§281ΣΩ. καλῶς γε, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, λέγεις.
SOCRATES: "You speak well," I said.
πλέον γάρ που οἶμαι θάτερόν ἐστιν, ἐάν τις χρῆται ὁτῳοῦν μὴ ὀρθῶς πράγματι ἢ ἐὰν ἐᾷ· τὸ μὲν γὰρ κακόν, τὸ δὲ οὔτε κακὸν οὔτε ἀγαθόν.
"For I suppose the one is more (of an evil), if someone uses any thing whatever not rightly, than if he lets it alone; for the former is bad, but the latter is neither bad nor good.
ἢ οὐχ οὕτω φαμέν; —συνεχώρει. —τί οὖν;
Or do we not say so?" — He agreed. — "What then?
ἐν τῇ ἐργασίᾳ τε καὶ χρήσει τῇ περὶ τὰ ξύλα μῶν ἄλλο τί ἐστιν τὸ ἀπεργαζόμενον ὀρθῶς χρῆσθαι ἢ ἐπιστήμη ἡ τεκτονική; —
οὐ δῆτα,
ἔφη. —ἀλλὰ μήν που καὶ ἐν τῇ περὶ τὰ σκεύη ἐργασίᾳ τὸ ὀρθῶς ἐπιστήμη ἐστὶν ἡ ἀπεργαζομένη. —συνέφη. —ἆρʼ οὖν, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, καὶ περὶ τὴν χρείαν ὧν ἐλέγομεν τὸ πρῶτον τῶν ἀγαθῶν, πλούτου τε καὶ ὑγιείας καὶ κάλλους, τὸ ὀρθῶς πᾶσι τοῖς τοιούτοις χρῆσθαι ἐπιστήμη ἦν ἡγουμένη καὶ κατορθοῦσα τὴν πρᾶξιν, ἢ ἄλλο τι; —
ἐπιστήμη,
ἦ δʼ ὅς. —οὐ μόνον ἄρα εὐτυχίαν ἀλλὰ καὶ εὐπραγίαν, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἡ ἐπιστήμη παρέχει τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἐν πάσῃ κτήσει τε καὶ πράξει. —ὡμολόγει. —ἆρʼ οὖν ὦ πρὸς Διός, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, ὄφελός τι τῶν ἄλλων κτημάτων ἄνευ φρονήσεως καὶ σοφίας;
In the working and use of wood, is it anything other than the knowledge of carpentry that produces right use?" — "Certainly not," he said. — "But surely also in the working of utensils, it is knowledge that produces the right way." — He agreed. — "Is it then," I said, "also concerning the use of the goods we mentioned at first, wealth and health and beauty, that the right use of all such things is guided and made successful in action by knowledge, or by something else?" — "Knowledge," he said. — "So, as it seems, knowledge provides men not only with good fortune but also with well-doing in every possession and action." — He agreed. — "Is there then, by Zeus," I said, "any benefit from the other possessions without understanding and wisdom?
ἆρά γε ἂν ὄναιτο ἄνθρωπος πολλὰ κεκτημένος καὶ πολλὰ πράττων νοῦν μὴ ἔχων, ἢ μᾶλλον ὀλίγα νοῦν ἔχων;
Would a man benefit by possessing many things and doing many things without having intellect, or rather by possessing few things with intellect?
ὧδε δὲ σκόπει· οὐκ ἐλάττω πράττων ἐλάττω ἂν ἐξαμαρτάνοι, ἐλάττω δὲ ἁμαρτάνων ἧττον ἂν κακῶς πράττοι, ἧττον δὲ κακῶς πράττων ἄθλιος ἧττον ἂν εἴη; —
πάνυ γʼ,
ἔφη. —πότερον οὖν ἂν μᾶλλον ἐλάττω τις πράττοι πένης ὢν ἢ πλούσιος; —
πένης,
ἔφη. —πότερον δὲ ἀσθενὴς ἢ ἰσχυρός; —
ἀσθενής. —πότερον δὲ ἔντιμος ἢ ἄτιμος; —
ἄτιμος. —πότερον δὲ ἀνδρεῖος ὢν καὶ σώφρων ἐλάττω ἂν πράττοι ἢ δειλός; —
δειλός. —οὐκοῦν καὶ ἀργὸς μᾶλλον ἢ ἐργάτης; —συνεχώρει. —καὶ βραδὺς μᾶλλον ἢ ταχύς, καὶ ἀμβλὺ ὁρῶν καὶ ἀκούων μᾶλλον ἢ ὀξύ; —πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα συνεχωροῦμεν ἀλλήλοις. —ἐν κεφαλαίῳ δʼ, ἔφην, ὦ Κλεινία, κινδυνεύει σύμπαντα ἃ τὸ πρῶτον ἔφαμεν ἀγαθὰ εἶναι, οὐ περὶ τούτου ὁ λόγος αὐτοῖς εἶναι, ὅπως αὐτά γε καθʼ αὑτὰ πέφυκεν ἀγαθὰ, ἀλλʼ ὡς ἔοικεν ὧδʼ ἔχει· ἐὰν μὲν αὐτῶν ἡγῆται ἀμαθία, μείζω κακὰ εἶναι τῶν ἐναντίων, ὅσῳ δυνατώτερα ὑπηρετεῖν τῷ ἡγουμένῳ κακῷ ὄντι, ἐὰν δὲ φρόνησίς τε καὶ σοφία, μείζω ἀγαθά, αὐτὰ δὲ καθʼ αὑτὰ οὐδέτερα αὐτῶν οὐδενὸς ἄξια εἶναι. —
φαίνεται,
ἔφη,
ὡς ἔοικεν, οὕτως, ὡς σὺ λέγεις.
Consider it in this way: by doing fewer things, would he not err less, and by erring less, fare less badly, and by faring less badly, be less miserable?" — "Certainly," he said. — "Would one then do fewer things more by being poor or rich?" — "Poor," he said. — "And weak or strong?" — "Weak." — "And honored or dishonored?" — "Dishonored." — "And would one do fewer things by being courageous and temperate, or cowardly?" — "Cowardly." — "Therefore, also an idle person more than an industrious worker?" — He agreed. — "And a slow person more than a quick one, and one seeing and hearing dully more than sharply?" — We agreed with one another on all such points. — "In sum, then," I said, "Clinias, it seems that for all the things we at first said were good, the question for them is not how they are by nature good in themselves, but it seems to be thus: if ignorance leads them, they are greater evils than their opposites, inasmuch as they are more capable of serving their leader, which is bad; but if understanding and wisdom lead them, they are greater goods, while in themselves neither of them is of any value." — "It appears, as it seems, to be so, just as you say," he said. — "What then follows for us from what has been said?
—τί οὖν ἡμῖν συμβαίνει ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων; ἄλλο τι ἢ τῶν μὲν ἄλλων οὐδὲν ὂν οὔτε ἀγαθὸν οὔτε κακόν, τούτοιν δὲ δυοῖν ὄντοιν ἡ μὲν σοφία ἀγαθόν, ἡ δὲ ἀμαθία κακόν; —ὡμολόγει.
Is it anything other than that, while of the other things none is either good or bad, of these two, wisdom is good and ignorance is bad?" — He agreed.