§199ΣΩ. καὶ δήπου τὰ περὶ τὸν πόλεμον αὐτοὶ ἂν μαρτυρήσαιτε ὅτι ἡ στρατηγία κάλλιστα προμηθεῖται τά τε ἄλλα καὶ περὶ τὸ μέλλον ἔσεσθαι, οὐδὲ τῇ μαντικῇ οἴεται δεῖν ὑπηρετεῖν ἀλλὰ ἄρχειν, ὡς εἰδυῖα κάλλιον τὰ περὶ τὸν πόλεμον καὶ γιγνόμενα καὶ γενησόμενα· καὶ ὁ νόμος οὕτω τάττει, μὴ τὸν μάντιν τοῦ στρατηγοῦ ἄρχειν, ἀλλὰ τὸν στρατηγὸν τοῦ μάντεως.
Socrates: And surely concerning warfare you yourselves would testify that generalship provides most beautifully for other things and especially for the future, and does not think it should serve prophecy but rather rule it, since it knows better the things concerning war, both what is happening and what will happen; and the law ordains it so, that the prophet should not rule the general, but the general the prophet.
φήσομεν ταῦτα, ὦ Λάχης;
Shall we say this, Laches?
ΛΑ. φήσομεν.
Laches: We shall.
ΣΩ. τί δέ;
Socrates: And what of this?
σὺ ἡμῖν, ὦ Νικία, σύμφῃς περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν τὴν αὐτὴν ἐπιστήμην καὶ ἐσομένων καὶ γιγνομένων καὶ γεγονότων ἐπαΐειν;
Nicias, do you agree with us that the same knowledge understands the same things, whether future, happening, or past?
ΝΙ. ἔγωγε· δοκεῖ γάρ μοι οὕτως, ὦ Σώκρατες.
Nicias: I do; for it seems so to me, Socrates.
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν, ὦ ἄριστε, καὶ ἡ ἀνδρεία τῶν δεινῶν ἐπιστήμη ἐστὶν καὶ θαρραλέων, ὡς φῄς·
Socrates: Then, my excellent friend, courage is knowledge of things to be feared and things to be dared, as you say, is it not?
ἦ γάρ; ΝΙ. ναί.
Nicias: Yes.
ΣΩ. τὰ δὲ δεινὰ ὡμολόγηται καὶ τὰ θαρραλέα τὰ μὲν μέλλοντα ἀγαθά, τὰ δὲ μέλλοντα κακὰ εἶναι.
Socrates: And things to be feared and things to be dared have been agreed to be future evils and future goods respectively.
ΝΙ. πάνυ γε.
Nicias: Quite so.
ΣΩ. ἡ δέ γʼ αὐτὴ ἐπιστήμη τῶν αὐτῶν καὶ μελλόντων καὶ πάντως ἐχόντων εἶναι.
Socrates: And yet the same knowledge is of the same things, whether future or in any state whatsoever.
ΝΙ. ἔστι ταῦτα.
Nicias: That is so.
ΣΩ. οὐ μόνον ἄρα τῶν δεινῶν καὶ θαρραλέων ἡ ἀνδρεία ἐπιστήμη ἐστίν· οὐ γὰρ μελλόντων μόνον πέρι τῶν ἀγαθῶν τε καὶ κακῶν ἐπαΐει, ἀλλὰ καὶ γιγνομένων καὶ γεγονότων καὶ πάντως ἐχόντων, ὥσπερ αἱ ἄλλαι ἐπιστῆμαι.
Socrates: Courage, therefore, is not only knowledge of things to be feared and things to be dared; for it does not understand only concerning future goods and evils, but also concerning things happening and past and in any state whatsoever, just like the other knowledges.
ΝΙ. ἔοικέν γε.
Nicias: It seems so.
ΣΩ. μέρος ἄρα ἀνδρείας ἡμῖν, ὦ Νικία, ἀπεκρίνω σχεδόν τι τρίτον· καίτοι ἡμεῖς ἠρωτῶμεν ὅλην ἀνδρείαν ὅτι εἴη.
Socrates: Therefore, Nicias, you answered us only a part of courage, almost a third, though we were asking what the whole of courage was.
καὶ νῦν δή, ὡς ἔοικεν, κατὰ τὸν σὸν λόγον οὐ μόνον δεινῶν τε καὶ θαρραλέων ἐπιστήμη ἡ ἀνδρεία ἐστίν, ἀλλὰ σχεδόν τι ἡ περὶ πάντων ἀγαθῶν τε καὶ κακῶν καὶ πάντως ἐχόντων, ὡς νῦν αὖ ὁ σὸς λόγος, ἀνδρεία ἂν εἴη.
And now indeed, as it seems, according to your argument courage is not only knowledge of things to be feared and things to be dared, but almost the knowledge concerning all goods and evils and in any state whatsoever, as your argument now in turn would make it.
οὕτως αὖ μετατίθεσθαι ἢ πῶς λέγεις, ὦ Νικία;
Do you change your mind in this way, Nicias, or how do you say?
ΝΙ. ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ, ὦ Σώκρατες.
Nicias: It seems so to me, Socrates.
ΣΩ. δοκεῖ οὖν σοι, ὦ δαιμόνιε, ἀπολείπειν ἄν τι ὁ τοιοῦτος ἀρετῆς, εἴπερ εἰδείη τά τε ἀγαθὰ πάντα καὶ παντάπασιν ὡς γίγνεται καὶ γενήσεται καὶ γέγονε, καὶ τὰ κακὰ ὡσαύτως;
Socrates: Do you think, then, my admirable friend, that such a man would lack anything of virtue, if indeed he knew all goods and altogether how they are happening, will happen, and have happened, and the evils likewise?
καὶ τοῦτον οἴει ἂν σὺ ἐνδεᾶ εἶναι σωφροσύνης ἢ δικαιοσύνης τε καὶ ὁσιότητος, ᾧ γε μόνῳ προσήκει καὶ περὶ θεοὺς καὶ περὶ ἀνθρώπους ἐξευλαβεῖσθαί τε τὰ δεινὰ καὶ τὰ μή, καὶ τἀγαθὰ πορίζεσθαι, ἐπισταμένῳ ὀρθῶς προσομιλεῖν;
And do you think this man would be in want of temperance or justice and holiness, he to whom alone indeed belongs, concerning both gods and men, to be careful of what is to be feared and what is not, and to provide goods, knowing how to associate with them rightly?
ΝΙ. λέγειν τὶ ὦ Σώκρατές μοι δοκεῖς.
Nicias: You seem to me, Socrates, to have a point.
ΣΩ. οὐκ ἄρα, ὦ Νικία, μόριον ἀρετῆς ἂν εἴη τὸ νῦν σοι λεγόμενον, ἀλλὰ σύμπασα ἀρετή.
Socrates: Therefore, Nicias, what is now being spoken of by you would not be a part of virtue, but the whole of virtue.
ΝΙ. ἔοικεν.
Nicias: It seems so.
ΣΩ. καὶ μὴν ἔφαμέν γε τὴν ἀνδρείαν μόριον εἶναι ἓν τῶν τῆς ἀρετῆς.
Socrates: And yet we said indeed that courage was one part of the parts of virtue.
ΝΙ. ἔφαμεν γάρ.
Nicias: Yes, we did.
ΣΩ. τὸ δέ γε νῦν λεγόμενον οὐ φαίνεται.
Socrates: But what is now being spoken of does not appear so.
ΝΙ. οὐκ ἔοικεν.
Nicias: It does not seem so.
ΣΩ. οὐκ ἄρα ηὑρήκαμεν, ὦ Νικία, ἀνδρεία ὅτι ἔστιν.
Socrates: We have not then found, Nicias, what courage is.
ΝΙ. οὐ φαινόμεθα.
Nicias: It does not appear we have.