§208ΣΩ. τί οὖν;
SOCRATES: What then?
ὅταν ἐν τῷ τοιούτῳ καιρῷ
Θεαίτητον
γράφων τις θῆτα καὶ εἶ οἴηταί τε δεῖν γράφειν καὶ γράψῃ, καὶ αὖ
Θεόδωρον
ἐπιχειρῶν γράφειν ταῦ καὶ εἶ οἴηταί τε δεῖν γράφειν καὶ γράψῃ, ἆρʼ ἐπίστασθαι φήσομεν αὐτὸν τὴν πρώτην τῶν ὑμετέρων ὀνομάτων συλλαβήν;
When in such a situation someone, writing "Theaetetus", thinks that he ought to write theta and epsilon and actually writes them, and again, when attempting to write "Theodorus", thinks he ought to write tau and epsilon and actually writes them, shall we say that he knows the first syllable of your names?
ΘΕΑΙ. ἀλλʼ ἄρτι ὡμολογήσαμεν τὸν οὕτως ἔχοντα μήπω εἰδέναι.
THEAETETUS: No, we have just agreed that one in this condition does not yet know.
ΣΩ. κωλύει οὖν τι καὶ περὶ τὴν δευτέραν συλλαβὴν καὶ τρίτην καὶ τετάρτην οὕτως ἔχειν τὸν αὐτόν;
SOCRATES: Is there anything, then, to prevent the same person from being in this state regarding the second, third, and fourth syllables?
ΘΕΑΙ. οὐδέν γε.
THEAETETUS: Not at all.
ΣΩ. ἆρʼ οὖν τότε τὴν διὰ στοιχείου διέξοδον ἔχων γράψει
Θεαίτητον
μετὰ ὀρθῆς δόξης, ὅταν ἑξῆς γράφῃ;
SOCRATES: Will he then, possessing the way through the element, write "Theaetetus" with correct opinion, when he writes them in order?
ΘΕΑΙ. δῆλον δή.
THEAETETUS: Clearly so.
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν ἔτι ἀνεπιστήμων ὤν, ὀρθὰ δὲ δοξάζων, ὥς φαμεν;
SOCRATES: Is he not, then, still without knowledge, yet holding correct opinions, as we say?
ΘΕΑΙ. ναί.
THEAETETUS: Yes.
ΣΩ. λόγον γε ἔχων μετὰ ὀρθῆς δόξης.
SOCRATES: And indeed possessing an account along with correct opinion.
τὴν γὰρ διὰ τοῦ στοιχείου ὁδὸν ἔχων ἔγραφεν, ἣν δὴ λόγον ὡμολογήσαμεν.
For he wrote having the way through the element, which we agreed is "account".
ΘΕΑΙ. ἀληθῆ.
THEAETETUS: True.
ΣΩ. ἔστιν ἄρα, ὦ ἑταῖρε, μετὰ λόγου ὀρθὴ δόξα, ἣν οὔπω δεῖ ἐπιστήμην καλεῖν.
SOCRATES: There is, then, my friend, correct opinion with an account, which we must not yet call knowledge.
ΘΕΑΙ. κινδυνεύει.
THEAETETUS: It seems so.
ΣΩ. ὄναρ δή, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἐπλουτήσαμεν οἰηθέντες ἔχειν τὸν ἀληθέστατον ἐπιστήμης λόγον.
SOCRATES: It seems we have become rich in a dream, thinking we have the truest account of knowledge.
ἢ μήπω κατηγορῶμεν;
Or should we not yet condemn it?
ΣΩ. ἴσως γὰρ οὐ τοῦτό τις αὐτὸν ὁριεῖται, ἀλλὰ τὸ λοιπὸν εἶδος τῶν τριῶν, ὧν ἕν γέ τι ἔφαμεν λόγον θήσεσθαι τὸν ἐπιστήμην ὁριζόμενον δόξαν εἶναι ὀρθὴν μετὰ λόγου.
SOCRATES: For perhaps one will not define it this way, but as the remaining form of the three, one of which we said anyone defining knowledge as correct opinion with an account would posit as "account".
ΘΕΑΙ. ὀρθῶς ὑπέμνησας· ἔτι γὰρ ἓν λοιπόν.
THEAETETUS: You have rightly reminded me; for there is still one remaining.
τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἦν διανοίας ἐν φωνῇ ὥσπερ εἴδωλον, τὸ δʼ ἄρτι λεχθὲν διὰ στοιχείου ὁδὸς ἐπὶ τὸ ὅλον· τὸ δὲ δὴ τρίτον τί λέγεις;
The first was a sort of image of thought in voice, and the one just mentioned was the way through the element to the whole; but what do you say the third is?
ΣΩ. ὅπερ ἂν οἱ πολλοὶ εἴποιεν, τὸ ἔχειν τι σημεῖον εἰπεῖν ᾧ τῶν ἁπάντων διαφέρει τὸ ἐρωτηθέν.
SOCRATES: What the many would say: to be able to state some sign by which the thing asked about differs from all others.
ΘΕΑΙ. οἷον τίνα τίνος ἔχεις μοι λόγον εἰπεῖν;
THEAETETUS: For example, what account of what thing can you tell me?
ΣΩ. οἷον, εἰ βούλει, ἡλίου πέρι ἱκανὸν οἶμαί σοι εἶναι ἀποδέξασθαι, ὅτι τὸ λαμπρότατόν ἐστι τῶν κατὰ τὸν οὐρανὸν ἰόντων περὶ γῆν.
SOCRATES: For example, if you like, about the sun, I think it is sufficient for you to accept that it is the brightest of the things that go across the heaven around the earth.
ΘΕΑΙ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν.
THEAETETUS: Absolutely so.
ΣΩ. λαβὲ δὴ οὗ χάριν εἴρηται.
SOCRATES: Grasp then why this is said.
ἔστι δὲ ὅπερ ἄρτι ἐλέγομεν, ὡς ἄρα τὴν διαφορὰν ἑκάστου ἂν λαμβάνῃς ᾗ τῶν ἄλλων διαφέρει, λόγον, ὥς φασί τινες, λήψῃ· ἕως δʼ ἂν κοινοῦ τινος ἐφάπτῃ, ἐκείνων πέρι σοι ἔσται ὁ λόγος ὧν ἂν ἡ κοινότης ᾖ.
It is what we were just saying: that if you grasp the difference of each thing by which it differs from others, you will grasp the "account", as some say; but as long as you touch upon something common, your account will be about those things to which the commonness belongs.
ΘΕΑΙ. μανθάνω· καί μοι δοκεῖ καλῶς ἔχειν λόγον τὸ τοιοῦτον καλεῖν.
THEAETETUS: I understand; and it seems well to me to call such a thing an account.
ΣΩ. ὃς δʼ ἂν μετʼ ὀρθῆς δόξης περὶ ὁτουοῦν τῶν ὄντων τὴν διαφορὰν τῶν ἄλλων προσλάβῃ, αὐτοῦ ἐπιστήμων γεγονὼς ἔσται οὗ πρότερον ἦν δοξαστής.
SOCRATES: And whoever, along with correct opinion about any of the things that are, adds the difference from other things, will have become a knower of that of which he was previously a mere opiner.
ΘΕΑΙ. φαμέν γε μὴν οὕτω.
THEAETETUS: We certainly say so.
ΣΩ. νῦν δῆτα, ὦ Θεαίτητε, παντάπασιν ἔγωγε, ἐπειδὴ ἐγγὺς ὥσπερ σκιαγραφήματος γέγονα τοῦ λεγομένου, συνίημι οὐδὲ σμικρόν· ἕως δὲ ἀφειστήκη πόρρωθεν, ἐφαίνετό τί μοι λέγεσθαι.
SOCRATES: Now indeed, Theaetetus, since I have got close to what has been said, as if to a shadow-painting, I understand not even a little; but while I stood far off, it seemed to me to make some sense.
ΘΕΑΙ. πῶς τί τοῦτο;
THEAETETUS: How so? What do you mean by this?