§459ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν περὶ πάντων ὥστʼ ἐν ὄχλῳ πιθανὸν εἶναι, οὐ διδάσκοντα ἀλλὰ πείθοντα;
ΣΩ. Then is it about all subjects so as to be persuasive among the crowd, not by teaching but by persuading? ΓΟΡ.
ΓΟΡ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν.
Exactly so. ΣΩ.
ΣΩ. ἔλεγές τοι νυνδὴ ὅτι καὶ περὶ τοῦ ὑγιεινοῦ τοῦ ἰατροῦ πιθανώτερος ἔσται ὁ ῥήτωρ.
You were saying just now, you know, that even concerning what is healthy the rhetorician will be more persuasive than the physician. ΓΟΡ.
ΓΟΡ. καὶ γὰρ ἔλεγον, ἔν γε ὄχλῳ.
Yes, I was indeed saying so, among the crowd at least. ΣΩ.
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν τὸ ἐν ὄχλῳ τοῦτό ἐστιν, ἐν τοῖς μὴ εἰδόσιν;
Then this 'among the crowd' is among those who do not know?
οὐ γὰρ δήπου ἔν γε τοῖς εἰδόσι τοῦ ἰατροῦ πιθανώτερος ἔσται.
For surely among those who know, he will not be more persuasive than the physician. ΓΟΡ.
ΓΟΡ. ἀληθῆ λέγεις.
You speak the truth. ΣΩ.
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν εἴπερ τοῦ ἰατροῦ πιθανώτερος ἔσται, τοῦ εἰδότος πιθανώτερος γίγνεται;
Then if indeed he is to be more persuasive than the physician, he becomes more persuasive than the one who knows? ΓΟΡ.
ΓΟΡ. πάνυ γε.
Quite so. ΣΩ.
ΣΩ. οὐκ ἰατρός γε ὤν· ἦ γάρ;
Not being a physician, at any rate; is that not so? ΓΟΡ.
ΓΟΡ. ναί.
Yes. ΣΩ.
ΣΩ. ὁ δὲ μὴ ἰατρός γε δήπου ἀνεπιστήμων ὧν ὁ ἰατρὸς ἐπιστήμων.
And the non-physician, surely, is ignorant of those things of which the physician is knowledgeable. ΓΟΡ.
ΓΟΡ. δῆλον ὅτι.
Clearly so. ΣΩ.
ΣΩ. ὁ οὐκ εἰδὼς ἄρα τοῦ εἰδότος ἐν οὐκ εἰδόσι πιθανώτερος ἔσται, ὅταν ὁ ῥήτωρ τοῦ ἰατροῦ πιθανώτερος ᾖ.
The one who does not know, therefore, will be more persuasive than the one who knows among those who do not know, when the rhetorician is more persuasive than the physician.
τοῦτο συμβαίνει ἢ ἄλλο τι;
Is this what happens, or something else? ΓΟΡ.
ΓΟΡ. τοῦτο ἐνταῦθά γε συμβαίνει.
This is indeed what happens in this case. ΣΩ.
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν καὶ περὶ τὰς ἄλλας ἁπάσας τέχνας ὡσαύτως ἔχει ὁ ῥήτωρ καὶ ἡ ῥητορική·
Then is it also the same way for the rhetorician and rhetoric concerning all other arts?
αὐτὰ μὲν τὰ πράγματα οὐδὲν δεῖ αὐτὴν εἰδέναι ὅπως ἔχει, μηχανὴν δέ τινα πειθοῦς ηὑρηκέναι ὥστε φαίνεσθαι τοῖς οὐκ εἰδόσι μᾶλλον εἰδέναι τῶν εἰδότων.
There is no need for it to know the things themselves as they are, but only to have found some device of persuasion so as to appear to those who do not know to know more than those who do know. ΓΟΡ.
ΓΟΡ. οὐκοῦν πολλὴ ῥᾳστώνη, ὦ Σώκρατες, γίγνεται, μὴ μαθόντα τὰς ἄλλας τέχνας ἀλλὰ μίαν ταύτην, μηδὲν ἐλαττοῦσθαι τῶν δημιουργῶν;
Then is it not a great ease, Socrates, not to have learned the other arts but only this one, and yet to be at no disadvantage compared to the craftsmen? ΣΩ.
ΣΩ. εἰ μὲν ἐλαττοῦται ἢ μὴ ἐλαττοῦται ὁ ῥήτωρ τῶν ἄλλων διὰ τὸ οὕτως ἔχειν, αὐτίκα ἐπισκεψόμεθα, ἐάν τι ἡμῖν πρὸς λόγου ᾖ· νῦν δὲ τόδε πρότερον σκεψώμεθα, ἆρα τυγχάνει περὶ τὸ δίκαιον καὶ τὸ ἄδικον καὶ τὸ αἰσχρὸν καὶ τὸ καλὸν καὶ ἀγαθὸν καὶ κακὸν οὕτως ἔχων ὁ ῥητορικὸς ὡς περὶ τὸ ὑγιεινὸν καὶ περὶ τὰ ἄλλα ὧν αἱ ἄλλαι τέχναι, αὐτὰ μὲν οὐκ εἰδώς, τί ἀγαθὸν ἢ τί κακόν ἐστιν ἢ τί καλὸν ἢ τί αἰσχρὸν ἢ δίκαιον ἢ ἄδικον, πειθὼ δὲ περὶ αὐτῶν μεμηχανημένος ὥστε δοκεῖν εἰδέναι οὐκ εἰδὼς ἐν οὐκ εἰδόσιν μᾶλλον τοῦ εἰδότος;
Whether the rhetorician is at a disadvantage or not compared to the others because of being in this state, we shall examine presently, if it is of any use to our argument; but now let us first examine this: whether the rhetorician happens to be in the same state regarding the just and the unjust, the shameful and the beautiful, the good and the bad, as he is regarding what is healthy and the other things of which the other arts are; not knowing the things themselves—what is good or what is bad, or what is beautiful or what is shameful, or just or unjust—but having devised a persuasion about them so that, not knowing, he seems to those who do not know to know more than the one who knows?
ἢ ἀνάγκη εἰδέναι, καὶ δεῖ προεπιστάμενον ταῦτα ἀφικέσθαι παρὰ σὲ τὸν μέλλοντα μαθήσεσθαι τὴν ῥητορικήν;
Or is it necessary to know them, and must the one who is going to learn rhetoric arrive at your place already knowing these things beforehand?
εἰ δὲ μή, σὺ ὁ τῆς ῥητορικῆς διδάσκαλος τούτων μὲν οὐδὲν διδάξεις τὸν ἀφικνούμενον—οὐ γὰρ σὸν ἔργον —ποιήσεις δʼ ἐν τοῖς πολλοῖς δοκεῖν εἰδέναι αὐτὸν τὰ τοιαῦτα οὐκ εἰδότα καὶ δοκεῖν ἀγαθὸν εἶναι οὐκ ὄντα;
Or if not, will you, the teacher of rhetoric, teach the newcomer none of these things—for that is not your task—but will you make him seem to the many to know such things when he does not know them, and seem to be a good man when he is not?
ἢ τὸ παράπαν οὐχ οἷός τε ἔσῃ αὐτὸν διδάξαι τὴν ῥητορικήν, ἐὰν μὴ προειδῇ περὶ τούτων τὴν ἀλήθειαν;
Or will you be altogether unable to teach him rhetoric if he does not know the truth about these things beforehand?
ἢ πῶς τὰ τοιαῦτα ἔχει, ὦ Γοργία;
Or how do such matters stand, Gorgias?
καὶ πρὸς Διός, ὥσπερ ἄρτι εἶπες, ἀποκαλύψας τῆς ῥητορικῆς εἰπὲ τίς ποθʼ ἡ δύναμίς ἐστιν.
And by Zeus, just as you said just now, reveal the power of rhetoric and tell us what on earth it is.