§473ΠΩΛ. ἄτοπά γε, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐπιχειρεῖς λέγειν.
POLUS: You are attempting to say strange things, Socrates!
ΣΩ. πειράσομαι δέ γε καὶ σὲ ποιῆσαι, ὦ ἑταῖρε, ταὐτὰ ἐμοὶ λέγειν· φίλον γάρ σε ἡγοῦμαι.
SOCRATES: But I shall try, my friend, to make you too say the same things as I do; for I consider you a friend.
νῦν μὲν οὖν ἃ διαφερόμεθα ταῦτʼ ἐστιν· σκόπει δὲ καὶ σύ.
Now, these are the things we differ about; consider them yourself too.
εἶπον ἐγώ που ἐν τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν τὸ ἀδικεῖν τοῦ ἀδικεῖσθαι κάκιον εἶναι.
I said, I believe, somewhere in what went before, that doing injustice is worse than suffering injustice.
ΠΩΛ. πάνυ γε.
POLUS: Certainly.
ΣΩ. σὺ δὲ τὸ ἀδικεῖσθαι.
SOCRATES: But you said suffering injustice is worse.
ΠΩΛ. ναί.
POLUS: Yes.
ΣΩ. καὶ τοὺς ἀδικοῦντας ἀθλίους ἔφην εἶναι ἐγώ, καὶ ἐξηλέγχθην ὑπὸ σοῦ.
SOCRATES: And I said that those who do injustice are miserable, and I was refuted by you.
ΠΩΛ. ναὶ μὰ Δία.
POLUS: Yes, by Zeus!
ΣΩ. ὡς σύ γε οἴει, ὦ Πῶλε.
SOCRATES: As you indeed believe, Polus.
ΠΩΛ. ἀληθῆ γε οἰόμενος.
POLUS: And believing what is true, at any rate.
ΣΩ. ἴσως.
SOCRATES: Perhaps.
σὺ δέ γε εὐδαίμονας αὖ τοὺς ἀδικοῦντας, ἐὰν μὴ διδῶσι δίκην.
But you in turn believe that those who do injustice are happy, if they do not pay the penalty.
ΠΩΛ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν.
POLUS: Yes, absolutely.
ΣΩ. ἐγὼ δέ γε αὐτοὺς ἀθλιωτάτους φημί, τοὺς δὲ διδόντας δίκην ἧττον.
SOCRATES: But I say they are most miserable, and those who pay the penalty are less so.
βούλει καὶ τοῦτο ἐλέγχειν;
Do you wish to refute this too?
ΠΩΛ. ἀλλʼ ἔτι τοῦτʼ ἐκείνου χαλεπώτερόν ἐστιν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐξελέγξαι.
POLUS: Why, this is even more difficult to refute than that, Socrates!
ΣΩ. οὐ δῆτα, ὦ Πῶλε, ἀλλʼ ἀδύνατον· τὸ γὰρ ἀληθὲς οὐδέποτε ἐλέγχεται.
SOCRATES: Not at all, Polus, but impossible; for the truth is never refuted.
ΠΩΛ. πῶς λέγεις;
POLUS: How do you mean?
ἐὰν ἀδικῶν ἄνθρωπος ληφθῇ τυραννίδι ἐπιβουλεύων, καὶ ληφθεὶς στρεβλῶται καὶ ἐκτέμνηται καὶ τοὺς ὀφθαλμοὺς ἐκκάηται, καὶ ἄλλας πολλὰς καὶ μεγάλας καὶ παντοδαπὰς λώβας αὐτός τε λωβηθεὶς καὶ τοὺς αὑτοῦ ἐπιδὼν παῖδάς τε καὶ γυναῖκα τὸ ἔσχατον ἀνασταυρωθῇ ἢ καταπιττωθῇ, οὗτος εὐδαιμονέστερος ἔσται ἢ ἐὰν διαφυγὼν τύραννος καταστῇ καὶ ἄρχων ἐν τῇ πόλει διαβιῷ ποιῶν ὅτι ἂν βούληται, ζηλωτὸς ὢν καὶ εὐδαιμονιζόμενος ὑπὸ τῶν πολιτῶν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ξένων;
If a man is caught acting unjustly, plotting to set up a tyranny, and having been caught, is tortured on the wheel, castrated, has his eyes burned out, and having himself suffered many other great and various outrages and seen his own children and wife suffer them, is finally crucified or smeared with pitch and burned to death—will this man be happier than if he escapes, becomes tyrant, lives out his life ruling in the city, doing whatever he wishes, envied and congratulated on his happiness by the citizens and other foreigners?
ταῦτα λέγεις ἀδύνατον εἶναι ἐξελέγχειν;
Is this what you say is impossible to refute?
ΣΩ. μορμολύττῃ αὖ, ὦ γενναῖε Πῶλε, καὶ οὐκ ἐλέγχεις· ἄρτι δὲ ἐμαρτύρου.
SOCRATES: You are trying to frighten me with bogies again, noble Polus, and are not refuting me; just now you were calling witnesses.
ὅμως δὲ ὑπόμνησόν με σμικρόν. ἐὰν ἀδίκως ἐπιβουλεύων τυραννίδι, εἶπες;
But still, remind me of one small thing: "if he plots unjustly to set up a tyranny," you said?
ΠΩΛ. ἔγωγε.
POLUS: I did.
ΣΩ. εὐδαιμονέστερος μὲν τοίνυν οὐδέποτε ἔσται οὐδέτερος αὐτῶν, οὔτε ὁ κατειργασμένος τὴν τυραννίδα ἀδίκως οὔτε ὁ διδοὺς δίκην—δυοῖν γὰρ ἀθλίοιν εὐδαιμονέστερος μὲν οὐκ ἂν εἴη—ἀθλιώτερος μέντοι ὁ διαφεύγων καὶ τυραννεύσας.
SOCRATES: Then neither of them will ever be happier, neither the one who has successfully established the tyranny unjustly, nor the one who pays the penalty—for of two miserable men, one could not be happier—yet the one who escapes and becomes tyrant is indeed more miserable.
τί τοῦτο, ὦ Πῶλε;
What is this, Polus?
γελᾷς;
Are you laughing?
ἄλλο αὖ τοῦτο εἶδος ἐλέγχου ἐστίν, ἐπειδάν τίς τι εἴπῃ, καταγελᾶν, ἐλέγχειν δὲ μή;
Is this in turn another form of refutation, to laugh when someone says something, but not to refute?
ΠΩΛ. οὐκ οἴει ἐξεληλέγχθαι, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὅταν τοιαῦτα λέγῃς ἃ οὐδεὶς ἂν φήσειεν ἀνθρώπων;
POLUS: Do you not think you have been refuted, Socrates, when you say things such as no human being would say?
ἐπεὶ ἐροῦ τινα τουτωνί.
For ask any of these people here.
§474ΣΩ. ὦ Πῶλε, οὐκ εἰμὶ τῶν πολιτικῶν, καὶ πέρυσι βουλεύειν λαχών, ἐπειδὴ ἡ φυλὴ ἐπρυτάνευε καὶ ἔδει με ἐπιψηφίζειν, γέλωτα παρεῖχον καὶ οὐκ ἠπιστάμην ἐπιψηφίζειν.
SOCRATES: Polus, I am not one of the politicians, and last year, having been chosen by lot to be on the Council, when my tribe was presiding and it was my duty to put the vote, I presented a laughable spectacle and did not know how to put the vote.
μὴ οὖν μηδὲ νῦν με κέλευε ἐπιψηφίζειν τοὺς παρόντας, ἀλλʼ εἰ μὴ ἔχεις τούτων βελτίω ἔλεγχον, ὅπερ νυνδὴ ἐγὼ ἔλεγον, ἐμοὶ ἐν τῷ μέρει παράδος, καὶ πείρασαι τοῦ ἐλέγχου οἷον ἐγὼ οἶμαι δεῖν εἶναι.
So do not bid me now either to put the vote to those present, but if you do not have a better refutation than these, hand the turn over to me, as I was just saying, and try the kind of refutation that I think there ought to be.
ἐγὼ γὰρ ὧν ἂν λέγω ἕνα μὲν παρασχέσθαι μάρτυρα ἐπίσταμαι, αὐτὸν πρὸς ὃν ἄν μοι ὁ λόγος ᾖ, τοὺς δὲ πολλοὺς ἐῶ χαίρειν, καὶ ἕνα ἐπιψηφίζειν ἐπίσταμαι, τοῖς δὲ πολλοῖς οὐδὲ διαλέγομαι. ὅρα οὖν εἰ ἐθελήσεις ἐν τῷ μέρει διδόναι ἔλεγχον ἀποκρινόμενος τὰ ἐρωτώμενα.
For I know how to produce one witness for the things I say, namely the very person with whom my discussion is, but I let the many go; and I know how to take the vote of one, but I do not even converse with the many.
ἐγὼ γὰρ δὴ οἶμαι καὶ ἐμὲ καὶ σὲ καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ἀνθρώπους τὸ ἀδικεῖν τοῦ ἀδικεῖσθαι κάκιον ἡγεῖσθαι καὶ τὸ μὴ διδόναι δίκην τοῦ διδόναι.
See then if you will be willing to submit to refutation in your turn by answering the questions.
ΠΩΛ. ἐγὼ δέ γε οὔτʼ ἐμὲ οὔτʼ ἄλλον ἀνθρώπων οὐδένα.
For I certainly think that both I and you and other human beings believe that doing injustice is worse than suffering it, and not paying the penalty is worse than paying it.
ἐπεὶ σὺ δέξαιʼ ἂν μᾶλλον ἀδικεῖσθαι ἢ ἀδικεῖν;
POLUS: And I say that neither I nor any other human being believes so.
ΣΩ. καὶ σύ γʼ ἂν καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι πάντες.
For would you rather suffer injustice than do it?
ΠΩΛ. πολλοῦ γε δεῖ, ἀλλʼ οὔτʼ ἐγὼ οὔτε σὺ οὔτʼ ἄλλος οὐδείς.
SOCRATES: Yes, and you would too, and everyone else.
ΣΩ. οὔκουν ἀποκρινῇ;
POLUS: Far from it!
ΠΩΛ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν·
Neither I, nor you, nor anyone else.
καὶ γὰρ ἐπιθυμῶ εἰδέναι ὅτι ποτʼ ἐρεῖς.
SOCRATES: Will you not answer then?
ΣΩ. λέγε δή μοι, ἵνʼ εἰδῇς, ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ ἐξ ἀρχῆς σε ἠρώτων·
POLUS: Yes, indeed; for I am eager to know what on earth you will say.
πότερον δοκεῖ σοι, ὦ Πῶλε, κάκιον εἶναι, τὸ ἀδικεῖν ἢ τὸ ἀδικεῖσθαι;
SOCRATES: Tell me then, so that you may know, just as if I were asking you from the beginning: which of the two seems to you, Polus, to be worse, doing injustice or suffering it?
ΠΩΛ. τὸ ἀδικεῖσθαι ἔμοιγε.
POLUS: Suffering it, in my opinion.
ΣΩ. τί δὲ δή;
SOCRATES: What about this?
αἴσχιον πότερον τὸ ἀδικεῖν ἢ τὸ ἀδικεῖσθαι;
Which is shameful, doing injustice or suffering it?
ἀποκρίνου.
Answer.
ΠΩΛ. τὸ ἀδικεῖν.
POLUS: Doing injustice.
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν καὶ κάκιον, εἴπερ αἴσχιον.
SOCRATES: Is it not therefore also worse, if indeed it is more shameful?
ΠΩΛ. ἥκιστά γε.
POLUS: Not in the least.
ΣΩ. μανθάνω· οὐ ταὐτὸν ἡγῇ σύ, ὡς ἔοικας, καλόν τε καὶ ἀγαθὸν καὶ κακὸν καὶ αἰσχρόν.
SOCRATES: I understand; you do not, as it seems, consider the beautiful and the good, and the bad and the shameful, to be the same.
ΠΩΛ. οὐ δῆτα.
POLUS: Certainly not.
ΣΩ. τί δὲ τόδε;
SOCRATES: But what about this?
τὰ καλὰ πάντα, οἷον καὶ σώματα καὶ χρώματα καὶ σχήματα καὶ φωνὰς καὶ ἐπιτηδεύματα, εἰς οὐδὲν ἀποβλέπων καλεῖς ἑκάστοτε καλά;
All beautiful things, such as bodies, colors, shapes, voices, and practices—do you call them beautiful each time without looking to anything?
οἷον πρῶτον τὰ σώματα τὰ καλὰ οὐχὶ ἤτοι κατὰ τὴν χρείαν λέγεις καλὰ εἶναι, πρὸς ὃ ἂν ἕκαστον χρήσιμον ᾖ, πρὸς τοῦτο, ἢ κατὰ ἡδονήν τινα, ἐὰν ἐν τῷ θεωρεῖσθαι χαίρειν ποιῇ τοὺς θεωροῦντας;
For instance, first, do you not say that beautiful bodies are beautiful either on account of their usefulness, for whatever purpose each is useful, or on account of some pleasure, if they make those who look at them rejoice in viewing them?
ἔχεις τι ἐκτὸς τούτων λέγειν περὶ σώματος κάλλους;
Have you anything else to say besides these about the beauty of a body?
ΠΩΛ. οὐκ ἔχω.
POLUS: I have not.
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν καὶ τἆλλα πάντα οὕτω καὶ σχήματα καὶ χρώματα ἢ διὰ ἡδονήν τινα ἢ διὰ ὠφελίαν ἢ διʼ ἀμφότερα καλὰ προσαγορεύεις;
SOCRATES: Then do you also address all other things—both shapes and colors—as beautiful either because of some pleasure, or because of some utility, or because of both?
ΠΩΛ. ἔγωγε.
POLUS: I do.
ΣΩ. οὐ καὶ τὰς φωνὰς καὶ τὰ κατὰ τὴν μουσικὴν πάντα ὡσαύτως;
SOCRATES: And do you not also address voices and all things in music in the same way?
ΠΩΛ. ναί.
POLUS: Yes.
ΣΩ. καὶ μὴν τά γε κατὰ τοὺς νόμους καὶ τὰ ἐπιτηδεύματα οὐ δήπου ἐκτὸς τούτων ἐστίν, τὰ καλά, τοῦ ἢ ὠφέλιμα εἶναι ἢ ἡδέα ἢ ἀμφότερα.
SOCRATES: And indeed, things in laws and practices, the beautiful ones, are surely not outside of these, namely, of being either useful or pleasant or both.