§351ΣΩ.
ἐγὼ δὲ οὐδαμοῦ οὐδʼ ἐνταῦθα ὁμολογῶ τοὺς δυνατοὺς ἰσχυροὺς εἶναι, τοὺς μέντοι ἰσχυροὺς δυνατούς· οὐ γὰρ ταὐτὸν εἶναι δύναμίν τε καὶ ἰσχύν, ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν καὶ ἀπὸ ἐπιστήμης γίγνεσθαι, τὴν δύναμιν, καὶ ἀπὸ μανίας γε καὶ θυμοῦ, ἰσχὺν δὲ ἀπὸ φύσεως καὶ εὐτροφίας τῶν σωμάτων.
Protagoras: But I do not anywhere, not even here, agree that the powerful are strong, though indeed that the strong are powerful; for power and strength are not the same, but the one, power, arises both from knowledge and indeed from madness and passion, while strength arises from nature and the good nurture of bodies.
οὕτω δὲ κἀκεῖ οὐ ταὐτὸν εἶναι θάρσος τε καὶ ἀνδρείαν· ὥστε συμβαίνει τοὺς μὲν ἀνδρείους θαρραλέους εἶναι, μὴ μέντοι τούς γε θαρραλέους ἀνδρείους πάντας·
And so also there, boldness and courage are not the same; so that it results that the courageous are bold, but indeed not all the bold are courageous.
θάρσος μὲν γὰρ καὶ ἀπὸ τέχνης γίγνεται ἀνθρώποις καὶ ἀπὸ θυμοῦ γε καὶ ἀπὸ μανίας, ὥσπερ ἡ δύναμις, ἀνδρεία δὲ ἀπὸ φύσεως καὶ εὐτροφίας τῶν ψυχῶν γίγνεται.
For boldness arises in men both from art and indeed from passion and from madness, just like power, but courage arises from nature and the good nurture of souls.
λέγεις δέ τινας, ἔφην, ὦ Πρωταγόρα, τῶν ἀνθρώπων εὖ ζῆν, τοὺς δὲ κακῶς; —ἔφη. —ἆρʼ οὖν δοκεῖ σοι ἄνθρωπος ἂν εὖ ζῆν, εἰ ἀνιώμενός τε καὶ ὀδυνώμενος ζῴη; —οὐκ ἔφη. —τί δʼ εἰ ἡδέως βιοὺς τὸν βίον τελευτήσειεν;
"And do you say, Protagoras," I said, "that some men live well, and others badly?" "He said yes." "Would a man then seem to you to live well if he lived being pained and suffering?" "He said no." "But what if he should end his life having lived pleasantly?
οὐκ εὖ ἄν σοι δοκεῖ οὕτως βεβιωκέναι; —
ἔμοιγʼ,
ἔφη.
Would he not seem to you to have lived well in this way?" "To me at least," he said.
—τὸ μὲν ἄρα ἡδέως ζῆν ἀγαθόν, τὸ δʼ ἀηδῶς κακόν. —
εἴπερ τοῖς καλοῖς γʼ,
ἔφη,
ζῴη ἡδόμενος. —τί δή, ὦ Πρωταγόρα;
"Then to live pleasantly is good, and to live unpleasantly is bad." "If indeed," he said, "he should live enjoying beautiful things." "Why so, Protagoras?
μὴ καὶ σύ, ὥσπερ οἱ πολλοί, ἡδέʼ ἄττα καλεῖς κακὰ καὶ ἀνιαρὰ ἀγαθά;
Do you too, like the majority, call some pleasant things bad, and some painful things good?
ἐγὼ γὰρ λέγω, καθʼ ὃ ἡδέα ἐστίν, ἆρα κατὰ τοῦτο οὐκ ἀγαθά, μὴ εἴ τι ἀπʼ αὐτῶν ἀποβήσεται ἄλλο;
For I say, insofar as they are pleasant, are they not in this respect good, unless indeed something else will result from them?
καὶ αὖθις αὖ τὰ ἀνιαρὰ ὡσαύτως οὕτως οὐ καθʼ ὅσον ἀνιαρά, κακά; —
οὐκ οἶδα, ὦ Σώκρατες,
ἔφη,
ἁπλῶς οὕτως, ὡς σὺ ἐρωτᾷς, εἰ ἐμοὶ ἀποκριτέον ἐστὶν ὡς τὰ ἡδέα τε ἀγαθά ἐστιν ἅπαντα καὶ τὰ ἀνιαρὰ κακά· ἀλλά μοι δοκεῖ οὐ μόνον πρὸς τὴν νῦν ἀπόκρισιν ἐμοὶ ἀσφαλέστερον εἶναι ἀποκρίνασθαι, ἀλλὰ καὶ πρὸς πάντα τὸν ἄλλον βίον τὸν ἐμόν, ὅτι ἔστι μὲν ἃ τῶν ἡδέων οὐκ ἔστιν ἀγαθά, ἔστι δʼ αὖ καὶ ἃ τῶν ἀνιαρῶν οὐκ ἔστι κακά, ἔστι δʼ ἃ ἔστι, καὶ τρίτον ἃ οὐδέτερα, οὔτε κακὰ οὔτʼ ἀγαθά. —ἡδέα δὲ καλεῖς, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, οὐ τὰ ἡδονῆς μετέχοντα ἢ ποιοῦντα ἡδονήν; —
πάνυ γʼ,
ἔφη.
And again in turn, are not painful things likewise bad, insofar as they are painful?" "I do not know, Socrates," he said, "simply in this way as you ask, whether I must answer that pleasant things are all good and painful things all bad; but it seems to me safer to answer, not only with respect to the present answer but also with respect to all the rest of my life, that there are some of pleasant things which are not good, and there are on the other hand also some of painful things which are not bad, and there are some which are, and thirdly, some which are neither, neither bad nor good." "And do you call pleasant," I said, "things which partake of pleasure or produce pleasure?" "Certainly," he said.
—τοῦτο τοίνυν λέγω, καθʼ ὅσον ἡδέα ἐστίν, εἰ οὐκ ἀγαθά, τὴν ἡδονὴν αὐτὴν ἐρωτῶν εἰ οὐκ ἀγαθόν ἐστιν.
"This then is what I say: insofar as they are pleasant, are they not good?
—
ὥσπερ σὺ λέγεις,
ἔφη,
ἑκάστοτε, ὦ Σώκρατες, σκοπώμεθα αὐτό, καὶ ἐὰν μὲν πρὸς λόγον δοκῇ εἶναι τὸ σκέμμα καὶ τὸ αὐτὸ φαίνηται ἡδύ τε καὶ ἀγαθόν, συγχωρησόμεθα· εἰ δὲ μή, τότε ἤδη ἀμφισβητήσομεν. πότερον οὖν, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, σὺ βούλει ἡγεμονεύειν τῆς σκέψεως, ἢ ἐγὼ ἡγῶμαι; δίκαιος,
ἔφη,
σὺ ἡγεῖσθαι· σὺ γὰρ καὶ κατάρχεις τοῦ λόγου.
I am asking about pleasure itself, whether it is not a good thing." "As you say each time, Socrates," he said, "let us examine it; and if the inquiry seems to be to the point and the pleasant and the good appear to be the same, we shall agree; but if not, then we shall dispute." "Whether then," I said, "do you wish to lead the inquiry, or shall I lead?" "It is right," he said, "for you to lead; for you are indeed the one who began the discussion."