Plato · Gorgias §475

Proof That Doing Injustice Is Worse Than Suffering It

Passage 20 of 53 · Greek

Summary

Socrates argues that since doing injustice is more shameful than suffering it, it must exceed it either in pain or in badness. Since doing injustice is not more painful, it must be worse (exceed in badness), forcing Polus to admit this conclusion.

§475ΠΩΛ. οὐκ ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ.

POLUS: It does not seem so to me.

ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν καὶ τὸ τῶν μαθημάτων κάλλος ὡσαύτως;

SOCRATES: Then is it not the same also with the beauty of studies?

ΠΩΛ. πάνυ γε· καὶ καλῶς γε νῦν ὁρίζῃ, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἡδονῇ τε καὶ ἀγαθῷ ὁριζόμενος τὸ καλόν.

POLUS: Yes, absolutely; and you define it beautifully now, Socrates, by defining the beautiful by pleasure and the good.

ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν τὸ αἰσχρὸν τῷ ἐναντίῳ, λύπῃ τε καὶ κακῷ;

SOCRATES: Then is not the shameful defined by the opposite, by pain and the bad?

ΠΩΛ. ἀνάγκη.

POLUS: Necessarily.

ΣΩ. ὅταν ἄρα δυοῖν καλοῖν θάτερον κάλλιον ᾖ, ἢ τῷ ἑτέρῳ τούτοιν ἢ ἀμφοτέροις ὑπερβάλλον κάλλιόν ἐστιν, ἤτοι ἡδονῇ ἢ ὠφελίᾳ ἢ ἀμφοτέροις.

SOCRATES: Therefore, when one of two beautiful things is more beautiful than the other, it is more beautiful by exceeding either in one of these two or in both, that is, either in pleasure or in utility or in both?

ΠΩΛ. πάνυ γε.

POLUS: Certainly.

ΣΩ. καὶ ὅταν δὲ δὴ δυοῖν αἰσχροῖν τὸ ἕτερον αἴσχιον ᾖ, ἤτοι λύπῃ ἢ κακῷ ὑπερβάλλον αἴσχιον ἔσται·

SOCRATES: And when in turn one of two shameful things is more shameful, it will be more shameful by exceeding either in pain or in badness; or is that not necessary?

ἢ οὐκ ἀνάγκη; ΠΩΛ. ναί.

POLUS: Yes.

ΣΩ. φέρε δή, πῶς ἐλέγετο νυνδὴ περὶ τοῦ ἀδικεῖν καὶ ἀδικεῖσθαι;

SOCRATES: Come then, what was being said just now about doing injustice and suffering it?

οὐκ ἔλεγες τὸ μὲν ἀδικεῖσθαι κάκιον εἶναι, τὸ δὲ ἀδικεῖν αἴσχιον;

Were you not saying that suffering injustice is worse, but doing it is more shameful?

ΠΩΛ. ἔλεγον.

POLUS: I was saying so.

ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν εἴπερ αἴσχιον τὸ ἀδικεῖν τοῦ ἀδικεῖσθαι, ἤτοι λυπηρότερόν ἐστιν καὶ λύπῃ ὑπερβάλλον αἴσχιον ἂν εἴη ἢ κακῷ ἢ ἀμφοτέροις;

SOCRATES: Then if indeed doing injustice is more shameful than suffering it, must it not be either more painful, and be more shameful by exceeding in pain, or in badness, or in both?

οὐ καὶ τοῦτο ἀνάγκη;

Is this too not necessary?

ΠΩΛ. πῶς γὰρ οὔ;

POLUS: How could it not be?

ΣΩ. πρῶτον μὲν δὴ σκεψώμεθα, ἆρα λύπῃ ὑπερβάλλει τὸ ἀδικεῖν τοῦ ἀδικεῖσθαι, καὶ ἀλγοῦσι μᾶλλον οἱ ἀδικοῦντες ἢ οἱ ἀδικούμενοι;

SOCRATES: First then let us consider, does doing injustice exceed suffering it in pain, and do those who do injustice suffer more pain than those who suffer it?

ΠΩΛ. οὐδαμῶς, ὦ Σώκρατες, τοῦτό γε.

POLUS: By no means, Socrates, at least not that.

ΣΩ. οὐκ ἄρα λύπῃ γε ὑπερέχει.

SOCRATES: Then it does not surpass in pain.

ΠΩΛ. οὐ δῆτα.

POLUS: Certainly not.

ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν εἰ μὴ λύπῃ, ἀμφοτέροις μὲν οὐκ ἂν ἔτι ὑπερβάλλοι.

SOCRATES: Then if not in pain, it could no longer exceed in both.

ΠΩΛ. οὐ φαίνεται.

POLUS: It seems not.

ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν τῷ ἑτέρῳ λείπεται.

SOCRATES: Therefore it is left with the other of the two.

ΠΩΛ. ναί.

POLUS: Yes.

ΣΩ. τῷ κακῷ.

SOCRATES: In the bad.

ΠΩΛ. ἔοικεν.

POLUS: It seems so.

ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν κακῷ ὑπερβάλλον τὸ ἀδικεῖν κάκιον ἂν εἴη τοῦ ἀδικεῖσθαι.

SOCRATES: Therefore, by exceeding in badness, doing injustice would be worse than suffering it.

ΠΩΛ. δῆλον δὴ ὅτι.

POLUS: It is indeed clear.

ΣΩ. ἄλλο τι οὖν ὑπὸ μὲν τῶν πολλῶν ἀνθρώπων καὶ ὑπὸ σοῦ ὡμολογεῖτο ἡμῖν ἐν τῷ ἔμπροσθεν χρόνῳ αἴσχιον εἶναι τὸ ἀδικεῖν τοῦ ἀδικεῖσθαι;

SOCRATES: Was it not agreed by us, then, in the time before, both by the majority of mankind and by you, that doing injustice is more shameful than suffering it?

ΠΩΛ. ναί.

POLUS: Yes.

ΣΩ. νῦν δέ γε κάκιον ἐφάνη.

SOCRATES: But now indeed it has appeared to be worse.

ΠΩΛ. ἔοικε.

POLUS: It seems so.

ΣΩ. δέξαιο ἂν οὖν σὺ μᾶλλον τὸ κάκιον καὶ τὸ αἴσχιον ἀντὶ τοῦ ἧττον;

SOCRATES: Would you then prefer the worse and the more shameful instead of the less so?

μὴ ὄκνει ἀποκρίνασθαι, ὦ Πῶλε·

Do not hesitate to answer, Polus; for you will not be harmed at all.

οὐδὲν γὰρ βλαβήσῃ· ἀλλὰ γενναίως τῷ λόγῳ ὥσπερ ἰατρῷ παρέχων ἀποκρίνου, καὶ ἢ φάθι ἢ μὴ ἃ ἐρωτῶ.

But submit yourself courageously to the argument as to a physician, and answer, and either say yes or no to what I ask.

ΠΩΛ. ἀλλʼ οὐκ ἂν δεξαίμην, ὦ Σώκρατες.

POLUS: But I would not prefer it, Socrates.

ΣΩ. ἄλλος δέ τις ἀνθρώπων;

SOCRATES: And would any other human being?

ΠΩΛ. οὔ μοι δοκεῖ κατά γε τοῦτον τὸν λόγον.

POLUS: It does not seem so to me, at least according to this argument.

ΣΩ. ἀληθῆ ἄρα ἐγὼ ἔλεγον, ὅτι οὔτʼ ἂν ἐγὼ οὔτʼ ἂν σὺ οὔτʼ ἄλλος οὐδεὶς ἀνθρώπων δέξαιτʼ ἂν μᾶλλον ἀδικεῖν ἢ ἀδικεῖσθαι· κάκιον γὰρ τυγχάνει ὄν.

SOCRATES: Then I was saying the truth, that neither I nor you nor any other human being would prefer doing injustice to suffering it; for it actually is worse.

ΠΩΛ. φαίνεται.

POLUS: It seems so.

Notes

475aὁρίζῃ — Although the form is a middle-passive second-person singular, it is used here in an active sense of the middle voice (indirect middle), meaning 'defining for oneself' or 'making a definition'.
475dἄλλο τι οὖν — An idiomatic expression arising from the ellipsis of ἤ from ἄλλο τι ἤ. It functions as a strong affirmative question expecting a positive answer, equivalent to the Latin 'nonne' ('is it not the case that...').
475dπαρέχων — The reflexive pronoun ἑαυτόν is omitted here, and the participle is used intransitively to mean 'submitting or offering oneself' to the argument (τῷ λόγῳ), just as to a physician (ὥσπερ ἰατρῷ).

Cite this passage

Plato, Gorgias §475. Humanitext Reader, https://reader.humanitext.ai/en/text/urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0059.tlg023.humanitext-grc2:475

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