§457ΓΟΡ. οὔκουν οἱ διδάξαντες πονηροί, οὐδὲ ἡ τέχνη οὔτε αἰτία οὔτε πονηρὰ τούτου ἕνεκά ἐστιν, ἀλλʼ οἱ μὴ χρώμενοι οἶμαι ὀρθῶς.
ΓΟΡ. Therefore, those who taught are not wicked, nor is the art either to be blamed or wicked because of this, but rather, I think, those who do not use it rightly.
ὁ αὐτὸς δὴ λόγος καὶ περὶ τῆς ῥητορικῆς.
And the very same argument applies also to rhetoric.
δυνατὸς μὲν γὰρ πρὸς ἅπαντάς ἐστιν ὁ ῥήτωρ καὶ περὶ παντὸς λέγειν, ὥστε πιθανώτερος εἶναι ἐν τοῖς πλήθεσιν ἔμβραχυ περὶ ὅτου ἂν βούληται· ἀλλʼ οὐδέν τι μᾶλλον τούτου ἕνεκα δεῖ οὔτε τοὺς ἰατροὺς τὴν δόξαν ἀφαιρεῖσθαι— ὅτι δύναιτο ἂν τοῦτο ποιῆσαι—οὔτε τοὺς ἄλλους δημιουργούς, ἀλλὰ δικαίως καὶ τῇ ῥητορικῇ χρῆσθαι, ὥσπερ καὶ τῇ ἀγωνίᾳ.
For the rhetorician is capable of speaking against all people and about every subject, so as to be more persuasive among the crowds, in short, about whatever he wishes; but not for this reason should he any more strip the physicians of their reputation—just because he could do this—nor the other craftsmen, but he must use rhetoric justly, just as one must use competitive skill.
ἐὰν δὲ οἶμαι ῥητορικὸς γενόμενός τις κᾆτα ταύτῃ τῇ δυνάμει καὶ τῇ τέχνῃ ἀδικῇ, οὐ τὸν διδάξαντα δεῖ μισεῖν τε καὶ ἐκβάλλειν ἐκ τῶν πόλεων.
But I think that if someone, having become a rhetorician, then does wrong with this power and art, one must not hate and banish the teacher from the cities.
ἐκεῖνος μὲν γὰρ ἐπὶ δικαίου χρείᾳ παρέδωκεν, ὁ δʼ ἐναντίως χρῆται.
For that teacher handed it down for just use, but the pupil uses it in the opposite way.
τὸν οὖν οὐκ ὀρθῶς χρώμενον μισεῖν δίκαιον καὶ ἐκβάλλειν καὶ ἀποκτεινύναι ἀλλʼ οὐ τὸν διδάξαντα.
Therefore, it is just to hate, banish, and kill the one who does not use it rightly, but not the teacher. ΣΩ.
ΣΩ. οἶμαι, ὦ Γοργία, καὶ σὲ ἔμπειρον εἶναι πολλῶν λόγων καὶ καθεωρακέναι ἐν αὐτοῖς τὸ τοιόνδε, ὅτι οὐ ῥᾳδίως δύνανται περὶ ὧν ἂν ἐπιχειρήσωσιν διαλέγεσθαι διορισάμενοι πρὸς ἀλλήλους καὶ μαθόντες καὶ διδάξαντες ἑαυτούς, οὕτω διαλύεσθαι τὰς συνουσίας, ἀλλʼ ἐὰν περί του ἀμφισβητήσωσιν καὶ μὴ φῇ ὁ ἕτερος τὸν ἕτερον ὀρθῶς λέγειν ἢ μὴ σαφῶς, χαλεπαίνουσί τε καὶ κατὰ φθόνον οἴονται τὸν ἑαυτῶν λέγειν, φιλονικοῦντας ἀλλʼ οὐ ζητοῦντας τὸ προκείμενον ἐν τῷ λόγῳ· καὶ ἔνιοί γε τελευτῶντες αἴσχιστα ἀπαλλάττονται, λοιδορηθέντες τε καὶ εἰπόντες καὶ ἀκούσαντες περὶ σφῶν αὐτῶν τοιαῦτα οἷα καὶ τοὺς παρόντας ἄχθεσθαι ὑπὲρ σφῶν αὐτῶν, ὅτι τοιούτων ἀνθρώπων ἠξίωσαν ἀκροαταὶ γενέσθαι.
Gorgias, I think that you too have experience with many discussions and have observed in them the following sort of thing: that people cannot easily, on whatever subjects they undertake to discuss, define their terms to one another, learn and teach themselves, and so dissolve their gatherings, but if they dispute about something and one says the other is not speaking rightly or clearly, they grow angry and think that the other speaks out of envy of them, striving for victory rather than seeking what is proposed in the discussion; and some indeed in the end part in the most shameful way, having been insulted and having said and heard such things about themselves that even the bystanders are vexed on their own account, that they deemed such men worthy of being listened to.
τοῦ δὴ ἕνεκα λέγω ταῦτα;
Why on earth do I say these things?
ὅτι νῦν ἐμοὶ δοκεῖς σὺ οὐ πάνυ ἀκόλουθα λέγειν οὐδὲ σύμφωνα οἷς τὸ πρῶτον ἔλεγες περὶ τῆς ῥητορικῆς· φοβοῦμαι οὖν διελέγχειν σε, μή με ὑπολάβῃς οὐ πρὸς τὸ πρᾶγμα φιλονικοῦντα λέγειν τοῦ καταφανὲς γενέσθαι, ἀλλὰ πρὸς σέ.
Because now you seem to me to speak things not entirely consistent or harmonious with what you said at first about rhetoric; I am afraid, therefore, to refute you, lest you suppose that I speak not striving for victory to make the matter clear, but against you.
§458ΣΩ. ἐγὼ οὖν, εἰ μὲν καὶ σὺ εἶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων ὧνπερ καὶ ἐγώ, ἡδέως ἄν σε διερωτῴην· εἰ δὲ μή, ἐῴην ἄν.
ΣΩ. I, then, if you also are of those men of whom I myself am, would gladly go on questioning you; but if not, I would let it be.
ἐγὼ δὲ τίνων εἰμί;
And of what kind am I?
τῶν ἡδέως μὲν ἂν ἐλεγχθέντων εἴ τι μὴ ἀληθὲς λέγω, ἡδέως δʼ ἂν ἐλεγξάντων εἴ τίς τι μὴ ἀληθὲς λέγοι, οὐκ ἀηδέστερον μεντἂν ἐλεγχθέντων ἢ ἐλεγξάντων· μεῖζον γὰρ αὐτὸ ἀγαθὸν ἡγοῦμαι, ὅσῳπερ μεῖζον ἀγαθόν ἐστιν αὐτὸν ἀπαλλαγῆναι κακοῦ τοῦ μεγίστου ἢ ἄλλον ἀπαλλάξαι.
Of those who would gladly be refuted if I say anything not true, and would gladly refute if anyone should say anything not true, yet not less gladly refuted than refuting; for I consider this to be a greater good, by as much as it is a greater good to be released oneself from the greatest evil than to release another.
οὐδὲν γὰρ οἶμαι τοσοῦτον κακὸν εἶναι ἀνθρώπῳ, ὅσον δόξα ψευδὴς περὶ ὧν τυγχάνει νῦν ἡμῖν ὁ λόγος ὤν.
For I think there is no evil so great for a human being as a false opinion about the things which happen to be the subject of our present discussion.
εἰ μὲν οὖν καὶ σὺ φῂς τοιοῦτος εἶναι, διαλεγώμεθα· εἰ δὲ καὶ δοκεῖ χρῆναι ἐᾶν, ἐῶμεν ἤδη χαίρειν καὶ διαλύωμεν τὸν λόγον.
If, then, you also say that you are such a person, let us discuss; but if it seems that we should let it be, let us now bid it farewell and dissolve the discussion. ΓΟΡ.
ΓΟΡ. ἀλλὰ φημὶ μὲν ἔγωγε, ὦ Σώκρατες, καὶ αὐτὸς τοιοῦτος εἶναι οἷον σὺ ὑφηγῇ· ἴσως μέντοι χρῆν ἐννοεῖν καὶ τὸ τῶν παρόντων.
But I indeed claim, Socrates, that I myself am such a person as you have described; however, perhaps we ought to have considered also the interest of those present.
πάλαι γάρ τοι, πρὶν καὶ ὑμᾶς ἐλθεῖν, ἐγὼ τοῖς παροῦσι πολλὰ ἐπεδειξάμην, καὶ νῦν ἴσως πόρρω ἀποτενοῦμεν, ἢν διαλεγώμεθα.
For indeed, for a long time, even before you came, I have given many demonstrations to those present, and now perhaps we shall spin out the discussion far, if we go on discussing.
σκοπεῖν οὖν χρὴ καὶ τὸ τούτων, μή τινας αὐτῶν κατέχομεν βουλομένους τι καὶ ἄλλο πράττειν.
We must therefore consider their interest as well, lest we are detaining some of them who wish to do something else. ΧΑΙ.
ΧΑΙ. τοῦ μὲν θορύβου, ὦ Γοργία τε καὶ Σώκρατες, αὐτοὶ ἀκούετε τούτων τῶν ἀνδρῶν βουλομένων ἀκούειν ἐάν τι λέγητε· ἐμοὶ δʼ οὖν καὶ αὐτῷ μὴ γένοιτο τοσαύτη ἀσχολία, ὥστε τοιούτων λόγων καὶ οὕτω λεγομένων ἀφεμένῳ προὐργιαίτερόν τι γενέσθαι ἄλλο πράττειν.
You yourselves hear the clamor of these men, Gorgias and Socrates, who wish to hear if you say anything; as for myself, at any rate, may I never have so much business that, leaving such discussions spoken in such a way, it should become of greater importance for me to do something else.
ΚΑΛ. νὴ τοὺς θεούς, ὦ Χαιρεφῶν, καὶ μὲν δὴ καὶ αὐτὸς πολλοῖς ἤδη λόγοις παραγενόμενος οὐκ οἶδʼ εἰ πώποτε ἥσθην οὕτως ὥσπερ νυνί· ὥστʼ ἔμοιγε, κἂν τὴν ἡμέραν ὅλην ἐθέλητε διαλέγεσθαι, χαριεῖσθε.
ΚΑΛ. By the gods, Chaerephon, indeed I myself, though I have already been present at many discussions, do not know if I have ever been so pleased as I am now; so that, for my part, even if you wish to discuss the whole day, you will do me a favor. ΣΩ.
ΣΩ. ἀλλὰ μήν, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, τό γʼ ἐμὸν οὐδὲν κωλύει, εἴπερ ἐθέλει Γοργίας.
Indeed, Callicles, there is nothing to prevent on my part, if Gorgias is willing. ΓΟΡ.
ΓΟΡ. αἰσχρὸν δὴ τὸ λοιπόν, ὦ Σώκρατες, γίγνεται ἐμέ γε μὴ ἐθέλειν, αὐτὸν ἐπαγγειλάμενον ἐρωτᾶν ὅτι τις βούλεται.
It becomes shameful henceforth, Socrates, for me at least not to be willing, having myself announced that anyone may ask what he wishes.
ἀλλʼ εἰ δοκεῖ τουτοισί, διαλέγου τε καὶ ἐρώτα ὅτι βούλει.
But if it seems good to these men, go on discussing and ask whatever you wish. ΣΩ.
ΣΩ. ἄκουε δή, ὦ Γοργία, ἃ θαυμάζω ἐν τοῖς λεγομένοις ὑπὸ σοῦ· ἴσως γάρ τοι σοῦ ὀρθῶς λέγοντος ἐγὼ οὐκ ὀρθῶς ὑπολαμβάνω.
Listen then, Gorgias, to what I marvel at in the things said by you; for perhaps, though you speak rightly, I do not understand rightly.
ῥητορικὸν φῂς ποιεῖν οἷός τʼ εἶναι, ἐάν τις βούληται παρὰ σοῦ μανθάνειν;
Do you say that you are able to make someone a rhetorician, if he wishes to learn from you? ΓΟΡ.
ΓΟΡ. ναί.
Yes.