§454ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν ἐάν τις ἐρωτᾷ ἡμᾶς ποίας πειθοῦς καὶ περὶ τί, ἀποκρινούμεθά που αὐτῷ ὅτι τῆς διδασκαλικῆς τῆς περὶ τὸ ἄρτιόν τε καὶ τὸ περιττὸν ὅσον ἐστίν·
Socrates: So, if someone were to ask us what kind of persuasion and about what it is, we would presumably answer him that it is the teaching kind, the one about how many even and odd numbers there are.
καὶ τὰς ἄλλας ἃς νυνδὴ ἐλέγομεν τέχνας ἁπάσας ἕξομεν ἀποδεῖξαι πειθοῦς δημιουργοὺς οὔσας καὶ ἧστινος καὶ περὶ ὅτι· ἢ οὔ;
And would we not also be able to show that all the other arts we were just speaking of are producers of persuasion, and of what kind and about what?
ΓΟΡ. ναί.
Gorgias: Yes.
ΣΩ. οὐκ ἄρα ῥητορικὴ μόνη πειθοῦς ἐστιν δημιουργός.
Socrates: So rhetoric, then, is not the only producer of persuasion.
ΓΟΡ. ἀληθῆ λέγεις.
Gorgias: What you say is true.
ΣΩ. ἐπειδὴ τοίνυν οὐ μόνη ἀπεργάζεται τοῦτο τὸ ἔργον, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἄλλαι, δικαίως ὥσπερ περὶ τοῦ ζωγράφου μετὰ τοῦτο ἐπανεροίμεθʼ ἂν τὸν λέγοντα· ποίας δὴ πειθοῦς καὶ τῆς περὶ τί πειθοῦς ἡ ῥητορική ἐστιν τέχνη; ἢ οὐ δοκεῖ σοι δίκαιον εἶναι ἐπανερέσθαι;
Socrates: Since, then, it is not the only one that performs this work, but others do so too, just as in the case of the painter, would we not be justified in asking the speaker next: 'Of what kind of persuasion, and of persuasion about what, is rhetoric the art?' Or does it not seem to you justified to ask this further?
ΓΟΡ. ἔμοιγε.
Gorgias: To me it does.
ΣΩ. ἀπόκριναι δή, ὦ Γοργία, ἐπειδή γε καὶ σοὶ δοκεῖ οὕτως.
Socrates: Answer then, Gorgias, since indeed it seems so to you too.
ΓΟΡ. ταύτης τοίνυν τῆς πειθοῦς λέγω, ὦ Σώκρατες, τῆς ἐν τοῖς δικαστηρίοις καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις ὄχλοις, ὥσπερ καὶ ἄρτι ἔλεγον, καὶ περὶ τούτων ἅ ἐστι δίκαιά τε καὶ ἄδικα.
Gorgias: Well then, Socrates, I am speaking of that persuasion which takes place in law courts and in other crowds, just as I was saying just now, and concerning those things which are just and unjust.
ΣΩ. καὶ ἐγώ τοι ὑπώπτευον ταύτην σε λέγειν τὴν πειθὼ καὶ περὶ τούτων, ὦ Γοργία·
Socrates: Indeed, Gorgias, I too was suspecting that you meant this persuasion and about these things.
ἀλλʼ ἵνα μὴ θαυμάζῃς ἐὰν καὶ ὀλίγον ὕστερον τοιοῦτόν τί σε ἀνέρωμαι, ὃ δοκεῖ μὲν δῆλον εἶναι, ἐγὼ δʼ ἐπανερωτῶ—ὅπερ γὰρ λέγω, τοῦ ἑξῆς ἕνεκα περαίνεσθαι τὸν λόγον ἐρωτῶ, οὐ σοῦ ἕνεκα ἀλλʼ ἵνα μὴ ἐθιζώμεθα ὑπονοοῦντες προαρπάζειν ἀλλήλων τὰ λεγόμενα, ἀλλὰ σὺ τὰ σαυτοῦ κατὰ τὴν ὑπόθεσιν ὅπως ἂν βούλῃ περαίνῃς.
But so that you may not wonder if, a little later, I ask you another such question, which seems to be clear, but which I ask again—for as I say, I ask in order that the argument may be carried through in an orderly sequence, not for your sake, but so that we may not get into the habit of snatching away each other's words in anticipation of what is suspected, but that you may complete your own thoughts according to your hypothesis in whatever way you wish.
ΓΟΡ. καὶ ὀρθῶς γέ μοι δοκεῖς ποιεῖν, ὦ Σώκρατες.
Gorgias: And you seem to me to be doing quite rightly, Socrates.
ΣΩ. ἴθι δὴ καὶ τόδε ἐπισκεψώμεθα.
Socrates: Come then, let us also consider this.
καλεῖς τι μεμαθηκέναι;
Do you call something 'having learned'?
ΓΟΡ. καλῶ.
Gorgias: I do.
ΣΩ. τί δέ; πεπιστευκέναι;
Socrates: And what about 'having believed'?
ΓΟΡ. ἔγωγε.
Gorgias: Yes, indeed.
ΣΩ. πότερον οὖν ταὐτὸν δοκεῖ σοι εἶναι μεμαθηκέναι καὶ πεπιστευκέναι, καὶ μάθησις καὶ πίστις, ἢ ἄλλο τι;
Socrates: Do you, then, think that having learned and having believed, and learning and belief, are the same thing, or something different?
ΓΟΡ. οἴομαι μὲν ἔγωγε, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἄλλο.
Gorgias: I, for my part, think they are different, Socrates.
ΣΩ. καλῶς γὰρ οἴει· γνώσῃ δὲ ἐνθένδε.
Socrates: And you think rightly; you will know it from this.
εἰ γάρ τίς σε ἔροιτο· ἆρʼ ἔστιν τις, ὦ Γοργία, πίστις ψευδὴς καὶ ἀληθής; φαίης ἄν, ὡς ἐγὼ οἶμαι.
For if someone were to ask you: 'Is there, Gorgias, a false belief and a true one?' you would say there is, as I think.
ΓΟΡ. ναί.
Gorgias: Yes.
ΣΩ. τί δέ;
Socrates: And what about knowledge?
ἐπιστήμη ἐστὶν ψευδὴς καὶ ἀληθής;
Is there a false and a true knowledge?
ΓΟΡ. οὐδαμῶς.
Gorgias: Not at all.
ΣΩ. δῆλον ἄρʼ αὖ ὅτι οὐ ταὐτόν ἐστιν.
Socrates: So it is clear, then, that they are not the same.
ΓΟΡ. ἀληθῆ λέγεις.
Gorgias: What you say is true.
ΣΩ. ἀλλὰ μὴν οἵ τέ γε μεμαθηκότες πεπεισμένοι εἰσὶν καὶ οἱ πεπιστευκότες.
Socrates: And yet, both those who have learned and those who have believed are in a state of having been persuaded.
ΓΟΡ. ἔστι ταῦτα.
Gorgias: That is so.
ΣΩ. βούλει οὖν δύο εἴδη θῶμεν πειθοῦς, τὸ μὲν πίστιν παρεχόμενον ἄνευ τοῦ εἰδέναι, τὸ δʼ ἐπιστήμην;
Socrates: Do you wish, then, that we posit two kinds of persuasion, the one providing belief without knowing, and the other providing knowledge?
ΓΟΡ. πάνυ γε.
Gorgias: Certainly.
ΣΩ. ποτέραν οὖν ἡ ῥητορικὴ πειθὼ ποιεῖ ἐν δικαστηρίοις τε καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ὄχλοις περὶ τῶν δικαίων τε καὶ ἀδίκων;
Socrates: Which of the two persuasions, then, does rhetoric produce in law courts and other crowds concerning just and unjust things?
ἐξ ἧς πιστεύειν γίγνεται ἄνευ τοῦ εἰδέναι ἢ ἐξ ἧς τὸ εἰδέναι;
The one from which believing arises without knowing, or the one from which knowing arises?
ΓΟΡ. δῆλον δήπου, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὅτι ἐξ ἧς τὸ πιστεύειν.
Gorgias: It is clear, of course, Socrates, that it is the one from which believing arises.