§355ΣΩ. ἀλλʼ ἔτι καὶ νῦν ἀναθέσθαι ἔξεστιν, εἴ πῃ ἔχετε ἄλλο τι φάναι εἶναι τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἢ τὴν ἡδονήν, ἢ τὸ κακὸν ἄλλο τι ἢ τὴν ἀνίαν·
Socrates: "But even now it is still possible to retract, if you are able in some way to say that the good is something other than pleasure, or the bad something other than pain.
ἢ ἀρκεῖ ὑμῖν τὸ ἡδέως καταβιῶναι τὸν βίον ἄνευ λυπῶν;
Or is it enough for you to live out your life pleasantly without pains?
εἰ δὲ ἀρκεῖ καὶ μὴ ἔχετε μηδὲν ἄλλο φάναι εἶναι ἀγαθὸν ἢ κακὸν ὃ μὴ εἰς ταῦτα τελευτᾷ, τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο ἀκούετε.
If it is enough and you are not able to say that there is any other good or bad which does not end in these, then hear what follows.
φημὶ γὰρ ὑμῖν τούτου οὕτως ἔχοντος γελοῖον τὸν λόγον γίγνεσθαι, ὅταν λέγητε ὅτι πολλάκις γιγνώσκων τὰ κακὰ ἄνθρωπος ὅτι κακά ἐστιν, ὅμως πράττει αὐτά, ἐξὸν μὴ πράττειν, ὑπὸ τῶν ἡδονῶν ἀγόμενος καὶ ἐκπληττόμενος· καὶ αὖθις αὖ λέγετε ὅτι γιγνώσκων ὁ ἄνθρωπος τἀγαθὰ πράττειν οὐκ ἐθέλει διὰ τὰς παραχρῆμα ἡδονάς, ὑπὸ τούτων ἡττώμενος.
For I say to you that, if this is so, your argument becomes ridiculous when you say that often a man, knowing that bad things are bad, nevertheless does them, although it is possible for him not to do them, being led and overwhelmed by pleasures; and again on the other hand you say that a man, knowing the good, is unwilling to do it because of immediate pleasures, being overcome by them.
ὡς δὲ ταῦτα γελοῖά ἐστιν, κατάδηλον ἔσται, ἐὰν μὴ πολλοῖς ὀνόμασι χρώμεθα ἅμα, ἡδεῖ τε καὶ ἀνιαρῷ καὶ ἀγαθῷ καὶ κακῷ, ἀλλʼ ἐπειδὴ δύο ἐφάνη ταῦτα, δυοῖν καὶ ὀνόμασιν προσαγορεύωμεν αὐτά, πρῶτον μὲν ἀγαθῷ καὶ κακῷ, ἔπειτα αὖθις ἡδεῖ τε καὶ ἀνιαρῷ.
How ridiculous these things are will become completely clear if we do not use many names at once—pleasant, painful, good, and bad—but, since these appeared to be two, let us also call them by two names: first, good and bad, and then again, pleasant and painful.
θέμενοι δὴ οὕτω λέγωμεν ὅτι Γιγνώσκων ὁ ἄνθρωπος τὰ κακὰ ὅτι κακά ἐστιν, ὅμως αὐτὰ ποιεῖ. ἐὰν οὖν τις ἡμᾶς ἔρηται,
διὰ τί; Ἡττώμενος, φήσομεν·
Having set it down so, let us say: 'A man, knowing that bad things are bad, nevertheless does them.' If, then, someone should ask us, 'Why?' 'Because he is overcome,' we shall say.
ὑπὸ τοῦ; ἐκεῖνος ἐρήσεται ἡμᾶς·
'By what?' he will ask us.
ἡμῖν δὲ ὑπὸ μὲν ἡδονῆς οὐκέτι ἔξεστιν εἰπεῖν—ἄλλο γὰρ ὄνομα μετείληφεν ἀντὶ τῆς ἡδονῆς τὸ ἀγαθόν—ἐκείνῳ δὴ ἀποκρινώμεθα καὶ λέγωμεν ὅτι Ἡττώμενος—
ὑπὸ τίνος; φήσει.
But it is no longer permitted for us to say 'by pleasure'—for the good has taken the place of the name of pleasure—so let us answer him and say: 'Because he is overcome—' 'By what?' he will say.
τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ, φήσομεν νὴ Δία.
'By the good,' we shall say, by Zeus!
ἂν οὖν τύχῃ ὁ ἐρόμενος ἡμᾶς ὑβριστὴς ὤν, γελάσεται καὶ ἐρεῖ· ἦ γελοῖον λέγετε πρᾶγμα, εἰ πράττει τις κακά, γιγνώσκων ὅτι κακά ἐστιν, οὐ δέον αὐτὸν πράττειν, ἡττώμενος ὑπὸ τῶν ἀγαθῶν.
If, then, the one who asks us happens to be insolent, he will laugh and say: 'What a ridiculous thing you say, if someone does bad things, knowing that they are bad, when he ought not to do them, because he is overcome by the good.
ἆρα,
φήσει,
οὐκ ἀξίων ὄντων νικᾶν ἐν ὑμῖν τῶν ἀγαθῶν τὰ κακά, ἢ ἀξίων; φήσομεν δῆλον ὅτι ἀποκρινόμενοι, ὅτι οὐκ ἀξίων ὄντων· οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἐξημάρτανεν ὅν φαμεν ἥττω εἶναι τῶν ἡδονῶν.
Is it,' he will say, 'because the good is not worthy of overcoming the bad in your estimation, or because it is worthy?' We shall clearly say in reply, 'Because it is not worthy.' For otherwise, the one whom we say is weaker than pleasures would not have erred.
κατὰ τί δέ,
φήσει ἴσως,
ἀνάξιά ἐστιν τἀγαθὰ τῶν κακῶν ἢ τὰ κακὰ τῶν ἀγαθῶν;
'In what respect, then,' he will perhaps say, 'is the good unworthy of the bad, or the bad of the good?
ἢ κατʼ ἄλλο τι ἢ ὅταν τὰ μὲν μείζω, τὰ δὲ σμικρότερα ᾖ; ἢ πλείω, τὰ δὲ ἐλάττω ᾖ; οὐχ ἕξομεν εἰπεῖν ἄλλο ἢ τοῦτο.
Is it in any other respect than when one is larger and the other smaller, or one is more and the other is less?' We shall not be able to say anything other than this.
δῆλον ἄρα,
φήσει,
ὅτι τὸ ἡττᾶσθαι τοῦτο λέγετε, ἀντὶ ἐλαττόνων ἀγαθῶν μείζω κακὰ λαμβάνειν. ταῦτα μὲν οὖν οὕτω.
'It is clear then,' he will say, 'that by "being overcome" you mean this: taking greater bad things in exchange for fewer good things.' "So these things are so.