§460ΓΟΡ. ἀλλʼ ἐγὼ μὲν οἶμαι, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐὰν τύχῃ μὴ εἰδώς, καὶ ταῦτα παρʼ ἐμοῦ μαθήσεται. ΣΩ. ἔχε δή·
ΓΟΡ. But I indeed think, Socrates, that if he happens not to know, he will learn these things from me as well. ΣΩ.
καλῶς γὰρ λέγεις.
Hold on there; for you speak well.
ἐάνπερ ῥητορικὸν σύ τινα ποιήσῃς, ἀνάγκη αὐτὸν εἰδέναι τὰ δίκαια καὶ τὰ ἄδικα ἤτοι πρότερόν γε ἢ ὕστερον μαθόντα παρὰ σοῦ.
If you indeed make someone a rhetorician, it is necessary that he know what is just and what is unjust, either having learned them beforehand or later from you.
ΓΟΡ. πάνυ γε. ΣΩ. τί οὖν;
ΓΟΡ. Quite so. ΣΩ. What then?
ὁ τὰ τεκτονικὰ μεμαθηκὼς τεκτονικός, ἢ οὔ; ΓΟΡ. ναί.
Is the one who has learned carpentry a carpenter, or not? ΓΟΡ.
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν καὶ ὁ τὰ μουσικὰ μουσικός; ΓΟΡ. ναί.
Yes. ΣΩ. Then is the one who has learned music a musician? ΓΟΡ.
ΣΩ. καὶ ὁ τὰ ἰατρικὰ ἰατρικός;
Yes. ΣΩ. And the one who has learned medicine a physician?
καὶ τἆλλα οὕτω κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον, ὁ μεμαθηκὼς ἕκαστα τοιοῦτός ἐστιν οἷον ἡ ἐπιστήμη ἕκαστον ἀπεργάζεται; ΓΟΡ. πάνυ γε.
And the other things likewise according to the same argument, is the one who has learned each thing such as each science produces? ΓΟΡ.
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν κατὰ τοῦτον τὸν λόγον καὶ ὁ τὰ δίκαια μεμαθηκὼς δίκαιος; ΓΟΡ. πάντως δήπου.
Quite so. ΣΩ. Then according to this argument, is the one who has learned what is just also just? ΓΟΡ.
ΣΩ. ὁ δὲ δίκαιος δίκαιά που πράττει. ΓΟΡ. ναί.
Assuredly, of course. ΣΩ. And the just man surely does just deeds. ΓΟΡ. Yes.
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν ἀνάγκη τὸν ῥητορικὸν δίκαιον εἶναι, τὸν δὲ δίκαιον βούλεσθαι δίκαια πράττειν; ΓΟΡ. φαίνεταί γε.
ΣΩ. Then is it necessary that the rhetorician be just, and that the just man wishes to do just deeds? ΓΟΡ. So it appears, at least. ΣΩ.
ΣΩ. οὐδέποτε ἄρα βουλήσεται ὅ γε δίκαιος ἀδικεῖν. ΓΟΡ. ἀνάγκη.
Then the just man will never wish to do injustice. ΓΟΡ.
ΣΩ. τὸν δὲ ῥητορικὸν ἀνάγκη ἐκ τοῦ λόγου δίκαιον εἶναι. ΓΟΡ. ναί.
Necessarily. ΣΩ. And the rhetorician is necessary to be just from the argument. ΓΟΡ.
ΣΩ. οὐδέποτε ἄρα βουλήσεται ὁ ῥητορικὸς ἀδικεῖν. ΓΟΡ. οὐ φαίνεταί γε.
Yes. ΣΩ. Therefore, the rhetorician will never wish to do injustice. ΓΟΡ.
ΣΩ. μέμνησαι οὖν λέγων ὀλίγῳ πρότερον ὅτι οὐ δεῖ τοῖς παιδοτρίβαις ἐγκαλεῖν οὐδʼ ἐκβάλλειν ἐκ τῶν πόλεων, ἐὰν ὁ πύκτης τῇ πυκτικῇ χρῆταί τε καὶ ἀδίκως χρῆται καὶ ἀδικῇ, ὡσαύτως δὲ οὕτως καὶ ἐὰν ὁ ῥήτωρ τῇ ῥητορικῇ ἀδίκως χρῆται, μὴ τῷ διδάξαντι ἐγκαλεῖν μηδʼ ἐξελαύνειν ἐκ τῆς πόλεως, ἀλλὰ τῷ ἀδικοῦντι καὶ οὐκ ὀρθῶς χρωμένῳ τῇ ῥητορικῇ;
So it does not appear, at least. ΣΩ. Do you remember, then, saying a little earlier that one ought not to accuse physical trainers nor expel them from cities if the boxer uses boxing and uses it unjustly and does injustice, and likewise in the same way if the rhetorician uses rhetoric unjustly, one ought not to accuse the teacher nor drive him out of the city, but the one who does injustice and does not use rhetoric correctly?
ἐρρήθη ταῦτα ἢ οὔ; ΓΟΡ. ἐρρήθη.
Were these things said or not? ΓΟΡ.
ΣΩ. νῦν δέ γε ὁ αὐτὸς οὗτος φαίνεται, ὁ ῥητορικός, οὐκ ἄν ποτε ἀδικήσας. ἢ οὔ; ΓΟΡ. φαίνεται.
They were said. ΣΩ. But now, this very same person, the rhetorician, appears never to be able to do injustice, does he not? ΓΟΡ.
ΣΩ. καὶ ἐν τοῖς πρώτοις γε, ὦ Γοργία, λόγοις ἐλέγετο ὅτι ἡ ῥητορικὴ περὶ λόγους εἴη οὐ τοὺς τοῦ ἀρτίου καὶ περιττοῦ, ἀλλὰ τοὺς τοῦ δικαίου καὶ ἀδίκου· ἦ γάρ; ΓΟΡ. ναί.
So it appears. ΣΩ. And in the first arguments, Gorgias, it was said that rhetoric is about speeches, not those concerning the even and the odd, but those concerning the just and the unjust; was that not so? ΓΟΡ. Yes.
§461ΣΩ. ἐγὼ τοίνυν σου τότε ταῦτα λέγοντος ὑπέλαβον ὡς οὐδέποτʼ ἂν εἴη ἡ ῥητορικὴ ἄδικον πρᾶγμα, ὅ γʼ ἀεὶ περὶ δικαιοσύνης τοὺς λόγους ποιεῖται· ἐπειδὴ δὲ ὀλίγον ὕστερον ἔλεγες ὅτι ὁ ῥήτωρ τῇ ῥητορικῇ κἂν ἀδίκως χρῷτο, οὕτω θαυμάσας καὶ ἡγησάμενος οὐ συνᾴδειν τὰ λεγόμενα ἐκείνους εἶπον τοὺς λόγους, ὅτι εἰ μὲν κέρδος ἡγοῖο εἶναι τὸ ἐλέγχεσθαι ὥσπερ ἐγώ, ἄξιον εἴη διαλέγεσθαι, εἰ δὲ μή, ἐᾶν χαίρειν.
ΣΩ. Now, when you were saying these things then, I supposed that rhetoric would never be an unjust thing, since it always makes its speeches about justice; but when a little later you were saying that the rhetorician might use rhetoric even unjustly, I wondered, and thinking that the statements were not in harmony, I spoke those words, saying that if you thought it a gain to be refuted as I do, it would be worthwhile to converse, but if not, to let it go.
ὕστερον δὲ ἡμῶν ἐπισκοπουμένων ὁρᾷς δὴ καὶ αὐτὸς ὅτι αὖ ὁμολογεῖται τὸν ῥητορικὸν ἀδύνατον εἶναι ἀδίκως χρῆσθαι τῇ ῥητορικῇ καὶ ἐθέλειν ἀδικεῖν.
But later, as we examine it, you see indeed yourself that it is agreed again that it is impossible for the rhetorician to use rhetoric unjustly and to wish to do injustice.
ταῦτα οὖν ὅπῃ ποτὲ ἔχει, μὰ τὸν κύνα, ὦ Γοργία, οὐκ ὀλίγης συνουσίας ἐστὶν ὥστε ἱκανῶς διασκέψασθαι. ΠΩΛ. τί δέ, ὦ Σώκρατες;
By the dog, Gorgias, how on earth this stands is not a matter of a brief meeting to examine sufficiently. ΠΩΛ. What is this, Socrates?
οὕτω καὶ σὺ περὶ τῆς ῥητορικῆς δοξάζεις ὥσπερ νῦν λέγεις;
Do you indeed hold such an opinion about rhetoric as you now say?
ἢ οἴει—ὅτι Γοργίας ᾐσχύνθη σοι μὴ προσομολογῆσαι τὸν ῥητορικὸν ἄνδρα μὴ οὐχὶ καὶ τὰ δίκαια εἰδέναι καὶ τὰ καλὰ καὶ τὰ ἀγαθά, καὶ ἐὰν μὴ ἔλθῃ ταῦτα εἰδὼς παρʼ αὐτόν, αὐτὸς διδάξειν, ἔπειτα ἐκ ταύτης ἴσως τῆς ὁμολογίας ἐναντίον τι συνέβη ἐν τοῖς λόγοις—τοῦτο ὃ δὴ ἀγαπᾷς, αὐτὸς ἀγαγὼν ἐπὶ τοιαῦτα ἐρωτήματα—ἐπεὶ τίνα οἴει ἀπαρνήσεσθαι μὴ οὐχὶ καὶ αὐτὸν ἐπίστασθαι τὰ δίκαια καὶ ἄλλους διδάξειν;
Or do you think—because Gorgias was ashamed not to agree with you that the rhetorician also knows what is just, beautiful, and good, and that if he comes to him not knowing them, he himself will teach them, and then from this agreement perhaps some contradiction occurred in the arguments—this indeed which you love, having yourself led to such questions? For who do you think will deny that he himself both knows what is just and will teach others?
—ἀλλʼ εἰς τὰ τοιαῦτα ἄγειν πολλὴ ἀγροικία ἐστὶν τοὺς λόγους.
But to lead arguments into such things is a great rudeness. ΣΩ.
ΣΩ. ὦ κάλλιστε Πῶλε, ἀλλά τοι ἐξεπίτηδες κτώμεθα ἑταίρους καὶ ὑεῖς, ἵνα ἐπειδὰν αὐτοὶ πρεσβύτεροι γενόμενοι σφαλλώμεθα, παρόντες ὑμεῖς οἱ νεώτεροι ἐπανορθῶτε ἡμῶν τὸν βίον καὶ ἐν ἔργοις καὶ ἐν λόγοις.
My most excellent Polus, indeed we deliberately acquire companions and sons, so that when we, having become older, stumble, you who are younger being present may correct our life both in deeds and in words.
καὶ νῦν εἴ τι ἐγὼ καὶ Γοργίας ἐν τοῖς λόγοις σφαλλόμεθα, σὺ παρὼν ἐπανόρθου— δίκαιος δʼ εἶ—καὶ ἐγὼ ἐθέλω τῶν ὡμολογημένων εἴ τί σοι δοκεῖ μὴ καλῶς ὡμολογῆσθαι, ἀναθέσθαι ὅτι ἂν σὺ βούλῃ, ἐάν μοι ἓν μόνον φυλάττῃς. ΠΩΛ. τί τοῦτο λέγεις;
And now, if Gorgias and I stumble in our arguments, you being present correct us—and it is just for you to do so—and I am willing, if any of the agreed things seems to you not to have been well agreed, to take it back, whatever you wish, if only you observe one thing for me. ΠΩΛ.
ΣΩ. τὴν μακρολογίαν, ὦ Πῶλε, ἢν καθέρξῃς, ᾗ τὸ πρῶτον ἐπεχείρησας χρῆσθαι. ΠΩΛ. τί δέ;
What do you mean by this? ΣΩ. Length of speech, Polus, if you restrain it, which you first attempted to use. ΠΩΛ.
οὐκ ἐξέσται μοι λέγειν ὁπόσα ἂν βούλωμαι;
What? Shall it not be permitted for me to speak as much as I wish?
ΣΩ. δεινὰ μεντἂν πάθοις, ὦ βέλτιστε, εἰ Ἀθήναζε ἀφικόμενος, οὗ τῆς Ἑλλάδος πλείστη ἐστὶν ἐξουσία τοῦ λέγειν, ἔπειτα σὺ ἐνταῦθα τούτου μόνος ἀτυχήσαις.
ΣΩ. You would indeed suffer terribly, my good friend, if having arrived in Athens, where there is the greatest freedom of speech in Greece, you alone should then happen to be deprived of this here.