§462ΣΩ. ἀλλὰ ἀντίθες τοι·
ΣΩ.
σοῦ μακρὰ λέγοντος καὶ μὴ ἐθέλοντος τὸ ἐρωτώμενον ἀποκρίνεσθαι, οὐ δεινὰ ἂν αὖ ἐγὼ πάθοιμι, εἰ μὴ ἐξέσται μοι ἀπιέναι καὶ μὴ ἀκούειν σου;
But consider indeed; if you speak at length and are not willing to answer what is asked, would I not on my part suffer terribly if it will not be permitted for me to go away and not to hear you?
ἀλλʼ εἴ τι κήδῃ τοῦ λόγου τοῦ εἰρημένου καὶ ἐπανορθώσασθαι αὐτὸν βούλει, ὥσπερ νυνδὴ ἔλεγον, ἀναθέμενος ὅτι σοι δοκεῖ, ἐν τῷ μέρει ἐρωτῶν τε καὶ ἐρωτώμενος, ὥσπερ ἐγώ τε καὶ Γοργίας, ἔλεγχέ τε καὶ ἐλέγχου.
But if you care at all for the argument that has been spoken and wish to correct it, as I was just saying, taking back whatever seems to you, taking turns in asking and being asked, just as Gorgias and I did, refute and be refuted.
φῂς γὰρ δήπου καὶ σὺ ἐπίστασθαι ἅπερ Γοργίας· ἢ οὔ; ΠΩΛ. ἔγωγε.
For you surely say that you also know the very things that Gorgias does, do you not? ΠΩΛ. I do. ΣΩ.
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν καὶ σὺ κελεύεις σαυτὸν ἐρωτᾶν ἑκάστοτε ὅτι ἄν τις βούληται, ὡς ἐπιστάμενος ἀποκρίνεσθαι; ΠΩΛ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν.
Then do you also bid yourself to be asked each time whatever anyone wishes, as one who knows how to answer? ΠΩΛ. Very much so.
ΣΩ. καὶ νῦν δὴ τούτων ὁπότερον βούλει ποίει, ἐρώτα ἢ ἀποκρίνου. ΠΩΛ. ἀλλὰ ποιήσω ταῦτα.
ΣΩ. And now indeed do whichever of these you wish: ask or answer. ΠΩΛ. But I will do this.
καί μοι ἀπόκριναι, ὦ Σώκρατες· ἐπειδὴ Γοργίας ἀπορεῖν σοι δοκεῖ περὶ τῆς ῥητορικῆς, σὺ αὐτὴν τίνα φῂς εἶναι;
And answer me, Socrates: since Gorgias seems to you to be at a loss about rhetoric, what do you yourself say it is? ΣΩ.
ΣΩ. ἆρα ἐρωτᾷς ἥντινα τέχνην φημὶ εἶναι; ΠΩΛ. ἔγωγε.
Are you asking what kind of art I say it is? ΠΩΛ. I am. ΣΩ.
ΣΩ. οὐδεμία ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ, ὦ Πῶλε, ὥς γε πρὸς σὲ τἀληθῆ εἰρῆσθαι. ΠΩΛ. ἀλλὰ τί σοι δοκεῖ ἡ ῥητορικὴ εἶναι;
It seems to me to be no art at all, Polus, if I am to tell you the truth. ΠΩΛ. But what does rhetoric seem to you to be? ΣΩ.
ΣΩ. πρᾶγμα ὃ φῂς σὺ ποιῆσαι τέχνην ἐν τῷ συγγράμματι ὃ ἐγὼ ἔναγχος ἀνέγνων. ΠΩΛ. τί τοῦτο λέγεις;
A thing which you say you made into an art in the treatise which I recently read. ΠΩΛ. What do you mean by this? ΣΩ.
ΣΩ. ἐμπειρίαν ἔγωγέ τινα. ΠΩΛ. ἐμπειρία ἄρα σοι δοκεῖ ἡ ῥητορικὴ εἶναι; ΣΩ. ἔμοιγε, εἰ μή τι σὺ ἄλλο λέγεις. ΠΩΛ. τίνος ἐμπειρία;
A certain experience. ΠΩΛ. So does rhetoric seem to you to be an experience? ΣΩ. To me, yes, unless you say something else. ΠΩΛ. An experience of what? ΣΩ.
ΣΩ. χάριτός τινος καὶ ἡδονῆς ἀπεργασίας. ΠΩΛ. οὐκοῦν καλόν σοι δοκεῖ ἡ ῥητορικὴ εἶναι, χαρίζεσθαι οἷόν τε εἶναι ἀνθρώποις;
Of producing a certain grace and pleasure. ΠΩΛ. Then does rhetoric seem to you to be beautiful, to be able to gratify people? ΣΩ.
ΣΩ. τί δέ, ὦ Πῶλε;
What is this, Polus?
ἤδη πέπυσαι παρʼ ἐμοῦ ὅτι φημὶ αὐτὴν εἶναι, ὥστε τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο ἐρωτᾷς εἰ οὐ καλή μοι δοκεῖ εἶναι; ΠΩΛ. οὐ γὰρ πέπυσμαι ὅτι ἐμπειρίαν τινὰ αὐτὴν φῂς εἶναι;
Have you already learned from me what I say it is, so that after this you ask if it does not seem to me to be beautiful? ΠΩΛ. Did I not learn that you say it is a certain experience? ΣΩ.
ΣΩ. βούλει οὖν, ἐπειδὴ τιμᾷς τὸ χαρίζεσθαι, σμικρόν τί μοι χαρίσασθαι; ΠΩΛ. ἔγωγε.
Since you honor gratifying, are you willing to gratify me in some small way? ΠΩΛ. I am. ΣΩ.
ΣΩ. ἐροῦ νῦν με, ὀψοποιία ἥτις μοι δοκεῖ τέχνη εἶναι. ΠΩΛ. ἐρωτῶ δή, τίς τέχνη ὀψοποιία;
Ask me now what kind of art cookery seems to me to be. ΠΩΛ. I ask indeed, what art is cookery? ΣΩ.
ΣΩ. οὐδεμία, ὦ Πῶλε. ΠΩΛ. ἀλλὰ τί;
None at all, Polus. ΠΩΛ. But what?
φάθι.
Speak. ΣΩ.
ΣΩ. φημὶ δή, ἐμπειρία τις. ΠΩΛ. τίς;
I say indeed, a certain experience. ΠΩΛ. Of what?
φάθι.
Speak. ΣΩ.
ΣΩ. φημὶ δή, χάριτος καὶ ἡδονῆς ἀπεργασίας, ὦ Πῶλε. ΠΩΛ. ταὐτὸν ἄρʼ ἐστὶν ὀψοποιία καὶ ῥητορική;
I say indeed, of producing grace and pleasure, Polus. ΠΩΛ. Are cookery and rhetoric then the same? ΣΩ.
ΣΩ. οὐδαμῶς γε, ἀλλὰ τῆς αὐτῆς μὲν ἐπιτηδεύσεως μόριον. ΠΩΛ. τίνος λέγεις ταύτης;
Not at all, but parts of the same practice. ΠΩΛ. What practice do you mean?
§463ΣΩ. μὴ ἀγροικότερον ᾖ τὸ ἀληθὲς εἰπεῖν· ὀκνῶ γὰρ Γοργίου ἕνεκα λέγειν, μὴ οἴηταί με διακωμῳδεῖν τὸ ἑαυτοῦ ἐπιτήδευμα.
ΣΩ. I fear it may be rather rude to speak the truth; for I hesitate on account of Gorgias, lest he think I am caricaturing his own practice.
ἐγὼ δέ, εἰ μὲν τοῦτό ἐστιν ἡ ῥητορικὴ ἣν Γοργίας ἐπιτηδεύει, οὐκ οἶδα—καὶ γὰρ ἄρτι ἐκ τοῦ λόγου οὐδὲν ἡμῖν καταφανὲς ἐγένετο τί ποτε οὗτος ἡγεῖται—ὃ δʼ ἐγὼ καλῶ τὴν ῥητορικήν, πράγματός τινός ἐστι μόριον οὐδενὸς τῶν καλῶν.
But for my part, whether this is the rhetoric which Gorgias practices, I do not know—for just now from our discussion nothing became clear to us as to what on earth he thinks it is—but what I call rhetoric is a part of a certain thing which is none of the beautiful things. ΓΟΡ.
ΓΟΡ. τίνος, ὦ Σώκρατες;
Of what thing, Socrates?
εἰπέ· μηδὲν ἐμὲ αἰσχυνθῇς.
Speak; do not be ashamed on my account. ΣΩ.
ΣΩ. δοκεῖ τοίνυν μοι, ὦ Γοργία, εἶναί τι ἐπιτήδευμα τεχνικὸν μὲν οὔ, ψυχῆς δὲ στοχαστικῆς καὶ ἀνδρείας καὶ φύσει δεινῆς προσομιλεῖν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις· καλῶ δὲ αὐτοῦ ἐγὼ τὸ κεφάλαιον κολακείαν.
It seems to me then, Gorgias, to be a certain practice, not of an art, but of a soul that is guessing, bold, and by nature clever at associating with men; and I call the sum of it flattery.
ταύτης μοι δοκεῖ τῆς ἐπιτηδεύσεως πολλὰ μὲν καὶ ἄλλα μόρια εἶναι, ἓν δὲ καὶ ἡ ὀψοποιική· ὃ δοκεῖ μὲν εἶναι τέχνη, ὡς δὲ ὁ ἐμὸς λόγος, οὐκ ἔστιν τέχνη ἀλλʼ ἐμπειρία καὶ τριβή.
Of this practice it seems to me there are many other parts, and one indeed is cookery; which seems to be an art, but according to my argument is not an art but experience and routine.
ταύτης μόριον καὶ τὴν ῥητορικὴν ἐγὼ καλῶ καὶ τήν γε κομμωτικὴν καὶ τὴν σοφιστικήν, τέτταρα ταῦτα μόρια ἐπὶ τέτταρσιν πράγμασιν.
And I call rhetoric a part of this, and indeed cosmetics and sophistry, these four parts for four things.
εἰ οὖν βούλεται πῶλος πυνθάνεσθαι, πυνθανέσθω· οὐ γάρ πω πέπυσται ὁποῖόν φημι ἐγὼ τῆς κολακείας μόριον εἶναι τὴν ῥητορικήν, ἀλλʼ αὐτὸν λέληθα οὔπω ἀποκεκριμένος, ὁ δὲ ἐπανερωτᾷ εἰ οὐ καλὸν ἡγοῦμαι εἶναι.
If therefore Polus wishes to inquire, let him inquire; for he has not yet learned what kind of part of flattery I say rhetoric is, but he himself has not noticed that I have not yet answered, and he asks again if I do not think it is beautiful.
ἐγὼ δὲ αὐτῷ οὐκ ἀποκρινοῦμαι πρότερον εἴτε καλὸν εἴτε αἰσχρὸν ἡγοῦμαι εἶναι τὴν ῥητορικὴν πρὶν ἂν πρῶτον ἀποκρίνωμαι ὅτι ἐστίν.
But I will not answer him beforehand whether I think rhetoric is beautiful or ugly before I first answer what it is.
οὐ γὰρ δίκαιον, ὦ Πῶλε· ἀλλʼ εἴπερ βούλει πυθέσθαι, ἐρώτα ὁποῖον μόριον τῆς κολακείας φημὶ εἶναι τὴν ῥητορικήν.
For it is not just, Polus; but if you really wish to learn, ask what kind of part of flattery I say rhetoric is. ΠΩΛ.
ΠΩΛ. ἐρωτῶ δή, καὶ ἀπόκριναι ὁποῖον μόριον.
I ask indeed, and answer what kind of part it is.
ΣΩ. ἆρʼ οὖν ἂν μάθοις ἀποκριναμένου;
ΣΩ. Would you then understand when I answer?
ἔστιν γὰρ ἡ ῥητορικὴ κατὰ τὸν ἐμὸν λόγον πολιτικῆς μορίου εἴδωλον. ΠΩΛ. τί οὖν;
For rhetoric is, according to my argument, an image of a part of politics. ΠΩΛ. What then?
καλὸν ἢ αἰσχρὸν λέγεις αὐτὴν εἶναι;
Do you say it is beautiful or ugly? ΣΩ.
ΣΩ. αἰσχρὸν ἔγωγε—τὰ γὰρ κακὰ αἰσχρὰ καλῶ—ἐπειδὴ δεῖ σοι ἀποκρίνασθαι ὡς ἤδη εἰδότι ἃ ἐγὼ λέγω.
Ugly indeed—for I call bad things ugly—since you must be answered as one who already knows what I mean. ΓΟΡ.
ΓΟΡ. μὰ τὸν Δία, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀλλʼ ἐγὼ οὐδὲ αὐτὸς συνίημι ὅτι λέγεις.
By Zeus, Socrates, but I myself do not understand what you mean.
ΣΩ. εἰκότως γε, ὦ Γοργία·
ΣΩ.
οὐδὲν γάρ πω σαφὲς λέγω, πῶλος δὲ ὅδε νέος ἐστὶ καὶ ὀξύς.
Naturally, Gorgias; for I am not yet saying anything clear, and this Polus here is young and sharp. ΓΟΡ.
ΓΟΡ. ἀλλὰ τοῦτον μὲν ἔα, ἐμοὶ δʼ εἰπὲ πῶς λέγεις πολιτικῆς μορίου εἴδωλον εἶναι τὴν ῥητορικήν.
But let him be, and tell me how you say rhetoric is an image of a part of politics.