§453ΣΩ. νῦν μοι δοκεῖς δηλῶσαι, ὦ Γοργία, ἐγγύτατα τὴν ῥητορικὴν ἥντινα τέχνην ἡγῇ εἶναι, καὶ εἴ τι ἐγὼ συνίημι, λέγεις ὅτι πειθοῦς δημιουργός ἐστιν ἡ ῥητορική, καὶ ἡ πραγματεία αὐτῆς ἅπασα καὶ τὸ κεφάλαιον εἰς τοῦτο τελευτᾷ·
Socrates: Now, Gorgias, you seem to me to have revealed as closely as possible what kind of art you consider rhetoric to be. And if I understand anything at all, you are saying that rhetoric is a producer of persuasion, and that its whole activity and its sum total end in this.
ἢ ἔχεις τι λέγειν ἐπὶ πλέον τὴν ῥητορικὴν δύνασθαι ἢ πειθὼ τοῖς ἀκούουσιν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ποιεῖν;
Or do you have anything to say that rhetoric can do more than to produce persuasion in the soul of the listeners?
ΓΟΡ. οὐδαμῶς, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀλλά μοι δοκεῖς ἱκανῶς ὁρίζεσθαι·
Gorgias: Not at all, Socrates; rather, you seem to me to define it sufficiently.
ἔστιν γὰρ τοῦτο τὸ κεφάλαιον αὐτῆς.
For this is indeed its sum total.
ΣΩ. ἄκουσον δή, ὦ Γοργία.
Socrates: Listen then, Gorgias.
ἐγὼ γὰρ εὖ ἴσθʼ ὅτι, ὡς ἐμαυτὸν πείθω, εἴπερ τις ἄλλος ἄλλῳ διαλέγεται βουλόμενος εἰδέναι αὐτὸ τοῦτο περὶ ὅτου ὁ λόγος ἐστίν, καὶ ἐμὲ εἶναι τούτων ἕνα·
For be well assured that, as I persuade myself, if anyone else ever dialogues with another wishing to know the very thing about which the speech is, I believe that I too am one of these.
ἀξιῶ δὲ καὶ σέ.
And I think you are too.
ΓΟΡ. τί οὖν δή, ὦ Σώκρατες;
Gorgias: What do you mean by this, Socrates?
ΣΩ. ἐγὼ ἐρῶ νῦν.
Socrates: I will tell you now.
ἐγὼ τὴν ἀπὸ τῆς ῥητορικῆς πειθώ, ἥτις ποτʼ ἐστὶν ἣν σὺ λέγεις καὶ περὶ ὧντινων πραγμάτων ἐστὶν πειθώ, σαφῶς μὲν εὖ ἴσθʼ ὅτι οὐκ οἶδα, οὐ μὴν ἀλλʼ ὑποπτεύω γε ἣν οἶμαί σε λέγειν καὶ περὶ ὧν·
As for the persuasion that comes from rhetoric, whatever it is that you mean and about whatever matters it is persuasion, be well assured that I do not know it clearly; nevertheless, I do suspect which one I think you mean and about what.
οὐδὲν μέντοι ἧττον ἐρήσομαί σε τίνα ποτὲ λέγεις τὴν πειθὼ τὴν ἀπὸ τῆς ῥητορικῆς καὶ περὶ τίνων αὐτὴν εἶναι.
Nonetheless, I shall ask you what on earth you mean by the persuasion from rhetoric and about what things it is.
τοῦ ἕνεκα δὴ αὐτὸς ὑποπτεύων σὲ ἐρήσομαι, ἀλλʼ οὐκ αὐτὸς λέγω;
For what purpose, then, do I ask you when I myself suspect it, instead of saying it myself?
οὐ σοῦ ἕνεκα ἀλλὰ τοῦ λόγου, ἵνα οὕτω προΐῃ ὡς μάλιστʼ ἂν ἡμῖν καταφανὲς ποιοῖ περὶ ὅτου λέγεται.
It is not for your sake, but for the sake of the argument, so that it may proceed in such a way as to make what is being talked about most clear to us.
σκόπει γὰρ εἴ σοι δοκῶ δικαίως ἀνερωτᾶν σε· ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ ἐτύγχανόν σε ἐρωτῶν τίς ἐστιν τῶν ζωγράφων Ζεῦξις, εἴ μοι εἶπες ὅτι ὁ τὰ ζῷα γράφων, ἆρʼ οὐκ ἂν δικαίως σε ἠρόμην ὁ τὰ ποῖα τῶν ζῴων γράφων καὶ ποῦ;
For consider if I seem to be justified in questioning you: just as if I happened to be asking you which of the painters Zeuxis is, and if you told me that he is the one who paints animals, would I not have been justified in asking you what kind of animals he paints, and where?
ΓΟΡ. πάνυ γε.
Gorgias: Certainly.
ΣΩ. ἆρα διὰ τοῦτο, ὅτι καὶ ἄλλοι εἰσὶ ζωγράφοι γράφοντες ἄλλα πολλὰ ζῷα;
Socrates: Is it for this reason, because there are also other painters who paint many other animals?
ΓΟΡ. ναί.
Gorgias: Yes.
ΣΩ. εἰ δέ γε μηδεὶς ἄλλος ἢ Ζεῦξις ἔγραφε, καλῶς ἄν σοι ἀπεκέκριτο;
Socrates: But if no one else but Zeuxis painted them, would your answer have been fine?
ΓΟΡ. πῶς γὰρ οὔ;
Gorgias: How could it not?
ΣΩ. ἴθι δὴ καὶ περὶ τῆς ῥητορικῆς εἰπέ· πότερόν σοι δοκεῖ πειθὼ ποιεῖν ἡ ῥητορικὴ μόνη ἢ καὶ ἄλλαι τέχναι;
Socrates: Come then, speak also about rhetoric: does it seem to you that rhetoric alone produces persuasion, or do other arts do so as well?
λέγω δὲ τὸ τοιόνδε· ὅστις διδάσκει ὁτιοῦν πρᾶγμα, πότερον ὃ διδάσκει πείθει ἢ οὔ;
I mean something like this: does whoever teaches any matter persuade what he teaches, or not?
ΓΟΡ. οὐ δῆτα, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀλλὰ πάντων μάλιστα πείθει.
Gorgias: Not at all, Socrates; rather, he persuades most of all.
ΣΩ. πάλιν δὴ ἐπὶ τῶν αὐτῶν τεχνῶν λέγωμεν ὧνπερ νυνδή·
Socrates: Let us speak again about the same arts that we were just speaking of.
ἡ ἀριθμητικὴ οὐ διδάσκει ἡμᾶς ὅσα ἐστὶν τὰ τοῦ ἀριθμοῦ, καὶ ὁ ἀριθμητικὸς ἄνθρωπος;
Does not arithmetic, and the arithmetician, teach us how many things belong to number?
ΓΟΡ. πάνυ γε.
Gorgias: Certainly.
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν καὶ πείθει;
Socrates: Therefore, does it also persuade?
ΓΟΡ. ναί.
Gorgias: Yes.
ΣΩ. πειθοῦς ἄρα δημιουργός ἐστιν καὶ ἡ ἀριθμητική;
Socrates: So arithmetic is also a producer of persuasion?
ΓΟΡ. φαίνεται.
Gorgias: It appears so.