§41ΠΡΩ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν τοὐναντίον, ὦ Σώκρατες, εἴρηκας.
PROTARCHUS: Socrates, you have said completely the opposite.
σχεδὸν γὰρ τῷ ψεύδει μὲν οὐ πάνυ πονηρὰς ἄν τις λύπας τε καὶ ἡδονὰς θείη, μεγάλῃ δὲ ἄλλῃ καὶ πολλῇ συμπιπτούσας πονηρίᾳ.
For one would hardly hold that pains and pleasures are very bad because of falsity, but rather because they coincide with some other great and abundant badness.
ΣΩ. τὰς μὲν τοίνυν πονηρὰς ἡδονὰς καὶ διὰ πονηρίαν οὔσας τοιαύτας ὀλίγον ὕστερον ἐροῦμεν, ἂν ἔτι δοκῇ νῷν· τὰς δὲ ψευδεῖς κατʼ ἄλλον τρόπον ἐν ἡμῖν πολλὰς καὶ πολλάκις ἐνούσας τε καὶ ἐγγιγνομένας λεκτέον.
SOCRATES: As for bad pleasures, then, and those that are such because of badness, we shall speak a little later, if it still seems good to both of us; but as for the false ones, we must speak of them as being present and arising in us in another way, in great numbers and many times.
τούτῳ γὰρ ἴσως χρησόμεθα πρὸς τὰς κρίσεις.
For we shall perhaps use this for our judgments.
ΠΡΩ. πῶς γὰρ οὔκ; εἴπερ γε εἰσίν.
PROTARCHUS: Why, of course, if indeed they exist.
ΣΩ. ἀλλʼ, ὦ Πρώταρχε, εἰσὶν κατά γε τὴν ἐμήν.
SOCRATES: But, Protarchus, they do exist, at least according to my view.
τοῦτο δὲ τὸ δόγμα ἕως ἂν κέηται παρʼ ἡμῖν, ἀδύνατον ἀνέλεγκτον δήπου γίγνεσθαι.
And as long as this conviction lies before us, it is surely impossible for it to remain unexamined.
ΠΡΩ. καλῶς.
PROTARCHUS: Good.
ΣΩ. περιιστώμεθα δὴ καθάπερ ἀθληταὶ πρὸς τοῦτον αὖ τὸν λόγον.
SOCRATES: Let us then, like athletes, take our positions to face this argument in turn.
ΠΡΩ. ἴωμεν.
PROTARCHUS: Let us go.
ΣΩ. ἀλλὰ μὴν εἴπομεν, εἴπερ μεμνήμεθα, ὀλίγον ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν, ὡς ὅταν αἱ λεγόμεναι ἐπιθυμίαι ἐν ἡμῖν ὦσι, δίχα ἄρα τότε τὸ σῶμα καὶ χωρὶς τῆς ψυχῆς τοῖς παθήμασι διείληπται.
SOCRATES: Yet we did say, if we remember, a little before, that when the so-called desires are in us, the body then is divided in its experiences from the soul, apart and separate.
ΠΡΩ. μεμνήμεθα καὶ προερρήθη ταῦτα.
PROTARCHUS: We remember, and these things were said beforehand.
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν τὸ μὲν ἐπιθυμοῦν ἦν ἡ ψυχὴ τῶν τοῦ σώματος ἐναντίων ἕξεων, τὸ δὲ τὴν ἀλγηδόνα ἤ τινα διὰ πάθος ἡδονὴν τὸ σῶμα ἦν τὸ παρεχόμενον;
SOCRATES: Was not, then, the soul that which desires the opposite states of the body, while the body was that which provides the pain or some pleasure due to an affection?
ΠΡΩ. ἦν γὰρ οὖν.
PROTARCHUS: It certainly was.
ΣΩ. συλλογίζου δὴ τὸ γιγνόμενον ἐν τούτοις.
SOCRATES: Now, calculate what happens in these cases.
ΠΡΩ. λέγε.
PROTARCHUS: Speak.
ΣΩ. γίγνεται τοίνυν, ὁπόταν ᾖ ταῦτα, ἅμα παρακεῖσθαι λύπας τε καὶ ἡδονάς, καὶ τούτων αἰσθήσεις ἅμα παρʼ ἀλλήλας ἐναντίων οὐσῶν γίγνεσθαι, ὃ καὶ νυνδὴ ἐφάνη.
SOCRATES: It happens then, whenever these conditions exist, that pains and pleasures lie alongside each other at the same time, and perceptions of these, being opposite, arise alongside one another at the same time, which indeed appeared just now.
ΠΡΩ. φαίνεται γοῦν.
PROTARCHUS: It seems so, at any rate.
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν καὶ τόδε εἴρηται καὶ συνωμολογημένον ἡμῖν ἔμπροσθε κεῖται;
SOCRATES: Therefore, has this also been said and lies before us agreed upon previously?
ΠΡΩ. τὸ ποῖον;
PROTARCHUS: What sort of thing?
ΣΩ. ὡς τὸ μᾶλλόν τε καὶ ἧττον ἄμφω τούτω δέχεσθον, λύπη τε καὶ ἡδονή, καὶ ὅτι τῶν ἀπείρων εἴτην.
SOCRATES: That both of these, pain and pleasure, admit of the "more and less," and that they belong to the unlimited?
ΠΡΩ. εἴρηται.
PROTARCHUS: It has been said.
τί μήν;
Of course.
ΣΩ. τίς οὖν μηχανὴ ταῦτʼ ὀρθῶς κρίνεσθαι;
SOCRATES: What means is there, then, for these to be judged correctly?
ΠΡΩ. πῇ δὴ καὶ πῶς;
PROTARCHUS: In what way indeed and how?
ΣΩ. εἰ τὸ βούλημα ἡμῖν τῆς κρίσεως τούτων ἐν τοιούτοις τισὶ διαγνῶναι βούλεται ἑκάστοτε τίς τούτων πρὸς ἀλλήλας μείζων καὶ τίς ἐλάττων καὶ τίς μᾶλλον καὶ τίς σφοδροτέρα, λύπη τε πρὸς ἡδονὴν καὶ λύπη πρὸς λύπην καὶ ἡδονὴ πρὸς ἡδονήν.
SOCRATES: If the intention of our judgment of these, in such cases, wishes to discern on each occasion which of these in comparison with one another is greater and which is smaller, and which is more and which is more intense—pain compared to pleasure, and pain to pain, and pleasure to pleasure.
ΠΡΩ. ἀλλʼ ἔστι ταῦτά τε τοιαῦτα καὶ ἡ βούλησις τῆς κρίσεως αὕτη.
PROTARCHUS: Well, these things are indeed of such a kind, and this is the intention of the judgment.
§42ΣΩ. τί οὖν;
SOCRATES: What then?
ἐν μὲν ὄψει τὸ πόρρωθεν καὶ ἐγγύθεν ὁρᾶν τὰ μεγέθη τὴν ἀλήθειαν ἀφανίζει καὶ ψευδῆ ποιεῖ δοξάζειν, ἐν λύπαις δʼ ἄρα καὶ ἡδοναῖς οὐκ ἔστι ταὐτὸν τοῦτο γιγνόμενον;
In the case of sight, does not seeing magnitudes from far off and from close by obscure the truth and make one hold false opinions, and does not this same thing, then, happen in the case of pains and pleasures?
ΠΡΩ. πολὺ μὲν οὖν μᾶλλον, ὦ Σώκρατες.
PROTARCHUS: Much more so indeed, Socrates.
ΣΩ. ἐναντίον δὴ τὸ νῦν τῷ σμικρὸν ἔμπροσθε γέγονεν.
SOCRATES: What is happening now, indeed, is the opposite of what happened a little while ago.
ΠΡΩ. τὸ ποῖον λέγεις;
PROTARCHUS: What sort of thing do you mean?
ΣΩ. τότε μὲν αἱ δόξαι ψευδεῖς τε καὶ ἀληθεῖς αὗται γιγνόμεναι τὰς λύπας τε καὶ ἡδονὰς ἅμα τοῦ παρʼ αὑταῖς παθήματος ἀνεπίμπλασαν.
SOCRATES: At that time, those opinions, by becoming false and true, filled the pains and pleasures at the same time with their own affection.
ΠΡΩ. ἀληθέστατα.
PROTARCHUS: Most true.
ΣΩ. νῦν δέ γε αὐταὶ διὰ τὸ πόρρωθέν τε καὶ ἐγγύθεν ἑκάστοτε μεταβαλλόμεναι θεωρεῖσθαι, καὶ ἅμα τιθέμεναι παρʼ ἀλλήλας, αἱ μὲν ἡδοναὶ παρὰ τὸ λυπηρὸν μείζους φαίνονται καὶ σφοδρότεραι, λῦπαι δʼ αὖ διὰ τὸ παρʼ ἡδονὰς τοὐναντίον ἐκείναις.
SOCRATES: But now, because they themselves are observed on each occasion changing from far off and from close by, and are placed at the same time alongside each other, the pleasures appear greater and more intense in comparison with what is painful, and the pains, on the other hand, in comparison with the pleasures, appear the opposite to those.
ΠΡΩ. ἀνάγκη γίγνεσθαι τὰ τοιαῦτα διὰ ταῦτα.
PROTARCHUS: It is necessary for such things to happen because of these things.
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν ὅσῳ μείζους τῶν οὐσῶν ἑκάτεραι καὶ ἐλάττους φαίνονται, τοῦτο ἀποτεμόμενος ἑκατέρων τὸ φαινόμενον ἀλλʼ οὐκ ὄν, οὔτε αὐτὸ ὀρθῶς φαινόμενον ἐρεῖς, οὐδʼ αὖ ποτε τὸ ἐπὶ τούτῳ μέρος τῆς ἡδονῆς καὶ λύπης γιγνόμενον ὀρθόν τε καὶ ἀληθὲς τολμήσεις λέγειν.
SOCRATES: Therefore, in so far as each of them appears greater or smaller than they actually are, if you cut off from each this part which is apparent but not real, you will neither say that this apparent part itself is correctly apparent, nor, on the other hand, will you ever dare to say that the part of pleasure and pain which arises based on this is correct and true.
ΠΡΩ. οὐ γὰρ οὖν.
PROTARCHUS: Certainly not.
ΣΩ. τούτων τοίνυν ἑξῆς ὀψόμεθα ἐὰν τῇδε ἀπαντῶμεν ἡδονὰς καὶ λύπας ψευδεῖς ἔτι μᾶλλον ἢ ταύτας φαινομένας τε καὶ οὔσας ἐν τοῖς ζῴοις.
SOCRATES: Next after these, then, we shall see, if we proceed in this direction, pleasures and pains in living beings that are false to an even greater degree than these, both appearing and being so.
ΠΡΩ. ποίας δὴ καὶ πῶς λέγεις;
PROTARCHUS: Which ones indeed and how do you mean?
ΣΩ. εἴρηταί που πολλάκις ὅτι τῆς φύσεως ἑκάστων διαφθειρομένης μὲν συγκρίσεσι καὶ διακρίσεσι καὶ πληρώσεσι καὶ κενώσεσι καί τισιν αὔξαις καὶ φθίσεσι λῦπαί τε καὶ ἀλγηδόνες καὶ ὀδύναι καὶ πάνθʼ ὁπόσα τοιαῦτʼ ὀνόματα ἔχει συμβαίνει γιγνόμενα.
SOCRATES: It has been said, I suppose, many times that when the nature of each is being destroyed by combinations and separations, and by fillings and emptyings, and by certain growths and decays, pains and aches and sufferings and all such names happen to arise.
ΠΡΩ. ναί, ταῦτα εἴρηται πολλάκις.
PROTARCHUS: Yes, these things have been said many times.
ΣΩ. εἰς δέ γε τὴν αὑτῶν φύσιν ὅταν καθιστῆται, ταύτην αὖ τὴν κατάστασιν ἡδονὴν ἀπεδεξάμεθα παρʼ ἡμῶν αὐτῶν.
SOCRATES: And when indeed they are restored to their own nature, we accepted this restoration, on our part, as pleasure.
ΠΡΩ. ὀρθῶς.
PROTARCHUS: Correct.
ΣΩ. τί δʼ ὅταν περὶ τὸ σῶμα μηδὲν τούτων γιγνόμενον ἡμῶν ᾖ;
SOCRATES: But what when none of these things is happening in relation to our body?
ΠΡΩ. πότε δὲ τοῦτʼ ἂν γένοιτο, ὦ Σώκρατες;
PROTARCHUS: But when would this happen, Socrates?
ΣΩ. οὐδὲν πρὸς λόγον ἐστίν, ὦ Πρώταρχε, ὃ σὺ νῦν ἤρου τὸ ἐρώτημα.
SOCRATES: The question which you have just asked, Protarchus, is not to the point.
ΠΡΩ. τί δή;
PROTARCHUS: Why indeed?
ΣΩ. διότι τὴν ἐμὴν ἐρώτησιν οὐ κωλύεις με διερέσθαι σε πάλιν.
SOCRATES: Because you do not prevent me from asking you my question again.
ΠΡΩ. ποίαν;
PROTARCHUS: Which one?
ΣΩ. εἰ δʼ οὖν μὴ γίγνοιτο, ὦ Πρώταρχε, φήσω, τὸ τοιοῦτον, τί ποτε ἀναγκαῖον ἐξ αὐτοῦ συμβαίνειν ἡμῖν;
SOCRATES: If, at any rate, such a thing should not happen, Protarchus, I shall say, what must necessarily result for us from it?
ΠΡΩ. μὴ κινουμένου τοῦ σώματος ἐφʼ ἑκάτερα φῄς;
PROTARCHUS: Do you mean when the body is not moved in either direction?
ΣΩ. οὕτως.
SOCRATES: Exactly.
ΠΡΩ. δῆλον δὴ τοῦτό γε, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὡς οὔτε ἡδονὴ γίγνοιτʼ ἂν ἐν τῷ τοιούτῳ ποτὲ οὔτʼ ἄν τις λύπη.
PROTARCHUS: It is clear indeed, at any rate, Socrates, that in such a state neither pleasure nor any pain could ever arise.