§481ΣΩ. τοὐναντίον δέ γε αὖ μεταβαλόντα, εἰ ἄρα δεῖ τινα κακῶς ποιεῖν, εἴτʼ ἐχθρὸν εἴτε ὁντινοῦν, ἐὰν μόνον μὴ αὐτὸς ἀδικῆται ὑπὸ τοῦ ἐχθροῦ—τοῦτο μὲν γὰρ εὐλαβητέον—ἐὰν δὲ ἄλλον ἀδικῇ ὁ ἐχθρός, παντὶ τρόπῳ παρασκευαστέον, καὶ πράττοντα καὶ λέγοντα, ὅπως μὴ δῷ δίκην μηδὲ ἔλθῃ παρὰ τὸν δικαστήν·
SOCRATES: But on the other hand, reversing this, if indeed one must do harm to someone, whether an enemy or anyone at all—provided only that one is not himself treated unjustly by the enemy, for this indeed must be guarded against—but if the enemy does injustice to another, one must prepare in every way, both by acting and by speaking, so that he does not pay the penalty nor go before the judge.
ἐὰν δὲ ἔλθῃ, μηχανητέον ὅπως ἂν διαφύγῃ καὶ μὴ δῷ δίκην ὁ ἐχθρός, ἀλλʼ ἐάντε χρυσίον ᾖ ἡρπακὼς πολύ, μὴ ἀποδιδῷ τοῦτο ἀλλʼ ἔχων ἀναλίσκῃ καὶ εἰς ἑαυτὸν καὶ εἰς τοὺς ἑαυτοῦ ἀδίκως καὶ ἀθέως, ἐάντε αὖ θανάτου ἄξια ἠδικηκὼς ᾖ, ὅπως μὴ ἀποθανεῖται, μάλιστα μὲν μηδέποτε, ἀλλʼ ἀθάνατος ἔσται πονηρὸς ὤν, εἰ δὲ μή, ὅπως ὡς πλεῖστον χρόνον βιώσεται τοιοῦτος ὤν.
And if he does go, one must scheme so that the enemy escapes and does not pay the penalty; rather, if he has stolen a great amount of gold, he should not return it, but keep it and spend it on himself and his own associates unjustly and godlessly, and if again he has committed injustices worthy of death, so that he will not die—ideally never, but will remain immortal, being wicked—or if not, so that he will live for as long a time as possible, being such.
ἐπὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ, ὦ Πῶλε, ἡ ῥητορικὴ χρήσιμος εἶναι, ἐπεὶ τῷ γε μὴ μέλλοντι ἀδικεῖν οὐ μεγάλη τίς μοι δοκεῖ ἡ χρεία αὐτῆς εἶναι, εἰ δὴ καὶ ἔστιν τις χρεία, ὡς ἔν γε τοῖς πρόσθεν οὐδαμῇ ἐφάνη οὖσα.
For such things, Polus, it seems to me that rhetoric is useful, since for one who does not intend to do injustice, its usefulness does not seem to me to be very great, if indeed there even is any usefulness, as in our previous discussion it appeared to be of no use at all.
ΚΑΛ. εἰπέ μοι, ὦ Χαιρεφῶν, σπουδάζει ταῦτα Σωκράτης ἢ παίζει;
CALLICLES: Tell me, Chaerephon, is Socrates in earnest about this, or is he playing?
ΧΑΙ. ἐμοὶ μὲν δοκεῖ, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, ὑπερφυῶς σπουδάζειν· οὐδὲν μέντοι οἷον τὸ αὐτὸν ἐρωτᾶν.
CHAEREPHON: To me indeed, Callicles, he seems to be exceptionally in earnest; however, there is nothing like asking him himself.
ΚΑΛ. νὴ τοὺς θεοὺς ἀλλʼ ἐπιθυμῶ.
CALLICLES: By the gods, but I do desire to!
εἰπέ μοι, ὦ Σώκρατες, πότερόν σε θῶμεν νυνὶ σπουδάζοντα ἢ παίζοντα;
Tell me, Socrates, whether we should assume you are now in earnest or playing?
εἰ μὲν γὰρ σπουδάζεις τε καὶ τυγχάνει ταῦτα ἀληθῆ ὄντα ἃ λέγεις, ἄλλο τι ἢ ἡμῶν ὁ βίος ἀνατετραμμένος ἂν εἴη τῶν ἀνθρώπων καὶ πάντα τὰ ἐναντία πράττομεν, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἢ ἃ δεῖ;
For if you are in earnest and these things you say happen to be true, wouldn't our human life be turned upside down, and we are doing, as it seems, all the opposite of what we ought?
ΣΩ. ὦ Καλλίκλεις, εἰ μή τι ἦν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις πάθος, τοῖς μὲν ἄλλο τι, τοῖς δὲ ἄλλο τι τὸ αὐτό, ἀλλά τις ἡμῶν ἴδιόν τι ἔπασχεν πάθος ἢ οἱ ἄλλοι, οὐκ ἂν ἦν ῥᾴδιον ἐνδείξασθαι τῷ ἑτέρῳ τὸ ἑαυτοῦ πάθημα.
SOCRATES: Callicles, if human beings did not share a certain common experience—some one experience, others another of the same kind—but instead one of us experienced some unique feeling different from the others, it would not be easy to make clear one's own experience to the other.
λέγω δʼ ἐννοήσας ὅτι ἐγώ τε καὶ σὺ νῦν τυγχάνομεν ταὐτόν τι πεπονθότες, ἐρῶντε δύο ὄντε δυοῖν ἑκάτερος, ἐγὼ μὲν Ἀλκιβιάδου τε τοῦ Κλεινίου καὶ φιλοσοφίας, σὺ δὲ δυοῖν, τοῦ τε Ἀθηναίων δήμου καὶ τοῦ Πυριλάμπους.
I say this because I perceive that you and I happen to have experienced the same thing: we are two lovers, each of two objects: I of Alcibiades, son of Cleinias, and of philosophy; you of two as well: the Athenian demos, and the son of Pyrilampes.
αἰσθάνομαι οὖν σου ἑκάστοτε, καίπερ ὄντος δεινοῦ, ὅτι ἂν φῇ σου τὰ παιδικὰ καὶ ὅπως ἂν φῇ ἔχειν, οὐ δυναμένου ἀντιλέγειν, ἀλλʼ ἄνω καὶ κάτω μεταβαλλομένου·
I notice, then, that on every occasion, despite being clever, whatever your beloved says and in whatever way he says things are, you are unable to contradict him, but shift up and down.
ἔν τε τῇ ἐκκλησίᾳ, ἐάν τι σοῦ λέγοντος ὁ δῆμος ὁ Ἀθηναίων μὴ φῇ οὕτως ἔχειν, μεταβαλλόμενος λέγεις ἃ ἐκεῖνος βούλεται, καὶ πρὸς τὸν Πυριλάμπους νεανίαν τὸν καλὸν τοῦτον τοιαῦτα ἕτερα πέπονθας.
And in the assembly, if the Athenian demos says things are not as you say they are when you speak, you shift and say what it wants; and you have a similar experience with respect to this beautiful youth, the son of Pyrilampes.