§466ΣΩ. ἐὰν μὲν οὖν καὶ ἐγὼ σοῦ ἀποκρινομένου μὴ ἔχω ὅτι χρήσωμαι, ἀπότεινε καὶ σὺ λόγον, ἐὰν δὲ ἔχω, ἔα με χρῆσθαι·
SOCRATES: If, then, when you answer, I also do not know what to make of it, you too stretch out a speech; but if I do, let me use it, for that is just.
δίκαιον γάρ. καὶ νῦν ταύτῃ τῇ ἀποκρίσει εἴ τι ἔχεις χρῆσθαι, χρῶ.
And now, if you can make any use of this answer of mine, do so.
ΠΩΛ. τί οὖν φῄς;
POLUS: What do you say, then?
κολακεία δοκεῖ σοι εἶναι ἡ ῥητορική;
Does rhetoric seem to you to be flattery?
ΣΩ. κολακείας μὲν οὖν ἔγωγε εἶπον μόριον.
SOCRATES: I said indeed it was a part of flattery.
ἀλλʼ οὐ μνημονεύεις τηλικοῦτος ὤν, ὦ Πῶλε;
But do you not remember at your age, Polus?
τί τάχα δράσεις;
What will you do next?
ΠΩΛ. ἆρʼ οὖν δοκοῦσί σοι ὡς κόλακες ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι φαῦλοι νομίζεσθαι οἱ ἀγαθοὶ ῥήτορες;
POLUS: Do the good rhetoricians then seem to you to be regarded in their cities as worthless flatterers?
ΣΩ. ἐρώτημα τοῦτʼ ἐρωτᾷς ἢ λόγου τινὸς ἀρχὴν λέγεις;
SOCRATES: Is this a question you are asking, or are you starting some argument?
ΠΩΛ. ἐρωτῶ ἔγωγε.
POLUS: I am asking, indeed.
ΣΩ. οὐδὲ νομίζεσθαι ἔμοιγε δοκοῦσιν.
SOCRATES: They do not seem to me to be regarded at all.
ΠΩΛ. πῶς οὐ νομίζεσθαι;
POLUS: How not regarded?
οὐ μέγιστον δύνανται ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν;
Do they not have the greatest power in their cities?
ΣΩ. οὔκ, εἰ τὸ δύνασθαί γε λέγεις ἀγαθόν τι εἶναι τῷ δυναμένῳ.
SOCRATES: No, not if you mean that having power is something good for the one who has it.
ΠΩΛ. ἀλλὰ μὴν λέγω γε.
POLUS: But indeed I do say so.
ΣΩ. ἐλάχιστον τοίνυν μοι δοκοῦσι τῶν ἐν τῇ πόλει δύνασθαι οἱ ῥήτορες.
SOCRATES: Then the rhetoricians seem to me to have the least power of those in the city.
ΠΩΛ. τί δέ;
POLUS: What?
οὐχ, ὥσπερ οἱ τύραννοι, ἀποκτεινύασίν τε ὃν ἂν βούλωνται, καὶ ἀφαιροῦνται χρήματα καὶ ἐκβάλλουσιν ἐκ τῶν πόλεων ὃν ἂν δοκῇ αὐτοῖς;
Do they not, like tyrants, kill whomsoever they wish, and strip of property, and banish from the cities whomsoever they see fit?
ΣΩ. νὴ τὸν κύνα, ἀμφιγνοῶ μέντοι, ὦ Πῶλε, ἐφʼ ἑκάστου ὧν λέγεις πότερον αὐτὸς ταῦτα λέγεις καὶ γνώμην σαυτοῦ ἀποφαίνῃ, ἢ ἐμὲ ἐρωτᾷς.
SOCRATES: By the dog, I am actually in doubt, Polus, regarding each of the things you say, whether you are saying these things yourself and declaring your own opinion, or asking me.
ΠΩΛ. ἀλλʼ ἔγωγε σὲ ἐρωτῶ.
POLUS: But indeed I am asking you.
ΣΩ. εἶεν, ὦ φίλε·
SOCRATES: Very well, my friend.
ἔπειτα δύο ἅμα με ἐρωτᾷς;
Then are you asking me two questions at once?
ΠΩΛ. πῶς δύο;
POLUS: How two?
ΣΩ. οὐκ ἄρτι οὕτω πως ἔλεγες· ἦ οὐχὶ ἀποκτεινύασιν οἱ ῥήτορες οὓς ἂν βούλωνται, ὥσπερ οἱ τύραννοι, καὶ χρήματα ἀφαιροῦνται καὶ ἐξελαύνουσιν ἐκ τῶν πόλεων ὃν ἂν δοκῇ αὐτοῖς;
SOCRATES: Did you not just now say something like this: "Do not the rhetoricians kill whomsoever they wish, like tyrants, and strip of property, and banish from the cities whomsoever they see fit?" POLUS: I did.
ΠΩΛ. ἔγωγε. ΣΩ. λέγω τοίνυν σοι ὅτι δύο ταῦτʼ ἐστιν τὰ ἐρωτήματα, καὶ ἀποκρινοῦμαί γέ σοι πρὸς ἀμφότερα.
SOCRATES: I tell you then that these are two questions, and I will answer you to both.
φημὶ γάρ, ὦ Πῶλε, ἐγὼ καὶ τοὺς ῥήτορας καὶ τοὺς τυράννους δύνασθαι μὲν ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν σμικρότατον, ὥσπερ νυνδὴ ἔλεγον· οὐδὲν γὰρ ποιεῖν ὧν βούλονται ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν, ποιεῖν μέντοι ὅτι ἂν αὐτοῖς δόξῃ βέλτιστον εἶναι.
For I say, Polus, that both the rhetoricians and the tyrants have the least power in their cities, just as I was saying; for they do almost nothing of what they wish, though they do whatever seems to them to be best.
ΠΩΛ. οὐκοῦν τοῦτο ἔστιν τὸ μέγα δύνασθαι;
POLUS: Is this not then having great power?
ΣΩ. οὔχ, ὥς γέ φησιν πῶλος.
SOCRATES: No, not according to what Polus says, at least.
ΠΩΛ. ἐγὼ οὔ φημι;
POLUS: I say not?
φημὶ μὲν οὖν ἔγωγε.
Indeed, I do say so.
ΣΩ. μὰ τὸν—οὐ σύ γε, ἐπεὶ τὸ μέγα δύνασθαι ἔφης ἀγαθὸν εἶναι τῷ δυναμένῳ.
SOCRATES: By the—no, you do not, since you said that having great power is something good for the one who has power.
ΠΩΛ. φημὶ γὰρ οὖν.
POLUS: Yes, indeed I do.
ΣΩ. ἀγαθὸν οὖν οἴει εἶναι, ἐάν τις ποιῇ ταῦτα ἃ ἂν δοκῇ αὐτῷ βέλτιστα εἶναι, νοῦν μὴ ἔχων;
SOCRATES: Do you then think it is good, if someone does those things which seem to him to be best, when he has no intelligence?
καὶ τοῦτο καλεῖς σὺ μέγα δύνασθαι;
And do you call this having great power?
ΠΩΛ. οὐκ ἔγωγε.
POLUS: Not I.
§467ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν ἀποδείξεις τοὺς ῥήτορας νοῦν ἔχοντας καὶ τέχνην τὴν ῥητορικὴν ἀλλὰ μὴ κολακείαν, ἐμὲ ἐξελέγξας;
SOCRATES: Will you not then prove that the rhetoricians have intelligence and that rhetoric is an art and not flattery, by refuting me?
εἰ δέ με ἐάσεις ἀνέλεγκτον, οἱ ῥήτορες οἱ ποιοῦντες ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν ἃ δοκεῖ αὐτοῖς καὶ οἱ τύραννοι οὐδὲν ἀγαθὸν τοῦτο κεκτήσονται, ἡ δὲ δύναμίς ἐστιν, ὡς σὺ φῄς, ἀγαθόν, τὸ δὲ ποιεῖν ἄνευ νοῦ ἃ δοκεῖ καὶ σὺ ὁμολογεῖς κακὸν εἶναι· ἢ οὔ;
But if you leave me unrefuted, the rhetoricians who do in their cities what seems fit to them, and the tyrants, will have acquired no good in this, though power is, as you say, a good, and doing what seems fit without intelligence is, as you also agree, an evil; or is it not?
ΠΩΛ. ἔγωγε.
POLUS: Yes, I do.
ΣΩ. πῶς ἂν οὖν οἱ ῥήτορες μέγα δύναιντο ἢ οἱ τύραννοι ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν, ἐὰν μὴ Σωκράτης ἐξελεγχθῇ ὑπὸ Πώλου ὅτι ποιοῦσιν ἃ βούλονται;
SOCRATES: How then could the rhetoricians or the tyrants have great power in their cities, unless Socrates is refuted by Polus that they do what they wish?
ΠΩΛ. οὗτος ἀνήρ—
ΣΩ. οὔ φημι ποιεῖν αὐτοὺς ἃ βούλονται· ἀλλά μʼ ἔλεγχε.
POLUS: This fellow— SOCRATES: I say they do not do what they wish; but refute me!
ΠΩΛ. οὐκ ἄρτι ὡμολόγεις ποιεῖν ἃ δοκεῖ αὐτοῖς βέλτιστα εἶναι,;
POLUS: Did you not just now agree that they do what seems best to them?
ΣΩ. καὶ γὰρ νῦν ὁμολογῶ.
SOCRATES: Yes, and I agree to it now too.
ΠΩΛ. οὐκ οὖν ποιοῦσιν ἃ βούλονται;
POLUS: Do they not then do what they wish?
ΣΩ. οὔ φημι.
SOCRATES: I say they do not.
ΠΩΛ. ποιοῦντες ἃ δοκεῖ αὐτοῖς;
POLUS: While doing what seems fit to them?
ΣΩ. φημί.
SOCRATES: I say so, yes.
ΠΩΛ. σχέτλιά γε λέγεις καὶ ὑπερφυῆ, ὦ Σώκρατες.
POLUS: You say outrageous and extraordinary things, Socrates!
ΣΩ. μὴ κακηγόρει, ὦ λῷστε Πῶλε, ἵνα προσείπω σε κατὰ σέ· ἀλλʼ εἰ μὲν ἔχεις ἐμὲ ἐρωτᾶν, ἐπίδειξον ὅτι ψεύδομαι, εἰ δὲ μή, αὐτὸς ἀποκρίνου.
SOCRATES: Do not speak ill, my excellent Polus, that I may address you in your own style; but if you have questions to ask me, show that I am lying, but if not, answer yourself.
ΠΩΛ. ἀλλʼ ἐθέλω ἀποκρίνεσθαι, ἵνα καὶ εἰδῶ ὅτι λέγεις.
POLUS: But I am willing to answer, so that I may also know what you mean.
ΣΩ. πότερον οὖν σοι δοκοῦσιν οἱ ἄνθρωποι τοῦτο βούλεσθαι ὃ ἂν πράττωσιν ἑκάστοτε, ἢ ἐκεῖνο οὗ ἕνεκα πράττουσιν τοῦθʼ ὃ πράττουσιν;
SOCRATES: Do people then seem to you to wish for that which they do on each occasion, or for that for the sake of which they do what they do?
οἷον οἱ τὰ φάρμακα πίνοντες παρὰ τῶν ἰατρῶν πότερόν σοι δοκοῦσιν τοῦτο βούλεσθαι ὅπερ ποιοῦσιν, πίνειν τὸ φάρμακον καὶ ἀλγεῖν, ἢ ἐκεῖνο, τὸ ὑγιαίνειν, οὗ ἕνεκα πίνουσιν;
For instance, do those who drink medicine from doctors seem to you to wish for that which they do, namely, to drink the medicine and suffer pain, or for that other thing, to be healthy, for the sake of which they drink it?
ΠΩΛ. δῆλον ὅτι τὸ ὑγιαίνειν.
POLUS: Clearly, to be healthy.
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν καὶ οἱ πλέοντές τε καὶ τὸν ἄλλον χρηματισμὸν χρηματιζόμενοι οὐ τοῦτό ἐστιν ὃ βούλονται, ὃ ποιοῦσιν ἑκάστοτε (τίς γὰρ βούλεται πλεῖν τε καὶ κινδυνεύειν καὶ πράγματʼ ἔχειν; ) ἀλλʼ ἐκεῖνο οἶμαι οὗ ἕνεκα πλέουσιν, πλουτεῖν· πλούτου γὰρ ἕνεκα πλέουσιν.
SOCRATES: Then also those who sail and engage in other business do not wish for that which they do on each occasion (for who wishes to sail and run risks and have trouble?), but they wish, I think, for that for the sake of which they sail, namely, to be rich; for they sail for the sake of wealth.
ΠΩΛ. πάνυ γε.
POLUS: Quite so.
ΣΩ. ἄλλο τι οὖν οὕτω καὶ περὶ πάντων;
SOCRATES: Is it then not so with everything?
ἐάν τίς τι πράττῃ ἕνεκά του, οὐ τοῦτο βούλεται ὃ πράττει, ἀλλʼ ἐκεῖνο οὗ ἕνεκα πράττει;
If someone does something for the sake of something, he does not wish for that which he does, but for that for the sake of which he does it?
ΠΩΛ. ναί.
POLUS: Yes.
ΣΩ. ἆρʼ οὖν ἔστιν τι τῶν ὄντων ὃ οὐχὶ ἤτοι ἀγαθόν γʼ ἐστὶν ἢ κακὸν ἢ μεταξὺ τούτων, οὔτε ἀγαθὸν οὔτε κακόν;
SOCRATES: Is there then anything in existence which is not either good, or bad, or intermediate between these, neither good nor bad?
ΠΩΛ. πολλὴ ἀνάγκη, ὦ Σώκρατες.
POLUS: It is absolutely necessary, Socrates.
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν λέγεις εἶναι ἀγαθὸν μὲν σοφίαν τε καὶ ὑγίειαν καὶ πλοῦτον καὶ τἆλλα τὰ τοιαῦτα, κακὰ δὲ τἀναντία τούτων;
SOCRATES: Do you then say that wisdom, health, wealth, and other such things are good, and their opposites bad?
ΠΩΛ. ἔγωγε.
POLUS: I do indeed.