§280ΣΩ. τί δέ;
SOCRATES: "What then?
στρατευόμενος μετὰ ποτέρου ἂν ἥδιον τοῦ κινδύνου τε καὶ τῆς τύχης μετέχοις, μετὰ σοφοῦ στρατηγοῦ ἢ μετὰ ἀμαθοῦς; —
μετὰ σοφοῦ. —τί δέ;
If you were on a campaign, with which of the two would you more gladly share the danger and the fortune, with a wise general or an ignorant one?" — "With the wise one." — "And what?
ἀσθενῶν μετὰ ποτέρου ἂν ἡδέως κινδυνεύοις, μετὰ σοφοῦ ἰατροῦ ἢ μετὰ ἀμαθοῦς; —
μετὰ σοφοῦ. —ἆρʼ οὖν, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, ὅτι εὐτυχέστερον ἂν οἴει πράττειν μετὰ σοφοῦ πράττων ἢ μετὰ ἀμαθοῦς; —συνεχώρει. —ἡ σοφία ἄρα πανταχοῦ εὐτυχεῖν ποιεῖ τοὺς ἀνθρώπους.
If you were sick, with which of the two would you gladly run risks, with a wise doctor or an ignorant one?" — "With the wise one." — "Is it then," I said, "because you think you would fare more fortunately acting with a wise person than with an ignorant one?" — He agreed. — "Wisdom, then, makes men fortunate everywhere.
οὐ γὰρ δήπου ἁμαρτάνοι γʼ ἄν ποτέ τι σοφία, ἀλλʼ ἀνάγκη ὀρθῶς πράττειν καὶ τυγχάνειν· ἦ γὰρ ἂν οὐκέτι σοφία εἴη.
For surely wisdom could never err in anything, but must of necessity act rightly and succeed; for otherwise it would no longer be wisdom.
συνωμολογησάμεθα τελευτῶντες οὐκ οἶδʼ ὅπως ἐν κεφαλαίῳ οὕτω τοῦτο ἔχειν, σοφίας παρούσης, ᾧ ἂν παρῇ, μηδὲν προσδεῖσθαι εὐτυχίας·
We agreed in the end, I know not how, in sum that this is so: that when wisdom is present, the one to whom it is present has no need of good fortune in addition.
ἐπειδὴ δὲ τοῦτο συνωμολογησάμεθα, πάλιν ἐπυνθανόμην αὐτοῦ τὰ πρότερον ὡμολογημένα πῶς ἂν ἡμῖν ἔχοι.
And when we had agreed on this, I asked him again how our previous agreements would stand.
ὡμολογήσαμεν γάρ, ἔφην, εἰ ἡμῖν ἀγαθὰ πολλὰ παρείη, εὐδαιμονεῖν ἂν καὶ εὖ πράττειν. —συνέφη. —ἆρʼ οὖν εὐδαιμονοῖμεν ἂν διὰ τὰ παρόντα ἀγαθά, εἰ μηδὲν ἡμᾶς ὠφελοῖ ἢ εἰ ὠφελοῖ; —
εἰ ὠφελοῖ,
ἔφη. —ἆρʼ οὖν ἄν τι ὠφελοῖ, εἰ εἴη μόνον ἡμῖν, χρῴμεθα δʼ αὐτοῖς μή;
For we agreed, I said, that if many good things were present to us, we would be happy and fare well." — He agreed. — "Would we then be happy because of the good things present, if they did not benefit us at all, or if they did benefit us?" — "If they did benefit us," he said. — "Would they then benefit us at all, if we only had them, but did not use them?
οἷον σιτία εἰ ἡμῖν εἴη πολλά, ἐσθίοιμεν δὲ μή, ἢ ποτόν, πίνοιμεν δὲ μή, ἔσθʼ ὅτι ὠφελοίμεθʼ ἄν; —
οὐ δῆτα,
ἔφη. —τί δέ;
For example, if we had much food, but did not eat it, or drink, but did not drink it, is there any way we would be benefited?" — "Certainly not," he said. — "What then?
οἱ δημιουργοὶ πάντες, εἰ αὐτοῖς εἴη πάντα τὰ ἐπιτήδεια παρεσκευασμένα ἑκάστῳ εἰς τὸ ἑαυτοῦ ἔργον, χρῷντο δὲ αὐτοῖς μή, ἆρʼ ἂν οὗτοι εὖ πράττοιεν διὰ τὴν κτῆσιν, ὅτι κεκτημένοι εἶεν πάντα ἃ δεῖ κεκτῆσθαι τὸν δημιουργόν;
If all the craftsmen had all the necessary materials prepared for each for his own work, but did not use them, would they do well because of their possession, because they possessed all that a craftsman ought to possess?
οἷον τέκτων, εἰ παρεσκευασμένος εἴη τά τε ὄργανα ἅπαντα καὶ ξύλα ἱκανά, τεκταίνοιτο δὲ μή, ἔσθʼ ὅτι ὠφελοῖτʼ ἂν ἀπὸ τῆς κτήσεως; —
οὐδαμῶς,
ἔφη. —τί δέ, εἴ τις κεκτημένος εἴη πλοῦτόν τε καὶ ἃ νυνδὴ ἐλέγομεν πάντα τὰ ἀγαθά, χρῷτο δὲ αὐτοῖς μή, ἆρʼ ἂν εὐδαιμονοῖ διὰ τὴν τούτων κτῆσιν τῶν ἀγαθῶν; —
οὐ δῆτα, ὦ Σώκρατες. —δεῖ ἄρα, ἔφην, ὡς ἔοικεν, μὴ μόνον κεκτῆσθαι τὰ τοιαῦτα ἀγαθὰ τὸν μέλλοντα εὐδαίμονα ἔσεσθαι, ἀλλὰ καὶ χρῆσθαι αὐτοῖς· ἢ οὐδὲν ὄφελος τῆς κτήσεως γίγνεται. —
ἀληθῆ λέγεις. —ἆρʼ οὖν, ὦ Κλεινία, ἤδη τοῦτο ἱκανὸν πρὸς τὸ εὐδαίμονα ποιῆσαί τινα, τό τε κεκτῆσθαι τἀγαθὰ καὶ τὸ χρῆσθαι αὐτοῖς; —
ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ. —πότερον, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, ἐὰν ὀρθῶς χρῆταί τις ἢ καὶ ἐὰν μή; —
ἐὰν ὀρθῶς.
For example, a carpenter, if he were provided with all his tools and sufficient wood, but did not do any carpentry, is there any way he would benefit from the possession?" — "In no way," he said. — "And what if someone possessed wealth and all the good things we were just now mentioning, but did not use them, would he be happy because of the possession of these good things?" — "Certainly not, Socrates." — "It is necessary then, I said, as it seems, that the one who is going to be happy should not only possess such good things, but also use them; or else no benefit comes from the possession." — "You speak the truth." — "Is this then already enough, Clinias, to make someone happy: both to possess the good things and to use them?" — "It seems so to me." — "Which of the two," I said, "if one uses them rightly, or even if not?" — "If rightly."