§464ΣΩ. ἀλλʼ ἐγὼ πειράσομαι φράσαι ὅ γέ μοι φαίνεται εἶναι ἡ ῥητορική· εἰ δὲ μὴ τυγχάνει ὂν τοῦτο, πῶλος ὅδε ἐλέγξει.
ΣΩ. But I will try to explain what rhetoric seems to me to be; and if it does not happen to be this, this Polus here will refute me.
σῶμά που καλεῖς τι καὶ ψυχήν; ΓΟΡ. πῶς γὰρ οὔ; ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν καὶ τούτων οἴει τινὰ εἶναι ἑκατέρου εὐεξίαν; ΓΟΡ. ἔγωγε. ΣΩ. τί δέ;
You call something body and something soul, do you not? ΓΟΡ. Of course. ΣΩ. Then do you also believe there is a state of good health for each of these? ΓΟΡ. I do. ΣΩ. What then?
δοκοῦσαν μὲν εὐεξίαν, οὖσαν δʼ οὔ;
A health that seems to be, but is not?
οἷον τοιόνδε λέγω· πολλοὶ δοκοῦσιν εὖ ἔχειν τὰ σώματα, οὓς οὐκ ἂν ῥᾳδίως αἴσθοιτό τις ὅτι οὐκ εὖ ἔχουσιν, ἀλλʼ ἢ ἰατρός τε καὶ τῶν γυμναστικῶν τις. ΓΟΡ. ἀληθῆ λέγεις.
I mean something like this: many people seem to have their bodies in good condition, and no one would easily notice that they are not in good condition, except a doctor or one of the trainers. ΓΟΡ. You speak the truth. ΣΩ.
ΣΩ. τὸ τοιοῦτον λέγω καὶ ἐν σώματι εἶναι καὶ ἐν ψυχῇ, ὃ ποιεῖ μὲν δοκεῖν εὖ ἔχειν τὸ σῶμα καὶ τὴν ψυχήν, ἔχει δὲ οὐδὲν μᾶλλον. ΓΟΡ. ἔστι ταῦτα.
I say that such a thing exists both in the body and in the soul, which makes the body and the soul seem to be in good condition, though they are not so at all. ΓΟΡ. This is so. ΣΩ.
ΣΩ. φέρε δή σοι, ἐὰν δύνωμαι, σαφέστερον ἐπιδείξω ὃ λέγω.
Come then, if I can, I will show you more clearly what I mean.
δυοῖν ὄντοιν τοῖν πραγμάτοιν δύο λέγω τέχνας· τὴν μὲν ἐπὶ τῇ ψυχῇ πολιτικὴν καλῶ, τὴν δὲ ἐπὶ σώματι μίαν μὲν οὕτως ὀνομάσαι οὐκ ἔχω σοι, μιᾶς δὲ οὔσης τῆς τοῦ σώματος θεραπείας δύο μόρια λέγω, τὴν μὲν γυμναστικήν, τὴν δὲ ἰατρικήν·
Since there are two things, I say there are two arts: the one for the soul I call politics, but the one for the body I cannot name for you as one, but while the care of the body is one, I say there are two parts of it, gymnastics and medicine.
τῆς δὲ πολιτικῆς ἀντὶ μὲν τῆς γυμναστικῆς τὴν νομοθετικήν, ἀντίστροφον δὲ τῇ ἰατρικῇ τὴν δικαιοσύνην.
And in politics, corresponding to gymnastics, there is legislation, and as the counterpart to medicine, justice.
ἐπικοινωνοῦσι μὲν δὴ ἀλλήλαις, ἅτε περὶ τὸ αὐτὸ οὖσαι, ἑκάτεραι τούτων, ἥ τε ἰατρικὴ τῇ γυμναστικῇ καὶ ἡ δικαιοσύνη τῇ νομοθετικῇ· ὅμως δὲ διαφέρουσίν τι ἀλλήλων.
Now these indeed share with each other, since they are about the same thing, each of these pairs—medicine with gymnastics, and justice with legislation—yet they differ somewhat from each other.
τεττάρων δὴ τούτων οὐσῶν, καὶ ἀεὶ πρὸς τὸ βέλτιστον θεραπευουσῶν τῶν μὲν τὸ σῶμα, τῶν δὲ τὴν ψυχήν, ἡ κολακευτικὴ αἰσθομένη —οὐ γνοῦσα λέγω ἀλλὰ στοχασαμένη—τέτραχα ἑαυτὴν διανείμασα, ὑποδῦσα ὑπὸ ἕκαστον τῶν μορίων, προσποιεῖται εἶναι τοῦτο ὅπερ ὑπέδυ, καὶ τοῦ μὲν βελτίστου οὐδὲν φροντίζει, τῷ δὲ ἀεὶ ἡδίστῳ θηρεύεται τὴν ἄνοιαν καὶ ἐξαπατᾷ, ὥστε δοκεῖ πλείστου ἀξία εἶναι.
There being then these four, and they always caring, the one pair for the body, the other for the soul, for what is best, flattery, having perceived this—I do not say having known but having guessed—having divided itself into four, and having crept under each of the parts, pretends to be that which it has crept under, and cares nothing for what is best, but with what is always most pleasant it hunts after folly and deceives, so that it seems to be of the greatest value.
ὑπὸ μὲν οὖν τὴν ἰατρικὴν ἡ ὀψοποιικὴ ὑποδέδυκεν, καὶ προσποιεῖται τὰ βέλτιστα σιτία τῷ σώματι εἰδέναι, ὥστʼ εἰ δέοι ἐν παισὶ διαγωνίζεσθαι ὀψοποιόν τε καὶ ἰατρόν, ἢ ἐν ἀνδράσιν οὕτως ἀνοήτοις ὥσπερ οἱ παῖδες, πότερος ἐπαΐει περὶ τῶν χρηστῶν σιτίων καὶ πονηρῶν, ὁ ἰατρὸς ἢ ὁ ὀψοποιός, λιμῷ ἂν ἀποθανεῖν τὸν ἰατρόν.
Under medicine, then, cookery has crept, and pretends to know the best foods for the body, so that if a cook and a doctor had to compete before children, or before men as foolish as children, as to which of them knows about good and bad foods, the doctor or the cook, the doctor would die of hunger.
§465ΣΩ. κολακείαν μὲν οὖν αὐτὸ καλῶ, καὶ αἰσχρόν φημι εἶναι τὸ τοιοῦτον, ὦ Πῶλε—τοῦτο γὰρ πρὸς σὲ λέγω—ὅτι τοῦ ἡδέος στοχάζεται ἄνευ τοῦ βελτίστου· τέχνην δὲ αὐτὴν οὔ φημι εἶναι ἀλλʼ ἐμπειρίαν, ὅτι οὐκ ἔχει λόγον οὐδένα ᾧ προσφέρει ἃ προσφέρει ὁποῖʼ ἄττα τὴν φύσιν ἐστίν, ὥστε τὴν αἰτίαν ἑκάστου μὴ ἔχειν εἰπεῖν.
ΣΩ. This, then, I call flattery, and I say such a thing is ugly, Polus—for I say this to you—because it aims at the pleasant without the best; and I say it is not an art but an experience, because it has no account to give of the nature of the things which it applies, by which it applies them, so that it cannot tell the cause of each.
ἐγὼ δὲ τέχνην οὐ καλῶ ὃ ἂν ᾖ ἄλογον πρᾶγμα· τούτων δὲ πέρι εἰ ἀμφισβητεῖς, ἐθέλω ὑποσχεῖν λόγον.
And I do not call an art that which is an irrational thing; but if you dispute about these things, I am willing to submit to an argument.
τῇ μὲν οὖν ἰατρικῇ, ὥσπερ λέγω, ἡ ὀψοποιικὴ κολακεία ὑπόκειται· τῇ δὲ γυμναστικῇ κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον τοῦτον ἡ κομμωτική, κακοῦργός τε καὶ ἀπατηλὴ καὶ ἀγεννὴς καὶ ἀνελεύθερος, σχήμασιν καὶ χρώμασιν καὶ λειότητι καὶ ἐσθῆσιν ἀπατῶσα, ὥστε ποιεῖν ἀλλότριον κάλλος ἐφελκομένους τοῦ οἰκείου τοῦ διὰ τῆς γυμναστικῆς ἀμελεῖν.
Under medicine, then, as I say, the flattery of cookery is placed; and under gymnastics, in this same way, cosmetics, which is mischievous and deceptive and ignoble and illiberal, deceiving with shapes and colors and smoothness and clothing, so as to make people acquire an alien beauty and neglect their own which comes through gymnastics.
ἵνʼ οὖν μὴ μακρολογῶ, ἐθέλω σοι εἰπεῖν ὥσπερ οἱ γεωμέτραι—ἤδη γὰρ ἂν ἴσως ἀκολουθήσαις—ὅτι ὃ κομμωτικὴ πρὸς γυμναστικήν, τοῦτο σοφιστικὴ πρὸς νομοθετικήν, καὶ ὅτι ὃ ὀψοποιικὴ πρὸς ἰατρικήν, τοῦτο ῥητορικὴ πρὸς δικαιοσύνην.
So, that I may not speak at length, I am willing to tell you as the geometers do—for by now you would perhaps follow—that what cosmetics is to gymnastics, sophistry is to legislation, and what cookery is to medicine, rhetoric is to justice.
ὅπερ μέντοι λέγω, διέστηκε μὲν οὕτω φύσει, ἅτε δʼ ἐγγὺς ὄντων φύρονται ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ καὶ περὶ ταὐτὰ σοφισταὶ καὶ ῥήτορες, καὶ οὐκ ἔχουσιν ὅτι χρήσονται οὔτε αὐτοὶ ἑαυτοῖς οὔτε οἱ ἄλλοι ἄνθρωποι τούτοις.
However, as I say, although they are thus distinguished by nature, yet because they are close, sophists and rhetoricians are jumbled together in the same place and about the same things, and they do not know what to make of themselves, nor do other men know what to make of them.
καὶ γὰρ ἄν, εἰ μὴ ἡ ψυχὴ τῷ σώματι ἐπεστάτει, ἀλλʼ αὐτὸ αὑτῷ, καὶ μὴ ὑπὸ ταύτης κατεθεωρεῖτο καὶ διεκρίνετο ἥ τε ὀψοποιικὴ καὶ ἡ ἰατρική, ἀλλʼ αὐτὸ τὸ σῶμα ἔκρινε σταθμώμενον ταῖς χάρισι ταῖς πρὸς αὑτό, τὸ τοῦ Ἀναξαγόρου ἂν πολὺ ἦν, ὦ φίλε Πῶλε—σὺ γὰρ τούτων ἔμπειρος—ὁμοῦ ἂν πάντα χρήματα ἐφύρετο ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ, ἀκρίτων ὄντων τῶν τε ἰατρικῶν καὶ ὑγιεινῶν καὶ ὀψοποιικῶν.
For indeed, if the soul did not rule the body, but the body ruled itself, and if cookery and medicine were not examined and distinguished by the soul, but the body itself judged, measuring by the pleasures directed toward itself, the saying of Anaxagoras would be realized to a high degree, my dear Polus—for you are experienced in these things—all things would be jumbled together in the same place, and medical, healthy, and culinary matters would be undistinguished.
ὃ μὲν οὖν ἐγώ φημι τὴν ῥητορικὴν εἶναι, ἀκήκοας· ἀντίστροφον ὀψοποιίας ἐν ψυχῇ, ὡς ἐκεῖνο ἐν σώματι.
What I say rhetoric is, then, you have heard: a counterpart of cookery in the soul, as that is in the body.
ἴσως μὲν οὖν ἄτοπον πεποίηκα, ὅτι σε οὐκ ἐῶν μακροὺς λόγους λέγειν αὐτὸς συχνὸν λόγον ἀποτέτακα.
Perhaps, then, I have done a strange thing, because, while not allowing you to make long speeches, I myself have stretched out a long discourse.
ἄξιον μὲν οὖν ἐμοὶ συγγνώμην ἔχειν ἐστίν· λέγοντος γάρ μου βραχέα οὐκ ἐμάνθανες, οὐδὲ χρῆσθαι τῇ ἀποκρίσει ἥν σοι ἀπεκρινάμην οὐδὲν οἷός τʼ ἦσθα, ἀλλʼ ἐδέου διηγήσεως.
It is indeed right to forgive me; for when I spoke briefly you did not understand, nor were you able to make any use of the answer I gave you, but you needed an explanation.