§206ΣΩ. τί δʼ αὖ;
SOCRATES: What about this then?
τοὐναντίον λέγοντος ἆρʼ οὐ μᾶλλον ἂν ἀποδέξαιο ἐξ ὧν αὐτὸς σύνοισθα σαυτῷ ἐν τῇ τῶν γραμμάτων μαθήσει;
Would you not rather accept the opposite if someone said it, from what you yourself are conscious of in your learning of letters?
ΘΕΑΙ. τὸ ποῖον;
THEAETETUS: What sort of thing do you mean?
ΣΩ. ὡς οὐδὲν ἄλλο μανθάνων διετέλεσας ἢ τὰ στοιχεῖα ἔν τε τῇ ὄψει διαγιγνώσκειν πειρώμενος καὶ ἐν τῇ ἀκοῇ αὐτὸ καθʼ αὑτὸ ἕκαστον, ἵνα μὴ ἡ θέσις σε ταράττοι λεγομένων τε καὶ γραφομένων.
SOCRATES: That in learning you did nothing else than try to distinguish each element by itself, both in sight and in hearing, so that their position might not disturb you when they are spoken and written.
ΘΕΑΙ. ἀληθέστατα λέγεις.
THEAETETUS: You speak most truly.
ΣΩ. ἐν δὲ κιθαριστοῦ τελέως μεμαθηκέναι μῶν ἄλλο τι ἦν ἢ τὸ τῷ φθόγγῳ ἑκάστῳ δύνασθαι ἐπακολουθεῖν, ποίας χορδῆς εἴη· ἃ δὴ στοιχεῖα πᾶς ἂν ὁμολογήσειε μουσικῆς λέγεσθαι;
SOCRATES: And under the lyre-player, was perfect learning anything other than being able to follow each sound, to know which string it belonged to; which indeed everyone would agree are called the elements of music?
ΘΕΑΙ. οὐδὲν ἄλλο.
THEAETETUS: Nothing else.
ΣΩ. ὧν μὲν ἄρʼ αὐτοὶ ἔμπειροί ἐσμεν στοιχείων καὶ συλλαβῶν, εἰ δεῖ ἀπὸ τούτων τεκμαίρεσθαι καὶ εἰς τὰ ἄλλα, πολὺ τὸ τῶν στοιχείων γένος ἐναργεστέραν τε τὴν γνῶσιν ἔχειν φήσομεν καὶ κυριωτέραν τῆς συλλαβῆς πρὸς τὸ λαβεῖν τελέως ἕκαστον μάθημα, καὶ ἐάν τις φῇ συλλαβὴν μὲν γνωστόν, ἄγνωστον δὲ πεφυκέναι στοιχεῖον, ἑκόντα ἢ ἄκοντα παίζειν ἡγησόμεθʼ αὐτόν.
SOCRATES: If, then, we are to judge from these elements and syllables of which we themselves have experience to other things as well, we shall say that the class of elements has a knowledge much clearer and more decisive than that of the syllable for the purpose of perfectly grasping each subject of study; and if anyone says that the syllable is naturally knowable, but the element is unknowable, we shall think he is joking, whether willingly or unwillingly.
ΘΕΑΙ. κομιδῇ μὲν οὖν.
THEAETETUS: Absolutely so.
ΣΩ. ἀλλὰ δὴ τούτου μὲν ἔτι κἂν ἄλλαι φανεῖεν ἀποδείξεις, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ· τὸ δὲ προκείμενον μὴ ἐπιλαθώμεθα διʼ αὐτὰ ἰδεῖν, ὅτι δή ποτε καὶ λέγεται τὸ μετὰ δόξης ἀληθοῦς λόγον προσγενόμενον τὴν τελεωτάτην ἐπιστήμην γεγονέναι.
SOCRATES: But indeed, other proofs of this might still appear, as it seems to me; but let us not forget to look, because of these very things, at our proposed subject: what indeed is meant by the saying that when an account is added to true opinion, it becomes the most perfect knowledge.
ΘΕΑΙ. οὐκοῦν χρὴ ὁρᾶν.
THEAETETUS: Then we must look into it.
ΣΩ. φέρε δή, τί ποτε βούλεται τὸν λόγον ἡμῖν σημαίνειν;
SOCRATES: Come then, what does 'account' mean to signify to us?
τριῶν γὰρ ἕν τί μοι δοκεῖ λέγειν.
For it seems to me to say one of three things.
ΘΕΑΙ. τίνων δή;
THEAETETUS: What are they indeed?
ΣΩ. τὸ μὲν πρῶτον εἴη ἂν τὸ τὴν αὑτοῦ διάνοιαν ἐμφανῆ ποιεῖν διὰ φωνῆς μετὰ ῥημάτων τε καὶ ὀνομάτων, ὥσπερ εἰς κάτοπτρον ἢ ὕδωρ τὴν δόξαν ἐκτυπούμενον εἰς τὴν διὰ τοῦ στόματος ῥοήν.
SOCRATES: The first would be to make one's own thought manifest through speech with verbs and nouns, stamping the opinion into the stream flowing through the mouth, just as into a mirror or water.
ἢ οὐ δοκεῖ σοι τὸ τοιοῦτον λόγος εἶναι;
Or does not such a thing seem to you to be an account?
ΘΕΑΙ. ἔμοιγε.
THEAETETUS: To me indeed.
τὸν γοῦν αὐτὸ δρῶντα λέγειν φαμέν.
At any rate, we say that the person who does this speaks.
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν αὖ τοῦτό γε πᾶς ποιεῖν δυνατὸς θᾶττον ἢ σχολαίτερον, τὸ ἐνδείξασθαι τί δοκεῖ περὶ ἑκάστου αὐτῷ, ὁ μὴ ἐνεὸς ἢ κωφὸς ἀπʼ ἀρχῆς· καὶ οὕτως ὅσοι τι ὀρθὸν δοξάζουσι, πάντες αὐτὸ μετὰ λόγου φανοῦνται ἔχοντες, καὶ οὐδαμοῦ ἔτι ὀρθὴ δόξα χωρὶς ἐπιστήμης γενήσεται.
SOCRATES: Now, on the other hand, anyone is capable of doing this, more quickly or more slowly—showing what he thinks about each thing, provided he is not mute or deaf from birth; and so all who hold a correct opinion will appear to have it with an account, and correct opinion will nowhere exist apart from knowledge.
ΘΕΑΙ. ἀληθῆ.
THEAETETUS: True.
§207ΣΩ. μὴ τοίνυν ῥᾳδίως καταγιγνώσκωμεν τὸ μηδὲν εἰρηκέναι τὸν ἀποφηνάμενον ἐπιστήμην ὃ νῦν σκοποῦμεν.
SOCRATES: Therefore, let us not easily find guilty of having said nothing the one who declared knowledge to be what we are now examining.
ἴσως γὰρ ὁ λέγων οὐ τοῦτο ἔλεγεν, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἐρωτηθέντα τί ἕκαστον δυνατὸν εἶναι τὴν ἀπόκρισιν διὰ τῶν στοιχείων ἀποδοῦναι τῷ ἐρομένῳ.
For perhaps the speaker did not mean this, but rather being able, when asked what each thing is, to give the answer to the questioner through the elements.
ΘΕΑΙ. οἷον τί λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες;
THEAETETUS: As what, for instance, do you mean, Socrates?
ΣΩ. οἷον καὶ Ἡσίοδος περὶ ἁμάξης λέγει τὸ
ἑκατὸν δέ τε δούραθʼ ἁμάξης. ἃ ἐγὼ μὲν οὐκ ἂν δυναίμην εἰπεῖν, οἶμαι δὲ οὐδὲ σύ· ἀλλʼ ἀγαπῷμεν ἂν ἐρωτηθέντες ὅτι ἐστὶν ἅμαξα, εἰ ἔχοιμεν εἰπεῖν τροχοί, ἄξων, ὑπερτερία, ἄντυγες, ζυγόν.
SOCRATES: As, for example, Hesiod says of a wagon, 'and a hundred timbers of a wagon.' Which I indeed should not be able to name, and I think neither would you; but we should be content if, when asked what a wagon is, we were able to say: wheels, axle, body, rails, yoke.
ΘΕΑΙ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν.
THEAETETUS: Very much so.
ΣΩ. ὁ δέ γε ἴσως οἴοιτʼ ἂν ἡμᾶς, ὥσπερ ἂν τὸ σὸν ὄνομα ἐρωτηθέντας καὶ ἀποκρινομένους κατὰ συλλαβήν, γελοίους εἶναι, ὀρθῶς μὲν δοξάζοντας καὶ λέγοντας ἃ λέγομεν, οἰομένους δὲ γραμματικοὺς εἶναι καὶ ἔχειν τε καὶ λέγειν γραμματικῶς τὸν τοῦ Θεαιτήτου ὀνόματος λόγον· τὸ δʼ οὐκ εἶναι ἐπιστημόνως οὐδὲν λέγειν, πρὶν ἂν διὰ τῶν στοιχείων μετὰ τῆς ἀληθοῦς δόξης ἕκαστον περαίνῃ τις, ὅπερ καὶ ἐν τοῖς πρόσθε που ἐρρήθη.
SOCRATES: But he, perhaps, would think that we, just as if we were asked your name and answered syllable by syllable, are ridiculous, holding correct opinions and saying what we say indeed, but thinking we are grammarians and that we have and speak grammatically the account of the name of Theaetetus; but that it is not speaking with knowledge at all, until one goes through each thing through the elements along with true opinion, which was also said somewhere in the earlier discussion.
ΘΕΑΙ. ἐρρήθη γάρ.
THEAETETUS: Yes, indeed, it was said.
ΣΩ. οὕτω τοίνυν καὶ περὶ ἁμάξης ἡμᾶς μὲν ὀρθὴν ἔχειν δόξαν, τὸν δὲ διὰ τῶν ἑκατὸν ἐκείνων δυνάμενον διελθεῖν αὐτῆς τὴν οὐσίαν, προσλαβόντα τοῦτο, λόγον τε προσειληφέναι τῇ ἀληθεῖ δόξῃ καὶ ἀντὶ δοξαστικοῦ τεχνικόν τε καὶ ἐπιστήμονα περὶ ἁμάξης οὐσίας γεγονέναι, διὰ στοιχείων τὸ ὅλον περάναντα.
SOCRATES: So then, also in the case of a wagon, we indeed have correct opinion, but he who is able to go through its essence through those hundred parts, by adding this, has added an account to his true opinion, and instead of merely opining, has become a craftsman and a knower about the essence of a wagon, having gone through the whole through its elements.
ΘΕΑΙ. οὐκοῦν εὖ δοκεῖ σοι, ὦ Σώκρατες;
THEAETETUS: Does it not then seem well said to you, Socrates?
ΣΩ. εἰ σοί, ὦ ἑταῖρε, δοκεῖ, καὶ ἀποδέχῃ τὴν διὰ στοιχείου διέξοδον περὶ ἑκάστου λόγον εἶναι, τὴν δὲ κατὰ συλλαβὰς ἢ καὶ κατὰ μεῖζον ἔτι ἀλογίαν, τοῦτό μοι λέγε, ἵνʼ αὐτὸ ἐπισκοπῶμεν.
SOCRATES: If, my friend, it seems so to you, and you accept that the going through each thing through the element is an account, whereas that by syllables or even by larger units is lack of account, tell me this, so that we may examine it.
ΘΕΑΙ. ἀλλὰ πάνυ ἀποδέχομαι.
THEAETETUS: But I absolutely accept it.
ΣΩ. πότερον ἡγούμενος ἐπιστήμονα εἶναι ὁντινοῦν ὁτουοῦν, ὅταν τὸ αὐτὸ τοτὲ μὲν τοῦ αὐτοῦ δοκῇ αὐτῷ εἶναι, τοτὲ δὲ ἑτέρου, ἢ καὶ ὅταν τοῦ αὐτοῦ τοτὲ μὲν ἕτερον, τοτὲ δὲ ἕτερον δοξάζῃ;
SOCRATES: Do you think that anyone is a knower of anything, when the same thing seems to him at one time to belong to the same thing, and at another time to another, or when he opines at one time one thing and at another time another about the same thing?
ΘΕΑΙ. μὰ Δίʼ οὐκ ἔγωγε.
THEAETETUS: By Zeus, not I.
ΣΩ. εἶτα ἀμνημονεῖς ἐν τῇ τῶν γραμμάτων μαθήσει κατʼ ἀρχὰς σαυτόν τε καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους δρῶντας αὐτά;
SOCRATES: Then do you not remember that in your learning of letters you and the others did exactly this at the beginning?
ΘΕΑΙ. ἆρα λέγεις τῆς αὐτῆς συλλαβῆς τοτὲ μὲν ἕτερον, τοτὲ δὲ ἕτερον ἡγουμένους γράμμα, καὶ τὸ αὐτὸ τοτὲ μὲν εἰς τὴν προσήκουσαν, τοτὲ δὲ εἰς ἄλλην τιθέντας συλλαβήν;
THEAETETUS: Do you mean when people think that there is at one time one letter and at another time another in the same syllable, and when they place the same letter at one time in the proper syllable and at another time in another?
ΣΩ. ταῦτα λέγω.
SOCRATES: I mean that.
ΘΕΑΙ. μὰ Δίʼ οὐ τοίνυν ἀμνημονῶ, οὐδέ γέ πω ἡγοῦμαι ἐπίστασθαι τοὺς οὕτως ἔχοντας.
THEAETETUS: By Zeus, I certainly do not forget, nor indeed do I yet think that those who are in this condition have knowledge.