§197ΛΑ. νὴ τοὺς θεούς, καὶ εὖ γε λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες.
Laches: By the gods, and you speak well, Socrates.
καὶ ἡμῖν ὡς ἀληθῶς τοῦτο ἀπόκριναι, ὦ Νικία, πότερον σοφώτερα φῂς ἡμῶν ταῦτα εἶναι τὰ θηρία, ἃ πάντες ὁμολογοῦμεν ἀνδρεῖα εἶναι, ἢ πᾶσιν ἐναντιούμενος τολμᾷς μηδὲ ἀνδρεῖα αὐτὰ καλεῖν;
And answer us this in truth, Nicias: do you say that these beasts, which we all agree are courageous, are wiser than us, or do you dare, opposing everyone, not even to call them courageous?
ΝΙ. οὐ γάρ τι, ὦ Λάχης, ἔγωγε ἀνδρεῖα καλῶ οὔτε θηρία οὔτε ἄλλο οὐδὲν τὸ τὰ δεινὰ ὑπὸ ἀνοίας μὴ φοβούμενον, ἀλλʼ ἄφοβον καὶ μῶρον·
Nicias: Not at all, Laches; I certainly do not call courageous either beasts or anything else that, through folly, does not fear things to be feared, but rather mindless and foolish.
ἢ καὶ τὰ παιδία πάντα οἴει με ἀνδρεῖα καλεῖν, ἃ διʼ ἄνοιαν οὐδὲν δέδοικεν;
Or do you think I call all young children courageous, who through folly fear nothing?
ἀλλʼ οἶμαι τὸ ἄφοβον καὶ τὸ ἀνδρεῖον οὐ ταὐτόν ἐστιν.
I think that being fearless and being courageous are not the same.
ἐγὼ δὲ ἀνδρείας μὲν καὶ προμηθίας πάνυ τισὶν ὀλίγοις οἶμαι μετεῖναι, θρασύτητος δὲ καὶ τόλμης καὶ τοῦ ἀφόβου μετὰ ἀπρομηθίας πάνυ πολλοῖς καὶ ἀνδρῶν καὶ γυναικῶν καὶ παίδων καὶ θηρίων.
I believe that while very few share in courage and foresight, very many—men, women, children, and beasts—share in boldness, daring, and fearlessness without foresight.
ταῦτʼ οὖν ἃ σὺ καλεῖς ἀνδρεῖα καὶ οἱ πολλοί, ἐγὼ θρασέα καλῶ, ἀνδρεῖα δὲ τὰ φρόνιμα περὶ ὧν λέγω.
Consequently, those things which you and the multitude call courageous, I call rash, and I call courageous those wise things of which I speak.
ΛΑ. θέασαι, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὡς εὖ ὅδε ἑαυτὸν δή, ὡς οἴεται, κοσμεῖ τῷ λόγῳ· οὓς δὲ πάντες ὁμολογοῦσιν ἀνδρείους εἶναι, τούτους ἀποστερεῖν ἐπιχειρεῖ ταύτης τῆς τιμῆς.
Laches: See, Socrates, how well this man, as he thinks, adorns himself with speech; but those whom everyone agrees are courageous, he attempts to deprive of this honor.
ΝΙ. οὔκουν σέ γε, ὦ Λάχης, ἀλλὰ θάρρει· φημὶ γάρ σε εἶναι σοφόν, καὶ Λάμαχόν γε, εἴπερ ἐστὲ ἀνδρεῖοι, καὶ ἄλλους γε συχνοὺς Ἀθηναίων.
Nicias: Not you, Laches, so be of good cheer; for I say that you are wise, and Lamachus too, if indeed you are courageous, and many other Athenians besides.
ΛΑ. οὐδὲν ἐρῶ πρὸς ταῦτα, ἔχων εἰπεῖν, ἵνα μή με φῇς ὡς ἀληθῶς Αἰξωνέα εἶναι.
Laches: I shall say nothing to this, though I have something to say, so that you may not say I am truly an Aexonean.
ΣΩ. μηδέ γε εἴπῃς, ὦ Λάχης· καὶ γάρ μοι δοκεῖς οὐδὲ ᾐσθῆσθαι ὅτι ταύτην τὴν σοφίαν παρὰ Δάμωνος τοῦ ἡμετέρου ἑταίρου παρείληφεν, ὁ δὲ Δάμων τῷ προδίκῳ πολλὰ πλησιάζει, ὃς δὴ δοκεῖ τῶν σοφιστῶν κάλλιστα τὰ τοιαῦτα ὀνόματα διαιρεῖν.
Socrates: Do not say anything, Laches; for you seem to me not even to have noticed that he has received this wisdom from Damon, our companion, and Damon associates much with Prodicus, who indeed of the sophists is thought to make such distinctions of words most beautifully.
ΛΑ. καὶ γὰρ πρέπει, ὦ Σώκρατες, σοφιστῇ τὰ τοιαῦτα μᾶλλον κομψεύεσθαι ἢ ἀνδρὶ ὃν ἡ πόλις ἀξιοῖ αὑτῆς προεστάναι.
Laches: And indeed it is fitting, Socrates, for a sophist to play with such subtleties rather than for a man whom the city deems worthy to stand at its head.
ΣΩ. πρέπει μέν που, ὦ μακάριε, τῶν μεγίστων προστατοῦντι μεγίστης φρονήσεως μετέχειν·
Socrates: It is indeed fitting, my blessed friend, for one presiding over the greatest things to share in the greatest wisdom.
δοκεῖ δέ μοι Νικίας ἄξιος εἶναι ἐπισκέψεως, ὅποι ποτὲ βλέπων τοὔνομα τοῦτο τίθησι τὴν ἀνδρείαν.
But Nicias seems to me worthy of examination, to see where on earth he is looking when he defines courage with this name.
ΛΑ. αὐτὸς τοίνυν σκόπει, ὦ Σώκρατες.
Laches: Examine him then yourself, Socrates.
ΣΩ. τοῦτο μέλλω ποιεῖν, ὦ ἄριστε· μὴ μέντοι οἴου με ἀφήσειν σε τῆς κοινωνίας τοῦ λόγου, ἀλλὰ πρόσεχε τὸν νοῦν καὶ συσκόπει τὰ λεγόμενα.
Socrates: This I am about to do, my excellent friend; do not, however, think that I shall release you from sharing in the argument, but pay attention and examine with me what is said.
ΛΑ. ταῦτα δὴ ἔστω, εἰ δοκεῖ χρῆναι.
Laches: Let it be so, if you think it necessary.
§198ΣΩ. ἀλλὰ δοκεῖ.
Socrates: Indeed I do.
σὺ δέ, Νικία, λέγε ἡμῖν πάλιν ἐξ ἀρχῆς· οἶσθʼ ὅτι τὴν ἀνδρείαν κατʼ ἀρχὰς τοῦ λόγου ἐσκοποῦμεν ὡς μέρος ἀρετῆς σκοποῦντες;
And you, Nicias, tell us again from the beginning: do you know that at the beginning of the argument we were examining courage, looking at it as a part of virtue?
ΝΙ. πάνυ γε.
Nicias: Certainly.
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν καὶ σὺ τοῦτο ἀπεκρίνω ὡς μόριον, ὄντων δὴ καὶ ἄλλων μερῶν, ἃ σύμπαντα ἀρετὴ κέκληται;
Socrates: And did you not answer this as a part, there being indeed other parts, which all together are called virtue?
ΝΙ. πῶς γὰρ οὔ;
Nicias: How could I not?
ΣΩ. ἆρʼ οὖν ἅπερ ἐγὼ καὶ σὺ ταῦτα λέγεις;
Socrates: Do you then say the same things as Laches and I do?
ἐγὼ δὲ καλῶ πρὸς ἀνδρείᾳ σωφροσύνην καὶ δικαιοσύνην καὶ ἄλλʼ ἄττα τοιαῦτα.
For I, in addition to courage, call temperance, justice, and other such things parts of virtue.
οὐ καὶ σύ;
Do you not also?
ΝΙ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν.
Nicias: By all means.
ΣΩ. ἔχε δή.
Socrates: Very well.
ταῦτα μὲν γὰρ ὁμολογοῦμεν, περὶ δὲ τῶν δεινῶν καὶ θαρραλέων σκεψώμεθα, ὅπως μὴ σὺ μὲν ἄλλʼ ἄττα ἡγῇ, ἡμεῖς δὲ ἄλλα.
Since we agree on these things, let us examine things to be feared and things to be dared, so that you do not think one thing and Laches and I another.
ἃ μὲν οὖν ἡμεῖς ἡγούμεθα, φράσομέν σοι· σὺ δὲ ἂν μὴ ὁμολογῇς, διδάξεις.
We shall tell you what we think; and if you do not agree, you shall instruct us.
ἡγούμεθα δʼ ἡμεῖς δεινὰ μὲν εἶναι ἃ καὶ δέος παρέχει, θαρραλέα δὲ ἃ μὴ δέος παρέχει—δέος δὲ παρέχει οὐ τὰ γεγονότα οὐδὲ τὰ παρόντα τῶν κακῶν, ἀλλὰ τὰ προσδοκώμενα·
We think that things to be feared are those which produce fear, and things to be dared are those which do not produce fear; and fear is produced not by past or present evils, but by those that are expected; for fear is an expectation of a future evil.
δέος γὰρ εἶναι προσδοκίαν μέλλοντος κακοῦ—ἢ οὐχ οὕτω καὶ συνδοκεῖ, ὦ Λάχης;
Or does it not seem so to you also, Laches?
ΛΑ. πάνυ γε σφόδρα, ὦ Σώκρατες.
Laches: Very much so, Socrates.
ΣΩ. τὰ μὲν ἡμέτερα τοίνυν, ὦ Νικία, ἀκούεις, ὅτι δεινὰ μὲν τὰ μέλλοντα κακά φαμεν εἶναι, θαρραλέα δὲ τὰ μὴ κακὰ ἢ ἀγαθὰ μέλλοντα·
Socrates: Our view then, Nicias, you hear: we say that things to be feared are future evils, and things to be dared are future non-evils or goods.
σὺ δὲ ταύτῃ ἢ ἄλλῃ περὶ τούτων λέγεις;
Do you speak of them in this way or in some other?
ΝΙ. ταύτῃ ἔγωγε.
Nicias: In this way, I do.
ΣΩ. τούτων δέ γε τὴν ἐπιστήμην ἀνδρείαν προσαγορεύεις;
Socrates: And the knowledge of these is what you call courage?
ΝΙ. κομιδῇ γε.
Nicias: Quite so.
ΣΩ. ἔτι δὴ τὸ τρίτον σκεψώμεθα εἰ συνδοκεῖ σοί τε καὶ ἡμῖν.
Socrates: Let us still examine the third point, to see if it seems correct both to you and to us.
ΝΙ. τὸ ποῖον δὴ τοῦτο;
Nicias: What sort of point is this?
ΣΩ. ἐγὼ δὴ φράσω.
Socrates: I shall tell you.
δοκεῖ γὰρ δὴ ἐμοί τε καὶ τῷδε, περὶ ὅσων ἐστὶν ἐπιστήμη, οὐκ ἄλλη μὲν εἶναι περὶ γεγονότος εἰδέναι ὅπῃ γέγονεν, ἄλλη δὲ περὶ γιγνομένων ὅπῃ γίγνεται, ἄλλη δὲ ὅπῃ ἂν κάλλιστα γένοιτο καὶ γενήσεται τὸ μήπω γεγονός, ἀλλʼ ἡ αὐτή.
It seems to me and to Laches that concerning whatever there is knowledge, it is not one knowledge about the past to know how it happened, another about the present to know how it is happening, and another about how what has not yet happened would and will best happen, but rather the same knowledge.
οἷον περὶ τὸ ὑγιεινὸν εἰς ἅπαντας τοὺς χρόνους οὐκ ἄλλη τις ἢ ἰατρική, μία οὖσα, ἐφορᾷ καὶ γιγνόμενα καὶ γεγονότα καὶ γενησόμενα ὅπῃ γενήσεται· καὶ περὶ τὰ ἐκ τῆς γῆς αὖ φυόμενα ἡ γεωργία ὡσαύτως ἔχει·
For example, concerning what is healthy for all times, no other knowledge than medicine, being one, oversees both things happening, things past, and things that will happen, how they will happen; and concerning things growing from the earth, agriculture is in the same state.