§39ΣΩ. ἡ μνήμη ταῖς αἰσθήσεσι συμπίπτουσα εἰς ταὐτὸν κἀκεῖνα ἃ περὶ ταῦτʼ ἐστὶ τὰ παθήματα φαίνονταί μοι σχεδὸν οἷον γράφειν ἡμῶν ἐν ταῖς ψυχαῖς τότε λόγους·
SOCRATES: Memory falling in with perceptions into the same place, and those experiences which concern these, seem to me almost, as it were, to write words in our souls at that time.
καὶ ὅταν μὲν ἀληθῆ γράφῃ, δόξα τε ἀληθὴς καὶ λόγοι ἀπʼ αὐτοῦ συμβαίνουσιν ἀληθεῖς ἐν ἡμῖν γιγνόμενοι· ψευδῆ δʼ ὅταν ὁ τοιοῦτος παρʼ ἡμῖν γραμματεὺς γράψῃ, τἀναντία τοῖς ἀληθέσιν ἀπέβη.
And when it writes true things, true opinion and, from this, true words result, arising in us; but when such a scribe among us writes false things, the opposite of the true things results.
ΠΡΩ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν δοκεῖ μοι, καὶ ἀποδέχομαι τὰ ῥηθέντα οὕτως.
PROTARCHUS: It certainly seems so to me, and I accept what has been said in this way.
ΣΩ. ἀποδέχου δὴ καὶ ἕτερον δημιουργὸν ἡμῶν ἐν ταῖς ψυχαῖς ἐν τῷ τότε χρόνῳ γιγνόμενον.
SOCRATES: Accept then also another craftsman arising in our souls at that time.
ΠΡΩ. τίνα;
PROTARCHUS: Whom?
ΣΩ. ζωγράφον, ὃς μετὰ τὸν γραμματιστὴν τῶν λεγομένων εἰκόνας ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ τούτων γράφει.
SOCRATES: A painter, who after the scribe draws images of these spoken things in the soul.
ΠΡΩ. πῶς δὴ τοῦτον αὖ καὶ πότε λέγομεν;
PROTARCHUS: How and when, on the other hand, do we say this one is present?
ΣΩ. ὅταν ἀπʼ ὄψεως ἤ τινος ἄλλης αἰσθήσεως τὰ τότε δοξαζόμενα καὶ λεγόμενα ἀπαγαγών τις τὰς τῶν δοξασθέντων καὶ λεχθέντων εἰκόνας ἐν αὑτῷ ὁρᾷ πως.
SOCRATES: When someone, having withdrawn from sight or some other perception the things then opined and spoken, sees in some way within himself the images of the things opined and spoken.
ἢ τοῦτο οὐκ ἔστι γιγνόμενον παρʼ ἡμῖν;
Or is this not something arising in us?
ΠΡΩ. σφόδρα μὲν οὖν.
PROTARCHUS: Most certainly.
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν αἱ μὲν τῶν ἀληθῶν δοξῶν καὶ λόγων εἰκόνες ἀληθεῖς, αἱ δὲ τῶν ψευδῶν ψευδεῖς;
SOCRATES: Therefore, are the images of true opinions and words true, and those of false ones false?
ΠΡΩ. παντάπασιν.
PROTARCHUS: Entirely so.
ΣΩ. εἰ δὴ ταῦτʼ ὀρθῶς εἰρήκαμεν, ἔτι καὶ τόδε ἐπὶ τούτοις σκεψώμεθα.
SOCRATES: If indeed we have said these things correctly, let us further consider this also in addition to them.
ΠΡΩ. τὸ ποῖον;
PROTARCHUS: What sort of thing?
ΣΩ. εἰ περὶ μὲν τῶν ὄντων καὶ τῶν γεγονότων ταῦτα ἡμῖν οὕτω πάσχειν ἀναγκαῖον, περὶ δὲ τῶν μελλόντων οὔ;
SOCRATES: Whether, if it is necessary for us to experience these things in this way concerning things that are and things that have happened, it is not so concerning things that are to come?
ΠΡΩ. περὶ ἁπάντων μὲν οὖν τῶν χρόνων ὡσαύτως.
PROTARCHUS: Rather, in the same way concerning all times.
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν αἵ γε διὰ τῆς ψυχῆς αὐτῆς ἡδοναὶ καὶ λῦπαι ἐλέχθησαν ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν ὡς πρὸ τῶν διὰ τοῦ σώματος ἡδονῶν καὶ λυπῶν προγίγνοιντʼ ἄν, ὥσθʼ ἡμῖν συμβαίνει τὸ προχαίρειν τε καὶ προλυπεῖσθαι περὶ τὸν μέλλοντα χρόνον εἶναι γιγνόμενον;
SOCRATES: Therefore, were not the pleasures and pains through the soul itself said in what went before to arise before the pleasures and pains through the body, so that it happens to us that anticipating pleasure and anticipating pain occur in relation to the future time?
ΠΡΩ. ἀληθέστατα.
PROTARCHUS: Most true.
ΣΩ. πότερον οὖν τὰ γράμματά τε καὶ ζωγραφήματα, ἃ σμικρῷ πρότερον ἐτίθεμεν ἐν ἡμῖν γίγνεσθαι, περὶ μὲν τὸν γεγονότα καὶ τὸν παρόντα χρόνον ἐστίν, περὶ δὲ τὸν μέλλοντα οὐκ ἔστιν;
SOCRATES: Do the writings and paintings, then, which we assumed a little while ago to arise in us, concern the past and the present time, but do not concern the future?
ΠΡΩ. σφόδρα γε.
PROTARCHUS: Very much so.
ΣΩ. ἆρα σφόδρα λέγεις, ὅτι πάντʼ ἐστὶ ταῦτα ἐλπίδες εἰς τὸν ἔπειτα χρόνον οὖσαι, ἡμεῖς δʼ αὖ διὰ παντὸς τοῦ βίου ἀεὶ γέμομεν ἐλπίδων;
SOCRATES: Do you say "very much so" because all these are expectations that belong to the time to come, and we on our part are always full of expectations throughout our whole life?
ΠΡΩ. παντάπασι μὲν οὖν.
PROTARCHUS: Quite so, indeed.
ΣΩ. ἄγε δή, πρὸς τοῖς νῦν εἰρημένοις καὶ τόδε ἀπόκριναι.
SOCRATES: Come now, in addition to what has just been said, answer this too.
ΠΡΩ. τὸ ποῖον;
PROTARCHUS: What sort of thing?
ΣΩ. δίκαιος ἀνὴρ καὶ εὐσεβὴς καὶ ἀγαθὸς πάντως ἆρʼ οὐ θεοφιλής ἐστιν;
SOCRATES: Is not a just, pious, and entirely good man beloved of the gods?
ΠΡΩ. τί μήν;
PROTARCHUS: Why, of course.
§40ΣΩ. τί δέ;
SOCRATES: And what about an unjust and entirely bad man?
ἄδικός τε καὶ παντάπασι κακὸς ἆρʼ οὐ τοὐναντίον ἐκείνῳ;
Is he not the opposite of that one?
ΠΡΩ. πῶς δʼ οὔ;
PROTARCHUS: How could he not be?
ΣΩ. πολλῶν μὴν ἐλπίδων, ὡς ἐλέγομεν ἄρτι, πᾶς ἄνθρωπος γέμει;
SOCRATES: Yet is every human being full of many expectations, as we were saying just now?
ΠΡΩ. τί δʼ οὔ;
PROTARCHUS: Why not?
ΣΩ. λόγοι μήν εἰσιν ἐν ἑκάστοις ἡμῶν, ἃς ἐλπίδας ὀνομάζομεν;
SOCRATES: And are there words in each of us which we call expectations?
ΠΡΩ. ναί.
PROTARCHUS: Yes.
ΣΩ. καὶ δὴ καὶ τὰ φαντάσματα ἐζωγραφημένα·
SOCRATES: And indeed, there are also the painted images.
καί τις ὁρᾷ πολλάκις ἑαυτῷ χρυσὸν γιγνόμενον ἄφθονον καὶ ἐπʼ αὐτῷ πολλὰς ἡδονάς· καὶ δὴ καὶ ἐνεζωγραφημένον αὐτὸν ἐφʼ αὑτῷ χαίροντα σφόδρα καθορᾷ.
And someone often sees abundant gold coming to him, and many pleasures upon it; and indeed, he beholds himself painted as rejoicing exceedingly in himself.
ΠΡΩ. τί δʼ οὔ;
PROTARCHUS: Why not?
ΣΩ. τούτων οὖν πότερα φῶμεν τοῖς μὲν ἀγαθοῖς ὡς τὸ πολὺ τὰ γεγραμμένα παρατίθεσθαι ἀληθῆ διὰ τὸ θεοφιλεῖς εἶναι, τοῖς δὲ κακοῖς ὡς αὖ τὸ πολὺ τοὐναντίον, ἢ μὴ φῶμεν;
SOCRATES: Shall we say then, concerning these, that for the good, for the most part, the things written are presented as true because they are beloved of the gods, but for the bad, for the most part, the opposite, or shall we not say so?
ΠΡΩ. καὶ μάλα φατέον.
PROTARCHUS: We must certainly say so.
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν καὶ τοῖς κακοῖς ἡδοναί γε οὐδὲν ἧττον πάρεισιν ἐζωγραφημέναι, ψευδεῖς δὲ αὗταί που.
SOCRATES: Therefore, for the bad too, pleasures are present, painted no less, but these are, I suppose, false.
ΠΡΩ. τί μήν;
PROTARCHUS: Why, of course.
ΣΩ. ψευδέσιν ἄρα ἡδοναῖς τὰ πολλὰ οἱ πονηροὶ χαίρουσιν, οἱ δʼ ἀγαθοὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἀληθέσιν.
SOCRATES: For the most part, then, the wicked rejoice in false pleasures, and the good among human beings in true ones.
ΠΡΩ. ἀναγκαιότατα λέγεις.
PROTARCHUS: What you say is most necessary.
ΣΩ. εἰσὶν δὴ κατὰ τοὺς νῦν λόγους ψευδεῖς ἐν ταῖς τῶν ἀνθρώπων ψυχαῖς ἡδοναί, μεμιμημέναι μέντοι τὰς ἀληθεῖς ἐπὶ τὰ γελοιότερα, καὶ λῦπαι δὲ ὡσαύτως.
SOCRATES: According to the present arguments, then, there are false pleasures in the souls of human beings, which are, however, imitations of the true ones of a more ridiculous kind, and pains likewise.
ΠΡΩ. εἰσίν.
PROTARCHUS: There are.
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν ἦν δοξάζειν μὲν ὄντως ἀεὶ τῷ τὸ παράπαν δοξάζοντι, μὴ ἐπʼ οὖσι δὲ μηδʼ ἐπὶ γεγονόσι μηδὲ ἐπʼ ἐσομένοις ἐνίοτε.
SOCRATES: Therefore, it was possible for one who opines at all to actually opine always, but sometimes not about things that are, nor about things that have happened, nor about things that will be.
ΠΡΩ. πάνυ γε.
PROTARCHUS: Very much so.
ΣΩ. καὶ ταῦτά γε ἦν οἶμαι τὰ ἀπεργαζόμενα δόξαν ψευδῆ τότε καὶ τὸ ψευδῶς δοξάζειν.
SOCRATES: And these, I think, were the things that then produced false opinion and opining falsely.
ἦ γάρ;
Was it not so?
ΠΡΩ. ναί.
PROTARCHUS: Yes.
ΣΩ. τί οὖν;
SOCRATES: What then?
οὐκ ἀνταποδοτέον ταῖς λύπαις τε καὶ ἡδοναῖς τὴν τούτων ἀντίστροφον ἕξιν ἐν ἐκείνοις;
Must we not attribute to pains and pleasures their corresponding condition in those things?
ΠΡΩ. πῶς;
PROTARCHUS: How?
ΣΩ. ὡς ἦν μὲν χαίρειν ὄντως ἀεὶ τῷ τὸ παράπαν ὁπωσοῦν καὶ εἰκῇ χαίροντι, μὴ μέντοι ἐπὶ τοῖς οὖσι μηδʼ ἐπὶ τοῖς γεγονόσιν ἐνίοτε, πολλάκις δὲ καὶ ἴσως πλειστάκις ἐπὶ τοῖς μηδὲ μέλλουσί ποτε γενήσεσθαι.
SOCRATES: In the sense that it was possible for one who rejoices at all, in any way and at random, to actually rejoice always, yet sometimes not about things that are, nor about things that have happened, and often, and perhaps most of all, about things that are never going to happen.
ΠΡΩ. καὶ ταῦθʼ οὕτως ἀναγκαῖον, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔχειν.
PROTARCHUS: This also, Socrates, must necessarily be so.
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν ὁ αὐτὸς λόγος ἂν εἴη περὶ φόβων τε καὶ θυμῶν καὶ πάντων τῶν τοιούτων, ὡς ἔστι καὶ ψευδῆ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα ἐνίοτε;
SOCRATES: Therefore, would not the same argument hold concerning fears and angers and all such things, that all such things are also sometimes false?
ΠΡΩ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν.
PROTARCHUS: Quite so, indeed.
ΣΩ. τί δέ;
SOCRATES: And what?
πονηρὰς δόξας καὶ χρηστὰς ἄλλως ἢ ψευδεῖς γιγνομένας ἔχομεν εἰπεῖν;
Can we speak of bad opinions and good ones as arising in any other way than by becoming false?
ΠΡΩ. οὐκ ἄλλως.
PROTARCHUS: In no other way.
ΣΩ. οὐδʼ ἡδονάς γʼ οἶμαι κατανοοῦμεν ὡς ἄλλον τινὰ τρόπον εἰσὶν πονηραὶ πλὴν τῷ ψευδεῖς εἶναι.
SOCRATES: Nor, I think, do we perceive pleasures to be bad in any other way than by being false.