Plato · Gorgias §496-497

Distinguishing Pleasure from Good through Opposites

Passage 33 of 53 · Greek

Summary

Socrates points out that while opposite states like health and disease cannot coexist, pain and pleasure (such as thirst and drinking) are experienced and cease simultaneously, thereby proving that the pleasant and the good are distinct.

§496ΣΩ. οἷον περὶ ὅτου βούλει τοῦ σώματος ἀπολαβὼν σκόπει.

SOCRATES: For instance, take any part of the body you like and consider it.

νοσεῖ που ἄνθρωπος ὀφθαλμούς, ᾧ ὄνομα ὀφθαλμία;

Does not a man sometimes have a disease in his eyes, which is called ophthalmia?

ΚΑΛ. πῶς γὰρ οὔ;

CALLICLES: Of course.

ΣΩ. οὐ δήπου καὶ ὑγιαίνει γε ἅμα τοὺς αὐτούς;

SOCRATES: Surely he does not also have healthy eyes at the same time?

ΚΑΛ. οὐδʼ ὁπωστιοῦν.

CALLICLES: Not in the least.

ΣΩ. τί δὲ ὅταν τῆς ὀφθαλμίας ἀπαλλάττηται;

SOCRATES: And what when he gets rid of ophthalmia?

ἆρα τότε καὶ τῆς ὑγιείας ἀπαλλάττεται τῶν ὀφθαλμῶν καὶ τελευτῶν ἅμα ἀμφοτέρων ἀπήλλακται;

Does he then also get rid of the health of his eyes, and so in the end is he rid of both at the same time?

ΚΑΛ. ἥκιστά γε.

CALLICLES: Not at all.

ΣΩ. θαυμάσιον γὰρ οἶμαι καὶ ἄλογον γίγνεται·

SOCRATES: For that, I think, would be a wondrous and irrational result, would it not?

ἦ γάρ; ΚΑΛ. σφόδρα γε.

CALLICLES: Most certainly.

ΣΩ. ἀλλʼ ἐν μέρει οἶμαι ἑκάτερον καὶ λαμβάνει καὶ ἀπολλύει;

SOCRATES: But, I suppose, he acquires and loses each in turn?

ΚΑΛ. φημί.

CALLICLES: Yes, I agree.

ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν καὶ ἰσχὺν καὶ ἀσθένειαν ὡσαύτως;

SOCRATES: And strength and weakness in the same way?

ΚΑΛ. ναί.

CALLICLES: Yes.

ΣΩ. καὶ τάχος καὶ βραδυτῆτα;

SOCRATES: And speed and slowness?

ΚΑΛ. πάνυ γε.

CALLICLES: Yes, indeed.

ΣΩ. ἦ καὶ τἀγαθὰ καὶ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν καὶ τἀναντία τούτων, κακά τε καὶ ἀθλιότητα, ἐν μέρει λαμβάνει καὶ ἐν μέρει ἀπαλλάττεται ἑκατέρου;

SOCRATES: And does he also acquire and get rid of good things and happiness, and their opposites, evil things and misery, each in turn?

ΚΑΛ. πάντως δήπου.

CALLICLES: Most assuredly, I think.

ΣΩ. ἐὰν εὕρωμεν ἄρα ἄττα ὧν ἅμα τε ἀπαλλάττεται ἄνθρωπος καὶ ἅμα ἔχει, δῆλον ὅτι ταῦτά γε οὐκ ἂν εἴη τό τε ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸ κακόν.

SOCRATES: Then, if we find any things which a man gets rid of and possesses at the same time, it is clear that these could not be the good and the bad.

ὁμολογοῦμεν ταῦτα;

Do we agree on this?

καὶ εὖ μάλα σκεψάμενος ἀποκρίνου.

Consider it very carefully before you answer.

ΚΑΛ. ἀλλʼ ὑπερφυῶς ὡς ὁμολογῶ.

CALLICLES: Yes, I agree prodigiously.

ΣΩ. ἴθι δὴ ἐπὶ τὰ ἔμπροσθεν ὡμολογημένα.

SOCRATES: Come then, to our previous admissions.

τὸ πεινῆν ἔλεγες πότερον ἡδὺ ἢ ἀνιαρὸν εἶναι;

Did you say that hunger was pleasant or painful?

αὐτὸ λέγω τὸ πεινῆν.

I mean hunger itself.

ΚΑΛ. ἀνιαρὸν ἔγωγε· τὸ μέντοι πεινῶντα ἐσθίειν ἡδὺ λέγω.

CALLICLES: Painful, I say; but to eat when hungry is pleasant, I say.

ΣΩ. μανθάνω· ἀλλʼ οὖν τό γε πεινῆν αὐτὸ ἀνιαρόν.

SOCRATES: I understand; but at any rate hunger itself is painful, is it not?

ἢ οὐχί; ΚΑΛ. φημί.

CALLICLES: Yes, it is.

ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν καὶ τὸ διψῆν;

SOCRATES: And thirst too?

ΚΑΛ. σφόδρα γε.

CALLICLES: Most certainly.

ΣΩ. πότερον οὖν ἔτι πλείω ἐρωτῶ, ἢ ὁμολογεῖς ἅπασαν ἔνδειαν καὶ ἐπιθυμίαν ἀνιαρὸν εἶναι;

SOCRATES: Shall I ask you any more, or do you agree that all lack and desire is painful?

ΚΑΛ. ὁμολογῶ, ἀλλὰ μὴ ἐρώτα.

CALLICLES: I agree, so do not ask.

ΣΩ. εἶεν·

SOCRATES: Very well.

διψῶντα δὲ δὴ πίνειν ἄλλο τι ἢ ἡδὺ φῂς εἶναι;

But do you say that drinking when thirsty is anything other than pleasant?

ΚΑΛ. ἔγωγε.

CALLICLES: Yes, I do.

ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν τούτου οὗ λέγεις τὸ μὲν διψῶντα λυπούμενον δήπου ἐστίν;

SOCRATES: Now, in this act that you speak of, "being thirsty" is surely being in pain?

ΚΑΛ. ναί.

CALLICLES: Yes.

ΣΩ. τὸ δὲ πίνειν πλήρωσίς τε τῆς ἐνδείας καὶ ἡδονή;

SOCRATES: And "drinking" is a filling up of the lack and a pleasure?

ΚΑΛ. ναί.

CALLICLES: Yes.

ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν κατὰ τὸ πίνειν χαίρειν λέγεις;

SOCRATES: So you say that in drinking one rejoices?

ΚΑΛ. μάλιστα.

CALLICLES: Most certainly.

ΣΩ. διψῶντά γε.

SOCRATES: When thirsty, that is?

ΚΑΛ. φημί.

CALLICLES: Yes.

ΣΩ. λυπούμενον;

SOCRATES: And when in pain?

ΚΑΛ. ναί.

CALLICLES: Yes.

ΣΩ. αἰσθάνῃ οὖν τὸ συμβαῖνον, ὅτι λυπούμενον χαίρειν λέγεις ἅμα, ὅταν διψῶντα πίνειν λέγῃς;

SOCRATES: Do you perceive, then, what follows: that you say one rejoices while in pain at the same time, when you say that one drinks when thirsty?

ἢ οὐχ ἅμα τοῦτο γίγνεται κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν τόπον καὶ χρόνον εἴτε ψυχῆς εἴτε σώματος βούλει;

Or does this not happen at the same time and in the same place, whether of the soul or of the body as you please?

οὐδὲν γὰρ οἶμαι διαφέρει.

For I think it makes no difference.

ἔστι ταῦτα ἢ οὔ;

Is this so or not?

ΚΑΛ. ἔστιν.

CALLICLES: It is so.

ΣΩ. ἀλλὰ μὴν εὖ γε πράττοντα κακῶς πράττειν ἅμα ἀδύνατον φῂς εἶναι.

SOCRATES: But you said it is impossible to fare well and to fare ill at the same time.

§497ΚΑΛ. φημὶ γάρ.

CALLICLES: Yes, I did.

ΣΩ. ἀνιώμενον δέ γε χαίρειν δυνατὸν ὡμολόγηκας.

SOCRATES: But you have admitted that it is possible to rejoice when in pain.

ΚΑΛ. φαίνεται.

CALLICLES: So it appears.

ΣΩ. οὐκ ἄρα τὸ χαίρειν ἐστὶν εὖ πράττειν οὐδὲ τὸ ἀνιᾶσθαι κακῶς, ὥστε ἕτερον γίγνεται τὸ ἡδὺ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ.

SOCRATES: Therefore, to rejoice is not to fare well, nor is to be in pain to fare ill, so that the pleasant is different from the good.

ΚΑΛ. οὐκ οἶδʼ ἅττα σοφίζῃ, ὦ Σώκρατες.

CALLICLES: I do not know what kind of sophistries you are playing with, Socrates.

ΣΩ. οἶσθα, ἀλλὰ ἀκκίζῃ, ὦ Καλλίκλεις·

SOCRATES: You do know, Callicles, but you are playing coy.

καὶ πρόιθί γε ἔτι εἰς τὸ ἔμπροσθεν, ἵνα εἰδῇς ὡς σοφὸς ὤν με νουθετεῖς.

Go on just a little further, so that you may realize how wise you are in warning me.

οὐχ ἅμα διψῶν τε ἕκαστος ἡμῶν πέπαυται καὶ ἅμα ἡδόμενος διὰ τοῦ πίνειν;

Do not each of us cease from being thirsty and at the same time cease from feeling pleasure through drinking?

ΚΑΛ. οὐκ οἶδα ὅτι λέγεις.

CALLICLES: I do not know what you mean.

ΓΟΡ. μηδαμῶς, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, ἀλλʼ ἀποκρίνου καὶ ἡμῶν ἕνεκα, ἵνα περανθῶσιν οἱ λόγοι.

GORGIAS: Do not do that, Callicles, but answer for our sakes too, so that the arguments may be brought to an end.

ΚΑΛ. ἀλλʼ ἀεὶ τοιοῦτός ἐστιν Σωκράτης, ὦ Γοργία· σμικρὰ καὶ ὀλίγου ἄξια ἀνερωτᾷ καὶ ἐξελέγχει.

CALLICLES: But Socrates is always like this, Gorgias; he asks these petty, worthless questions and refutes them.

ΓΟΡ. ἀλλὰ τί σοὶ διαφέρει;

GORGIAS: But what difference does that make to you?

πάντως οὐ σὴ αὕτη ἡ τιμή, ὦ Καλλίκλεις· ἀλλʼ ὑπόσχες Σωκράτει ἐξελέγξαι ὅπως ἂν βούληται.

In any case, it is not your reputation at stake, Callicles; just submit to Socrates to let him examine you however he wishes.

ΚΑΛ. Ἐρώτα δὴ σὺ τὰ σμικρά τε καὶ στενὰ ταῦτα, ἐπείπερ Γοργίᾳ δοκεῖ οὕτως.

CALLICLES: Ask, then, those petty and narrow questions of yours, since Gorgias thinks so.

ΣΩ. εὐδαίμων εἶ, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, ὅτι τὰ μεγάλα μεμύησαι πρὶν τὰ σμικρά· ἐγὼ δʼ οὐκ ᾤμην θεμιτὸν εἶναι.

SOCRATES: You are a happy man, Callicles, in having been initiated into the greater mysteries before the lesser; I did not think that was permitted.

ὅθεν οὖν ἀπέλιπες ἀποκρίνου, εἰ οὐχ ἅμα παύεται διψῶν ἕκαστος ἡμῶν καὶ ἡδόμενος.

Answer, then, from where you left off: does not each of us cease from being thirsty and at the same time cease from feeling pleasure?

ΚΑΛ. φημί.

CALLICLES: Yes, I say so.

ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν καὶ πεινῶν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιθυμιῶν καὶ ἡδονῶν ἅμα παύεται;

SOCRATES: And does he not also cease from being hungry and from the other desires and pleasures at the same time?

ΚΑΛ. ἔστι ταῦτα.

CALLICLES: That is so.

ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν καὶ τῶν λυπῶν καὶ τῶν ἡδονῶν ἅμα παύεται;

SOCRATES: Then also from pains and pleasures he ceases at the same time?

ΚΑΛ. ναί.

CALLICLES: Yes.

ΣΩ. ἀλλὰ μὴν τῶν ἀγαθῶν γε καὶ κακῶν οὐχ ἅμα παύεται, ὡς σὺ ὡμολόγεις·

SOCRATES: But from good things and bad things he does not cease at the same time, as you were admitting.

νῦν δὲ οὐχ ὁμολογεῖς;

Do you not admit it now?

ΚΑΛ. ἔγωγε·

CALLICLES: I do agree.

τί οὖν δή;

What of it?

ΣΩ. ὅτι οὐ τὰ αὐτὰ γίγνεται, ὦ φίλε, τἀγαθὰ τοῖς ἡδέσιν οὐδὲ τὰ κακὰ τοῖς ἀνιαροῖς.

SOCRATES: That they are not the same, my friend—the good and the pleasant, nor the bad and the painful.

τῶν μὲν γὰρ ἅμα παύεται, τῶν δὲ οὔ, ὡς ἑτέρων ὄντων·

For we cease from the one class at the same time, but not from the other, because they are different.

πῶς οὖν ταὐτὰ ἂν εἴη τὰ ἡδέα τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς ἢ τὰ ἀνιαρὰ τοῖς κακοῖς;

How then could pleasant things be the same as good things, or painful things the same as bad things?

ἐὰν δὲ βούλῃ, καὶ τῇδε ἐπίσκεψαι (οἶμαι γάρ σοι οὐδὲ ταύτῃ ὁμολογεῖσθαι· ἄθρει δέ) τοὺς ἀγαθοὺς οὐχὶ ἀγαθῶν παρουσίᾳ ἀγαθοὺς καλεῖς, ὥσπερ τοὺς καλοὺς οἷς ἂν κάλλος παρῇ;

But if you like, consider it in this way too (for I do not think you agree with this either, but look at it): do you not call good men good by the presence of good things, just as you call beautiful those in whom beauty is present?

ΚΑΛ. ἔγωγε.

CALLICLES: Yes, I do.

ΣΩ. τί δέ;

SOCRATES: And what then?

ἀγαθοὺς ἄνδρας καλεῖς ἄφρονας καὶ δειλούς;

Do you call foolish and cowardly men good?

οὐ γὰρ ἄρτι γε, ἀλλὰ τοὺς ἀνδρείους καὶ φρονίμους ἔλεγες· ἢ οὐ τούτους ἀγαθοὺς καλεῖς;

You certainly did not just now, but you were calling the courageous and wise so.

ΚΑΛ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

Or do you not call these good?

ΣΩ. τί δέ;

CALLICLES: Most certainly I do.

παῖδα ἀνόητον χαίροντα ἤδη εἶδες;

SOCRATES: And what?

ΚΑΛ. ἔγωγε.

Have you ever seen a foolish child rejoicing?

ΣΩ. ἄνδρα δὲ οὔπω εἶδες ἀνόητον χαίροντα;

CALLICLES: Yes, I have.

ΚΑΛ. οἶμαι ἔγωγε·

SOCRATES: And have you never seen a foolish man rejoicing?

ἀλλὰ τί τοῦτο;

CALLICLES: I think I have.

ΣΩ. οὐδέν·

But what of that?

ἀλλʼ ἀποκρίνου.

SOCRATES: Nothing; just answer.

ΚΑΛ. εἶδον.

CALLICLES: I have seen it.

Notes

496aοἷον περὶ ὅτου βούλει τοῦ σώματος ἀπολαβὼν — The relative pronoun `ὅτου` (contracted from `οὗτινος`) is combined with the verb `βούλει` (second-person singular of `βούλομαι`) to express an indefinite choice, meaning "whichever you wish." `τοῦ σώματος` is a partitive genitive depending on `ὅτου`. The participle `ἀπολαβών` means "having set apart" or "taking separately," prompting the examination of a specific part of the body.
496cἄττα ὧν ἅμα τε ἀπαλλάττεται ἄνθρωπος καὶ ἅμα ἔχει — The indefinite pronoun `ἄτta` (Attic for `τινά`) serves as the antecedent. The relative pronoun `ὧν` is in the genitive, attracted by the verb `ἀπαλλάττεται` which governs the genitive, but it also functions as the object of `ἔχει`, which governs the accusative—a case of relative attraction and shared object.
497bἵνα εἰδῇς ὡς σοφὸς ὤν με νουθετεῖς — `ὡς` is an indirect interrogative adverb meaning "how," introducing the clause `ὡς ... με νουθετεῖς` ("how you admonish me"). `σοφὸς ὤν` is a nominative participle modifying the subject of the clause, expressing a circumstantial or causal sense, used here with irony ("as one who is wise").
497eἀγαθῶν παρουσίᾳ ἀγαθοὺς καλεῖς — `ἀγαθοὺς` is a predicate accusative to the implied object of `καλεῖς`, forming a double accusative construction ("you call them good"). `ἀγαθῶν` is the genitive of the neuter plural `τὰ ἀγαθά` ("good things"), depending on `παρουσίᾳ` ("presence").

Cite this passage

Plato, Gorgias §496-497. Humanitext Reader, https://reader.humanitext.ai/en/text/urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0059.tlg023.humanitext-grc2:496-497

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