§477ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν εἴπερ καλά, ἀγαθά;
SOCRATES: If, then, they are beautiful, are they not also good?
ἢ γὰρ ἡδέα ἢ ὠφέλιμα.
For they are either pleasant or beneficial.
ΠΩΛ. ἀνάγκη.
POLUS: Necessarily.
ΣΩ. ἀγαθὰ ἄρα πάσχει ὁ δίκην διδούς;
SOCRATES: Therefore, does the one who pays the penalty experience good things?
ΠΩΛ. ἔοικεν.
POLUS: It seems so.
ΣΩ. ὠφελεῖται ἄρα;
SOCRATES: Then he is benefited?
ΠΩΛ. ναί.
POLUS: Yes.
ΣΩ. ἆρα ἥνπερ ἐγὼ ὑπολαμβάνω τὴν ὠφελίαν;
SOCRATES: Is it indeed the benefit that I suppose?
βελτίων τὴν ψυχὴν γίγνεται, εἴπερ δικαίως κολάζεται;
Does he become better in his soul, if indeed he is justly disciplined?
ΠΩΛ. εἰκός γε.
POLUS: It is likely.
ΣΩ. κακίας ἄρα ψυχῆς ἀπαλλάττεται ὁ δίκην διδούς;
SOCRATES: Therefore, does the one paying the penalty get rid of the badness of the soul?
ΠΩΛ. ναί.
POLUS: Yes.
ΣΩ. ἆρα οὖν τοῦ μεγίστου ἀπαλλάττεται κακοῦ;
SOCRATES: Is he then getting rid of the greatest evil?
ὧδε δὲ σκόπει· ἐν χρημάτων κατασκευῇ ἀνθρώπου κακίαν ἄλλην τινὰ ἐνορᾷς ἢ πενίαν;
Consider it in this way: in the acquisition of wealth, do you see any other badness in a human being than poverty?
ΠΩΛ. οὔκ, ἀλλὰ πενίαν.
POLUS: No, only poverty.
ΣΩ. τί δʼ ἐν σώματος κατασκευῇ;
SOCRATES: And what about in the constitution of the body?
κακίαν ἂν φήσαις ἀσθένειαν εἶναι καὶ νόσον καὶ αἶσχος καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα;
Would you say the badness is weakness, disease, ugliness, and things of that sort?
ΠΩΛ. ἔγωγε.
POLUS: I would.
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν καὶ ἐν ψυχῇ πονηρίαν ἡγῇ τινα εἶναι;
SOCRATES: And do you believe there is also some badness in the soul?
ΠΩΛ. πῶς γὰρ οὔ;
POLUS: How could I not?
ΣΩ. ταύτην οὖν οὐκ ἀδικίαν καλεῖς καὶ ἀμαθίαν καὶ δειλίαν καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα;
SOCRATES: And do you not call this injustice, ignorance, cowardice, and things of that sort?
ΠΩΛ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν.
POLUS: Certainly.
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν χρημάτων καὶ σώματος καὶ ψυχῆς, τριῶν ὄντων, τριττὰς εἴρηκας πονηρίας, πενίαν, νόσον, ἀδικίαν;
SOCRATES: Therefore, of wealth, body, and soul, these being three, you have named three badnesses: poverty, disease, and injustice?
ΠΩΛ. ναί.
POLUS: Yes.
ΣΩ. τίς οὖν τούτων τῶν πονηριῶν αἰσχίστη;
SOCRATES: Which of these badnesses is the most shameful?
οὐχ ἡ ἀδικία καὶ συλλήβδην ἡ τῆς ψυχῆς πονηρία;
Is it not injustice, and in a word, the badness of the soul?
ΠΩΛ. πολύ γε.
POLUS: By far.
ΣΩ. εἰ δὴ αἰσχίστη, καὶ κακίστη;
SOCRATES: If indeed it is the most shameful, is it also the worst?
ΠΩΛ. πῶς, ὦ Σώκρατες, λέγεις;
POLUS: What do you mean by that, Socrates?
ΣΩ. ὡδί· ἀεὶ τὸ αἴσχιστον ἤτοι λύπην μεγίστην παρέχον ἢ βλάβην ἢ ἀμφότερα αἴσχιστόν ἐστιν ἐκ τῶν ὡμολογημένων ἐν τῷ ἔμπροσθεν.
SOCRATES: This: that the most shameful is always so either because it causes the greatest pain, or harm, or both, based on what we agreed before.
ΠΩΛ. μάλιστα.
POLUS: Very much so.
ΣΩ. αἴσχιστον δὲ ἀδικία καὶ σύμπασα ψυχῆς πονηρία νυνδὴ ὡμολόγηται ἡμῖν;
SOCRATES: And have injustice and the entire badness of the soul just been agreed by us to be the most shameful?
ΠΩΛ. ὡμολόγηται γάρ.
POLUS: They have indeed.
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν ἢ ἀνιαρότατόν ἐστι καὶ ἀνίᾳ ὑπερβάλλον αἴσχιστον τούτων ἐστὶν ἢ βλάβῃ ἢ ἀμφότερα;
SOCRATES: Therefore, is it either the most painful, surpassing in pain, that makes it the most shameful of these, or is it because of harm, or both?
ΠΩΛ. ἀνάγκη.
POLUS: Necessarily.
ΣΩ. ἆρʼ οὖν ἀλγεινότερόν ἐστιν τοῦ πένεσθαι καὶ κάμνειν τὸ ἄδικον εἶναι καὶ ἀκόλαστον καὶ δειλὸν καὶ ἀμαθῆ;
SOCRATES: Is being unjust, undisciplined, cowardly, and ignorant more painful than being poor and sick?
ΠΩΛ. οὐκ ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀπὸ τούτων γε.
POLUS: It does not seem so to me, Socrates, at least not from these.
ΣΩ. ὑπερφυεῖ τινι ἄρα ὡς μεγάλῃ βλάβῃ καὶ κακῷ θαυμασίῳ ὑπερβάλλουσα τἆλλα ἡ τῆς ψυχῆς πονηρία αἴσχιστόν ἐστι πάντων, ἐπειδὴ οὐκ ἀλγηδόνι γε, ὡς ὁ σὸς λόγος.
SOCRATES: Therefore, by surpassing the others in some extraordinary, immense harm and wonderful evil, the badness of the soul is the most shameful of all, since it is not by pain, according to your argument.
ΠΩΛ. φαίνεται.
POLUS: It seems so.
ΣΩ. ἀλλὰ μήν που τό γε μεγίστῃ βλάβῃ ὑπερβάλλον μέγιστον ἂν κακὸν εἴη τῶν ὄντων.
SOCRATES: But surely, that which surpasses in the greatest harm would be the greatest evil among existing things.
ΠΩΛ. ναί.
POLUS: Yes.
ΣΩ. ἡ ἀδικία ἄρα καὶ ἡ ἀκολασία καὶ ἡ ἄλλη ψυχῆς πονηρία μέγιστον τῶν ὄντων κακόν ἐστιν;
SOCRATES: Therefore, are injustice, lack of discipline, and the other badness of the soul the greatest evil among existing things?
ΠΩΛ. φαίνεται.
POLUS: It seems so.
ΣΩ. τίς οὖν τέχνη πενίας ἀπαλλάττει;
SOCRATES: Now, what art rids us of poverty?
οὐ χρηματιστική;
Is it not that of money-making?
ΠΩΛ. ναί.
POLUS: Yes.
ΣΩ. τίς δὲ νόσου;
SOCRATES: And what rids us of disease?
οὐκ ἰατρική;
Is it not medicine?
§478ΠΩΛ. ἀνάγκη.
POLUS: Necessarily.
ΣΩ. τίς δὲ πονηρίας καὶ ἀδικίας;
SOCRATES: And what rids us of badness and injustice?
εἰ μὴ οὕτως εὐπορεῖς, ὧδε σκόπει· ποῖ ἄγομεν καὶ παρὰ τίνας τοὺς κάμνοντας τὰ σώματα;
If you are not so ready with an answer, consider it this way: where and to whom do we take those who are sick in their bodies?
ΠΩΛ. παρὰ τοὺς ἰατρούς, ὦ Σώκρατες.
POLUS: To the physicians, Socrates.
ΣΩ. ποῖ δὲ τοὺς ἀδικοῦντας καὶ τοὺς ἀκολασταίνοντας;
SOCRATES: And where do we take those who commit injustice and act without discipline?
ΠΩΛ. παρὰ τοὺς δικαστὰς λέγεις;
POLUS: Do you mean to the judges?
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν δίκην δώσοντας;
SOCRATES: Is it not to pay the penalty?
ΠΩΛ. φημί.
POLUS: I agree.
ΣΩ. ἆρʼ οὖν οὐ δικαιοσύνῃ τινὶ χρώμενοι κολάζουσιν οἱ ὀρθῶς κολάζοντες;
SOCRATES: Do they not discipline using some form of justice, those who discipline correctly?
ΠΩΛ. δῆλον δή.
POLUS: Clearly.
ΣΩ. χρηματιστικὴ μὲν ἄρα πενίας ἀπαλλάττει, ἰατρικὴ δὲ νόσου, δίκη δὲ ἀκολασίας καὶ ἀδικίας.
SOCRATES: Therefore, money-making rids us of poverty, while medicine rids us of disease, and justice rids us of lack of discipline and injustice.
ΠΩΛ. φαίνεται.
POLUS: It seems so.
ΣΩ. τί οὖν τούτων κάλλιστόν ἐστιν;
SOCRATES: Which, then, of these is the most beautiful?
ΠΩΛ. τίνων λέγεις;
POLUS: Which do you mean?
ΣΩ. χρηματιστικῆς, ἰατρικῆς, δίκης.
SOCRATES: Of money-making, medicine, and justice.
ΠΩΛ. πολὺ διαφέρει, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἡ δίκη.
POLUS: Justice, Socrates, is far superior.
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν αὖ ἤτοι ἡδονὴν πλείστην ποιεῖ ἢ ὠφελίαν ἢ ἀμφότερα, εἴπερ κάλλιστόν ἐστιν;
SOCRATES: Therefore, again, does it produce either the greatest pleasure, or benefit, or both, if indeed it is the most beautiful?
ΠΩΛ. ναί.
POLUS: Yes.
ΣΩ. ἆρʼ οὖν τὸ ἰατρεύεσθαι ἡδύ ἐστιν, καὶ χαίρουσιν οἱ ἰατρευόμενοι;
SOCRATES: Now, is undergoing medical treatment pleasant, and do those undergoing it rejoice?
ΠΩΛ. οὐκ ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ.
POLUS: It does not seem so to me.
ΣΩ. ἀλλʼ ὠφέλιμόν γε. ἦ γάρ;
SOCRATES: But it is at least beneficial, is it not?
ΠΩΛ. ναί.
POLUS: Yes.
ΣΩ. μεγάλου γὰρ κακοῦ ἀπαλλάττεται, ὥστε λυσιτελεῖ ὑπομεῖναι τὴν ἀλγηδόνα καὶ ὑγιῆ εἶναι.
SOCRATES: For one is rid of a great evil, so that it is profitable to endure the pain and be healthy.
ΠΩΛ. πῶς γὰρ οὔ;
POLUS: How could it not be?
ΣΩ. ἆρʼ οὖν οὕτως ἂν περὶ σῶμα εὐδαιμονέστατος ἄνθρωπος εἴη, ἰατρευόμενος, ἢ μηδὲ κάμνων ἀρχήν;
SOCRATES: Would a man, then, be happiest regarding his body in this way, by undergoing treatment, or by not being sick at all from the beginning?
ΠΩΛ. δῆλον ὅτι μηδὲ κάμνων.
POLUS: Clearly, by not being sick at all.
ΣΩ. οὐ γὰρ τοῦτʼ ἦν εὐδαιμονία, ὡς ἔοικε, κακοῦ ἀπαλλαγή, ἀλλὰ τὴν ἀρχὴν μηδὲ κτῆσις.
SOCRATES: For happiness, it seems, was not this—the riddance of evil—but rather not possessing it at all from the beginning.
ΠΩΛ. ἔστι ταῦτα.
POLUS: That is so.
ΣΩ. τί δέ;
SOCRATES: What about this?
ἀθλιώτερος πότερος δυοῖν ἐχόντοιν κακὸν εἴτʼ ἐν σώματι εἴτʼ ἐν ψυχῇ, ὁ ἰατρευόμενος καὶ ἀπαλλαττόμενος τοῦ κακοῦ, ἢ ὁ μὴ ἰατρευόμενος, ἔχων δέ;
Which of two people possessing evil, whether in body or in soul, is more wretched: the one who undergoes treatment and is rid of the evil, or the one who does not undergo treatment but keeps it?
ΠΩΛ. φαίνεταί μοι ὁ μὴ ἰατρευόμενος.
POLUS: It seems to me, the one who does not undergo treatment.
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν τὸ δίκην διδόναι μεγίστου κακοῦ ἀπαλλαγὴ ἦν, πονηρίας;
SOCRATES: And was paying the penalty a riddance of the greatest evil, namely, badness?
ΠΩΛ. ἦν γάρ.
POLUS: It was indeed.
ΣΩ. σωφρονίζει γάρ που καὶ δικαιοτέρους ποιεῖ καὶ ἰατρικὴ γίγνεται πονηρίας ἡ δίκη.
SOCRATES: For it disciplines, I believe, and makes people more just, and justice becomes a medicine for badness.
ΠΩΛ. ναί.
POLUS: Yes.
ΣΩ. εὐδαιμονέστατος μὲν ἄρα ὁ μὴ ἔχων κακίαν ἐν ψυχῇ, ἐπειδὴ τοῦτο μέγιστον τῶν κακῶν ἐφάνη.
SOCRATES: Therefore, the happiest is the one who does not have badness in his soul, since this was shown to be the greatest of evils.
ΠΩΛ. δῆλον δή.
POLUS: Clearly.
ΣΩ. δεύτερος δέ που ὁ ἀπαλλαττόμενος.
SOCRATES: And second, I suppose, is the one who is rid of it.
ΠΩΛ. ἔοικεν.
POLUS: It seems so.
ΣΩ. οὗτος δʼ ἦν ὁ νουθετούμενός τε καὶ ἐπιπληττόμενος καὶ δίκην διδούς.
SOCRATES: And this was the one who is admonished, rebuked, and pays the penalty.
ΠΩΛ. ναί.
POLUS: Yes.
ΣΩ. κάκιστα ἄρα ζῇ ὁ ἔχων καὶ μὴ ἀπαλλαττόμενος.
SOCRATES: Therefore, the one who lives worst is the one who possesses it and is not rid of it.
ΠΩΛ. φαίνεται.
POLUS: It seems so.