§501ΣΩ. ἴθι δή, ἃ καὶ πρὸς τούσδε ἐγὼ ἔλεγον, διομολόγησαί μοι, εἰ ἄρα σοι ἔδοξα τότε ἀληθῆ λέγειν.
SOCRATES: Come then, agree with me on what I was also saying to these men, to see if I seemed to you then to speak the truth.
ἔλεγον δέ που ὅτι ἡ μὲν ὀψοποιικὴ οὔ μοι δοκεῖ τέχνη εἶναι ἀλλʼ ἐμπειρία, ἡ δʼ ἰατρική, λέγων ὅτι ἡ μὲν τούτου οὗ θεραπεύει καὶ τὴν φύσιν ἔσκεπται καὶ τὴν αἰτίαν ὧν πράττει, καὶ λόγον ἔχει τούτων ἑκάστου δοῦναι, ἡ ἰατρική·
For I was saying, I believe, that cookery does not seem to me to be a craft but a knack, whereas medicine is a craft.
ἡ δʼ ἑτέρα τῆς ἡδονῆς, πρὸς ἣν ἡ θεραπεία αὐτῇ ἐστιν ἅπασα, κομιδῇ ἀτέχνως ἐπʼ αὐτὴν ἔρχεται, οὔτε τι τὴν φύσιν σκεψαμένη τῆς ἡδονῆς οὔτε τὴν αἰτίαν, ἀλόγως τε παντάπασιν ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν οὐδὲν διαριθμησαμένη, τριβῇ καὶ ἐμπειρίᾳ μνήμην μόνον σῳζομένη τοῦ εἰωθότος γίγνεσθαι, ᾧ δὴ καὶ πορίζεται τὰς ἡδονάς.
I said this because the one—medicine—has investigated both the nature of that which it treats and the cause of what it does, and has an account to give of each of these; whereas the other, which is concerned with pleasure, toward which its entire treatment is directed, goes after it in a completely uncraftlike way, having investigated neither the nature of pleasure nor its cause, and in an utterly irrational way, so to speak, making no distinctions at all, preserving by routine and knack only the memory of what is accustomed to happen, by which indeed it also provides pleasures.
ταῦτʼ οὖν πρῶτον σκόπει εἰ δοκεῖ σοι ἱκανῶς λέγεσθαι, καὶ εἶναί τινες καὶ περὶ ψυχὴν τοιαῦται ἄλλαι πραγματεῖαι, αἱ μὲν τεχνικαί, προμήθειάν τινα ἔχουσαι τοῦ βελτίστου περὶ τὴν ψυχήν, αἱ δὲ τούτου μὲν ὀλιγωροῦσαι, ἐσκεμμέναι δʼ αὖ, ὥσπερ ἐκεῖ, τὴν ἡδονὴν μόνον τῆς ψυχῆς, τίνα ἂν αὐτῇ τρόπον γίγνοιτο, ἥτις δὲ ἢ βελτίων ἢ χείρων τῶν ἡδονῶν, οὔτε σκοπούμεναι οὔτε μέλον αὐταῖς ἄλλο ἢ χαρίζεσθαι μόνον, εἴτε βέλτιον εἴτε χεῖρον.
Consider then, first, whether this seems to you to be satisfactorily said, and whether there are also certain other such pursuits concerning the soul, some being craftlike, having a certain foresight for what is best for the soul, and others disregarding this, but having investigated, just as in the other case, only the pleasure of the soul, in what way it might come to it, but neither investigating which of the pleasures is better or worse, nor caring for anything other than to gratify it alone, whether for better or for worse.
ἐμοὶ μὲν γάρ, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, δοκοῦσίν τε εἶναι, καὶ ἔγωγέ φημι τὸ τοιοῦτον κολακείαν εἶναι καὶ περὶ σῶμα καὶ περὶ ψυχὴν καὶ περὶ ἄλλο ὅτου ἄν τις τὴν ἡδονὴν θεραπεύῃ, ἀσκέπτως ἔχων τοῦ ἀμείνονός τε καὶ τοῦ χείρονος·
For to me, Callicles, they seem to exist, and I say that such a thing is flattery, both concerning the body and concerning the soul and concerning anything else whose pleasure one might treat, being regardless of the better and the worse.
σὺ δὲ δὴ πότερον συγκατατίθεσαι ἡμῖν περὶ τούτων τὴν αὐτὴν δόξαν ἢ ἀντίφῃς;
Do you, then, agree with us in having the same opinion about these things, or do you speak against it?
ΚΑΛ. οὐκ ἔγωγε, ἀλλὰ συγχωρῶ, ἵνα σοι καὶ περανθῇ ὁ λόγος καὶ Γοργίᾳ τῷδε χαρίσωμαι.
CALLICLES: I do not speak against it, but I concede, so that your argument may be completed and that I may gratify Gorgias here.
ΣΩ. πότερον δὲ περὶ μὲν μίαν ψυχὴν ἔστιν τοῦτο, περὶ δὲ δύο καὶ πολλὰς οὐκ ἔστιν;
SOCRATES: And is this the case concerning one soul, but not concerning two and many?
ΚΑΛ. οὔκ, ἀλλὰ καὶ περὶ δύο καὶ περὶ πολλάς.
CALLICLES: No, but also concerning two and many.
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν καὶ ἁθρόαις ἅμα χαρίζεσθαι ἔστι, μηδὲν σκοπούμενον τὸ βέλτιστον;
SOCRATES: Is it not then also possible to gratify them all at once in a crowd, without looking at all to what is best?
ΚΑΛ. οἶμαι ἔγωγε.
CALLICLES: I think so.
ΣΩ. ἔχεις οὖν εἰπεῖν αἵτινές εἰσιν αἱ ἐπιτηδεύσεις αἱ τοῦτο ποιοῦσαι;
SOCRATES: Can you then tell me what those practices are that do this?
μᾶλλον δέ, εἰ βούλει, ἐμοῦ ἐρωτῶντος, ἣ μὲν ἄν σοι δοκῇ τούτων εἶναι, φάθι, ἣ δʼ ἂν μή, μὴ φάθι.
Or rather, if you prefer, as I ask, if any of these seems to you to be such, say so, and if not, say not.
πρῶτον δὲ σκεψώμεθα τὴν αὐλητικήν.
First, let us consider flute-playing.
οὐ δοκεῖ σοι τοιαύτη τις εἶναι, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, τὴν ἡδονὴν ἡμῶν μόνον διώκειν, ἄλλο δʼ οὐδὲν φροντίζειν;
Does it not seem to you, Callicles, to be of such a kind, pursuing only our pleasure, and caring for nothing else?
ΚΑΛ. ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ.
CALLICLES: It seems so to me.
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν καὶ αἱ τοιαίδε ἅπασαι, οἷον ἡ κιθαριστικὴ ἡ ἐν τοῖς ἀγῶσιν;
SOCRATES: And also all such activities, like cithara-playing in the contests?
ΚΑΛ. ναί.
CALLICLES: Yes.