§500ΣΩ. ἕνεκα γάρ που τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἅπαντα ἡμῖν ἔδοξεν πρακτέον εἶναι, εἰ μνημονεύεις, ἐμοί τε καὶ Πώλῳ.
SOCRATES: For it was for the sake of good things, I think, that we—both Polus and I—agreed that all things should be done, if you remember.
ἆρα καὶ σοὶ συνδοκεῖ οὕτω, τέλος εἶναι ἁπασῶν τῶν πράξεων τὸ ἀγαθόν, καὶ ἐκείνου ἕνεκα δεῖν πάντα τἆλλα πράττεσθαι ἀλλʼ οὐκ ἐκεῖνο τῶν ἄλλων;
Does it seem so to you as well? Namely, that the good is the end of all actions, and that for the sake of that, all other things must be done, but not that for the sake of the others?
σύμψηφος ἡμῖν εἶ καὶ σὺ ἐκ τρίτων;
Are you also of the same vote with us, as the third?
ΚΑΛ. ἔγωγε.
CALLICLES: I am.
ΣΩ. τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἄρα ἕνεκα δεῖ καὶ τἆλλα καὶ τὰ ἡδέα πράττειν, ἀλλʼ οὐ τἀγαθὰ τῶν ἡδέων.
SOCRATES: It is for the sake of good things, then, that we must do other things, including pleasant things, and not good things for the sake of pleasant things.
ΚΑΛ. πάνυ γε.
CALLICLES: Most certainly.
ΣΩ. ἆρʼ οὖν παντὸς ἀνδρός ἐστιν ἐκλέξασθαι ποῖα ἀγαθὰ τῶν ἡδέων ἐστὶν καὶ ὁποῖα κακά, ἢ τεχνικοῦ δεῖ εἰς ἕκαστον;
SOCRATES: Is it, then, the part of any and every man to select which of the pleasant things are good and which are bad, or is a craftsman needed for each case?
ΚΑΛ. τεχνικοῦ.
CALLICLES: A craftsman.
ΣΩ. ἀναμνησθῶμεν δὴ ὧν αὖ ἐγὼ πρὸς Πῶλον καὶ Γοργίαν ἐτύγχανον λέγων.
SOCRATES: Let us, then, recall what I happened to be saying in turn to Polus and Gorgias.
ἔλεγον γὰρ αὖ, εἰ μνημονεύεις, ὅτι εἶεν παρασκευαὶ αἱ μὲν μέχρι ἡδονῆς, αὐτὸ τοῦτο μόνον παρασκευάζουσαι, ἀγνοοῦσαι δὲ τὸ βέλτιον καὶ τὸ χεῖρον, αἱ δὲ γιγνώσκουσαι ὅτι τε ἀγαθὸν καὶ ὅτι κακόν·
For I was saying, if you remember, that there are some preparations that extend only to pleasure, procuring this very thing alone, while being ignorant of the better and the worse, and others that know what is good and what is bad.
καὶ ἐτίθην τῶν μὲν περὶ τὰς ἡδονὰς τὴν μαγειρικὴν ἐμπειρίαν ἀλλὰ οὐ τέχνην, τῶν δὲ περὶ τὸ ἀγαθὸν τὴν ἰατρικὴν τέχνην.
And I placed among those concerning pleasures cookery as a mere knack but not a craft, and among those concerning the good, medicine as a craft.
καὶ πρὸς Φιλίου, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, μήτε αὐτὸς οἴου δεῖν πρὸς ἐμὲ παίζειν μηδʼ ὅτι ἂν τύχῃς παρὰ τὰ δοκοῦντα ἀποκρίνου, μήτʼ αὖ τὰ παρʼ ἐμοῦ οὕτως ἀποδέχου ὡς παίζοντος·
And by the god of friendship, Callicles, neither think that you yourself ought to jest with me, nor answer whatever comes into your head contrary to your real opinions, nor, on the other hand, accept what comes from me as if I were jesting.
ὁρᾷς γὰρ ὅτι περὶ τούτου ἡμῖν εἰσιν οἱ λόγοι, οὗ τί ἂν μᾶλλον σπουδάσειέ τις καὶ σμικρὸν νοῦν ἔχων ἄνθρωπος, ἢ τοῦτο, ὅντινα χρὴ τρόπον ζῆν, πότερον ἐπὶ ὃν σὺ παρακαλεῖς ἐμέ, τὰ τοῦ ἀνδρὸς δὴ ταῦτα πράττοντα, λέγοντά τε ἐν τῷ δήμῳ καὶ ῥητορικὴν ἀσκοῦντα καὶ πολιτευόμενον τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον ὃν ὑμεῖς νῦν πολιτεύεσθε, ἢ τόνδε τὸν βίον τὸν ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ, καὶ τί ποτʼ ἐστὶν οὗτος ἐκείνου διαφέρων.
For you see that our discussion is about this, than which what could a man, even one having but little sense, be more serious about than this: in what way one ought to live? Whether to that way of life to which you exhort me, doing these deeds of a "man," speaking in the assembly, practicing rhetoric, and engaging in politics in this manner in which you now engage in it, or to this life in philosophy, and in what way this one differs from that.
ἴσως οὖν βέλτιστόν ἐστιν, ὡς ἄρτι ἐγὼ ἐπεχείρησα, διαιρεῖσθαι, διελομένους δὲ καὶ ὁμολογήσαντας ἀλλήλοις, εἰ ἔστιν τούτω διττὼ τὼ βίω, σκέψασθαι τί τε διαφέρετον ἀλλήλοιν καὶ ὁπότερον βιωτέον αὐτοῖν.
Perhaps, then, it is best, as I just now attempted, to make a division, and after dividing and agreeing with each other, if indeed these are two distinct lives, to examine in what way they differ from each other and which of the two must be lived.
ἴσως οὖν οὔπω οἶσθα τί λέγω.
Perhaps, then, you do not yet know what I mean.
ΚΑΛ. οὐ δῆτα.
CALLICLES: No indeed.
ΣΩ. ἀλλʼ ἐγώ σοι σαφέστερον ἐρῶ.
SOCRATES: But I will tell you more clearly.
ἐπειδὴ ὡμολογήκαμεν ἐγώ τε καὶ σὺ εἶναι μέν τι ἀγαθόν, εἶναι δέ τι ἡδύ, ἕτερον δὲ τὸ ἡδὺ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ, ἑκατέρου δὲ αὐτοῖν μελέτην τινὰ εἶναι καὶ παρασκευὴν τῆς κτήσεως, τὴν μὲν τοῦ ἡδέος θήραν, τὴν δὲ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ—αὐτὸ δέ μοι τοῦτο πρῶτον ἢ σύμφαθι ἢ μή.
Since you and I have agreed that there is something good, and there is something pleasant, and that the pleasant is different from the good, and that there is a certain care and preparation for acquiring each of them, the one being the hunt for the pleasant, and the other for the good—but first, either agree with me on this very point or deny it.
σύμφῃς;
Do you agree?
ΚΑΛ. οὕτως φημί.
CALLICLES: I say so.