§43ΣΩ. κάλλιστʼ εἶπες.
SOCRATES: Most beautifully said.
ἀλλὰ γὰρ οἶμαι τόδε λέγεις, ὡς ἀεί τι τούτων ἀναγκαῖον ἡμῖν συμβαίνειν, ὡς οἱ σοφοί φασιν· ἀεὶ γὰρ ἅπαντα ἄνω τε καὶ κάτω ῥεῖ.
But indeed, I think you mean this: that one of these must always necessarily happen to us, as the wise say; for all things are always flowing up and down.
ΠΡΩ. λέγουσι γὰρ οὖν, καὶ δοκοῦσί γε οὐ φαύλως λέγειν.
PROTARCHUS: For they do say so, and indeed they seem to speak not poorly.
ΣΩ. πῶς γὰρ ἄν, μὴ φαῦλοί γε ὄντες;
SOCRATES: For how could they, since they themselves are not poor thinkers?
ἀλλὰ γὰρ ὑπεκστῆναι τὸν λόγον ἐπιφερόμενον τοῦτον βούλομαι.
But indeed, I wish to step aside from this approaching argument.
τῇδʼ οὖν διανοοῦμαι φεύγειν, καὶ σύ μοι σύμφευγε.
In this way, then, I plan to escape, and do you escape together with me.
ΠΡΩ. λέγε ὅπῃ.
PROTARCHUS: Say in what direction.
ΣΩ. ταῦτα μὲν τοίνυν οὕτως ἔστω, φῶμεν πρὸς τούτους·
SOCRATES: Then let us say to them that these things are so.
σὺ δʼ ἀπόκριναι πότερον ἀεὶ πάντα, ὁπόσα πάσχει τι τῶν ἐμψύχων, ταῦτʼ αἰσθάνεται τὸ πάσχον, καὶ οὔτʼ αὐξανόμενοι λανθάνομεν ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς οὔτε τι τῶν τοιούτων οὐδὲν πάσχοντες, ἢ πᾶν τοὐναντίον.
But you answer me whether everything that any living thing experiences is always perceived by that which experiences it, so that neither when we grow are we unaware of ourselves, nor when we experience any of such things, or is it completely the opposite?
ΠΡΩ. ἅπαν δήπου τοὐναντίον· ὀλίγου γὰρ τά γε τοιαῦτα λέληθε πάνθʼ ἡμᾶς.
PROTARCHUS: Completely the opposite, surely; for almost all such things escape our notice.
ΣΩ. οὐ τοίνυν καλῶς ἡμῖν εἴρηται τὸ νυνδὴ ῥηθέν, ὡς αἱ μεταβολαὶ κάτω τε καὶ ἄνω γιγνόμεναι λύπας τε καὶ ἡδονὰς ἀπεργάζονται.
SOCRATES: Therefore, what was just said—that the changes occurring up and down produce pains and pleasures—was not well said by us.
ΠΡΩ. τί μήν;
PROTARCHUS: Indeed, how could it be?
ΣΩ. ὧδʼ ἔσται κάλλιον καὶ ἀνεπιληπτότερον τὸ λεγόμενον.
SOCRATES: It will be more beautiful and less open to objection if stated in this way.
ΠΡΩ. πῶς;
PROTARCHUS: How?
ΣΩ. ὡς αἱ μὲν μεγάλαι μεταβολαὶ λύπας τε καὶ ἡδονὰς ποιοῦσιν ἡμῖν, αἱ δʼ αὖ μέτριαί τε καὶ σμικραὶ τὸ παράπαν οὐδέτερα τούτων.
SOCRATES: That great changes produce pains and pleasures in us, whereas moderate and small ones produce absolutely neither of these.
ΠΡΩ. ὀρθότερον οὕτως ἢ ʼκείνως, ὦ Σώκρατες.
PROTARCHUS: This way is more correct than that, Socrates.
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν εἰ ταῦτα οὕτω, πάλιν ὁ νυνδὴ ῥηθεὶς βίος ἂν ἥκοι.
SOCRATES: Therefore, if these things are so, the life just mentioned would come back to us again.
ΠΡΩ. ποῖος;
PROTARCHUS: Which one?
ΣΩ. ὃν ἄλυπόν τε καὶ ἄνευ χαρμονῶν ἔφαμεν εἶναι.
SOCRATES: The one we said was painless and without joys.
ΠΡΩ. ἀληθέστατα λέγεις.
PROTARCHUS: You speak most truly.
ΣΩ. ἐκ δὴ τούτων τιθῶμεν τριττοὺς ἡμῖν βίους, ἕνα μὲν ἡδύν, τὸν δʼ αὖ λυπηρόν, τὸν δʼ ἕνα μηδέτερα.
SOCRATES: Therefore, based on these, let us set down three lives for us: one pleasant, another painful, and one which is neither.
ἢ πῶς ἂν φαίης σὺ περὶ τούτων;
Or how would you speak of these?
ΠΡΩ. οὐκ ἄλλως ἔγωγε ἢ ταύτῃ, τρεῖς εἶναι τοὺς βίους.
PROTARCHUS: I, for my part, would not speak otherwise than that there are three lives.
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν οὐκ ἂν εἴη τὸ μὴ λυπεῖσθαί ποτε ταὐτὸν τῷ χαίρειν;
SOCRATES: Therefore, would not being free from pain ever be the same as rejoicing?
ΠΡΩ. πῶς γὰρ ἄν;
PROTARCHUS: For how could it be?
ΣΩ. ὁπόταν οὖν ἀκούσῃς ὡς ἥδιστον πάντων ἐστὶν ἀλύπως διατελεῖν τὸν βίον ἅπαντα, τί τόθʼ ὑπολαμβάνεις λέγειν τὸν τοιοῦτον;
SOCRATES: So, whenever you hear that living one's entire life without pain is the most pleasant of all things, what do you understand such a person to mean?
ΠΡΩ. ἡδὺ λέγειν φαίνεται ἔμοιγε οὗτος τὸ μὴ λυπεῖσθαι.
PROTARCHUS: To me, at least, this person seems to call being free from pain pleasant.
ΣΩ. τριῶν ὄντων οὖν ἡμῖν, ὧντινων βούλει, τίθει, καλλίοσιν ἵνα ὀνόμασι χρώμεθα, τὸ μὲν χρυσόν, τὸ δʼ ἄργυρον, τρίτον δὲ τὸ μηδέτερα τούτων.
SOCRATES: Since there are three things for us, assume them to be whatever you like, so that we may use more beautiful names—let one be gold, another silver, and a third which is neither of these.
ΠΡΩ. κεῖται.
PROTARCHUS: It is so assumed.
ΣΩ. τὸ δὴ μηδέτερα τούτων ἔσθʼ ἡμῖν ὅπως θάτερα γένοιτο ἄν, χρυσὸς ἢ ἄργυρος;
SOCRATES: Is there any way, then, for that which is neither of these to become either of the two, gold or silver, for us?
ΠΡΩ. καὶ πῶς ἄν;
PROTARCHUS: And how indeed could it?
ΣΩ. οὐδʼ ἄρα ὁ μέσος βίος ἡδὺς ἢ λυπηρὸς λεγόμενος ὀρθῶς ἄν ποτε οὔτʼ εἰ δοξάζοι τις, δοξάζοιτο, οὔτʼ εἰ λέγοι, λεχθείη, κατά γε τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον.
SOCRATES: Therefore, neither if anyone should think that the middle life is pleasant or painful, would he think correctly, nor if anyone should say so, would it be said correctly, at least according to correct reasoning.
ΠΡΩ. πῶς γὰρ ἄν;
PROTARCHUS: For how could it?
§44ΣΩ. ἀλλὰ μήν, ὦ ἑταῖρε, λεγόντων γε ταῦτα καὶ δοξαζόντων αἰσθανόμεθα.
SOCRATES: And yet, my friend, we do perceive people saying and thinking these very things.
ΠΡΩ. καὶ μάλα.
PROTARCHUS: Very much so.
ΣΩ. πότερον οὖν καὶ χαίρειν οἴονται τότε ὅταν μὴ λυπῶνται;
SOCRATES: Do they then also think that they are enjoying themselves at that time when they are not in pain?
ΠΡΩ. φασὶ γοῦν.
PROTARCHUS: They say so, at any rate.
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν οἴονται τότε χαίρειν· οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἔλεγόν που.
SOCRATES: Therefore, they think they are enjoying themselves then; for otherwise they would not say so, I suppose.
ΠΡΩ. κινδυνεύει.
PROTARCHUS: It seems likely.
ΣΩ. ψευδῆ γε μὴν δοξάζουσι περὶ τοῦ χαίρειν, εἴπερ χωρὶς τοῦ μὴ λυπεῖσθαι καὶ τοῦ χαίρειν ἡ φύσις ἑκατέρου.
SOCRATES: And yet, they hold a false opinion about enjoying themselves, if indeed the nature of being free from pain and that of enjoying oneself are separate.
ΠΡΩ. καὶ μὴν χωρίς γε ἦν.
PROTARCHUS: And indeed, they were separate.
ΣΩ. πότερον οὖν αἱρώμεθα παρʼ ἡμῖν ταῦτʼ εἶναι, καθάπερ ἄρτι, τρία, ἢ δύο μόνα, λύπην μὲν κακὸν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, τὴν δʼ ἀπαλλαγὴν τῶν λυπῶν, αὐτὸ τοῦτο ἀγαθὸν ὄν, ἡδὺ προσαγορεύεσθαι;
SOCRATES: Shall we then choose to maintain that these are three, just as just now, or only two: pain as an evil for humans, and the release from pains, which, being itself a good, is called pleasant?
ΠΡΩ. πῶς δὴ νῦν τοῦτο, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐρωτώμεθα ὑφʼ ἡμῶν αὐτῶν;
PROTARCHUS: How indeed, Socrates, are we being asked this by ourselves now?
οὐ γὰρ μανθάνω.
For I do not understand.
ΣΩ. ὄντως γὰρ τοὺς πολεμίους Φιλήβου τοῦδε, ὦ Πρώταρχε, οὐ μανθάνεις;
SOCRATES: For do you really not understand, Protarchus, who the enemies of our friend Philebus here are?
ΠΡΩ. λέγεις δὲ αὐτοὺς τίνας;
PROTARCHUS: And who do you say they are?
ΣΩ. καὶ μάλα δεινοὺς λεγομένους τὰ περὶ φύσιν, οἳ τὸ παράπαν ἡδονὰς οὔ φασιν εἶναι.
SOCRATES: Those who are said to be very clever regarding nature, who say that pleasures do not exist at all.
ΠΡΩ. τί μήν;
PROTARCHUS: Indeed, what do they say then?
ΣΩ. λυπῶν ταύτας εἶναι πάσας ἀποφυγάς, ἃς νῦν οἱ περὶ Φίληβον ἡδονὰς ἐπονομάζουσιν.
SOCRATES: That all these things which the followers of Philebus now name pleasures are actually escapes from pains.
ΠΡΩ. τούτοις οὖν ἡμᾶς πότερα πείθεσθαι συμβουλεύεις, ἢ πῶς, ὦ Σώκρατες;
PROTARCHUS: Do you advise us to believe them, Socrates, or what?
ΣΩ. οὔκ, ἀλλʼ ὥσπερ μάντεσι προσχρῆσθαί τισι, μαντευομένοις οὐ τέχνῃ ἀλλά τινι δυσχερείᾳ φύσεως οὐκ ἀγεννοῦς λίαν μεμισηκότων τὴν τῆς ἡδονῆς δύναμιν καὶ νενομικότων οὐδὲν ὑγιές, ὥστε καὶ αὐτὸ τοῦτο αὐτῆς τὸ ἐπαγωγὸν γοήτευμα, οὐχ ἡδονήν, εἶναι.
SOCRATES: No, but we should make use of them as if they were certain prophets, who prophesy not by art but by a certain harshness of a not ignoble nature, since they have hated the power of pleasure exceedingly and have deemed nothing in it to be healthy, so that even this very attractive sorcery of hers is considered not pleasure, but a deceptive charm.
τούτοις μὲν οὖν ταῦτα ἂν προσχρήσαιο, σκεψάμενος ἔτι καὶ τὰ ἄλλα αὐτῶν δυσχεράσματα· μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα αἵ γέ μοι δοκοῦσιν ἡδοναὶ ἀληθεῖς εἶναι πεύσῃ, ἵνα ἐξ ἀμφοῖν τοῖν λόγοιν σκεψάμενοι τὴν δύναμιν αὐτῆς παραθώμεθα πρὸς τὴν κρίσιν.
You would make use of them, then, in these respects, having examined also their other grievances; and after this you shall learn from me what pleasures seem to me to be true, so that, having examined her power from both arguments, we may set it before us for judgment.
ΠΡΩ. ὀρθῶς λέγεις.
PROTARCHUS: You speak correctly.
ΣΩ. μεταδιώκωμεν δὴ τούτους, ὥσπερ συμμάχους, κατὰ τὸ τῆς δυσχερείας αὐτῶν ἴχνος.
SOCRATES: Let us then pursue these people, as if they were allies, along the track of their harshness.
οἶμαι γὰρ τοιόνδε τι λέγειν αὐτούς, ἀρχομένους ποθὲν ἄνωθεν, ὡς εἰ βουληθεῖμεν ὁτουοῦν εἴδους τὴν φύσιν ἰδεῖν, οἷον τὴν τοῦ σκληροῦ, πότερον εἰς τὰ σκληρότατα ἀποβλέποντες οὕτως ἂν μᾶλλον συννοήσαιμεν ἢ πρὸς τὰ πολλοστὰ σκληρότητι;
For I think they say something of this sort, starting from somewhere above: if we should wish to see the nature of any class whatsoever, such as that of the hard, would we understand it better by looking at the hardest things, or at things with the least hardness?
δεῖ δή σε, ὦ Πρώταρχε, καθάπερ ἐμοί, καὶ τούτοις τοῖς δυσχερέσιν ἀποκρίνεσθαι.
Now you, Protarchus, must answer these harsh people just as I do.
ΠΡΩ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν, καὶ λέγω γε αὐτοῖς ὅτι πρὸς τὰ πρῶτα μεγέθει.
PROTARCHUS: Certainly indeed, and I say to them that we should look to those that are first in magnitude.