§270ΣΩ. πᾶσαι ὅσαι μεγάλαι τῶν τεχνῶν προσδέονται ἀδολεσχίας καὶ μετεωρολογίας φύσεως πέρι· τὸ γὰρ ὑψηλόνουν τοῦτο καὶ πάντῃ τελεσιουργὸν ἔοικεν ἐντεῦθέν ποθεν εἰσιέναι.
SOCRATES: All the great arts demand endless talk and speculation about nature; for this high-mindedness and all-round effectiveness seem to enter from some such source.
ὃ καὶ Περικλῆς πρὸς τῷ εὐφυὴς εἶναι ἐκτήσατο· προσπεσὼν γὰρ οἶμαι τοιούτῳ ὄντι Ἀναξαγόρᾳ, μετεωρολογίας ἐμπλησθεὶς καὶ ἐπὶ φύσιν νοῦ τε καὶ διανοίας ἀφικόμενος, ὧν δὴ πέρι τὸν πολὺν λόγον ἐποιεῖτο Ἀναξαγόρας, ἐντεῦθεν εἵλκυσεν ἐπὶ τὴν τῶν λόγων τέχνην τὸ πρόσφορον αὐτῇ.
This is what Pericles also acquired, in addition to being naturally gifted; for, falling in, I think, with Anaxagoras, who was such a man, and being filled with speculation on high matters, and arriving at the nature of mind and intellect—about which indeed Anaxagoras used to discourse so much—he drew from that source onto the art of speaking what was suitable for it.
ΦΑΙ. πῶς τοῦτο λέγεις;
PHAEDRUS: How do you mean this?
ΣΩ. ὁ αὐτός που τρόπος τέχνης ἰατρικῆς ὅσπερ καὶ ῥητορικῆς.
SOCRATES: The method of the art of medicine is surely the same as that of rhetoric.
ΦΑΙ. πῶς δή;
PHAEDRUS: How so?
ΣΩ. ἐν ἀμφοτέραις δεῖ διελέσθαι φύσιν, σώματος μὲν ἐν τῇ ἑτέρᾳ, ψυχῆς δὲ ἐν τῇ ἑτέρᾳ, εἰ μέλλεις, μὴ τριβῇ μόνον καὶ ἐμπειρίᾳ ἀλλὰ τέχνῃ, τῷ μὲν φάρμακα καὶ τροφὴν προσφέρων ὑγίειαν καὶ ῥώμην ἐμποιήσειν, τῇ δὲ λόγους τε καὶ ἐπιτηδεύσεις νομίμους πειθὼ ἣν ἂν βούλῃ καὶ ἀρετὴν παραδώσειν.
SOCRATES: In both of them we must analyze nature—of body in the one, and of soul in the other—if you are to proceed not by routine and experience only, but by art, applying medicines and diet to the one to produce health and strength, and administering words and customary practices to the other to hand down whatever persuasion you wish and virtue.
ΦΑΙ. τὸ γοῦν εἰκός, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὕτως.
PHAEDRUS: At least that is likely, Socrates, to be so.
ΣΩ. ψυχῆς οὖν φύσιν ἀξίως λόγου κατανοῆσαι οἴει δυνατὸν εἶναι ἄνευ τῆς τοῦ ὅλου φύσεως;
SOCRATES: Do you think, then, that it is possible to understand the nature of the soul in a worthwhile way without the nature of the whole?
ΦΑΙ. εἰ μὲν Ἱπποκράτει γε τῷ τῶν Ἀσκληπιαδῶν δεῖ τι πιθέσθαι, οὐδὲ περὶ σώματος ἄνευ τῆς μεθόδου ταύτης.
PHAEDRUS: If indeed we are to believe Hippocrates, the descendant of Asclepius, not even about the body can we understand without this method.
ΣΩ. καλῶς γάρ, ὦ ἑταῖρε, λέγει·
SOCRATES: For he speaks well, my friend.
χρὴ μέντοι πρὸς τῷ Ἱπποκράτει τὸν λόγον ἐξετάζοντα σκοπεῖν εἰ συμφωνεῖ.
However, in addition to Hippocrates, we must examine the argument to see if it agrees.
ΦΑΙ. φημί.
PHAEDRUS: I agree.
ΣΩ. τὸ τοίνυν περὶ φύσεως σκόπει τί ποτε λέγει Ἱπποκράτης τε καὶ ὁ ἀληθὴς λόγος.
SOCRATES: Look, then, at what indeed Hippocrates and true reason say about nature.
ἆρʼ οὐχ ὧδε δεῖ διανοεῖσθαι περὶ ὁτουοῦν φύσεως· πρῶτον μέν, ἁπλοῦν ἢ πολυειδές ἐστιν οὗ πέρι βουλησόμεθα εἶναι αὐτοὶ τεχνικοὶ καὶ ἄλλον δυνατοὶ ποιεῖν, ἔπειτα δέ, ἂν μὲν ἁπλοῦν ᾖ, σκοπεῖν τὴν δύναμιν αὐτοῦ, τίνα πρὸς τί πέφυκεν εἰς τὸ δρᾶν ἔχον ἢ τίνα εἰς τὸ παθεῖν ὑπὸ τοῦ, ἐὰν δὲ πλείω εἴδη ἔχῃ, ταῦτα ἀριθμησάμενον, ὅπερ ἐφʼ ἑνός, τοῦτʼ ἰδεῖν ἐφʼ ἑκάστου, τῷ τί ποιεῖν αὐτὸ πέφυκεν ἢ τῷ τί παθεῖν ὑπὸ τοῦ;
Must we not think in this way about the nature of anything whatsoever: first, whether that about which we shall wish to be ourselves experts and capable of making another so, is simple or multiform; and next, if it is simple, to examine its power, what power it naturally has to act upon what, or what power to be acted upon by what; and if it has more forms, to enumerate these, and, just as in the case of the single one, to see this in the case of each: what it is naturally suited to do to what, or what to suffer by what?
ΦΑΙ. κινδυνεύει, ὦ Σώκρατες.
PHAEDRUS: It seems likely, Socrates.
ΣΩ. ἡ γοῦν ἄνευ τούτων μέθοδος ἐοίκοι ἂν ὥσπερ τυφλοῦ πορείᾳ.
SOCRATES: At any rate, the method without these would be like the journey of a blind man.
ἀλλʼ οὐ μὴν ἀπεικαστέον τόν γε τέχνῃ μετιόντα ὁτιοῦν τυφλῷ οὐδὲ κωφῷ, ἀλλὰ δῆλον ὡς, ἄν τῴ τις τέχνῃ λόγους διδῷ, τὴν οὐσίαν δείξει ἀκριβῶς τῆς φύσεως τούτου πρὸς ὃ τοὺς λόγους προσοίσει· ἔσται δέ που ψυχὴ τοῦτο.
But indeed, one who pursues anything by art must not be likened to a blind man or a deaf man; but it is clear that, if someone teaches words to anyone by art, he will show with precision the essential nature of that to which he will apply the words; and this, I suppose, will be the soul.
ΦΑΙ. τί μήν;
PHAEDRUS: Of course.
§271ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν ἡ ἅμιλλα αὐτῷ τέταται πρὸς τοῦτο πᾶσα· πειθὼ γὰρ ἐν τούτῳ ποιεῖν ἐπιχειρεῖ.
SOCRATES: Therefore all his effort is directed toward this; for it is in this that he attempts to produce persuasion.
ἦ γάρ;
Is it not so?
ΦΑΙ. ναί.
PHAEDRUS: Yes.
ΣΩ. δῆλον ἄρα ὅτι ὁ Θρασύμαχός τε καὶ ὃς ἂν ἄλλος σπουδῇ τέχνην ῥητορικὴν διδῷ, πρῶτον πάσῃ ἀκριβείᾳ γράψει τε καὶ ποιήσει ψυχὴν ἰδεῖν, πότερον ἓν καὶ ὅμοιον πέφυκεν ἢ κατὰ σώματος μορφὴν πολυειδές· τοῦτο γάρ φαμεν φύσιν εἶναι δεικνύναι.
SOCRATES: It is clear then that Thrasymachus and whoever else seriously teaches the art of rhetoric will first write and make us see the soul with all precision, whether it is by nature one and uniform, or multiform like the shape of the body; for this is what we call showing its nature.
ΦΑΙ. παντάπασι μὲν οὖν.
PHAEDRUS: Most certainly.
ΣΩ. δεύτερον δέ γε, ὅτῳ τί ποιεῖν ἢ παθεῖν ὑπὸ τοῦ πέφυκεν.
SOCRATES: And secondly, what it is naturally disposed to do to what, or what to suffer from what.
ΦΑΙ. τί μήν;
PHAEDRUS: Of course.
ΣΩ. τρίτον δὲ δὴ διαταξάμενος τὰ λόγων τε καὶ ψυχῆς γένη καὶ τὰ τούτων παθήματα δίεισι πάσας αἰτίας, προσαρμόττων ἕκαστον ἑκάστῳ καὶ διδάσκων οἵα οὖσα ὑφʼ οἵων λόγων διʼ ἣν αἰτίαν ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἡ μὲν πείθεται, ἡ δὲ ἀπειθεῖ.
SOCRATES: And thirdly, having classified the types of speeches and of souls and their affections, he will go through all the causes, fitting each to each, and teaching what sort of soul is necessarily persuaded by what kind of speeches and for what reason, and why another is unpersuaded.
ΦΑΙ. κάλλιστα γοῦν ἄν, ὡς ἔοικʼ, ἔχοι οὕτως.
PHAEDRUS: Indeed that would be best, as it seems, in this way.
ΣΩ. οὔτοι μὲν οὖν, ὦ φίλε, ἄλλως ἐνδεικνύμενον ἢ λεγόμενον τέχνῃ ποτὲ λεχθήσεται ἢ γραφήσεται οὔτε τι ἄλλο οὔτε τοῦτο.
SOCRATES: At any rate, my friend, anything shown or spoken in any other way than this will never be spoken or written by art, whether anything else or this.
ἀλλʼ οἱ νῦν γράφοντες, ὧν σὺ ἀκήκοας, τέχνας λόγων πανοῦργοί εἰσιν καὶ ἀποκρύπτονται, εἰδότες ψυχῆς πέρι παγκάλως· πρὶν ἂν οὖν τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον λέγωσί τε καὶ γράφωσι, μὴ πειθώμεθα αὐτοῖς τέχνῃ γράφειν.
But those who write nowadays, whom you have heard, are rogues in their arts of speech and hide themselves, although they know about the soul very well; until, therefore, they speak and write in this way, let us not believe them to write by art.
ΦΑΙ. τίνα τοῦτον;
PHAEDRUS: What way is this?
ΣΩ. αὐτὰ μὲν τὰ ῥήματα εἰπεῖν οὐκ εὐπετές· ὡς δὲ δεῖ γράφειν, εἰ μέλλει τεχνικῶς ἔχειν καθʼ ὅσον ἐνδέχεται, λέγειν ἐθέλω.
SOCRATES: To state the actual words is not easy; but how one must write, if it is to be artistic as far as possible, I am willing to tell.
ΦΑΙ. λέγε δή.
PHAEDRUS: Tell me then.
ΣΩ. ἐπειδὴ λόγου δύναμις τυγχάνει ψυχαγωγία οὖσα, τὸν μέλλοντα ῥητορικὸν ἔσεσθαι ἀνάγκη εἰδέναι ψυχὴ ὅσα εἴδη ἔχει.
SOCRATES: Since the power of speech happens to be a leading of the soul, the one who is going to be a rhetorician must necessarily know how many forms the soul has.
ἔστιν οὖν τόσα καὶ τόσα, καὶ τοῖα καὶ τοῖα, ὅθεν οἱ μὲν τοιοίδε, οἱ δὲ τοιοίδε γίγνονται· τούτων δὲ δὴ οὕτω διῃρημένων, λόγων αὖ τόσα καὶ τόσα ἔστιν εἴδη, τοιόνδε ἕκαστον.
There are, then, so-and-so many, of such-and-such kinds, from which some people become of one sort, and others of another; and when these have been thus classified, there are again so-and-so many kinds of speeches, each of such-and-such a character.
οἱ μὲν οὖν τοιοίδε ὑπὸ τῶν τοιῶνδε λόγων διὰ τήνδε τὴν αἰτίαν ἐς τὰ τοιάδε εὐπειθεῖς, οἱ δὲ τοιοίδε διὰ τάδε δυσπειθεῖς·
People of such-and-such a kind, then, are easily persuaded to such-and-such things by such-and-such speeches for this reason, while people of that kind are hard to persuade for those reasons.
δεῖ δὴ ταῦτα ἱκανῶς νοήσαντα, μετὰ ταῦτα θεώμενον αὐτὰ ἐν ταῖς πράξεσιν ὄντα τε καὶ πραττόμενα, ὀξέως τῇ αἰσθήσει δύνασθαι ἐπακολουθεῖν, ἢ μηδὲν εἶναί πω πλέον αὐτῷ ὧν τότε ἤκουεν λόγων συνών.
One must indeed, having grasped these things sufficiently, and afterwards observing them in actual affairs, as they exist and are being put into practice, be able to follow them quickly with perception, or else there is not yet any advantage for him from the words which he used to hear when he was studying.