§476ΣΩ. ὁρᾷς οὖν, ὦ Πῶλε, ὁ ἔλεγχος παρὰ τὸν ἔλεγχον παραβαλλόμενος ὅτι οὐδὲν ἔοικεν, ἀλλὰ σοὶ μὲν οἱ ἄλλοι πάντες ὁμολογοῦσιν πλὴν ἐμοῦ, ἐμοὶ δὲ σὺ ἐξαρκεῖς εἷς ὢν μόνος καὶ ὁμολογῶν καὶ μαρτυρῶν, καὶ ἐγὼ σὲ μόνον ἐπιψηφίζων τοὺς ἄλλους ἐῶ χαίρειν.
SOCRATES: Do you see then, Polus, that when one refutation is compared with the other, they do not look alike at all? For you have all other people agreeing with you except me, but for me, you are sufficient, being one alone, agreeing and testifying; and I, taking only your vote, let the others go.
καὶ τοῦτο μὲν ἡμῖν οὕτως ἐχέτω·
Let this then be so for us.
μετὰ τοῦτο δὲ περὶ οὗ τὸ δεύτερον ἠμφεσβητήσαμεν σκεψώμεθα, τὸ ἀδικοῦντα διδόναι δίκην ἆρα μέγιστον τῶν κακῶν ἐστιν, ὡς σὺ ᾤου, ἢ μεῖζον τὸ μὴ διδόναι, ὡς αὖ ἐγὼ ᾤμην.
Next, let us consider what we disputed about second: whether for a wrongdoer to pay the penalty is indeed the greatest of evils, as you thought, or whether not paying it is a greater evil, as I on the contrary thought.
σκοπώμεθα δὲ τῇδε· τὸ διδόναι δίκην καὶ τὸ κολάζεσθαι δικαίως ἀδικοῦντα ἆρα τὸ αὐτὸ καλεῖς;
Let us look at it in this way: do you call paying the penalty and being justly disciplined the same thing for a wrongdoer?
ΠΩΛ. ἔγωγε.
POLUS: I do.
ΣΩ. ἔχεις οὖν λέγειν ὡς οὐχὶ τά γε δίκαια πάντα καλά ἐστιν, καθʼ ὅσον δίκαια;
SOCRATES: Can you then say that not all just things are beautiful, insofar as they are just?
καὶ διασκεψάμενος εἰπέ.
Consider and tell me.
ΠΩΛ. ἀλλά μοι δοκεῖ, ὦ Σώκρατες.
POLUS: No, they seem so to me, Socrates.
ΣΩ. σκόπει δὴ καὶ τόδε· ἆρα εἴ τίς τι ποιεῖ, ἀνάγκη τι εἶναι καὶ πάσχον ὑπὸ τούτου τοῦ ποιοῦντος;
SOCRATES: Consider then this too: if someone acts, must there be something that is acted upon by this actor?
ΠΩΛ. ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ.
POLUS: It seems so to me.
ΣΩ. ἆρα τοῦτο πάσχον ὃ τὸ ποιοῦν ποιεῖ, καὶ τοιοῦτον οἷον ποιεῖ τὸ ποιοῦν; λέγω δὲ τὸ τοιόνδε·
SOCRATES: And does the passive experience what the active does, and is it of the same sort as what the active does?
εἴ τις τύπτει, ἀνάγκη τι τύπτεσθαι;
I mean something like this: if someone strikes, is it necessary that something is struck?
ΠΩΛ. ἀνάγκη.
POLUS: Necessary.
ΣΩ. καὶ εἰ σφόδρα τύπτει ἢ ταχὺ ὁ τύπτων, οὕτω καὶ τὸ τυπτόμενον τύπτεσθαι;
SOCRATES: The one receiving the blow undergoes an effect corresponding to the action. If the one who strikes strikes hard or fast, is the one struck struck in that way?
ΠΩΛ. ναί.
POLUS: Yes.
ΣΩ. τοιοῦτον ἄρα πάθος τῷ τυπτομένῳ ἐστὶν οἷον ἂν τὸ τύπτον ποιῇ;
SOCRATES: So the passion of the one struck is of the same sort as the action of the striker?
ΠΩΛ. πάνυ γε.
POLUS: Certainly.
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν καὶ εἰ κάει τις, ἀνάγκη τι κάεσθαι;
SOCRATES: Then also if someone burns, must something be burned?
ΠΩΛ. πῶς γὰρ οὔ;
POLUS: How could it not be?
ΣΩ. καὶ εἰ σφόδρα γε κάει ἢ ἀλγεινῶς, οὕτω κάεσθαι τὸ καόμενον ὡς ἂν τὸ κᾶον κάῃ;
SOCRATES: And if he burns severely or painfully, is the burned thing burned in the way that the burner burns?
ΠΩΛ. πάνυ γε.
POLUS: Certainly.
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν καὶ εἰ τέμνει τι, ὁ αὐτὸς λόγος;
SOCRATES: Then also if someone cuts, does the same rational rule apply?
τέμνεται γάρ τι.
For something is cut.
ΠΩΛ. ναί.
POLUS: Yes.
ΣΩ. καὶ εἰ μέγα γε ἢ βαθὺ τὸ τμῆμα ἢ ἀλγεινόν, τοιοῦτον τμῆμα τέμνεται τὸ τεμνόμενον οἷον τὸ τέμνον τέμνει;
SOCRATES: And if the cut is large or deep or painful, is the thing cut cut in the same way as the cutting agent cuts?
ΠΩΛ. φαίνεται.
POLUS: It seems so.
ΣΩ. συλλήβδην δὴ ὅρα εἰ ὁμολογεῖς, ὃ ἄρτι ἔλεγον, περὶ πάντων, οἷον ἂν ποιῇ τὸ ποιοῦν, τοιοῦτον τὸ πάσχον πάσχειν.
SOCRATES: In short, see if you agree to what I was just saying about all things: that in whatever way the active agent acts, in that way the passive recipient experiences and is affected.
ΠΩΛ. ἀλλʼ ὁμολογῶ.
POLUS: I do agree.
ΣΩ. τούτων δὴ ὁμολογουμένων, τὸ δίκην διδόναι πότερον πάσχειν τί ἐστιν ἢ ποιεῖν;
SOCRATES: This being agreed, is paying the penalty a case of experiencing something or of doing something?
ΠΩΛ. ἀνάγκη, ὦ Σώκρατες, πάσχειν.
POLUS: Necessarily, Socrates, of experiencing.
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν ὑπό τινος ποιοῦντος;
SOCRATES: And is it not by some active agent?
ΠΩΛ. πῶς γὰρ οὔ;
POLUS: How could it not be?
ὑπό γε τοῦ κολάζοντος.
By the one who disciplines.
ΣΩ. ὁ δὲ ὀρθῶς κολάζων δικαίως κολάζει;
SOCRATES: And does the one who disciplines correctly discipline justly?
ΠΩΛ. ναί.
POLUS: Yes.
ΣΩ. δίκαια ποιῶν ἢ οὔ;
SOCRATES: Does he do just things or not?
ΠΩΛ. δίκαια.
POLUS: Just things.
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν ὁ κολαζόμενος δίκην διδοὺς δίκαια πάσχει;
SOCRATES: Therefore, is the one who is disciplined and pays the penalty experiencing just things?
ΠΩΛ. φαίνεται.
POLUS: It seems so.
ΣΩ. τὰ δὲ δίκαιά που καλὰ ὡμολόγηται;
SOCRATES: And just things, I believe, have been agreed to be beautiful?
ΠΩΛ. πάνυ γε.
POLUS: Certainly.
ΣΩ. τούτων ἄρα ὁ μὲν ποιεῖ καλά, ὁ δὲ πάσχει, ὁ κολαζόμενος.
SOCRATES: Therefore, of these two, the one does beautiful and beneficial things, and the other—the one being disciplined—experiences them.
ΠΩΛ. ναί.
POLUS: Yes.