§356ΣΩ. μεταλάβωμεν δὴ τὰ ὀνόματα πάλιν τὸ ἡδύ τε καὶ ἀνιαρὸν ἐπὶ τοῖς αὐτοῖς τούτοις, καὶ λέγωμεν ὅτι Ἄνθρωπος πράττει—τότε μὲν ἐλέγομεν τὰ κακά, νῦν δὲ λέγωμεν τὰ ἀνιαρά, γιγνώσκων ὅτι ἀνιαρά ἐστιν, ἡττώμενος ὑπὸ τῶν ἡδέων, δῆλον ὅτι ἀναξίων ὄντων νικᾶν.
Socrates: "Let us change the names back again to 'pleasant' and 'painful' for these same things, and let us say that: 'A man does'—then we said 'bad things', but now let us say 'painful things'—'knowing that they are painful, being overcome by pleasant things,' clearly when they are not worthy of overcoming.
καὶ τίς ἄλλη ἀναξία ἡδονῇ πρὸς λύπην ἐστίν, ἀλλʼ ἢ ὑπερβολὴ ἀλλήλων καὶ ἔλλειψις;
And what other unworthiness is there of pleasure in relation to pain, except excess and deficiency of one another?
ταῦτα δʼ ἐστὶ μείζω τε καὶ σμικρότερα γιγνόμενα ἀλλήλων καὶ πλείω καὶ ἐλάττω καὶ μᾶλλον καὶ ἧττον.
And these are things becoming larger and smaller than one another, and more and fewer, and more and less.
εἰ γάρ τις λέγοι ὅτι
ἀλλὰ πολὺ διαφέρει, ὦ Σώκρατες, τὸ παραχρῆμα ἡδὺ τοῦ εἰς τὸν ὕστερον χρόνον καὶ ἡδέος καὶ λυπηροῦ,
μῶν ἄλλῳ τῳ, φαίην ἂν ἔγωγε, ἢ ἡδονῇ καὶ λύπῃ;
For if someone should say: 'But, Socrates, the immediate pleasant differs greatly from the pleasant and painful that come in the future,' 'Does it differ,' I at least would say, 'by anything other than pleasure and pain?
οὐ γὰρ ἔσθʼ ὅτῳ ἄλλῳ. ἀλλʼ ὥσπερ ἀγαθὸς ἱστάναι ἄνθρωπος, συνθεὶς τὰ ἡδέα καὶ συνθεὶς τὰ λυπηρά, καὶ τὸ ἐγγὺς καὶ τὸ πόρρω στήσας ἐν τῷ ζυγῷ, εἰπὲ πότερα πλείω ἐστίν.
For there is nothing else by which it could.' Rather, like a man skilled in weighing, having put together the pleasant things and having put together the painful things, and having placed both the near and the far in the scale, say which are more.
ἐὰν μὲν γὰρ ἡδέα πρὸς ἡδέα ἱστῇς, τὰ μείζω ἀεὶ καὶ πλείω ληπτέα· ἐὰν δὲ λυπηρὰ πρὸς λυπηρά, τὰ ἐλάττω καὶ σμικρότερα· ἐὰν δὲ ἡδέα πρὸς λυπηρά, ἐὰν μὲν τὰ ἀνιαρὰ ὑπερβάλληται ὑπὸ τῶν ἡδέων, ἐάντε τὰ ἐγγὺς ὑπὸ τῶν πόρρω ἐάντε τὰ πόρρω ὑπὸ τῶν ἐγγύς, ταύτην τὴν πρᾶξιν πρακτέον ἐν ᾗ ἂν ταῦτʼ ἐνῇ· ἐὰν δὲ τὰ ἡδέα ὑπὸ τῶν ἀνιαρῶν, οὐ πρακτέα.
For if you weigh pleasant things against pleasant, the larger and more must always be taken; if painful against painful, the fewer and smaller; and if you weigh pleasant things against painful, if the painful are outweighed by the pleasant—whether the near by the far or the far by the near—that action must be done in which these are present; but if the pleasant are outweighed by the painful, it must not be done.
μή πῃ ἄλλῃ ἔχει, φαίην ἄν, ταῦτα, ὦ ἄνθρωποι;
'Is there any other way, gentlemen, that these things stand?' I would say.
οἶδʼ ὅτι οὐκ ἂν ἔχοιεν ἄλλως λέγειν. —συνεδόκει καὶ ἐκείνῳ. ὅτε δὴ τοῦτο οὕτως ἔχει, τόδε μοι ἀποκρίνασθε, φήσω.
I know that they would not be able to say otherwise." —He too agreed. —"Since, then, this is so, answer me this," I shall say.
φαίνεται ὑμῖν τῇ ὄψει τὰ αὐτὰ μεγέθη ἐγγύθεν μὲν μείζω, πόρρωθεν δὲ ἐλάττω·
"Do the same magnitudes appear to your sight larger from near at hand, and smaller from a distance?
ἢ οὔ; —φήσουσιν. —καὶ τὰ παχέα καὶ τὰ πολλὰ ὡσαύτως;
Or not?" —They will say they do. —"And is it the same with thick things and many things?
καὶ αἱ φωναὶ αἱ ἴσαι ἐγγύθεν μὲν μείζους, πόρρωθεν δὲ σμικρότεραι; —φαῖεν ἄν. —εἰ οὖν ἐν τούτῳ ἡμῖν ἦν τὸ εὖ πράττειν, ἐν τῷ τὰ μὲν μεγάλα μήκη καὶ πράττειν καὶ λαμβάνειν, τὰ δὲ σμικρὰ καὶ φεύγειν καὶ μὴ πράττειν, τίς ἂν ἡμῖν σωτηρία ἐφάνη τοῦ βίου;
And do equal sounds seem louder from nearby, and softer from a distance?" —They would say yes. —"If, then, our well-being consisted in this: in doing and choosing great lengths, and avoiding and not doing small ones, what would have appeared to be the salvation of our life?
ἆρα ἡ μετρητικὴ τέχνη ἢ ἡ τοῦ φαινομένου δύναμις;
Would it be the art of measurement, or the power of appearance?
ἢ αὕτη μὲν ἡμᾶς ἐπλάνα καὶ ἐποίει ἄνω τε καὶ κάτω πολλάκις μεταλαμβάνειν ταὐτὰ καὶ μεταμέλειν καὶ ἐν ταῖς πράξεσιν καὶ ἐν ταῖς αἱρέσεσιν τῶν μεγάλων τε καὶ σμικρῶν, ἡ δὲ μετρητικὴ ἄκυρον μὲν ἂν ἐποίησε τοῦτο τὸ φάντασμα, δηλώσασα δὲ τὸ ἀληθὲς ἡσυχίαν ἂν ἐποίησεν ἔχειν τὴν ψυχὴν μένουσαν ἐπὶ τῷ ἀληθεῖ καὶ ἔσωσεν ἂν τὸν βίον;
Would the latter have made us wander and made us often take the same things up and down, and repent both in our actions and in our choices of great and small, whereas the art of measurement would have made this appearance invalid, and by revealing the truth, would have made the soul have peace, remaining in the truth, and would have saved our life?
ἆρʼ ἂν ὁμολογοῖεν οἱ ἄνθρωποι πρὸς ταῦτα ἡμᾶς τὴν μετρητικὴν σῴζειν ἂν τέχνην ἢ ἄλλην; —
τὴν μετρητικήν,
ὡμολόγει. —
Would men agree with us that it is the art of measurement that would save us, or some other art?" "The art of measurement," he agreed.