες ὅτι κακά ἐστιν ὅμως ἐπιθυμοῦσιν αὐτῶν;
SOC. Thinking that the bad things are good, do you mean, or also knowing that they are bad and nevertheless desiring them?
ΜΕΝ. ἀμφότερα ἔμοιγε δοκοῦσιν.
MEN. Both seem to me to be the case.
ΣΩ. ἦ γὰρ δοκεῖ τίς σοι, ὦ Μένων, γιγνώσκων τὰ κακὰ ὅτι κακά ἐστιν ὅμως ἐπιθυμεῖν αὐτῶν;
SOC. Do you really think, Meno, that anyone, knowing that bad things are bad, nevertheless desires them?
ΜΕΝ. μάλιστα.
MEN. Most certainly.
ΣΩ. τί ἐπιθυμεῖν λέγεις;
SOC. What do you mean by desiring?
ἦ γενέσθαι αὐτῷ;
Is it that they should become his own?
ΜΕΝ. γενέσθαι· τί γὰρ ἄλλο;
MEN. That they should become his own; what else?
ΣΩ. πότερον ἡγούμενος τὰ κακὰ ὠφελεῖν ἐκεῖνον ᾧ ἂν γένηται, ἢ γιγνώσκων τὰ κακὰ ὅτι βλάπτει ᾧ ἂν παρῇ;
SOC. Do you think he believes that bad things benefit him to whom they come, or knowing that bad things harm him in whom they are present?
ΜΕΝ. εἰσὶ μὲν οἳ ἡγούμενοι τὰ κακὰ ὠφελεῖν, εἰσὶν δὲ καὶ οἳ γιγνώσκοντες ὅτι βλάπτει.
MEN. There are some who believe that bad things benefit, and there are also others who know that they harm.
ΣΩ. ἦ καὶ δοκοῦσί σοι γιγνώσκειν τὰ κακὰ ὅτι κακά ἐστιν οἱ ἡγούμενοι τὰ κακὰ ὠφελεῖν;
SOC. And do those who believe that bad things benefit really seem to you to know that bad things are bad?
ΜΕΝ. οὐ πάνυ μοι δοκεῖ τοῦτό γε.
MEN. That does not seem to me to be the case at all.
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν δῆλον ὅτι οὗτοι μὲν οὐ τῶν κακῶν ἐπιθυμοῦσιν, οἱ ἀγνοοῦντες αὐτά, ἀλλὰ ἐκείνων ἃ ᾤοντο ἀγαθὰ εἶναι, ἔστιν δὲ ταῦτά γε κακά· ὥστε οἱ ἀγνοοῦντες αὐτὰ καὶ οἰόμενοι ἀγαθὰ εἶναι δῆλον ὅτι τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἐπιθυμοῦσιν.
SOC. Then it is clear that these people do not desire bad things, those who are ignorant of them, but rather those things which they thought were good, but which are in fact bad; so that those who are ignorant of them and think they are good clearly desire good things.
ἢ οὔ;
Or not?
ΜΕΝ. κινδυνεύουσιν οὗτοί γε.
MEN. They likely do.
ΣΩ. τί δέ;
SOC.
οἱ τῶν κακῶν μὲν ἐπιθυμοῦντες, ὡς φῂς σύ, ἡγούμενοι δὲ τὰ κακὰ βλάπτειν ἐκεῖνον ᾧ ἂν γίγνηται, γιγνώσκουσιν δήπου ὅτι βλαβήσονται ὑπʼ αὐτῶν;
What about those who desire bad things, as you say, but believe that bad things harm him to whom they come; they surely know that they will be harmed by them?
§78ΜΕΝ. ἀνάγκη.
MEN. Necessarily.
ΣΩ. ἀλλὰ τοὺς βλαπτομένους οὗτοι οὐκ οἴονται ἀθλίους εἶναι καθʼ ὅσον βλάπτονται;
SOC. But do they not think that those who are harmed are wretched to the extent that they are harmed?
ΜΕΝ. καὶ τοῦτο ἀνάγκη.
MEN. This too is necessary.
ΣΩ. τοὺς δὲ ἀθλίους οὐ κακοδαίμονας;
SOC. And those who are wretched are unhappy?
ΜΕΝ. οἶμαι ἔγωγε.
MEN. I think so.
ΣΩ. ἔστιν οὖν ὅστις βούλεται ἄθλιος καὶ κακοδαίμων εἶναι;
SOC. Is there then anyone who wants to be wretched and unhappy?
ΜΕΝ. οὔ μοι δοκεῖ, ὦ Σώκρατες.
MEN. It does not seem so to me, Socrates.
ΣΩ. οὐκ ἄρα βούλεται, ὦ Μένων, τὰ κακὰ οὐδείς, εἴπερ μὴ βούλεται τοιοῦτος εἶναι.
SOC. Then no one, Meno, wants bad things, if indeed he does not want to be such.
τί γὰρ ἄλλο ἐστὶν ἄθλιον εἶναι ἢ ἐπιθυμεῖν τε τῶν κακῶν καὶ κτᾶσθαι;
For what else is being wretched than to desire bad things and to acquire them?
ΜΕΝ. κινδυνεύεις ἀληθῆ λέγειν, ὦ Σώκρατες· καὶ οὐδεὶς βούλεσθαι τὰ κακά.
MEN. You are likely speaking the truth, Socrates; and indeed no one wants bad things.
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν νυνδὴ ἔλεγες ὅτι ἔστιν ἡ ἀρετὴ βούλεσθαί τε τἀγαθὰ καὶ δύνασθαι;
SOC. Did you not say just now that virtue is to want good things and to have power?
ΜΕΝ. εἶπον γάρ.
MEN. Yes, I did.
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν τοῦ λεχθέντος τὸ μὲν βούλεσθαι πᾶσιν ὑπάρχει, καὶ ταύτῃ γε οὐδὲν ὁ ἕτερος τοῦ ἑτέρου βελτίων;
SOC. Then of what has been said, wanting belongs to all, and in this respect one is no better than another?
ΜΕΝ. φαίνεται.
MEN. So it appears.
ΣΩ. ἀλλὰ δῆλον ὅτι εἴπερ ἐστὶ βελτίων ἄλλος ἄλλου, κατὰ τὸ δύνασθαι ἂν εἴη ἀμείνων.
SOC. But it is clear that if one is better than another, it would be by being superior in respect of power.
ΜΕΝ. πάνυ γε.
MEN. Quite so.
ΣΩ. τοῦτʼ ἔστιν ἄρα, ὡς ἔοικε, κατὰ τὸν σὸν λόγον ἀρετή, δύναμις τοῦ πορίζεσθαι τἀγαθά.
SOC. This then is, as it seems, virtue according to your definition, the power of acquiring good things.
ΜΕΝ. παντάπασί μοι δοκεῖ, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὕτως ἔχειν ὡς σὺ νῦν ὑπολαμβάνεις.
MEN. It seems to me, Socrates, to be absolutely as you now understand it.
ΣΩ. ἴδωμεν δὴ καὶ τοῦτο εἰ ἀληθὲς λέγεις· ἴσως γὰρ ἂν εὖ λέγοις.
SOC. Let us see also whether this that you say is true; for perhaps you might be speaking well.
τἀγαθὰ φῂς οἷόν τʼ εἶναι πορίζεσθαι ἀρετὴν εἶναι;
You say that to be able to acquire good things is virtue?
ΜΕΝ. ἔγωγε.
MEN. Yes, I do.
ΣΩ. ἀγαθὰ δὲ καλεῖς οὐχὶ οἷον ὑγίειάν τε καὶ πλοῦτον;
SOC. And do you not call good things such as health and wealth?
ΜΕΝ. καὶ χρυσίον λέγω καὶ ἀργύριον κτᾶσθαι καὶ τιμὰς ἐν πόλει καὶ ἀρχάς.
MEN. I mean also to acquire gold and silver, and honors in the city, and offices.
ΣΩ. μὴ ἄλλʼ ἄττα λέγεις τἀγαθὰ ἢ τὰ τοιαῦτα;
SOC. Do you call anything else good than such things?
ΜΕΝ. οὔκ, ἀλλὰ πάντα λέγω τὰ τοιαῦτα.
MEN. No, but I mean all such things.
ΣΩ. εἶεν·
SOC.
χρυσίον δὲ δὴ καὶ ἀργύριον πορίζεσθαι ἀρετή ἐστιν, ὥς φησι Μένων ὁ τοῦ μεγάλου βασιλέως πατρικὸς ξένος.
Very well; to acquire gold and silver is virtue, as Meno says, the hereditary guest-friend of the Great King.
πότερον προστιθεῖς τούτῳ τῷ πόρῳ, ὦ Μένων, τὸ δικαίως καὶ ὁσίως, ἢ οὐδέν σοι διαφέρει, ἀλλὰ κἂν ἀδίκως τις αὐτὰ πορίζηται, ὁμοίως σὺ αὐτὰ ἀρετὴν καλεῖς;
Do you add to this acquiring, Meno, "justly and piously", or does it make no difference to you, and even if someone acquires them unjustly, do you equally call them virtue?
ΜΕΝ. οὐ δήπου, ὦ Σώκρατες.
MEN. Certainly not, Socrates.
ΣΩ. ἀλλὰ κακίαν.
SOC. But vice?
ΜΕΝ. πάντως δήπου.
MEN. Most certainly.
ΣΩ. δεῖ ἄρα, ὡς ἔοικε, τούτῳ τῷ πόρῳ δικαιοσύνην ἢ σωφροσύνην ἢ ὁσιότητα προσεῖναι, ἢ ἄλλο τι μόριον ἀρετῆς· εἰ δὲ μή, οὐκ ἔσται ἀρετή, καίπερ ἐκπορίζουσα τἀγαθά.
SOC. It must then, as it seems, be accompanied by justice or temperance or piety, or some other part of virtue; otherwise, it will not be virtue, even though it acquires good things.
ΜΕΝ. πῶς γὰρ ἄνευ τούτων ἀρετὴ γένοιτʼ ἄν;
MEN. For how could it become virtue without these?
ΣΩ. τὸ δὲ μὴ ἐκπορίζειν χρυσίον καὶ ἀργύριον, ὅταν μὴ δίκαιον ᾖ, μήτε αὑτῷ μήτε ἄλλῳ, οὐκ ἀρετὴ καὶ αὕτη ἐστὶν ἡ ἀπορία;
SOC. And not to acquire gold and silver, when it is not just, neither for oneself nor for another, is not this non-acquiring also virtue?
ΜΕΝ. φαίνεται.
MEN. So it appears.