Humanitext Reader

Plato · Gorgias §489

The Justice of the Many and Redefining the Superior

Passage 29 of 53 · Greek

Summary

Socrates points out that the consensus of the majority aligns with natural justice, exposing the contradiction in Callicles' position, while Callicles refines his definition of 'the superior' to mean 'the wiser' rather than the physically stronger.

§489ΣΩ. ἆρʼ οὖν οἱ πολλοὶ νομίζουσιν οὕτως, ὡς ἄρτι αὖ σὺ ἔλεγες, δίκαιον εἶναι τὸ ἴσον ἔχειν καὶ αἴσχιον τὸ ἀδικεῖν τοῦ ἀδικεῖσθαι;
SOCRATES: Well, then, do the many think this way, as you were saying just now, that to have an equal share is just, and to do injustice is more shameful than to suffer it?
ἔστιν ταῦτα ἢ οὔ;
Is this so or not?
καὶ ὅπως μὴ ἁλώσῃ ἐνταῦθα σὺ αὖ αἰσχυνόμενος.
And mind you don't get caught here by being ashamed again.
νομίζουσιν, ἢ οὔ, οἱ πολλοὶ τὸ ἴσον ἔχειν ἀλλʼ οὐ τὸ πλέον δίκαιον εἶναι, καὶ αἴσχιον τὸ ἀδικεῖν τοῦ ἀδικεῖσθαι;
Do the many think, or not, that to have an equal share and not to have more is just, and to do injustice is more shameful than to suffer it?
μὴ φθόνει μοι ἀποκρίνασθαι τοῦτο, Καλλίκλεις, ἵνʼ, ἐάν μοι ὁμολογήσῃς, βεβαιώσωμαι ἤδη παρὰ σοῦ, ἅτε ἱκανοῦ ἀνδρὸς διαγνῶναι ὡμολογηκότος.
Do not grudge me answering this, Callicles, so that if you agree with me, I may already have this confirmed by you, seeing that a competent man to judge has agreed.
ΚΑΛ. ἀλλʼ οἵ γε πολλοὶ νομίζουσιν οὕτως.
CALLICLES: Well, the many indeed think so.
ΣΩ. οὐ νόμῳ ἄρα μόνον ἐστὶν αἴσχιον τὸ ἀδικεῖν τοῦ ἀδικεῖσθαι, οὐδὲ δίκαιον τὸ ἴσον ἔχειν, ἀλλὰ καὶ φύσει·
SOCRATES: Then it is not only by law that to do injustice is more shameful than suffer it, nor that to have an equal share is just, but also by nature.
ὥστε κινδυνεύεις οὐκ ἀληθῆ λέγειν ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν οὐδὲ ὀρθῶς ἐμοῦ κατηγορεῖν λέγων ὅτι ἐναντίον ἐστὶν ὁ νόμος καὶ ἡ φύσις, ἃ δὴ καὶ ἐγὼ γνοὺς κακουργῶ ἐν τοῖς λόγοις, ἐὰν μέν τις κατὰ φύσιν λέγῃ, ἐπὶ τὸν νόμον ἄγων, ἐὰν δέ τις κατὰ νόμον, ἐπὶ τὴν φύσιν.
So you seem to be speaking falsely in what you said before, and not rightly accusing me when you said that law and nature are opposed, and that I, knowing this, play tricks in my arguments, if someone speaks according to nature, leading them to the law, and if someone speaks according to law, to nature.
ΚΑΛ. οὑτοσὶ ἀνὴρ οὐ παύσεται φλυαρῶν.
CALLICLES: This fellow will not stop talking nonsense.
εἰπέ μοι, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὐκ αἰσχύνῃ τηλικοῦτος ὢν ὀνόματα θηρεύων, καὶ ἐάν τις ῥήματι ἁμάρτῃ, ἕρμαιον τοῦτο ποιούμενος;
Tell me, Socrates, are you not ashamed at your age to hunt after words, and if someone makes a slip in a word, to make a godsend of it?
ἐμὲ γὰρ οἴει ἄλλο τι λέγειν τὸ κρείττους εἶναι ἢ τὸ βελτίους;
For do you think I mean by 'being superior' anything else than 'being better'?
οὐ πάλαι σοι λέγω ὅτι ταὐτόν φημι εἶναι τὸ βέλτιον καὶ τὸ κρεῖττον;
Have I not been telling you for a long time that I say the better and the superior are the same?
ἢ οἴει με λέγειν, ἐὰν συρφετὸς συλλεγῇ δούλων καὶ παντοδαπῶν ἀνθρώπων μηδενὸς ἀξίων πλὴν ἴσως τῷ σώματι ἰσχυρίσασθαι, καὶ οὗτοι φῶσιν, αὐτὰ ταῦτα εἶναι νόμιμα;
Or do you think I say that if a rabble of slaves and all sorts of men, worth nothing except perhaps in physical strength, is gathered together, and they say things, these very things are regulations?
ΣΩ. εἶεν, ὦ σοφώτατε Καλλίκλεις· οὕτω λέγεις;
SOCRATES: Very well, most wise Callicles; is this what you mean?
ΚΑΛ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν.
CALLICLES: Exactly.
ΣΩ. ἀλλʼ ἐγὼ μέν, ὦ δαιμόνιε, καὶ αὐτὸς πάλαι τοπάζω τοιοῦτόν τί σε λέγειν τὸ κρεῖττον, καὶ ἀνερωτῶ γλιχόμενος σαφῶς εἰδέναι ὅτι λέγεις.
SOCRATES: But, my dear sir, I myself have long suspected you meant something of this sort by 'superior', and I keep questioning you because I am eager to know clearly what you mean.
οὐ γὰρ δήπου σύ γε τοὺς δύο βελτίους ἡγῇ τοῦ ἑνός, οὐδὲ τοὺς σοὺς δούλους βελτίους σοῦ, ὅτι ἰσχυρότεροί εἰσιν ἢ σύ.
For surely you do not think two are better than one, nor your slaves better than you because they are stronger than you.
ἀλλὰ πάλιν ἐξ ἀρχῆς εἰπὲ τί ποτε λέγεις τοὺς βελτίους, ἐπειδὴ οὐ τοὺς ἰσχυροτέρους;
But tell me again from the beginning: what on earth do you mean by 'better', since you do not mean 'stronger'?
καὶ ὦ θαυμάσιε πρᾳότερόν με προδίδασκε, ἵνα μὴ ἀποφοιτήσω παρὰ σοῦ.
And, my admirable friend, instruct me more gently, so that I may not run away from your school.
ΚΑΛ. εἰρωνεύῃ, ὦ Σώκρατες.
CALLICLES: You are playing the ironist, Socrates.
ΣΩ. μὰ τὸν Ζῆθον, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, ᾧ σὺ χρώμενος πολλὰ νυνδὴ εἰρωνεύου πρός με·
SOCRATES: No, by Zethus, Callicles, whom you used just now to play the ironist plenty at me!
ἀλλʼ ἴθι εἰπέ, τίνας λέγεις τοὺς βελτίους εἶναι;
But come, tell me: who do you say are the better?
ΚΑΛ. τοὺς ἀμείνους ἔγωγε.
CALLICLES: The superior ones, I say.
ΣΩ. ὁρᾷς ἄρα ὅτι σὺ αὐτὸς ὀνόματα λέγεις, δηλοῖς δὲ οὐδέν;
SOCRATES: You see then that you yourself are speaking words, but you make nothing clear?
οὐκ ἐρεῖς, τοὺς βελτίους καὶ κρείττους πότερον τοὺς φρονιμωτέρους λέγεις ἢ ἄλλους τινάς;
Will you not say whether you mean by 'better' and 'superior' the wiser ones, or some others?
ΚΑΛ. ἀλλὰ ναὶ μὰ Δία τούτους λέγω, καὶ σφόδρα γε.
CALLICLES: Why, yes, by Zeus, I mean these, and very much so.

Notes

  1. 489aὅπως μὴ ἁλώσῃ — The construction ὅπως μή + second-person singular subjunctive (ἁλώσῃ). It is an elliptical usage functioning as a warning or caution, where a governing verb of seeing or taking care (such as ὅρα) is omitted. Here it means 'take care lest you get caught'.
  2. 489aἅτε ἱκανοῦ ἀνδρὸς διαγνῶναι ὡμολογηκότος — The conjunction ἅτε with a genitive absolute construction. The logical subject of the perfect active participle ὡμολογηκότος is ἱκανοῦ ἀνδρὸς. The adjective ἱκανός is followed by the explanatory infinitive of direction or ability, διαγνῶναι ('to judge/distinguish'). It functions in apposition to the preceding genitive pronoun σοῦ (governed by παρὰ), expressing an objective ground: 'since you, as a competent man to judge, have agreed'.
  3. 489eμὰ τὸν Ζῆθον — The particle of oath μὰ followed by the accusative (Ζῆθον). This is a conversational oath common in drama. It is a highly ironic response by Socrates, swearing by Zethus because Callicles had previously (at 485e–486c) compared Socrates to Amphion (the inactive philosopher) and himself to Zethus (the active practical man) from Euripides' play.

Cite this passage

Plato, Gorgias §489. Humanitext Reader, https://reader.humanitext.ai/en/text/urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0059.tlg023.humanitext-grc2:489

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