Humanitext Reader

Plato · Gorgias §468

Actions Aimed at the Good and the Tyrant's Impotence

Passage 15 of 53 · Greek

Summary

Socrates and Polus agree that human actions always aim at the "good" rather than the "intermediate" things themselves, concluding that those who act without intelligence do not do what they wish and thus do not possess true great power.

§468ΣΩ. τὰ δὲ μήτε ἀγαθὰ μήτε κακὰ ἆρα τοιάδε λέγεις, ἃ ἐνίοτε μὲν μετέχει τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ, ἐνίοτε δὲ τοῦ κακοῦ, ἐνίοτε δὲ οὐδετέρου, οἷον καθῆσθαι καὶ βαδίζειν καὶ τρέχειν καὶ πλεῖν, καὶ οἷον αὖ λίθους καὶ ξύλα καὶ τἆλλα τὰ τοιαῦτα;
SOCRATES: And do you mean that the things which are neither good nor bad are such as sometimes partake of the good, sometimes of the bad, and sometimes of neither, such as sitting, walking, running, and sailing, and again, like stones and wood and other such things?
οὐ ταῦτα λέγεις;
Is it not these you mean?
ἢ ἄλλʼ ἄττα καλεῖς τὰ μήτε ἀγαθὰ μήτε κακά;
Or do you call something else things which are neither good nor bad?
ΠΩΛ. οὔκ, ἀλλὰ ταῦτα.
POLUS: No, but these.
ΣΩ. πότερον οὖν τὰ μεταξὺ ταῦτα ἕνεκα τῶν ἀγαθῶν πράττουσιν ὅταν πράττωσιν, ἢ τἀγαθὰ τῶν μεταξύ;
SOCRATES: Do they then do these intermediate things, when they do them, for the sake of the good things, or the good things for the sake of the intermediate things?
ΠΩΛ. τὰ μεταξὺ δήπου τῶν ἀγαθῶν.
POLUS: Surely the intermediate things for the sake of the good things.
ΣΩ. τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἄρα διώκοντες καὶ βαδίζομεν ὅταν βαδίζωμεν, οἰόμενοι βέλτιον εἶναι, καὶ τὸ ἐναντίον ἕσταμεν ὅταν ἑστῶμεν, τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἕνεκα, τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ· ἢ οὔ;
SOCRATES: Therefore, it is in pursuit of the good that we both walk when we walk, thinking it is better, and on the contrary, we stand still when we stand still, for the sake of the same thing, the good; or is it not so?
ΠΩΛ. ναί.
POLUS: Yes.
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν καὶ ἀποκτείνυμεν, εἴ τινʼ ἀποκτείνυμεν, καὶ ἐκβάλλομεν καὶ ἀφαιρούμεθα χρήματα, οἰόμενοι ἄμεινον εἶναι ἡμῖν ταῦτα ποιεῖν ἢ μή;
SOCRATES: And so too we kill, if we kill anyone, and banish and strip of property, thinking it is better for us to do these things than not?
ΠΩΛ. πάνυ γε.
POLUS: Quite so.
ΣΩ. ἕνεκʼ ἄρα τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἅπαντα ταῦτα ποιοῦσιν οἱ ποιοῦντες.
SOCRATES: It is then for the sake of the good that those who do all these things do them.
ΠΩΛ. φημί.
POLUS: I say so.
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν ὡμολογήσαμεν, ἃ ἕνεκά του ποιοῦμεν, μὴ ἐκεῖνα βούλεσθαι, ἀλλʼ ἐκεῖνο οὗ ἕνεκα ταῦτα ποιοῦμεν;
SOCRATES: Did we not then agree that, as for the things we do for the sake of something, we do not wish for those things themselves, but for that for the sake of which we do them?
ΠΩΛ. μάλιστα.
POLUS: Most certainly.
ΣΩ. οὐκ ἄρα σφάττειν βουλόμεθα οὐδʼ ἐκβάλλειν ἐκ τῶν πόλεων οὐδὲ χρήματα ἀφαιρεῖσθαι ἁπλῶς οὕτως, ἀλλʼ ἐὰν μὲν ὠφέλιμα ᾖ ταῦτα, βουλόμεθα πράττειν αὐτά, βλαβερὰ δὲ ὄντα οὐ βουλόμεθα.
SOCRATES: Then we do not wish to slaughter people, or banish them from cities, or strip them of property simply in this way, but if these things are beneficial, we wish to do them, but if they are harmful, we do not wish to.
τὰ γὰρ ἀγαθὰ βουλόμεθα, ὡς φῂς σύ, τὰ δὲ μήτε ἀγαθὰ μήτε κακὰ οὐ βουλόμεθα, οὐδὲ τὰ κακά.
For we wish for the good things, as you say, but we do not wish for the things which are neither good nor bad, nor for the bad things.
ἦ γάρ;
Is that not so?
ἀληθῆ σοι δοκῶ λέγειν, ὦ Πῶλε, ἢ οὔ;
Do I seem to you to speak the truth, Polus, or not?
τί οὐκ ἀποκρίνῃ;
Why do you not answer?
ΠΩΛ. ἀληθῆ.
POLUS: True.
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν εἴπερ ταῦτα ὁμολογοῦμεν, εἴ τις ἀποκτείνει τινὰ ἢ ἐκβάλλει ἐκ πόλεως ἢ ἀφαιρεῖται χρήματα, εἴτε τύραννος ὢν εἴτε ῥήτωρ, οἰόμενος ἄμεινον εἶναι αὐτῷ, τυγχάνει δὲ ὂν κάκιον, οὗτος δήπου ποιεῖ ἃ δοκεῖ αὐτῷ· ἦ γάρ;
SOCRATES: Then if we agree on these things, if someone—whether he is a tyrant or a rhetorician—kills anyone or banishes him from the city or strips him of property, thinking it is better for him, but it happens to be worse, this person surely does what seems fit to him; is that not so?
ΠΩΛ. ναί.
POLUS: Yes.
ΣΩ. ἆρʼ οὖν καὶ ἃ βούλεται, εἴπερ τυγχάνει ταῦτα κακὰ ὄντα;
SOCRATES: Is it then also what he wishes, if indeed these things happen to be bad?
τί οὐκ ἀποκρίνῃ;
Why do you not answer?
ΠΩΛ. ἀλλʼ οὔ μοι δοκεῖ ποιεῖν ἃ βούλεται.
POLUS: Indeed, it does not seem to me that he does what he wishes.
ΣΩ. ἔστιν οὖν ὅπως ὁ τοιοῦτος μέγα δύναται ἐν τῇ πόλει ταύτῃ, εἴπερ ἐστὶ τὸ μέγα δύνασθαι ἀγαθόν τι κατὰ τὴν σὴν ὁμολογίαν;
SOCRATES: Is there then any way that such a person has great power in this city, if indeed having great power is something good according to your agreement?
ΠΩΛ. οὐκ ἔστιν.
POLUS: There is not.
ΣΩ. ἀληθῆ ἄρα ἐγὼ ἔλεγον, λέγων ὅτι ἔστιν ἄνθρωπον ποιοῦντα ἐν πόλει ἃ δοκεῖ αὐτῷ μὴ μέγα δύνασθαι μηδὲ ποιεῖν ἃ βούλεται.
SOCRATES: Then I was speaking the truth when I said that it is possible for a person who does what seems fit to him in a city not to have great power nor to do what he wishes.
ΠΩΛ. ὡς δὴ σύ, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὐκ ἂν δέξαιο ἐξεῖναί σοι ποιεῖν ὅτι δοκεῖ σοι ἐν τῇ πόλει μᾶλλον ἢ μή, οὐδὲ ζηλοῖς ὅταν ἴδῃς τινὰ ἢ ἀποκτείναντα ὃν ἔδοξεν αὐτῷ ἢ ἀφελόμενον χρήματα ἢ δήσαντα.
POLUS: As if you, Socrates, would not accept the freedom to do whatever seems fit to you in the city rather than not, or do not feel envy when you see someone who has either killed whomsoever he saw fit, or stripped him of property, or bound him!
ΣΩ. δικαίως λέγεις ἢ ἀδίκως;
SOCRATES: Do you mean justly or unjustly?

Notes

  1. 468bτὰ μεταξὺ δήπου τῶν ἀγαθῶν — Meaning "Surely we do the intermediate things for the sake of the good things." In response to the preceding question "πὸτερον... ἢ...", the verb πράττομεν (or πράττουσιν) and the preposition ἕνεκα are omitted.
  2. 468cἃ ἕνεκά του ποιοῦμεν, μὴ ἐκεῖνα βούλεσθαι — The clause introduced by the relative pronoun ἃ ("the things we do for the sake of something") serves as the object of the infinitive βούλεσθαι, which depends on the verb of agreement ὡμολογήσαμεν. The relative clause without an explicit antecedent is placed at the beginning of the sentence for emphasis.
  3. 468eὡς δὴ σύ, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὐκ ἂν δέξαιο... — The particles ὡς δή express strong irony or counter-argument ("as if... indeed"), here governing the potential optative with ἄν (οὐκ ἂν δέξαιο), meaning "as if you, Socrates, would not accept..."

Cite this passage

Plato, Gorgias §468. Humanitext Reader, https://reader.humanitext.ai/en/text/urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0059.tlg023.humanitext-grc2:468

Please note the AI-draft status of the translation and the date accessed.

Translation, notes and summary are AI-generated drafts, revised through reader feedback.