§272ΣΩ. ὅταν δὲ εἰπεῖν τε ἱκανῶς ἔχῃ οἷος ὑφʼ οἵων πείθεται, παραγιγνόμενόν τε δυνατὸς ᾖ διαισθανόμενος ἑαυτῷ ἐνδείκνυσθαι ὅτι οὗτός ἐστι καὶ αὕτη ἡ φύσις περὶ ἧς τότε ἦσαν οἱ λόγοι, νῦν ἔργῳ παροῦσά οἱ, ᾗ προσοιστέον τούσδε ὧδε τοὺς λόγους ἐπὶ τὴν τῶνδε πειθώ, ταῦτα δʼ ἤδη πάντα ἔχοντι, προσλαβόντι καιροὺς τοῦ πότε λεκτέον καὶ ἐπισχετέον, βραχυλογίας τε αὖ καὶ ἐλεινολογίας καὶ δεινώσεως ἑκάστων τε ὅσα ἂν εἴδη μάθῃ λόγων, τούτων τὴν εὐκαιρίαν τε καὶ ἀκαιρίαν διαγνόντι, καλῶς τε καὶ τελέως ἐστὶν ἡ τέχνη ἀπειργασμένη, πρότερον δʼ οὔ·
SOCRATES: And when he can sufficiently state what sort of person is persuaded by what kind of speeches, and is able, on being present, to perceive and show to himself that this is the person and this is the nature about which those discussions then were, now present to him in fact, to which he must apply these speeches in this way for the persuasion of these people—and when he already has all these, having also acquired the proper times of when to speak and when to hold back, and again having discerned the suitability and unsuitability of short speeches, pitiful speeches, exaggerations, and each of all the forms of speeches he may learn—then, and not before, is his art beautifully and completely finished.
ἀλλʼ ὅτι ἂν αὐτῶν τις ἐλλείπῃ λέγων ἢ διδάσκων ἢ γράφων, φῇ δὲ τέχνῃ λέγειν, ὁ μὴ πειθόμενος κρατεῖ.
But if anyone falls short of any of these in speaking or teaching or writing, and says he speaks by art, the one who is not persuaded wins out.
τί δὴ οὖν;
What then indeed?
φήσει ἴσως ὁ συγγραφεύς, ὦ Φαῖδρέ τε καὶ Σώκρατες, δοκεῖ οὕτως;
The writer will perhaps say, Phaedrus and Socrates, does it seem so?
μὴ ἄλλως πως ἀποδεκτέον λεγομένης λόγων τέχνης;
Must we not accept what is called the art of speech in some other way?
ΦΑΙ. ἀδύνατόν που, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἄλλως· καίτοι οὐ σμικρόν γε φαίνεται ἔργον.
PHAEDRUS: It is surely impossible, Socrates, in any other way; and yet it seems to be no small task.
ΣΩ. ἀληθῆ λέγεις.
SOCRATES: You speak the truth.
τούτου τοι ἕνεκα χρὴ πάντας τοὺς λόγους ἄνω καὶ κάτω μεταστρέφοντα ἐπισκοπεῖν εἴ τίς πῃ ῥᾴων καὶ βραχυτέρα φαίνεται ἐπʼ αὐτὴν ὁδός, ἵνα μὴ μάτην πολλὴν ἀπίῃ καὶ τραχεῖαν, ἐξὸν ὀλίγην τε καὶ λείαν.
For this very reason, one must examine all the arguments, turning them upside down, to see if a easier and shorter path to it appears anywhere, so that he may not go in vain on a long and rough path, when he might go on a short and smooth one.
ἀλλʼ εἴ τινά πῃ βοήθειαν ἔχεις ἐπακηκοὼς Λυσίου ἤ τινος ἄλλου, πειρῶ λέγειν ἀναμιμνῃσκόμενος.
But if you have any help to offer from having heard Lysias or anyone else, try to speak, recalling it.
ΦΑΙ. ἕνεκα μὲν πείρας ἔχοιμʼ ἄν, ἀλλʼ οὔτι νῦν γʼ οὕτως ἔχω.
PHAEDRUS: For the sake of trying, I might have something, but certainly not now in this way.
ΣΩ. βούλει οὖν ἐγώ τινʼ εἴπω λόγον ὃν τῶν περὶ ταῦτά τινων ἀκήκοα;
SOCRATES: Do you wish then that I tell some story which I have heard from some of those concerned with these matters?
ΦΑΙ. τί μήν;
PHAEDRUS: Of course.
ΣΩ. λέγεται γοῦν, ὦ Φαῖδρε, δίκαιον εἶναι καὶ τὸ τοῦ λύκου εἰπεῖν.
SOCRATES: It is said, at any rate, Phaedrus, that it is fair to state even the wolf's case.
ΦΑΙ. καὶ σύ γε οὕτω ποίει.
PHAEDRUS: And you do just so.
ΣΩ. φασὶ τοίνυν οὐδὲν οὕτω ταῦτα δεῖν σεμνύνειν οὐδʼ ἀνάγειν ἄνω μακρὰν περιβαλλομένους· παντάπασι γάρ, ὃ καὶ κατʼ ἀρχὰς εἴπομεν τοῦδε τοῦ λόγου, ὅτι οὐδὲν ἀληθείας μετέχειν δέοι δικαίων ἢ ἀγαθῶν πέρι πραγμάτων, ἢ καὶ ἀνθρώπων γε τοιούτων φύσει ὄντων ἢ τροφῇ, τὸν μέλλοντα ἱκανῶς ῥητορικὸν ἔσεσθαι.
SOCRATES: They say, then, that there is no need to make these things so solemn, nor to lead them far up by long circuits; for, as we also said at the beginning of this discussion, one who is to be a sufficient rhetorician has no need to share in the truth about just or good matters, or even about men who are of such a character by nature or education.
τὸ παράπαν γὰρ οὐδὲν ἐν τοῖς δικαστηρίοις τούτων ἀληθείας μέλειν οὐδενί, ἀλλὰ τοῦ πιθανοῦ· τοῦτο δʼ εἶναι τὸ εἰκός, ᾧ δεῖν προσέχειν τὸν μέλλοντα τέχνῃ ἐρεῖν.
For in the courts, they say, no one cares at all for the truth of these things, but for the persuasive; and this is the probable, to which one who is to speak by art must attend.
οὐδὲ γὰρ αὐτὰ τὰ πραχθέντα δεῖν λέγειν ἐνίοτε, ἐὰν μὴ εἰκότως ᾖ πεπραγμένα, ἀλλὰ τὰ εἰκότα, ἔν τε κατηγορίᾳ καὶ ἀπολογίᾳ, καὶ πάντως λέγοντα τὸ δὴ εἰκὸς διωκτέον εἶναι, πολλὰ εἰπόντα χαίρειν τῷ ἀληθεῖ·
For sometimes even the actual facts should not be told, if they were not probably done, but rather the probabilities, both in prosecution and defense, and in every way the speaker must pursue the probable, saying farewell to the truth after saying many things.
τοῦτο γὰρ διὰ παντὸς τοῦ λόγου γιγνόμενον τὴν ἅπασαν τέχνην πορίζειν.
For this, occurring throughout the whole speech, provides the entire art.
§273ΦΑΙ. αὐτά γε, ὦ Σώκρατες, διελήλυθας ἃ λέγουσιν οἱ περὶ τοὺς λόγους τεχνικοὶ προσποιούμενοι εἶναι· ἀνεμνήσθην γὰρ ὅτι ἐν τῷ πρόσθεν βραχέως τοῦ τοιούτου ἐφηψάμεθα, δοκεῖ δὲ τοῦτο πάμμεγα εἶναι τοῖς περὶ ταῦτα.
PHAEDRUS: You have run through, Socrates, the very things that those who pretend to be experts in speeches say; for I recalled that we touched briefly on something of this sort before, and this seems to be of great importance to those concerned with these matters.
ΣΩ. ἀλλὰ μὴν τόν γε Τεισίαν αὐτὸν πεπάτηκας ἀκριβῶς·
SOCRATES: But indeed, you have trodden Tisias himself with precision.
εἰπέτω τοίνυν καὶ τόδε ἡμῖν ὁ Τεισίας, μή τι ἄλλο λέγει τὸ εἰκὸς ἢ τὸ τῷ πλήθει δοκοῦν.
Let Tisias, then, tell us this also, whether he says the probable is anything other than what seems so to the multitude.
ΦΑΙ. τί γὰρ ἄλλο;
PHAEDRUS: What else indeed?
ΣΩ. τοῦτο δή, ὡς ἔοικε, σοφὸν εὑρὼν ἅμα καὶ τεχνικὸν ἔγραψεν ὡς ἐάν τις ἀσθενὴς καὶ ἀνδρικὸς ἰσχυρὸν καὶ δειλὸν συγκόψας, ἱμάτιον ἤ τι ἄλλο ἀφελόμενος, εἰς δικαστήριον ἄγηται, δεῖ δὴ τἀληθὲς μηδέτερον λέγειν, ἀλλὰ τὸν μὲν δειλὸν μὴ ὑπὸ μόνου φάναι τοῦ ἀνδρικοῦ συγκεκόφθαι, τὸν δὲ τοῦτο μὲν ἐλέγχειν ὡς μόνω ἤστην, ἐκείνῳ δὲ καταχρήσασθαι τῷ
"πῶς δʼ ἂν ἐγὼ τοιόσδε τοιῷδε ἐπεχείρησα;
SOCRATES: Having found this indeed, as it seems, as both wise and artistic, he wrote that if a weak but brave man, having beaten a strong but cowardly man and taken his cloak or something else, is brought to court, neither of them should tell the truth.
"
ὁ δʼ οὐκ ἐρεῖ δὴ τὴν ἑαυτοῦ κάκην, ἀλλά τι ἄλλο ψεύδεσθαι ἐπιχειρῶν τάχʼ ἂν ἔλεγχόν πῃ παραδοίη τῷ ἀντιδίκῳ.
The coward must say that he was not beaten by the brave man alone, while the latter must prove that they were alone, and make use of that line: "How could a man like me have attacked a man like him?" And the other will certainly not confess his own cowardice, but, attempting to tell some other lie, might perhaps hand over some proof to his opponent.
καὶ περὶ τἆλλα δὴ τοιαῦτʼ ἄττα ἐστὶ τὰ τέχνῃ λεγόμενα.
And there are other such things said by art.
οὐ γάρ, ὦ Φαῖδρε;
Is it not so, Phaedrus?
ΦΑΙ. τί μήν;
PHAEDRUS: Of course.
ΣΩ. φεῦ, δεινῶς γʼ ἔοικεν ἀποκεκρυμμένην τέχνην ἀνευρεῖν ὁ Τεισίας ἢ ἄλλος ὅστις δή ποτʼ ὢν τυγχάνει καὶ ὁπόθεν χαίρει ὀνομαζόμενος.
SOCRATES: Alas, Tisias seems to have discovered a terribly hidden art, or whoever indeed he happens to be and from wherever he pleases to be named.
ἀτάρ, ὦ ἑταῖρε, τούτῳ ἡμεῖς πότερον λέγωμεν ἢ μὴ—
ΦΑΙ. τὸ ποῖον;
But, my friend, shall we say to him or not— PHAEDRUS: What is that?
ΣΩ. ὅτι, ὦ Τεισία, πάλαι ἡμεῖς, πρὶν καὶ σὲ παρελθεῖν, τυγχάνομεν λέγοντες ὡς ἄρα τοῦτο τὸ εἰκὸς τοῖς πολλοῖς διʼ ὁμοιότητα τοῦ ἀληθοῦς τυγχάνει ἐγγιγνόμενον· τὰς δὲ ὁμοιότητας ἄρτι διήλθομεν ὅτι πανταχοῦ ὁ τὴν ἀλήθειαν εἰδὼς κάλλιστα ἐπίσταται εὑρίσκειν.
SOCRATES: "O Tisias, long ago, before you even came along, we happened to be saying that this probable actually happens to arise in the multitude through its likeness to the truth; and we recently went through the likenesses, showing that the one who knows the truth always knows best how to find them.
ὥστʼ εἰ μὲν ἄλλο τι περὶ τέχνης λόγων λέγεις, ἀκούοιμεν ἄν· εἰ δὲ μή, οἷς νυνδὴ διήλθομεν πεισόμεθα, ὡς ἐὰν μή τις τῶν τε ἀκουσομένων τὰς φύσεις διαριθμήσηται, καὶ κατʼ εἴδη τε διαιρεῖσθαι τὰ ὄντα καὶ μιᾷ ἰδέᾳ δυνατὸς ᾖ καθʼ ἓν ἕκαστον περιλαμβάνειν, οὔ ποτʼ ἔσται τεχνικὸς λόγων πέρι καθʼ ὅσον δυνατὸν ἀνθρώπῳ.
So if you say anything else about the art of speech, we would listen; but if not, we shall trust what we have just run through: that unless one enumerates the natures of those who are to hear, and is able to divide existing things by forms and to comprehend each single thing under one idea, he will never be an expert in speeches as far as is possible for a human being.
ταῦτα δὲ οὐ μή ποτε κτήσηται ἄνευ πολλῆς πραγματείας· ἣν οὐχ ἕνεκα τοῦ λέγειν καὶ πράττειν πρὸς ἀνθρώπους δεῖ διαπονεῖσθαι τὸν σώφρονα, ἀλλὰ τοῦ θεοῖς κεχαρισμένα μὲν λέγειν δύνασθαι, κεχαρισμένως δὲ πράττειν τὸ πᾶν εἰς δύναμιν.
And he will never acquire these things without much diligence; which the wise man must not labor at for the sake of speaking and acting before men, but in order to be able to speak things pleasing to gods, and to act pleasingly in all things as far as possible."