§499ΣΩ. συλλόγισαι δὴ κοινῇ μετʼ ἐμοῦ τί ἡμῖν συμβαίνει ἐκ τῶν ὡμολογημένων· καὶ δὶς γάρ τοι καὶ τρίς φασιν καλὸν εἶναι τὰ καλὰ λέγειν τε καὶ ἐπισκοπεῖσθαι.
SOCRATES: Come then, reckon up in common with me what follows for us from our admissions; for they say it is a fine thing to say and examine fine things twice and even thrice.
ἀγαθὸν μὲν εἶναι τὸν φρόνιμον καὶ ἀνδρεῖόν φαμεν.
We say that the wise and courageous man is good.
ἦ γάρ;
Is that not so?
ΚΑΛ. ναί.
CALLICLES: Yes.
ΣΩ. κακὸν δὲ τὸν ἄφρονα καὶ δειλόν;
SOCRATES: And the foolish and cowardly is bad?
ΚΑΛ. πάνυ γε.
CALLICLES: Most certainly.
ΣΩ. ἀγαθὸν δὲ αὖ τὸν χαίροντα;
SOCRATES: And again, that he who rejoices is good?
ΚΑΛ. ναί.
CALLICLES: Yes.
ΣΩ. κακὸν δὲ τὸν ἀνιώμενον;
SOCRATES: And he who feels pain is bad?
ΚΑΛ. ἀνάγκη.
CALLICLES: Necessarily.
ΣΩ. ἀνιᾶσθαι δὲ καὶ χαίρειν τὸν ἀγαθὸν καὶ κακὸν ὁμοίως, ἴσως δὲ καὶ μᾶλλον τὸν κακόν;
SOCRATES: And that the good and the bad feel pain and rejoice equally, or perhaps the bad even more?
ΚΑΛ. ναί.
CALLICLES: Yes.
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν ὁμοίως γίγνεται κακὸς καὶ ἀγαθὸς τῷ ἀγαθῷ ἢ καὶ μᾶλλον ἀγαθὸς ὁ κακός;
SOCRATES: Therefore, does the bad man become bad and good to an equal degree as the good man, or even more good?
οὐ ταῦτα συμβαίνει καὶ τὰ πρότερα ἐκεῖνα, ἐάν τις ταὐτὰ φῇ ἡδέα τε καὶ ἀγαθὰ εἶναι;
Does not this follow, as well as those earlier conclusions, if one asserts that pleasant things and good things are the same?
οὐ ταῦτα ἀνάγκη, ὦ Καλλίκλεις;
Are these not necessary consequences, Callicles?
ΚΑΛ. πάλαι τοί σου ἀκροῶμαι, ὦ Σώκρατες, καθομολογῶν, ἐνθυμούμενος ὅτι, κἂν παίζων τίς σοι ἐνδῷ ὁτιοῦν, τούτου ἅσμενος ἔχῃ ὥσπερ τὰ μειράκια.
CALLICLES: I have been listening to you for a long time, Socrates, and agreeing with you, while reflecting that, even if one concedes anything to you in jest, you gladly cling to it just like young boys.
ὡς δὴ σὺ οἴει ἐμὲ ἢ καὶ ἄλλον ὁντινοῦν ἀνθρώπων οὐχ ἡγεῖσθαι τὰς μὲν βελτίους ἡδονάς, τὰς δὲ χείρους.
As if you actually think that I, or any other human being whatever, do not believe that some pleasures are better and others worse!
ΣΩ. ἰοῦ ἰοῦ, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, ὡς πανοῦργος εἶ καί μοι ὥσπερ παιδὶ χρῇ, τοτὲ μὲν τὰ αὐτὰ φάσκων οὕτως ἔχειν, τοτὲ δὲ ἑτέρως, ἐξαπατῶν με.
SOCRATES: Oho, Callicles! What a rascal you are, and how you treat me like a child, telling me now that things are one way, and now another, trying to deceive me!
καίτοι οὐκ ᾤμην γε κατʼ ἀρχὰς ὑπὸ σοῦ ἑκόντος εἶναι ἐξαπατηθήσεσθαι, ὡς ὄντος φίλου·
And yet I did not think at the beginning that I should be voluntarily deceived by you, since you are a friend.
νῦν δὲ ἐψεύσθην, καὶ ὡς ἔοικεν ἀνάγκη μοι κατὰ τὸν παλαιὸν λόγον τὸ παρὸν εὖ ποιεῖν καὶ τοῦτο δέχεσθαι τὸ διδόμενον παρὰ σοῦ.
But now I have been mistaken, and it seems I must, according to the ancient proverb, "make the best of what is present" and accept just what is given by you.
ἔστιν δὲ δή, ὡς ἔοικεν, ὃ νῦν λέγεις, ὅτι ἡδοναί τινές εἰσιν αἱ μὲν ἀγαθαί, αἱ δὲ κακαί·
And what you are saying now, as it seems, is that some pleasures are good, and others bad.
ἦ γάρ;
Is that not so?
ΚΑΛ. ναί.
CALLICLES: Yes.
ΣΩ. ἆρʼ οὖν ἀγαθαὶ μὲν αἱ ὠφέλιμοι, κακαὶ δὲ αἱ βλαβεραί;
SOCRATES: Are, then, the beneficial ones good, and the harmful ones bad?
ΚΑΛ. πάνυ γε.
CALLICLES: Most certainly.
ΣΩ. ὠφέλιμοι δέ γε αἱ ἀγαθόν τι ποιοῦσαι, κακαὶ δὲ αἱ κακόν τι;
SOCRATES: And are those which produce some good beneficial, and those which produce some evil bad?
ΚΑΛ. φημί.
CALLICLES: Yes, I say so.
ΣΩ. ἆρʼ οὖν τὰς τοιάσδε λέγεις, οἷον κατὰ τὸ σῶμα ἃς νυνδὴ ἐλέγομεν ἐν τῷ ἐσθίειν καὶ πίνειν ἡδονάς, ἦ ἄρα τούτων αἱ μὲν ὑγίειαν ποιοῦσαι ἐν τῷ σώματι, ἢ ἰσχὺν ἢ ἄλλην τινὰ ἀρετὴν τοῦ σώματος, αὗται μὲν ἀγαθαί, αἱ δὲ τἀναντία τούτων κακαί;
SOCRATES: Are these, then, the sort of things you mean—for instance, in the case of the body, those pleasures we were speaking of just now in eating and drinking, if those which produce health in the body, or strength, or any other bodily virtue, are good, while those which produce the opposite of these are bad?
ΚΑΛ. πάνυ γε.
CALLICLES: Most certainly.
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν καὶ λῦπαι ὡσαύτως αἱ μὲν χρησταί εἰσιν, αἱ δὲ πονηραί;
SOCRATES: Therefore, are pains likewise some of them good, and others bad?
ΚΑΛ. πῶς γὰρ οὔ;
CALLICLES: Of course.
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν τὰς μὲν χρηστὰς καὶ ἡδονὰς καὶ λύπας καὶ αἱρετέον ἐστὶν καὶ πρακτέον;
SOCRATES: Therefore, must we choose and practice the good ones, both pleasures and pains?
ΚΑΛ. πάνυ γε.
CALLICLES: Most certainly.
ΣΩ. τὰς δὲ πονηρὰς οὔ;
SOCRATES: And the bad ones not?
ΚΑΛ. δῆλον δή.
CALLICLES: Obviously.