§261ΝΕ. ΣΩ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν.
YOUNG SOCRATES: Quite so.
ΞΕ. οὐκοῦν ἐπειδὴ τοῦτο μετρίως ἀφέστηκεν ἀπʼ ἐκείνων, ἀλλοτριότητι διορισθὲν πρὸς οἰκειότητα, τοῦτο αὐτὸ πάλιν αὖ διαιρεῖν ἀναγκαῖον, εἴ τινα τομὴν ἔτι ἔχομεν ὑπείκουσαν ἐν τούτῳ;
STRANGER: Since, then, this has stood at a moderate distance from those, being distinguished by difference in relation to kinship, is it not necessary to divide this itself again, if we still have any cut that yields in it?
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. πάνυ γε.
YOUNG SOCRATES: Certainly.
ΞΕ. καὶ μὴν φαινόμεθα ἔχειν· ἀλλʼ ἐπακολουθῶν σύντεμνε.
STRANGER: And indeed we seem to have one; but follow and cut with me.
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. πῇ;
YOUNG SOCRATES: In what way?
ΞΕ. πάντας ὁπόσους ἂν ἄρχοντας διανοηθῶμεν ἐπιτάξει προσχρωμένους ἆρʼ οὐχ εὑρήσομεν γενέσεώς τινος ἕνεκα προστάττοντας;
STRANGER: Shall we not find that all those rulers whom we can think of as employing command issue commands for the sake of some generation?
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. πῶς δʼ οὔ;
YOUNG SOCRATES: How not?
ΞΕ. καὶ μὴν τά γε γιγνόμενα πάντα δίχα διαλαβεῖν οὐ παντάπασι χαλεπόν.
STRANGER: And indeed, to divide all things that are generated into two is not altogether difficult.
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. πῇ;
YOUNG SOCRATES: In what way?
ΞΕ. τὰ μὲν ἄψυχα αὐτῶν ἐστί που συμπάντων, τὰ δʼ ἔμψυχα.
STRANGER: Some of them, of all of them, are inanimate, I suppose, and others are animate.
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. ναί.
YOUNG SOCRATES: Yes.
ΞΕ. τούτοις δέ γε αὐτοῖς τὸ τοῦ γνωστικοῦ μέρος ἐπιτακτικὸν ὄν, εἴπερ βουλόμεθα τέμνειν, τεμοῦμεν.
STRANGER: In these very things, then, we shall cut the commanding part of cognitive science, if we want to cut it.
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. κατὰ τί;
YOUNG SOCRATES: According to what?
ΞΕ. τὸ μὲν ἐπὶ ταῖς τῶν ἀψύχων γενέσεσιν αὐτοῦ τάττοντες, τὸ δʼ ἐπὶ ταῖς τῶν ἐμψύχων· καὶ πᾶν οὕτως ἤδη διαιρήσεται δίχα.
STRANGER: Assigning one part of it to the generation of inanimate things, and the other to that of animate things; and in this way the whole will already be divided in two.
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. παντάπασί γε.
YOUNG SOCRATES: Altogether so.
ΞΕ. τὸ μὲν τοίνυν αὐτῶν παραλίπωμεν, τὸ δʼ ἀναλάβωμεν, ἀναλαβόντες δὲ μερισώμεθα εἰς δύο τὸ σύμπαν.
STRANGER: Let us then leave aside one of them and take up the other, and having taken it up, let us divide the whole into two.
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. λέγεις δʼ αὐτοῖν ἀναληπτέον εἶναι πότερον;
YOUNG SOCRATES: Which of the two do you say we must take up?
ΞΕ. πάντως που τὸ περὶ τὰ ζῷα ἐπιτακτικόν.
STRANGER: Surely in any case the one concerning the commanding of animals.
οὐ γὰρ δὴ τό γε τῆς βασιλικῆς ἐπιστήμης ἐστί ποτε τῶν ἀψύχων ἐπιστατοῦν, οἷον ἀρχιτεκτονικόν, ἀλλὰ γενναιότερον, ἐν τοῖς ζῴοις καὶ περὶ αὐτὰ ταῦτα τὴν δύναμιν ἀεὶ κεκτημένον.
For the science of kingship is certainly not at any time presiding over inanimate things, like the master builder's art, but is more noble, always possessing its power among animals and concerning these very things.
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. ὀρθῶς.
YOUNG SOCRATES: Right.
ΞΕ. τήν γε μὴν τῶν ζῴων γένεσιν καὶ τροφὴν τὴν μέν τις ἂν ἴδοι μονοτροφίαν οὖσαν, τὴν δὲ κοινὴν τῶν ἐν ταῖς ἀγέλαις θρεμμάτων ἐπιμέλειαν.
STRANGER: Now as for the generation and rearing of animals, one might see one part as single rearing, and the other as the common care of animals in herds.
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. ὀρθῶς.
YOUNG SOCRATES: Right.
ΞΕ. ἀλλʼ οὐ μὴν τόν γε πολιτικὸν εὑρήσομεν ἰδιοτρόφον, ὥσπερ βοηλάτην ἤ τινα ἱπποκόμον, ἀλλʼ ἱπποφορβῷ τε καὶ βουφορβῷ μᾶλλον προσεοικότα.
STRANGER: But indeed we shall not find the statesman to be a rearer of individual animals, like an ox-driver or a groom, but more resembling a horse-herder and cattle-herder.
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. φαίνεταί γε δὴ ῥηθὲν νῦν.
YOUNG SOCRATES: It certainly seems so, now that it is said.
ΞΕ. πότερον οὖν τῆς ζῳοτροφίας τὴν τῶν συμπόλλων κοινὴν τροφὴν ἀγελαιοτροφίαν ἢ κοινοτροφικήν τινα ὀνομάζομεν;
STRANGER: Shall we then call the common rearing of many together, within the rearing of animals, herd-rearing or some kind of collective rearing?
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. ὁπότερον ἂν ἐν τῷ λόγῳ συμβαίνῃ.
YOUNG SOCRATES: Whichever of the two happens to be convenient in the discussion.
§262ΞΕ. καλῶς γε, ὦ Σώκρατες· κἂν διαφυλάξῃς τὸ μὴ σπουδάζειν ἐπὶ τοῖς ὀνόμασιν, πλουσιώτερος εἰς τὸ γῆρας ἀναφανήσῃ φρονήσεως.
STRANGER: Very well indeed, Socrates; and if you guard against taking names too seriously, you will appear richer in wisdom towards old age.
νῦν δὲ τοῦτο μέν, καθάπερ διακελεύῃ, ποιητέον·
But for now we must do this, just as you direct.
τὴν δὲ ἀγελαιοτροφικὴν ἆρʼ ἐννοεῖς πῇ τις δίδυμον ἀποφήνας τὸ ζητούμενον ἐν διπλασίοισι τὰ νῦν ἐν τοῖς ἡμίσεσιν εἰς τότε ποιήσει ζητεῖσθαι;
Do you perceive, then, in what way one, by showing the object of inquiry to be double, will cause what is now sought in halves to be sought in double parts at that time?
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. προθυμήσομαι.
YOUNG SOCRATES: I will try.
καί μοι δοκεῖ τῶν μὲν ἀνθρώπων ἑτέρα τις εἶναι, τῶν δʼ αὖ θηρίων ἄλλη τροφή.
And it seems to me that there is one rearing of humans, and another of wild beasts.
ΞΕ. παντάπασί γε προθυμότατα καὶ ἀνδρειότατα διῄρησαι· μὴ μέντοι τοῦτό γε εἰς αὖθις κατὰ δύναμιν πάσχωμεν.
STRANGER: You have divided indeed most eagerly and courageously; however, let us not, as far as possible, suffer this same thing hereafter.
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. τὸ ποῖον;
YOUNG SOCRATES: What kind of thing?
ΞΕ. μὴ σμικρὸν μόριον ἓν πρὸς μεγάλα καὶ πολλὰ ἀφαιρῶμεν, μηδὲ εἴδους χωρίς· ἀλλὰ τὸ μέρος ἅμα εἶδος ἐχέτω.
STRANGER: Let us not take away one small part in comparison to large and many parts, nor without a form; but let the part at the same time have a form.
κάλλιστον μὲν γὰρ ἀπὸ τῶν ἄλλων εὐθὺς διαχωρίζειν τὸ ζητούμενον, ἂν ὀρθῶς ἔχῃ, καθάπερ ὀλίγον σὺ πρότερον οἰηθεὶς ἔχειν τὴν διαίρεσιν ἐπέσπευσας τὸν λόγον, ἰδὼν ἐπʼ ἀνθρώπους πορευόμενον·
For it is a very fine thing to separate the object of inquiry immediately from the rest, if it is done correctly, just as you a little while ago, thinking you had the division, hastened the argument, seeing that it was going towards humans.
ἀλλὰ γάρ, ὦ φίλε, λεπτουργεῖν οὐκ ἀσφαλές, διὰ μέσων δὲ ἀσφαλέστερον ἰέναι τέμνοντας, καὶ μᾶλλον ἰδέαις ἄν τις προστυγχάνοι.
But indeed, my friend, it is not safe to slice too finely, but it is safer to go cutting through the middle, and one would more likely meet with ideas.
τοῦτο δὲ διαφέρει τὸ πᾶν πρὸς τὰς ζητήσεις.
And this makes all the difference in inquiries.
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. πῶς, ὦ ξένε, λέγεις τοῦτο;
YOUNG SOCRATES: How do you mean this, stranger?
ΞΕ. πειρατέον ἔτι σαφέστερον φράζειν εὐνοίᾳ τῆς σῆς φύσεως, ὦ Σώκρατες.
STRANGER: I must try to speak even more clearly out of goodwill towards your nature, Socrates.
ἐν τῷ μὲν οὖν παρεστηκότι τὰ νῦν δηλῶσαι μηδὲν ἐνδεῶς ἀδύνατον· ἐπιχειρητέον δέ τι καὶ σμικρῷ πλέον αὐτὸ προαγαγεῖν εἰς τὸ πρόσθεν σαφηνείας ἕνεκα.
In the present circumstances, it is impossible to show it without any deficiency; but we must attempt to advance it a little further forward for the sake of clarity.
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. ποῖον οὖν δὴ φράζεις διαιρουμένους ἡμᾶς οὐκ ὀρθῶς ἄρτι δρᾶν;
YOUNG SOCRATES: What kind of thing, then, do you say we were doing just now in dividing incorrectly?
ΞΕ. τοιόνδε, οἷον εἴ τις τἀνθρώπινον ἐπιχειρήσας δίχα διελέσθαι γένος διαιροῖ καθάπερ οἱ πολλοὶ τῶν ἐνθάδε διανέμουσι, τὸ μὲν Ἑλληνικὸν ὡς ἓν ἀπὸ πάντων ἀφαιροῦντες χωρίς, σύμπασι δὲ τοῖς ἄλλοις γένεσιν, ἀπείροις οὖσι καὶ ἀμείκτοις καὶ ἀσυμφώνοις πρὸς ἄλληλα, βάρβαρον μιᾷ κλήσει προσειπόντες αὐτὸ διὰ ταύτην τὴν μίαν κλῆσιν καὶ γένος ἓν αὐτὸ εἶναι προσδοκῶσιν· ἢ τὸν ἀριθμόν τις αὖ νομίζοι κατʼ εἴδη δύο διαιρεῖν μυριάδα ἀποτεμνόμενος ἀπὸ πάντων, ὡς ἓν εἶδος ἀποχωρίζων, καὶ τῷ λοιπῷ δὴ παντὶ θέμενος ἓν ὄνομα διὰ τὴν κλῆσιν αὖ καὶ τοῦτʼ ἀξιοῖ γένος ἐκείνου χωρὶς ἕτερον ἓν γίγνεσθαι.
STRANGER: Something like this: as if someone, attempting to divide the human race in two, should make the division in the way that the majority of people here distribute it, separating the Greek race as one from all the rest, and calling all the other races together—which are infinite and unmixed and discordant with one another—by the single name "barbarian," and because of this single name, they expect it to be a single race; or if someone, on the other hand, should think he is dividing number into two forms by cutting off ten thousand from all numbers, as if separating one form, and giving one name to all the rest, and because of this name, again, thinks this becomes a single other race separate from that one.
κάλλιον δέ που καὶ μᾶλλον κατʼ εἴδη καὶ δίχα διαιροῖτʼ ἄν, εἰ τὸν μὲν ἀριθμὸν ἀρτίῳ καὶ περιττῷ τις τέμνοι, τὸ δὲ αὖ τῶν ἀνθρώπων γένος ἄρρενι καὶ θήλει, Λυδοὺς δὲ ἢ Φρύγας ἤ τινας ἑτέρους πρὸς ἅπαντας τάττων ἀποσχίζοι τότε, ἡνίκα ἀποροῖ γένος ἅμα καὶ μέρος εὑρίσκειν ἑκάτερον τῶν σχισθέντων.
But it would be finer, I suppose, and more according to forms and in two, if someone should cut number into even and odd, and the human race on the other hand into male and female, and should split off Lydians or Phrygians or some others against all the rest only when he is at a loss to find both a race and a part at the same time for each of the split parts.