§196ΝΙ. ὧι ἐγὼ λέγω πολὺ μᾶλλον, ὦ βέλτιστε·
Nicias: To the one I am speaking of, it belongs far more, my excellent friend.
ἐπεὶ μάντιν γε τὰ σημεῖα μόνον δεῖ γιγνώσκειν τῶν ἐσομένων, εἴτε τῳ θάνατος εἴτε νόσος εἴτε ἀποβολὴ χρημάτων ἔσται, εἴτε νίκη εἴτε ἧττα ἢ πολέμου ἢ καὶ ἄλλης τινὸς ἀγωνίας·
For a prophet indeed needs only to know the signs of things to come, whether death, sickness, or loss of property will come to someone, or victory or defeat in war or in some other contest.
ὅτι δέ τῳ ἄμεινον τούτων ἢ παθεῖν ἢ μὴ παθεῖν, τί μᾶλλον μάντει προσήκει κρῖναι ἢ ἄλλῳ ὁτῳοῦν;
But why should it belong to a prophet any more than to anyone else to judge whether it is better for someone to suffer or not to suffer these things?
ΛΑ. ἀλλʼ ἐγὼ τούτου οὐ μανθάνω, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὅτι βούλεται λέγειν· οὔτε γὰρ μάντιν οὔτε ἰατρὸν οὔτε ἄλλον οὐδένα δηλοῖ ὅντινα λέγει τὸν ἀνδρεῖον, εἰ μὴ εἰ θεόν τινα λέγει αὐτὸν εἶναι.
Laches: But I do not understand, Socrates, what he wishes to say; for he makes clear neither a prophet, nor a physician, nor anyone else as the one he calls courageous, unless he is saying that he is some god.
ἐμοὶ μὲν οὖν φαίνεται Νικίας οὐκ ἐθέλειν γενναίως ὁμολογεῖν ὅτι οὐδὲν λέγει, ἀλλὰ στρέφεται ἄνω καὶ κάτω ἐπικρυπτόμενος τὴν αὑτοῦ ἀπορίαν·
To me, then, Nicias seems unwilling to confess nobly that he is saying nothing, but twists up and down, concealing his own difficulty.
καίτοι κἂν ἡμεῖς οἷοί τε ἦμεν ἄρτι ἐγώ τε καὶ σὺ τοιαῦτα στρέφεσθαι, εἰ ἐβουλόμεθα μὴ δοκεῖν ἐναντία ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς λέγειν.
And yet even you and I just now would have been able to twist in such a way, if we wished not to seem to contradict ourselves.
εἰ μὲν οὖν ἐν δικαστηρίῳ ἡμῖν οἱ λόγοι ἦσαν, εἶχεν ἄν τινα λόγον ταῦτα ποιεῖν· νῦν δὲ τί ἄν τις ἐν συνουσίᾳ τοιᾷδε μάτην κενοῖς λόγοις αὐτὸς αὑτὸν κοσμοῖ;
Now, if our arguments were in a court of law, there would be some reason to do this; but as it is, why should anyone in such a gathering vainly adorn himself with empty words?
ΣΩ. οὐδὲν οὐδʼ ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ, ὦ Λάχης·
Socrates: To me also, Laches, it seems that he should not.
ἀλλʼ ὁρῶμεν μὴ Νικίας οἴεταί τι λέγειν καὶ οὐ λόγου ἕνεκα ταῦτα λέγει.
But let us see whether Nicias thinks he is saying something and is not saying these things just for the sake of talking.
αὐτοῦ οὖν σαφέστερον πυθώμεθα τί ποτε νοεῖ· καὶ ἐάν τι φαίνηται λέγων, συγχωρησόμεθα, εἰ δὲ μή, διδάξομεν.
Let us then inquire of him more clearly what on earth he has in mind; and if he appears to be saying something, we shall agree, but if not, we shall instruct him.
ΛΑ. σὺ τοίνυν, ὦ Σώκρατες, εἰ βούλει πυνθάνεσθαι, πυνθάνου· ἐγὼ δʼ ἴσως ἱκανῶς πέπυσμαι.
Laches: You then, Socrates, if you wish to inquire, do so; but I have probably inquired enough.
ΣΩ. ἀλλʼ οὐδέν με κωλύει· κοινὴ γὰρ ἔσται ἡ πύστις ὑπὲρ ἐμοῦ τε καὶ σοῦ.
Socrates: But nothing prevents me; for the inquiry will be common on behalf of both me and you.
ΛΑ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν.
Laches: By all means.
ΣΩ. λέγε δή μοι, ὦ Νικία—μᾶλλον δʼ ἡμῖν· κοινούμεθα γὰρ ἐγώ τε καὶ Λάχης τὸν λόγον—τὴν ἀνδρείαν ἐπιστήμην φῂς δεινῶν τε καὶ θαρραλέων εἶναι;
Socrates: Tell me then, Nicias—or rather us, for Laches and I share the argument—do you say that courage is the knowledge of what is to be feared and what is to be dared?
ΝΙ. ἔγωγε.
Nicias: I do.
ΣΩ. τοῦτο δὲ οὐ παντὸς δὴ εἶναι ἀνδρὸς γνῶναι, ὁπότε γε μήτε ἰατρὸς μήτε μάντις αὐτὸ γνώσεται μηδὲ ἀνδρεῖος ἔσται, ἐὰν μὴ αὐτὴν ταύτην τὴν ἐπιστήμην προσλάβῃ·
Socrates: And that this is not for every man to know, since neither a physician nor a prophet will know it, nor will they be courageous unless they acquire this very knowledge?
οὐχ οὕτως ἔλεγες;
Was it not thus you were speaking?
ΝΙ. οὕτω μὲν οὖν.
Nicias: Quite so.
ΣΩ. κατὰ τὴν παροιμίαν ἄρα τῷ ὄντι οὐκ ἂν πᾶσα ὗς γνοίη οὐδʼ ἂν ἀνδρεία γένοιτο.
Socrates: According to the proverb, then, in truth not every sow would know it, nor would it become courageous.
ΝΙ. οὔ μοι δοκεῖ.
Nicias: It does not seem so to me.
ΣΩ. δῆλον δή, ὦ Νικία, ὅτι οὐδὲ τὴν Κρομμυωνίαν ὗν πιστεύεις σύ γε ἀνδρείαν γεγονέναι.
Socrates: It is clear then, Nicias, that you do not believe even the Crommyonian sow to have been courageous.
τοῦτο δὲ λέγω οὐ παίζων, ἀλλʼ ἀναγκαῖον οἶμαι τῷ ταῦτα λέγοντι μηδενὸς θηρίου ἀποδέχεσθαι ἀνδρείαν, ἢ συγχωρεῖν θηρίον τι οὕτω σοφὸν εἶναι, ὥστε ἃ ὀλίγοι ἀνθρώπων ἴσασι διὰ τὸ χαλεπὰ εἶναι γνῶναι, ταῦτα λέοντα ἢ πάρδαλιν ἤ τινα κάπρον φάναι εἰδέναι·
And I say this not in jest, but I think it is necessary for one who says these things either to admit the courage of no beast, or to agree that some beast is so wise that what few men know because it is difficult to know, these things a lion, or a leopard, or some wild boar knows.
ἀλλʼ ἀνάγκη ὁμοίως λέοντα καὶ ἔλαφον καὶ ταῦρον καὶ πίθηκον πρὸς ἀνδρείαν φάναι πεφυκέναι τὸν τιθέμενον ἀνδρείαν τοῦθʼ ὅπερ σὺ τίθεσαι.
Rather, it is necessary for one who defines courage as you do to say that a lion, a deer, a bull, and an ape are similarly naturally disposed with respect to courage.