§479ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν οὗτος τυγχάνει ὢν ὃς ἂν τὰ μέγιστα ἀδικῶν καὶ χρώμενος μεγίστῃ ἀδικίᾳ διαπράξηται ὥστε μήτε νουθετεῖσθαι μήτε κολάζεσθαι μήτε δίκην διδόναι, ὥσπερ σὺ φῂς Ἀρχέλαον παρεσκευάσθαι καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους τυράννους καὶ ῥήτορας καὶ δυνάστας;
SOCRATES: Therefore, does this person happen to be the one who, committing the greatest injustices and employing the greatest injustice, manages neither to be admonished, nor disciplined, nor to pay the penalty, just as you say Archelaus has managed to do, along with the other tyrants, rhetoricians, and potentates?
ΠΩΛ. ἔοικε.
POLUS: It seems so.
ΣΩ. σχεδὸν γάρ που οὗτοι, ὦ ἄριστε, τὸ αὐτὸ διαπεπραγμένοι εἰσὶν ὥσπερ ἂν εἴ τις τοῖς μεγίστοις νοσήμασιν συνισχόμενος διαπράξαιτο μὴ διδόναι δίκην τῶν περὶ τὸ σῶμα ἁμαρτημάτων τοῖς ἰατροῖς μηδὲ ἰατρεύεσθαι, φοβούμενος ὡσπερανεὶ παῖς τὸ κάεσθαι καὶ τὸ τέμνεσθαι, ὅτι ἀλγεινόν.
SOCRATES: For these people, my excellent friend, have achieved pretty much the same thing as someone who, being afflicted with the greatest diseases, should manage not to pay the penalty to the physicians for the errors of his body and not to be cured, fearing, like a child, cautery and surgery, because they are painful.
ἢ οὐ δοκεῖ καὶ σοὶ οὕτω;
Or does it not seem so to you as well?
ΠΩΛ. ἔμοιγε.
POLUS: I do.
ΣΩ. ἀγνοῶν γε, ὡς ἔοικεν, οἷόν ἐστιν ἡ ὑγίεια καὶ ἀρετὴ σώματος.
SOCRATES: Fearing it, as it seems, because he is ignorant of what health and excellence of the body are like.
κινδυνεύουσι γὰρ ἐκ τῶν νῦν ἡμῖν ὡμολογημένων τοιοῦτόν τι ποιεῖν καὶ οἱ τὴν δίκην φεύγοντες, ὦ Πῶλε, τὸ ἀλγεινὸν αὐτοῦ καθορᾶν, πρὸς δὲ τὸ ὠφέλιμον τυφλῶς ἔχειν καὶ ἀγνοεῖν ὅσῳ ἀθλιώτερόν ἐστι μὴ ὑγιοῦς σώματος μὴ ὑγιεῖ ψυχῇ συνοικεῖν, ἀλλὰ σαθρᾷ καὶ ἀδίκῳ καὶ ἀνοσίῳ, ὅθεν καὶ πᾶν ποιοῦσιν ὥστε δίκην μὴ διδόναι μηδʼ ἀπαλλάττεσθαι τοῦ μεγίστου κακοῦ, καὶ χρήματα παρασκευαζόμενοι καὶ φίλους καὶ ὅπως ἂν ὦσιν ὡς πιθανώτατοι λέγειν·
For those who flee justice, Polus, based on our current agreements, are likely doing something similar: they look only at its painful aspect, but are blind to its benefit, and are ignorant of how much more wretched it is to live with an unhealthy soul—one that is corrupt, unjust, and impious—than to live with an unhealthy body. Hence, they do everything possible so as not to pay the penalty and not to be rid of the greatest evil, providing themselves with wealth, friends, and the means to speak as persuasively as possible.
εἰ δὲ ἡμεῖς ἀληθῆ ὡμολογήκαμεν, ὦ Πῶλε, ἆρʼ αἰσθάνῃ τὰ συμβαίνοντα ἐκ τοῦ λόγου;
But if we have agreed to what is true, Polus, do you perceive the consequences that follow from our argument?
ἢ βούλει συλλογισώμεθα αὐτά;
Or do you want us to reason them out together?
ΠΩΛ. εἰ σοί γε δοκεῖ.
POLUS: If it seems best to you.
ΣΩ. ἆρʼ οὖν συμβαίνει μέγιστον κακὸν ἡ ἀδικία καὶ τὸ ἀδικεῖν;
SOCRATES: Does it follow, then, that injustice and doing injustice are the greatest evil?
ΠΩΛ. φαίνεταί γε.
POLUS: It seems so, at least.
ΣΩ. καὶ μὴν ἀπαλλαγή γε ἐφάνη τούτου τοῦ κακοῦ τὸ δίκην διδόναι;
SOCRATES: And yet, was paying the penalty shown to be a riddance of this evil?
ΠΩΛ. κινδυνεύει.
POLUS: It is likely.
ΣΩ. τὸ δέ γε μὴ διδόναι ἐμμονὴ τοῦ κακοῦ;
SOCRATES: And not paying it, is it the persistence of the evil?
ΠΩΛ. ναί.
POLUS: Yes.
ΣΩ. δεύτερον ἄρα ἐστὶν τῶν κακῶν μεγέθει τὸ ἀδικεῖν· τὸ δὲ ἀδικοῦντα μὴ διδόναι δίκην πάντων μέγιστόν τε καὶ πρῶτον κακῶν πέφυκεν.
SOCRATES: Therefore, doing injustice is second among evils in magnitude; but doing injustice and not paying the penalty has its nature as the greatest and first of all evils.
ΠΩΛ. ἔοικεν.
POLUS: It seems so.
ΣΩ. ἆρʼ οὖν οὐ περὶ τούτου, ὦ φίλε, ἠμφεσβητήσαμεν, σὺ μὲν τὸν Ἀρχέλαον εὐδαιμονίζων τὸν τὰ μέγιστα ἀδικοῦντα δίκην οὐδεμίαν διδόντα, ἐγὼ δὲ τοὐναντίον οἰόμενος, εἴτε Ἀρχέλαος εἴτʼ ἄλλος ἀνθρώπων ὁστισοῦν μὴ δίδωσι δίκην ἀδικῶν, τούτῳ προσήκειν ἀθλίῳ εἶναι διαφερόντως τῶν ἄλλων ἀνθρώπων, καὶ ἀεὶ τὸν ἀδικοῦντα τοῦ ἀδικουμένου ἀθλιώτερον εἶναι καὶ τὸν μὴ διδόντα δίκην τοῦ διδόντος;
SOCRATES: Was it not, then, about this very point, my friend, that we disputed, you declaring Archelaus happy because, while committing the greatest injustices, he paid no penalty at all, whereas I thought the opposite—that whether it is Archelaus or any other human being whatsoever who does not pay the penalty when committing injustice, it is fitting for him to be exceptionally wretched compared to other human beings, and that the one doing injustice is always more wretched than the one suffering it, and the one not paying the penalty than the one paying it?
οὐ ταῦτʼ ἦν τὰ ὑπʼ ἐμοῦ λεγόμενα;
Was this not what was said by me?
ΠΩΛ. ναί.
POLUS: Yes.
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν ἀποδέδεικται ὅτι ἀληθῆ ἐλέγετο;
SOCRATES: Has it not, then, been proved that what was said is true?
ΠΩΛ. φαίνεται.
POLUS: It seems so.
§480ΣΩ. εἶεν·
SOCRATES: Very well.
εἰ οὖν δὴ ταῦτα ἀληθῆ, ὦ Πῶλε, τίς ἡ μεγάλη χρεία ἐστὶν τῆς ῥητορικῆς;
If, then, these things are true, Polus, what is the great utility of rhetoric?
δεῖ μὲν γὰρ δὴ ἐκ τῶν νῦν ὡμολογημένων αὐτὸν ἑαυτὸν μάλιστα φυλάττειν ὅπως μὴ ἀδικήσει, ὡς ἱκανὸν κακὸν ἕξοντα.
For indeed, according to our current agreements, one must guard himself above all so as not to commit injustice, knowing that he will otherwise possess a sufficient evil.
οὐ γάρ;
Is that not so?
ΠΩΛ. πάνυ γε.
POLUS: Certainly.
ΣΩ. ἐὰν δέ γε ἀδικήσῃ ἢ αὐτὸς ἢ ἄλλος τις ὧν ἂν κήδηται, αὐτὸν ἑκόντα ἰέναι ἐκεῖσε ὅπου ὡς τάχιστα δώσει δίκην, παρὰ τὸν δικαστὴν ὥσπερ παρὰ τὸν ἰατρόν, σπεύδοντα ὅπως μὴ ἐγχρονισθὲν τὸ νόσημα τῆς ἀδικίας ὕπουλον τὴν ψυχὴν ποιήσει καὶ ἀνίατον·
SOCRATES: But if he himself should commit injustice, or anyone else for whom he cares, he must go of his own accord to where he will pay the penalty as quickly as possible, to the judge as if to the physician, hurrying so that the disease of injustice, becoming deep-seated through time, does not make his soul ulcerated and incurable.
ἢ πῶς λέγομεν, ὦ Πῶλε, εἴπερ τὰ πρότερον μένει ἡμῖν ὁμολογήματα;
Or how do we say it, Polus, if indeed our previous agreements still stand?
οὐκ ἀνάγκη ταῦτα ἐκείνοις οὕτω μὲν συμφωνεῖν, ἄλλως δὲ μή;
Is it not necessary that these consequences harmonize with those agreements in this way, and not otherwise?
ΠΩΛ. τί γὰρ δὴ φῶμεν, ὦ Σώκρατες;
POLUS: Indeed, Socrates, what else can we say?
ΣΩ. ἐπὶ μὲν ἄρα τὸ ἀπολογεῖσθαι ὑπὲρ τῆς ἀδικίας τῆς αὑτοῦ ἢ γονέων ἢ ἑταίρων ἢ παίδων ἢ πατρίδος ἀδικούσης οὐ χρήσιμος οὐδὲν ἡ ῥητορικὴ ἡμῖν, ὦ Πῶλε, εἰ μὴ εἴ τις ὑπολάβοι ἐπὶ τοὐναντίον—κατηγορεῖν δεῖν μάλιστα μὲν ἑαυτοῦ, ἔπειτα δὲ καὶ τῶν οἰκείων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὃς ἂν ἀεὶ τῶν φίλων τυγχάνῃ ἀδικῶν, καὶ μὴ ἀποκρύπτεσθαι ἀλλʼ εἰς τὸ φανερὸν ἄγειν τὸ ἀδίκημα, ἵνα δῷ δίκην καὶ ὑγιὴς γένηται, ἀναγκάζειν τε αὑτὸν καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους μὴ ἀποδειλιᾶν ἀλλὰ παρέχειν μύσαντα εὖ καὶ ἀνδρείως ὥσπερ τέμνειν καὶ κάειν ἰατρῷ, τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ καλὸν διώκοντα, μὴ ὑπολογιζόμενον τὸ ἀλγεινόν, ἐὰν μέν γε πληγῶν ἄξια ἠδικηκὼς ᾖ, τύπτειν παρέχοντα, ἐὰν δὲ δεσμοῦ, δεῖν, ἐὰν δὲ ζημίας, ἀποτίνοντα, ἐὰν δὲ φυγῆς, φεύγοντα, ἐὰν δὲ θανάτου, ἀποθνῄσκοντα, αὐτὸν πρῶτον ὄντα κατήγορον καὶ αὑτοῦ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων οἰκείων καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦτο χρώμενον τῇ ῥητορικῇ, ὅπως ἂν καταδήλων τῶν ἀδικημάτων γιγνομένων ἀπαλλάττωνται τοῦ μεγίστου κακοῦ, ἀδικίας.
SOCRATES: Therefore, Polus, for defending one's own injustice, or that of one's parents, companions, children, or country when it acts unjustly, rhetoric is of no use to us at all, unless indeed someone should suppose the very opposite—that one ought to accuse himself first of all, and then his relatives and anyone of his friends who happens to commit injustice, and not conceal the misdeed but bring it to light, so that he may pay the penalty and become healthy. He must force himself and others not to play the coward, but to submit with eyes closed, well and courageously, as if to a physician for cutting and cauterizing, pursuing what is good and beautiful, without taking the pain into account. If he has committed injustices worthy of stripes, he must offer himself to be beaten; if of imprisonment, to be bound; if of a fine, to pay it; if of exile, to be exiled; if of death, to die. He must be the first accuser of himself and of his other relatives, and use rhetoric for this very purpose: so that, as their injustices are made manifest, they may be rid of the greatest evil, which is injustice.
φῶμεν οὕτως ἢ μὴ φῶμεν, ὦ Πῶλε;
Shall we say this, Polus, or shall we not?
ΠΩΛ. ἄτοπα μέν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ, τοῖς μέντοι ἔμπροσθεν ἴσως σοι ὁμολογεῖται.
POLUS: To me, Socrates, these things seem strange, but yet they probably agree with what you said before.
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν ἢ κἀκεῖνα λυτέον ἢ τάδε ἀνάγκη συμβαίνειν;
SOCRATES: Therefore, must we either refute those earlier agreements, or must these consequences necessarily follow?
ΠΩΛ. ναί, τοῦτό γε οὕτως ἔχει.
POLUS: Yes, that is indeed how it stands.