§349ΣΩ. σὺ δὲ καὶ αὐτὸς ἀγαθὸς εἶ καὶ ἄλλους οἷός τʼ εἶ ποιεῖν ἀγαθούς, καὶ οὕτω πεπίστευκας σαυτῷ, ὥστε καὶ ἄλλων ταύτην τὴν τέχνην ἀποκρυπτομένων σύ γʼ ἀναφανδὸν σεαυτὸν ὑποκηρυξάμενος εἰς πάντας τοὺς Ἕλληνας, σοφιστὴν ἐπονομάσας σεαυτόν, ἀπέφηνας παιδεύσεως καὶ ἀρετῆς διδάσκαλον, πρῶτος τούτου μισθὸν ἀξιώσας ἄρνυσθαι.
Socrates: But you are not only yourself a good man but are also able to make others good, and you have so trusted in yourself that, while others conceal this art, you openly proclaim yourself to all the Greeks, naming yourself a sophist, and have declared yourself a teacher of education and virtue, being the first to deem it right to accept a fee for this.
πῶς οὖν οὐ σὲ χρῆν παρακαλεῖν ἐπὶ τὴν τούτων σκέψιν καὶ ἐρωτᾶν καὶ ἀνακοινοῦσθαι;
How, then, was it not necessary to invite you to the examination of these things, and to question you and communicate with you?
οὐκ ἔσθʼ ὅπως οὔ.
There is no way it was not.
καὶ νῦν δὴ ἐγὼ ἐκεῖνα, ἅπερ τὸ πρῶτον ἠρώτων περὶ τούτων, πάλιν ἐπιθυμῶ ἐξ ἀρχῆς τὰ μὲν ἀναμνησθῆναι παρὰ σοῦ, τὰ δὲ συνδιασκέψασθαι.
And so now indeed, those very things which I first asked about these matters, I desire again from the beginning partly to be reminded of by you, and partly to examine together with you.
ἦν δέ, ὡς ἐγᾦμαι, τὸ ἐρώτημα τόδε· σοφία καὶ σωφροσύνη καὶ ἀνδρεία καὶ δικαιοσύνη καὶ ὁσιότης, πότερον ταῦτα, πέντε ὄντα ὀνόματα, ἐπὶ ἑνὶ πράγματί ἐστιν, ἢ ἑκάστῳ τῶν ὀνομάτων τούτων ὑπόκειταί τις ἴδιος οὐσία καὶ πρᾶγμα ἔχον ἑαυτοῦ δύναμιν ἕκαστον, οὐκ ὂν οἷον τὸ ἕτερον αὐτῶν τὸ ἕτερον;
The question, as I think, was this: wisdom, temperance, courage, justice, and piety—are these, being five names, applied to one thing, or does there underlie each of these names a distinct reality and a thing having its own power, each not being such as the other is?
ἔφησθα οὖν σὺ οὐκ ὀνόματα ἐπὶ ἑνὶ εἶναι, ἀλλὰ ἕκαστον ἰδίῳ πράγματι τῶν ὀνομάτων τούτων ἐπικεῖσθαι, πάντα δὲ ταῦτα μόρια εἶναι ἀρετῆς, οὐχ ὡς τὰ τοῦ χρυσοῦ μόρια ὅμοιά ἐστιν ἀλλήλοις καὶ τῷ ὅλῳ οὗ μόριά ἐστιν, ἀλλʼ ὡς τὰ τοῦ προσώπου μόρια καὶ τῷ ὅλῳ οὗ μόριά ἐστιν καὶ ἀλλήλοις ἀνόμοια, ἰδίαν ἕκαστα δύναμιν ἔχοντα.
You said then that they were not names applied to one thing, but that each of these names was applied to a distinct thing, and that all these were parts of virtue, not as the parts of gold are like one another and to the whole of which they are parts, but as the parts of the face are unlike both to the whole of which they are parts and to one another, each having its own power.
ταῦτα εἰ μέν σοι δοκεῖ ἔτι ὥσπερ τότε, φάθι· εἰ δὲ ἄλλως πως, τοῦτο διόρισαι, ὡς ἔγωγε οὐδέν σοι ὑπόλογον τίθεμαι, ἐάν πῃ ἄλλῃ νῦν φήσῃς· οὐ γὰρ ἂν θαυμάζοιμι εἰ τότε ἀποπειρώμενός μου ταῦτα ἔλεγες.
If these things still seem to you as they did then, say so; but if in some other way, define this, since I do not hold you in any way accountable if you now say something else; for I would not be surprised if you were then speaking these things to test me.
ἀλλʼ ἐγώ σοι,
ἔφη,
λέγω, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὅτι ταῦτα πάντα μόρια μέν ἐστιν ἀρετῆς, καὶ τὰ μὲν τέτταρα αὐτῶν ἐπιεικῶς παραπλήσια ἀλλήλοις ἐστίν, ἡ δὲ ἀνδρεία πάνυ πολὺ διαφέρον πάντων τούτων.
'But I tell you, Socrates,' he said, 'that all these are indeed parts of virtue, and while four of them are reasonably close to one another, courage is very greatly different from all of these.
ὧδε δὲ γνώσῃ ὅτι ἐγὼ ἀληθῆ λέγω· εὑρήσεις γὰρ πολλοὺς τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἀδικωτάτους μὲν ὄντας καὶ ἀνοσιωτάτους καὶ ἀκολαστοτάτους καὶ ἀμαθεστάτους, ἀνδρειοτάτους δὲ διαφερόντως. ἔχε δή, ἔφην ἐγώ· ἄξιον γάρ τοι ἐπισκέψασθαι ὃ λέγεις.
And you will know in this way that I speak the truth; for you will find many men being most unjust, most impious, most licentious, and most ignorant, yet outstandingly courageous.' 'Hold on then,' I said; 'for what you say is indeed worthy of examination.
πότερον τοὺς ἀνδρείους θαρραλέους λέγεις ἢ ἄλλο τι; —
καὶ ἴτας γε,
ἔφη,
ἐφʼ ἃ οἱ πολλοὶ φοβοῦνται ἰέναι. —φέρε δή, τὴν ἀρετὴν καλόν τι φῂς εἶναι, καὶ ὡς καλοῦ ὄντος αὐτοῦ σὺ διδάσκαλον σαυτὸν παρέχεις; —
κάλλιστον μὲν οὖν
, ἔφη,
εἰ μὴ μαίνομαί γε. —πότερον οὖν, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, τὸ μέν τι αὐτοῦ αἰσχρόν, τὸ δέ τι καλόν, ἢ ὅλον καλόν; —
ὅλον που καλὸν ὡς οἷόν τε μάλιστα.
Do you say that courageous men are bold, or something else?' 'Yes, and indeed rushing,' he said, 'against those things which the majority fear to go against.' 'Come now, do you say that virtue is a beautiful thing, and as it is beautiful, do you offer yourself as a teacher of it?' 'Most beautiful indeed,' he said, 'unless I am mad.' 'Then,' I said, 'is some part of it shameful and some part beautiful, or is it entirely beautiful?' 'Entirely beautiful, surely, as much as possible.' Socrates: 'Do you know, then, who dive into wells boldly?' 'I do, namely, the divers.' 'Is it because they have knowledge, or for some other reason?' 'Because they have knowledge.' 'And who are bold to fight from horses?
— §350ΣΩ. οἶσθα οὖν τίνες εἰς τὰ φρέατα κολυμβῶσιν θαρραλέως; —
ἔγωγε, ὅτι οἱ κολυμβηταί. —πότερον διότι ἐπίστανται ἢ διʼ ἄλλο τι; —
ὅτι ἐπίστανται. —τίνες δὲ ἀπὸ τῶν ἵππων πολεμεῖν θαρραλέοι εἰσίν; πότερον οἱ ἱππικοὶ ἢ οἱ ἄφιπποι; —
οἱ ἱππικοί.
The horsemen, or those without horsemanship?' 'The horsemen.' 'And who with light shields?
—τίνες δὲ πέλτας ἔχοντες; οἱ πελταστικοὶ ἢ οἱ μή; —
οἱ πελταστικοί.
The peltasts, or those who are not?' 'The peltasts.
καὶ τὰ ἄλλα γε πάντα, εἰ τοῦτο ζητεῖς,
ἔφη,
οἱ ἐπιστήμονες τῶν μὴ ἐπισταμένων θαρραλεώτεροί εἰσιν, καὶ αὐτοὶ ἑαυτῶν ἐπειδὰν μάθωσιν ἢ πρὶν μαθεῖν. —ἤδη δέ τινας ἑώρακας, ἔφην, πάντων τούτων ἀνεπιστήμονας ὄντας, θαρροῦντας δὲ πρὸς ἕκαστα τούτων; —
ἔγωγε,
ἦ δʼ ὅς,
καὶ λίαν γε θαρροῦντας. —οὐκοῦν οἱ θαρραλέοι οὗτοι καὶ ἀνδρεῖοί εἰσιν; —
αἰσχρὸν μεντἄν,
ἔφη,
εἴη ἡ ἀνδρεία· ἐπεὶ οὗτοί γε μαινόμενοί εἰσιν.
And indeed in all other things, if this is what you are seeking,' he said, 'those who have knowledge are bolder than those who do not, and they themselves are bolder than themselves once they have learned than before learning.' 'And have you already seen some,' I said, 'who are without knowledge of all these things, yet are bold toward each of them?' 'I have indeed,' he said, 'and very bold indeed.' 'Are these bold ones, then, also courageous?' 'Otherwise, courage would indeed be shameful,' he said, 'since these are madmen.' 'How then,' I said, 'do you speak of the courageous?
—πῶς οὖν, ἔφην ἐγώ, λέγεις τοὺς ἀνδρείους; οὐχὶ τοὺς θαρραλέους εἶναι; —
καὶ νῦν γʼ,
ἔφη.
Is it not that they are bold?' 'Even now,' he said.
— οὐκοῦν οὗτοι, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, οἱ οὕτω θαρραλέοι ὄντες οὐκ ἀνδρεῖοι ἀλλὰ μαινόμενοι φαίνονται;
'Then,' I said, 'do these who are bold in this way appear not courageous but mad?
καὶ ἐκεῖ αὖ οἱ σοφώτατοι οὗτοι καὶ θαρραλεώτατοί εἰσιν, θαρραλεώτατοι δὲ ὄντες ἀνδρειότατοι;
And on the other hand, there, are the wisest ones also the boldest, and being the boldest, are they the most courageous?
καὶ κατὰ τοῦτον τὸν λόγον ἡ σοφία ἂν ἀνδρεία εἴη; οὐ καλῶς,
ἔφη,
μνημονεύεις, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἃ ἔλεγόν τε καὶ ἀπεκρινόμην σοι.
And according to this argument, would wisdom be courage?' 'You do not remember well, Socrates,' he said, 'what I said and answered to you.
ἔγωγε ἐρωτηθεὶς ὑπὸ σοῦ εἰ οἱ ἀνδρεῖοι θαρραλέοι εἰσίν, ὡμολόγησα· εἰ δὲ καὶ οἱ θαρραλέοι ἀνδρεῖοι, οὐκ ἠρωτήθην—εἰ γάρ με τότε ἤρου, εἶπον ἂν ὅτι οὐ πάντες—τοὺς δὲ ἀνδρείους ὡς οὐ θαρραλέοι εἰσίν, τὸ ἐμὸν ὁμολόγημα οὐδαμοῦ ἐπέδειξας ὡς οὐκ ὀρθῶς ὡμολόγησα.
For when I was asked by you whether the courageous are bold, I agreed; but whether the bold are also courageous, I was not asked—for if you had asked me then, I would have said not all. And as for my agreement that the courageous are bold, you have nowhere demonstrated that I did not agree correctly.
ἔπειτα τοὺς ἐπισταμένους αὐτοὺς ἑαυτῶν θαρραλεωτέρους ὄντας ἀποφαίνεις καὶ μὴ ἐπισταμένων ἄλλων, καὶ ἐν τούτῳ οἴει τὴν ἀνδρείαν καὶ τὴν σοφίαν ταὐτὸν εἶναι·
Then you show that those who have knowledge are bolder than themselves and than others who do not have knowledge, and in this you think that courage and wisdom are the same.
τούτῳ δὲ τῷ τρόπῳ μετιὼν καὶ τὴν ἰσχὺν οἰηθείης ἂν εἶναι σοφίαν.
But by proceeding in this way, you might also think that strength is wisdom.
πρῶτον μὲν γὰρ εἰ οὕτω μετιὼν ἔροιό με εἰ οἱ ἰσχυροὶ δυνατοί εἰσιν, φαίην ἄν· ἔπειτα, εἰ οἱ ἐπιστάμενοι παλαίειν δυνατώτεροί εἰσιν τῶν μὴ ἐπισταμένων παλαίειν καὶ αὐτοὶ αὑτῶν ἐπειδὰν μάθωσιν ἢ πρὶν μαθεῖν, φαίην ἄν·
For first, if proceeding in this way you were to ask me if the strong are powerful, I would say yes; then, if those who know how to wrestle are more powerful than those who do not know how to wrestle, and more powerful than themselves once they have learned than before learning, I would say yes.
ταῦτα δὲ ἐμοῦ ὁμολογήσαντος ἐξείη ἄν σοι, χρωμένῳ τοῖς αὐτοῖς τεκμηρίοις τούτοις, λέγειν ὡς κατὰ τὴν ἐμὴν ὁμολογίαν ἡ σοφία ἐστὶν ἰσχύς.
And when I had agreed to these things, it would be open to you, using these same proofs, to say that according to my agreement wisdom is strength.'