§469ΠΩΛ. ὁπότερʼ ἂν ποιῇ, οὐκ ἀμφοτέρως ζηλωτόν ἐστιν;
POLUS: Whichever of the two he does, is it not enviable in either case?
ΣΩ. εὐφήμει, ὦ Πῶλε.
SOCRATES: Speak words of good omen, Polus.
ΠΩΛ. τί δή;
POLUS: Why so?
ΣΩ. ὅτι οὐ χρὴ οὔτε τοὺς ἀζηλώτους ζηλοῦν οὔτε τοὺς ἀθλίους, ἀλλʼ ἐλεεῖν.
SOCRATES: Because one ought not to envy those who are unenviable nor those who are miserable, but to pity them.
ΠΩΛ. τί δέ;
POLUS: What?
οὕτω σοι δοκεῖ ἔχειν περὶ ὧν ἐγὼ λέγω τῶν ἀνθρώπων;
Does it seem to you to be so with the men of whom I speak?
ΣΩ. πῶς γὰρ οὔ;
SOCRATES: Why, how could it not?
ΠΩΛ. ὅστις οὖν ἀποκτείνυσιν ὃν ἂν δόξῃ αὐτῷ, δικαίως ἀποκτεινύς, ἄθλιος δοκεῖ σοι εἶναι καὶ ἐλεινός;
POLUS: Does he then, who kills whomever he sees fit, killing him justly, seem to you to be miserable and pitiable?
ΣΩ. οὐκ ἔμοιγε, οὐδὲ μέντοι ζηλωτός.
SOCRATES: Not to me, indeed, yet certainly not enviable either.
ΠΩΛ. οὐκ ἄρτι ἄθλιον ἔφησθα εἶναι;
POLUS: Did you not just now say he was miserable?
ΣΩ. τὸν ἀδίκως γε, ὦ ἑταῖρε, ἀποκτείναντα, καὶ ἐλεινόν γε πρός· τὸν δὲ δικαίως ἀζήλωτον.
SOCRATES: I meant the one who kills unjustly, my friend, and pitiable indeed as well; but the one who does so justly is unenviable.
ΠΩΛ. ἦ που ὅ γε ἀποθνῄσκων ἀδίκως ἐλεινός τε καὶ ἄθλιός ἐστιν.
POLUS: Surely, I suppose, the one who dies unjustly is both pitiable and miserable.
ΣΩ. ἧττον ἢ ὁ ἀποκτεινύς, ὦ Πῶλε, καὶ ἧττον ἢ ὁ δικαίως ἀποθνῄσκων.
SOCRATES: Less so than the one who kills, Polus, and less so than the one who dies justly.
ΠΩΛ. πῶς δῆτα, ὦ Σώκρατες;
POLUS: How can that be, Socrates?
ΣΩ. οὕτως, ὡς μέγιστον τῶν κακῶν τυγχάνει ὂν τὸ ἀδικεῖν.
SOCRATES: Thus, since doing injustice happens to be the greatest of evils.
ΠΩΛ. ἦ γὰρ τοῦτο μέγιστον;
POLUS: Is this indeed the greatest?
οὐ τὸ ἀδικεῖσθαι μεῖζον;
Is not suffering injustice greater?
ΣΩ. ἥκιστά γε.
SOCRATES: Not in the least.
ΠΩΛ. σὺ ἄρα βούλοιο ἂν ἀδικεῖσθαι μᾶλλον ἢ ἀδικεῖν;
POLUS: Would you then wish rather to suffer injustice than to do injustice?
ΣΩ. βουλοίμην μὲν ἂν ἔγωγε οὐδέτερα· εἰ δʼ ἀναγκαῖον εἴη ἀδικεῖν ἢ ἀδικεῖσθαι, ἑλοίμην ἂν μᾶλλον ἀδικεῖσθαι ἢ ἀδικεῖν.
SOCRATES: I should wish indeed for neither; but if it were necessary either to do injustice or to suffer it, I should choose rather to suffer injustice than to do it.
ΠΩΛ. σὺ ἄρα τυραννεῖν οὐκ ἂν δέξαιο;
POLUS: Would you then not accept being a tyrant?
ΣΩ. οὔκ, εἰ τὸ τυραννεῖν γε λέγεις ὅπερ ἐγώ.
SOCRATES: Not if you mean by "being a tyrant" the same thing as I do.
ΠΩΛ. ἀλλʼ ἔγωγε τοῦτο λέγω ὅπερ ἄρτι, ἐξεῖναι ἐν τῇ πόλει, ὃ ἂν δοκῇ αὐτῷ, ποιεῖν τοῦτο, καὶ ἀποκτεινύντι καὶ ἐκβάλλοντι καὶ πάντα πράττοντι κατὰ τὴν αὐτοῦ δόξαν.
POLUS: But I mean by it what I said just now: to have the power in the city to do whatever seems fit to him, whether by killing, or banishing, or doing everything according to his own opinion.
ΣΩ. ὦ μακάριε, ἐμοῦ δὴ λέγοντος τῷ λόγῳ ἐπιλαβοῦ.
SOCRATES: My admirable friend, then take hold of my argument while I speak.
εἰ γὰρ ἐγὼ ἐν ἀγορᾷ πληθούσῃ λαβὼν ὑπὸ μάλης ἐγχειρίδιον λέγοιμι πρὸς σὲ ὅτι
ὦ Πῶλε, ἐμοὶ δύναμίς τις καὶ τυραννὶς θαυμασία ἄρτι προσγέγονεν· ἐὰν γὰρ ἄρα ἐμοὶ δόξῃ τινὰ τουτωνὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων ὧν σὺ ὁρᾷς αὐτίκα μάλα δεῖν τεθνάναι, τεθνήξει οὗτος ὃν ἂν δόξῃ· κἄν τινα δόξῃ μοι τῆς κεφαλῆς αὐτῶν καταγῆναι δεῖν, κατεαγὼς ἔσται αὐτίκα μάλα, κἂν θοἰμάτιον διεσχίσθαι, διεσχισμένον ἔσται—οὕτω μέγα ἐγὼ δύναμαι ἐν τῇδε τῇ πόλει,
εἰ οὖν ἀπιστοῦντί σοι δείξαιμι τὸ ἐγχειρίδιον, ἴσως ἂν εἴποις ἰδὼν ὅτι
ὦ Σώκρατες, οὕτω μὲν πάντες ἂν μέγα δύναιντο, ἐπεὶ κἂν ἐμπρησθείη οἰκία τούτῳ τῷ τρόπῳ ἥντινά σοι δοκοῖ, καὶ τά γε Ἀθηναίων νεώρια καὶ αἱ τριήρεις καὶ τὰ πλοῖα πάντα καὶ τὰ δημόσια καὶ τὰ ἴδια· ἀλλʼ οὐκ ἄρα τοῦτʼ ἔστιν τὸ μέγα δύνασθαι, τὸ ποιεῖν ἃ δοκεῖ αὐτῷ· ἢ δοκεῖ σοι;
For if I, in a crowded marketplace, having taken a dagger under my arm, should say to you: "Polus, a certain wonderful power and tyranny has just now come to me; for if indeed I see fit that any of these men whom you see here should die on the spot, he whom I see fit shall be dead; and if I see fit that any of them should have his head broken, it shall be broken on the spot, and if his cloak should be torn, it shall be torn—so great is my power in this city." If then, while you were disbelieving, I should show you the dagger, you would perhaps say on seeing it: "Socrates, in this way everyone would have great power, since any house which you saw fit might be burned in this manner, and even the Athenian dockyards and triremes and all the vessels, both public and private." But then this is not what it is to have great power, namely doing what seems fit to one; or does it seem so to you?
ΠΩΛ. οὐ δῆτα οὕτω γε.
POLUS: Not indeed in that way.