§37ΣΩ. διορισώμεθα δὴ σαφέστερον ἔτι τὸ νυνδὴ λεγόμενον ἡδονῆς τε πέρι καὶ δόξης.
SOCRATES: Let us define still more clearly what was just now said concerning pleasure and opinion.
ἔστιν γάρ πού τι δοξάζειν ἡμῖν;
For is there, I suppose, such a thing as opining for us?
ΠΡΩ. ναί.
PROTARCHUS: Yes.
ΣΩ. καὶ ἥδεσθαι;
SOCRATES: And feeling pleasure?
ΠΡΩ. ναί.
PROTARCHUS: Yes.
ΣΩ. καὶ μὴν καὶ τὸ δοξαζόμενόν ἐστί τι;
SOCRATES: And indeed, is that which is opined also something?
ΠΡΩ. πῶς δʼ οὔ;
PROTARCHUS: How could it not be?
ΣΩ. καὶ τό γε ᾧ τὸ ἡδόμενον ἥδεται;
SOCRATES: And also that by which that which rejoices is pleased?
ΠΡΩ. καὶ πάνυ γε.
PROTARCHUS: Very much so.
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν τὸ δοξάζον, ἄντε ὀρθῶς ἄντε μὴ ὀρθῶς δοξάζῃ, τό γε δοξάζειν ὄντως οὐδέποτε ἀπόλλυσιν.
SOCRATES: Therefore, that which opines, whether it opines correctly or not correctly, never loses the fact of actually opining.
ΠΡΩ. πῶς γὰρ ἄν;
PROTARCHUS: For how could it?
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν καὶ τὸ ἡδόμενον, ἄντε ὀρθῶς ἄντε μὴ ὀρθῶς ἥδηται, τό γε ὄντως ἥδεσθαι δῆλον ὡς οὐδέποτʼ ἀπολεῖ.
SOCRATES: Therefore, that which rejoices also, whether it is pleased correctly or not correctly, clearly will never lose actually being pleased.
ΠΡΩ. ναί, καὶ τοῦθʼ οὕτως ἔχει.
PROTARCHUS: Yes, this also is so.
ΣΩ. ὅτῳ ποτὲ οὖν δὴ τρόπῳ δόξα ψευδής τε καὶ ἀληθὴς ἡμῖν φιλεῖ γίγνεσθαι, τὸ δὲ τῆς ἡδονῆς μόνον ἀληθές, δοξάζειν δʼ ὄντως καὶ χαίρειν ἀμφότερα ὁμοίως εἴληχεν σκεπτέον.
SOCRATES: In what way then does opinion tend to become both false and true for us, while that of pleasure is only true, although both have obtained actually opining and rejoicing equally, is what we must examine.
ΠΡΩ. σκεπτέον.
PROTARCHUS: We must examine it.
ΣΩ. ἆρʼ ὅτι δόξῃ μὲν ἐπιγίγνεσθον ψεῦδός τε καὶ ἀληθές, καὶ ἐγένετο οὐ μόνον δόξα διὰ ταῦτα ἀλλὰ καὶ ποιά τις ἑκατέρα, σκεπτέον φῂς τοῦτʼ εἶναι;
SOCRATES: Is it because falsehood and truth accrue to opinion, and because of these it becomes not only an opinion but also each of them of a certain quality? Is this what you say we must examine?
ΠΡΩ. ναί.
PROTARCHUS: Yes.
ΣΩ. πρὸς δέ γε τούτοις, εἰ καὶ τὸ παράπαν ἡμῖν τὰ μέν ἐστι ποίʼ ἄττα, ἡδονὴ δὲ καὶ λύπη μόνον ἅπερ ἐστί, ποιώ τινε δὲ οὐ γίγνεσθον, καὶ ταῦθʼ ἡμῖν διομολογητέον.
SOCRATES: And in addition to these, whether on the whole for us some things are of certain qualities, whereas pleasure and pain are only what they are, and do not become of certain qualities—this also we must agree upon.
ΠΡΩ. δῆλον.
PROTARCHUS: Clearly.
ΣΩ. ἀλλʼ οὐδὲν τοῦτό γε χαλεπὸν ἰδεῖν, ὅτι καὶ ποιώ τινε· πάλαι γὰρ εἴπομεν ὅτι μεγάλαι τε καὶ σμικραὶ καὶ σφόδρα ἑκάτεραι γίγνονται, λῦπαί τε καὶ ἡδοναί.
SOCRATES: But this at least is not at all difficult to see, that they are of certain qualities; for we said long ago that both of them, pains and pleasures, become great and small and intense.
ΠΡΩ. παντάπασι μὲν οὖν.
PROTARCHUS: Quite so, indeed.
ΣΩ. ἂν δέ γε πονηρία τούτων, ὦ Πρώταρχε, προσγίγνηταί τινι, πονηρὰν μὲν φήσομεν οὕτω γίγνεσθαι δόξαν, πονηρὰν δὲ καὶ ἡδονήν;
SOCRATES: But if badness, Protarchus, accrues to any of these, shall we say that opinion thus becomes bad, and pleasure also bad?
ΠΡΩ. ἀλλὰ τί μήν, ὦ Σώκρατες;
PROTARCHUS: Why, how else, Socrates?
ΣΩ. τί δʼ, ἂν ὀρθότης ἢ τοὐναντίον ὀρθότητι τινὶ τούτων προσγίγνηται;
SOCRATES: And what if correctness, or the opposite to correctness, accrues to one of these?
μῶν οὐκ ὀρθὴν μὲν δόξαν ἐροῦμεν, ἂν ὀρθότητα ἴσχῃ, ταὐτὸν δὲ ἡδονήν;
Shall we not say that an opinion is correct, if it has correctness, and likewise a pleasure?
ΠΡΩ. ἀναγκαῖον.
PROTARCHUS: Necessarily.
ΣΩ. ἂν δέ γε ἁμαρτανόμενον τὸ δοξαζόμενον ᾖ, τὴν δόξαν τότε ἁμαρτάνουσάν γε οὐκ ὀρθὴν ὁμολογητέον οὐδʼ ὀρθῶς δοξάζουσαν;
SOCRATES: But if that which is opined is mistaken, must we not agree that the opinion at that time, being mistaken, is not correct, nor is it opining correctly?
ΠΡΩ. πῶς γὰρ ἄν;
PROTARCHUS: For how could it be otherwise?
ΣΩ. τί δʼ, ἂν αὖ λύπην ἤ τινα ἡδονὴν περὶ τὸ ἐφʼ ᾧ λυπεῖται ἢ τοὐναντίον ἁμαρτάνουσαν ἐφορῶμεν, ὀρθὴν ἢ χρηστὴν ἤ τι τῶν καλῶν ὀνομάτων αὐτῇ προσθήσομεν;
SOCRATES: And what if, on the other hand, we see a pain or a certain pleasure mistaken about that with respect to which it is pained or, on the contrary, pleased? Shall we attach to it the name of "correct" or "good" or any of the beautiful names?
ΠΡΩ. ἀλλʼ οὐχ οἷόν τε, εἴπερ ἁμαρτήσεταί γε ἡδονή.
PROTARCHUS: But it is impossible, if indeed the pleasure is to be mistaken.
ΣΩ. καὶ μὴν ἔοικέν γε ἡδονὴ πολλάκις οὐ μετὰ δόξης ὀρθῆς ἀλλὰ μετὰ ψεύδους ἡμῖν γίγνεσθαι.
SOCRATES: And indeed, pleasure seems to arise in us often not with correct opinion, but with falsehood.
§38ΠΡΩ. πῶς γὰρ οὔ;
PROTARCHUS: For how could it not be so?
καὶ τὴν μὲν δόξαν γε, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐν τῷ τοιούτῳ καὶ τότε λέγομεν ψευδῆ, τὴν δʼ ἡδονὴν αὐτὴν οὐδεὶς ἄν ποτε προσείποι ψευδῆ.
And the opinion indeed, Socrates, in such a case and at that time, we call false, but the pleasure itself no one would ever address as false.
ΣΩ. ἀλλὰ προθύμως ἀμύνεις τῷ τῆς ἡδονῆς, ὦ Πρώταρχε, λόγῳ τὰ νῦν.
SOCRATES: But you zealously defend the argument for pleasure, Protarchus, at present.
ΠΡΩ. οὐδέν γε, ἀλλʼ ἅπερ ἀκούω λέγω.
PROTARCHUS: Not at all, but I am saying just what I hear.
ΣΩ. διαφέρει δʼ ἡμῖν οὐδέν, ὦ ἑταῖρε, ἡ μετὰ δόξης τε ὀρθῆς καὶ μετʼ ἐπιστήμης ἡδονὴ τῆς μετὰ τοῦ ψεύδους καὶ ἀγνοίας πολλάκις ἑκάστοις ἡμῶν ἐγγιγνομένης;
SOCRATES: But is there no difference for us, my friend, between the pleasure that comes with correct opinion and knowledge, and that which often arises in each of us with falsehood and ignorance?
ΠΡΩ. εἰκὸς γοῦν μὴ σμικρὸν διαφέρειν.
PROTARCHUS: It is likely, at least, that they differ not a little.
ΣΩ. τῆς δὴ διαφορᾶς αὐτοῖν ἐπὶ θεωρίαν ἔλθωμεν.
SOCRATES: Let us then proceed to the consideration of their difference.
ΠΡΩ. ἄγʼ ὅπῃ σοι φαίνεται.
PROTARCHUS: Lead on wherever it seems good to you.
ΣΩ. τῇδε δὴ ἄγω.
SOCRATES: This way, then, I lead.
ΠΡΩ. πῇ;
PROTARCHUS: Which way?
ΣΩ. δόξα, φαμέν, ἡμῖν ἔστι μὲν ψευδής, ἔστι δὲ καὶ ἀληθής;
SOCRATES: Is opinion, we say, for us sometimes false, and sometimes also true?
ΠΡΩ. ἔστιν.
PROTARCHUS: It is.
ΣΩ. ἕπεται μὴν ταύταις, ὃ νυνδὴ ἐλέγομεν, ἡδονὴ καὶ λύπη πολλάκις, ἀληθεῖ καὶ ψευδεῖ δόξῃ λέγω.
SOCRATES: And indeed, there follows upon these, as we were just saying, pleasure and pain often—I mean, upon true and false opinion.
ΠΡΩ. πάνυ γε.
PROTARCHUS: Very much so.
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν ἐκ μνήμης τε καὶ αἰσθήσεως δόξα ἡμῖν καὶ τὸ διαδοξάζειν ἐγχειρεῖν γίγνεθʼ ἑκάστοτε;
SOCRATES: Therefore, does opinion and the attempting to form an opinion arise for us each time from memory and perception?
ΠΡΩ. καὶ μάλα.
PROTARCHUS: Most certainly.
ΣΩ. ἆρʼ οὖν ἡμᾶς ὧδε περὶ ταῦτα ἀναγκαῖον ἡγούμεθʼ ἴσχειν;
SOCRATES: Do we then suppose that we must necessarily be in the following state concerning these things?
ΠΡΩ. πῶς;
PROTARCHUS: How?
ΣΩ. πολλάκις ἰδόντι τινὶ πόρρωθεν μὴ πάνυ σαφῶς τὰ καθορώμενα συμβαίνειν βούλεσθαι κρίνειν φαίης ἂν ταῦθʼ ἅπερ ὁρᾷ;
SOCRATES: Would you say that it often happens to someone who sees things from afar, not very clearly, that he wants to judge these very things which he sees?
ΠΡΩ. φαίην ἄν.
PROTARCHUS: I would say so.
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο αὐτὸς αὑτὸν οὗτος ἀνέροιτʼ ἂν ὧδε;
SOCRATES: Therefore, after this, would not this person ask himself as follows?
ΠΡΩ. πῶς;
PROTARCHUS: How?
ΣΩ. τί ποτʼ ἄρʼ ἔστι τὸ παρὰ τὴν πέτραν τοῦθʼ ἑστάναι φανταζόμενον ὑπό τινι δένδρῳ; ταῦτʼ εἰπεῖν ἄν τις πρὸς ἑαυτὸν δοκεῖ σοι, τοιαῦτʼ ἄττα κατιδὼν φαντασθέντα αὑτῷ ποτε;
SOCRATES: "What on earth is this that appears to be standing by the rock under some tree?" Do you think someone would say these things to himself, upon seeing such things appear to him at some time?
ΠΡΩ. τί μήν;
PROTARCHUS: Why, of course.
ΣΩ. ἆρʼ οὖν μετὰ ταῦτα ὁ τοιοῦτος ὡς ἀποκρινόμενος ἂν πρὸς αὑτὸν εἴποι τοῦτο, ὡς ἔστιν ἄνθρωπος, ἐπιτυχῶς εἰπών;
SOCRATES: Would such a person, then, after this, speak this to himself as if answering, saying "It is a human being," and speaking successfully?
ΠΡΩ. καὶ πάνυ γε.
PROTARCHUS: Very much so.
ΣΩ. καὶ παρενεχθείς γʼ αὖ τάχʼ ἂν ὡς ἔστι τινῶν ποιμένων ἔργον τὸ καθορώμενον ἄγαλμα προσείποι.
SOCRATES: And on the other hand, being misled, he might perhaps address what is seen as a statue, the work of some shepherds.
ΠΡΩ. μάλα γε.
PROTARCHUS: Very much so.
ΣΩ. κἂν μέν τίς γʼ αὐτῷ παρῇ, τά τε πρὸς αὑτὸν ῥηθέντα ἐντείνας εἰς φωνὴν πρὸς τὸν παρόντα αὐτὰ ταῦτʼ ἂν πάλιν φθέγξαιτο, καὶ λόγος δὴ γέγονεν οὕτως ὃ τότε δόξαν ἐκαλοῦμεν;
SOCRATES: And if someone is present with him, he would direct into a voice the things spoken to himself, and utter these very same things again to the one present, and so what we then called opinion has thus become a statement?
ΠΡΩ. τί μήν;
PROTARCHUS: Why, of course.
ΣΩ. ἂν δʼ ἄρα μόνος ᾖ τοῦτο ταὐτὸν πρὸς αὑτὸν διανοούμενος, ἐνίοτε καὶ πλείω χρόνον ἔχων ἐν αὑτῷ πορεύεται.
SOCRATES: But if he is alone, thinking this very same thing to himself, sometimes he goes on his way keeping it within himself for a longer time.
ΠΡΩ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν.
PROTARCHUS: Quite so, indeed.
ΣΩ. τί οὖν;
SOCRATES: What then?
ἆρα σοὶ φαίνεται τὸ περὶ τούτων ὅπερ ἐμοί;
Does the matter concerning these things seem to you as it does to me?
ΠΡΩ. τὸ ποῖον;
PROTARCHUS: What sort of thing?
ΣΩ. δοκεῖ μοι τότε ἡμῶν ἡ ψυχὴ βιβλίῳ τινὶ προσεοικέναι.
SOCRATES: It seems to me that our soul at that time resembles a certain book.
ΠΡΩ. πῶς;
PROTARCHUS: How?