§209ΣΩ. φράσω, ἐὰν οἷός τε γένωμαι.
SOCRATES: I will tell you, if I am able.
ὀρθὴν ἔγωγε ἔχων δόξαν περὶ σοῦ, ἐὰν μὲν προσλάβω τὸν σὸν λόγον, γιγνώσκω δή σε, εἰ δὲ μή, δοξάζω μόνον.
If I have a correct opinion about you, and if I add your account to it, then indeed I know you, but if not, I only opine.
ΘΕΑΙ. ναί.
THEAETETUS: Yes.
ΣΩ. λόγος δέ γε ἦν ἡ τῆς σῆς διαφορότητος ἑρμηνεία.
SOCRATES: And the "account" was the exposition of your difference.
ΘΕΑΙ. οὕτως.
THEAETETUS: It was.
ΣΩ. ἡνίκʼ οὖν ἐδόξαζον μόνον, ἄλλο τι ᾧ τῶν ἄλλων διαφέρεις, τούτων οὐδενὸς ἡπτόμην τῇ διανοίᾳ;
SOCRATES: When, therefore, I was only opining, did I not grasp in my thought any of the things by which you differ from others?
ΘΕΑΙ. οὐκ ἔοικε.
THEAETETUS: It seems not.
ΣΩ. τῶν κοινῶν τι ἄρα διενοούμην, ὧν οὐδὲν σὺ μᾶλλον ἤ τις ἄλλος ἔχει.
SOCRATES: Then I was thinking of some of the common things, none of which you possess any more than anyone else.
ΘΕΑΙ. ἀνάγκη.
THEAETETUS: Necessarily.
ΣΩ. φέρε δὴ πρὸς Διός·
SOCRATES: Come then, by Zeus!
πῶς ποτε ἐν τῷ τοιούτῳ σὲ μᾶλλον ἐδόξαζον ἢ ἄλλον ὁντινοῦν;
How in such a case did I opine you more than any other person?
θὲς γάρ με διανοούμενον ὡς ἔστιν οὗτος Θεαίτητος, ὃς ἂν ᾖ τε ἄνθρωπος καὶ ἔχῃ ῥῖνα καὶ ὀφθαλμοὺς καὶ στόμα καὶ οὕτω δὴ ἓν ἕκαστον τῶν μελῶν. αὕτη οὖν ἡ διάνοια ἔσθʼ ὅτι μᾶλλον ποιήσει με Θεαίτητον ἢ Θεόδωρον διανοεῖσθαι, ἢ τῶν λεγομένων Μυσῶν τὸν ἔσχατον;
For suppose me thinking that "this is Theaetetus, whoever is a man and has a nose, eyes, mouth, and each of the limbs in this way." Will this thought make me think of Theaetetus any more than of Theodorus, or of the lowest of the so-called Mysians?
ΘΕΑΙ. τί γάρ;
THEAETETUS: How could it?
ΣΩ. ἀλλʼ ἐὰν δὴ μὴ μόνον τὸν ἔχοντα ῥῖνα καὶ ὀφθαλμοὺς διανοηθῶ, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸν σιμόν τε καὶ ἐξόφθαλμον, μή τι σὲ αὖ μᾶλλον δοξάσω ἢ ἐμαυτὸν ἢ ὅσοι τοιοῦτοι;
SOCRATES: But if indeed I think not only of one having a nose and eyes, but also of one who is snub-nosed and has prominent eyes, shall I any more opine you than myself or whoever are like this?
ΘΕΑΙ. οὐδέν.
THEAETETUS: Not at all.
ΣΩ. ἀλλʼ οὐ πρότερόν γε, οἶμαι, Θεαίτητος ἐν ἐμοὶ δοξασθήσεται, πρὶν ἂν ἡ σιμότης αὕτη τῶν ἄλλων σιμοτήτων ὧν ἐγὼ ἑώρακα διάφορόν τι μνημεῖον παρʼ ἐμοὶ ἐνσημηναμένη κατάθηται—καὶ τἆλλα οὕτω ἐξ ὧν εἶ σύ—ἥ με, καὶ ἐὰν αὔριον ἀπαντήσω, ἀναμνήσει καὶ ποιήσει ὀρθὰ δοξάζειν περὶ σοῦ.
SOCRATES: But, I think, Theaetetus will not be opined in me until this snub-nosedness has stamped and deposited within me a distinctive memory different from the other snub-nosednesses I have seen—and similarly with the other things from which you are made—which, even if I meet you tomorrow, will remind me and make me hold a correct opinion about you.
ΘΕΑΙ. ἀληθέστατα.
THEAETETUS: Most true.
ΣΩ. περὶ τὴν διαφορότητα ἄρα καὶ ἡ ὀρθὴ δόξα ἂν εἴη ἑκάστου πέρι.
SOCRATES: Correct opinion, then, would also be about the difference of each thing.
ΘΕΑΙ. φαίνεταί γε.
THEAETETUS: So it appears.
ΣΩ. τὸ οὖν προσλαβεῖν λόγον τῇ ὀρθῇ δόξῃ τί ἂν ἔτι εἴη;
SOCRATES: Then what would "adding an account" to correct opinion still mean?
εἰ μὲν γὰρ προσδοξάσαι λέγει ᾗ διαφέρει τι τῶν ἄλλων, πάνυ γελοία γίγνεται ἡ ἐπίταξις.
For if it means to opine in addition how something differs from other things, the command becomes utterly ridiculous.
ΘΕΑΙ. πῶς;
THEAETETUS: How so?
ΣΩ. ὧν ὀρθὴν δόξαν ἔχομεν ᾗ τῶν ἄλλων διαφέρει, τούτων προσλαβεῖν κελεύει ἡμᾶς ὀρθὴν δόξαν ᾗ τῶν ἄλλων διαφέρει.
SOCRATES: Of things of which we have a correct opinion as to how they differ from other things, it commands us to add a correct opinion as to how they differ from other things.
καὶ οὕτως ἡ μὲν σκυτάλης ἢ ὑπέρου ἢ ὅτου δὴ λέγεται περιτροπὴ πρὸς ταύτην τὴν ἐπίταξιν οὐδὲν ἂν λέγοι, τυφλοῦ δὲ παρακέλευσις ἂν καλοῖτο δικαιότερον·
And so, the turning around of a pestle or a mortar or whatever they say would be nothing compared to this command; it would more justly be called the advice of a blind man.
τὸ γάρ, ἃ ἔχομεν, ταῦτα προσλαβεῖν κελεύειν, ἵνα μάθωμεν ἃ δοξάζομεν, πάνυ γενναίως ἔοικεν ἐσκοτωμένῳ.
For to command us to add what we already have, in order to learn what we opine, seems thoroughly like one in the dark.
ΘΕΑΙ. εἰπὲ δὴ τί νυνδὴ ὡς ἐρῶν ἐπύθου;
THEAETETUS: Tell me then, what was it you were asking just now, as if you were going to say something?
§210ΣΩ. εἰ τὸ λόγον, ὦ παῖ, προσλαβεῖν γνῶναι κελεύει, ἀλλὰ μὴ δοξάσαι τὴν διαφορότητα, ἡδὺ χρῆμʼ ἂν εἴη τοῦ καλλίστου τῶν περὶ ἐπιστήμης λόγου.
SOCRATES: If, my boy, commanding us to "add an account" means to "know" the difference, and not to "opine" it, it would be a delightful thing in the most beautiful discussion about knowledge.
τὸ γὰρ γνῶναι ἐπιστήμην που λαβεῖν ἐστιν·
For to "know" is surely to "acquire knowledge", is it not?
ἦ γάρ;
THEAETETUS: Yes.
ΘΕΑΙ. ναί.
SOCRATES: Therefore, when asked, it seems, what knowledge is, one will answer that it is correct opinion with knowledge of difference.
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν ἐρωτηθείς, ὡς ἔοικε, τί ἐστιν ἐπιστήμη, ἀποκρινεῖται ὅτι δόξα ὀρθὴ μετὰ ἐπιστήμης διαφορότητος. λόγου γὰρ πρόσληψις τοῦτʼ ἂν εἴη κατʼ ἐκεῖνον.
For according to that view, this would be the addition of an account.
ΘΕΑΙ. ἔοικεν.
THEAETETUS: It seems so.
ΣΩ. καὶ παντάπασί γε εὔηθες, ζητούντων ἡμῶν ἐπιστήμην, δόξαν φάναι ὀρθὴν εἶναι μετʼ ἐπιστήμης εἴτε διαφορότητος εἴτε ὁτουοῦν.
SOCRATES: And it is completely foolish, when we are seeking knowledge, to say that it is correct opinion with knowledge, whether of difference or of anything else.
οὔτε ἄρα αἴσθησις, ὦ Θεαίτητε, οὔτε δόξα ἀληθὴς οὔτε μετʼ ἀληθοῦς δόξης λόγος προσγιγνόμενος ἐπιστήμη ἂν εἴη.
Therefore, neither perception, Theaetetus, nor true opinion, nor an account added to true opinion, would be knowledge.
ΘΕΑΙ. οὐκ ἔοικεν.
THEAETETUS: It seems not.
ΣΩ. ἦ οὖν ἔτι κυοῦμέν τι καὶ ὠδίνομεν, ὦ φίλε, περὶ ἐπιστήμης, ἢ πάντα ἐκτετόκαμεν;
SOCRATES: Are we, then, still pregnant and in labor, my friend, concerning knowledge, or have we brought everything to birth?
ΘΕΑΙ. καὶ ναὶ μὰ Δίʼ ἔγωγε πλείω ἢ ὅσα εἶχον ἐν ἐμαυτῷ διὰ σὲ εἴρηκα.
THEAETETUS: Yes, by Zeus, I indeed have said through you more than I had in myself.
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν ταῦτα μὲν πάντα ἡ μαιευτικὴ ἡμῖν τέχνη ἀνεμιαῖά φησι γεγενῆσθαι καὶ οὐκ ἄξια τροφῆς;
SOCRATES: Does our art of midwifery, then, say that all these things have turned out to be wind-eggs and not worth rearing?
παντάπασι μὲν οὖν.
THEAETETUS: Absolutely so.
ΣΩ. ἐὰν τοίνυν ἄλλων μετὰ ταῦτα ἐγκύμων ἐπιχειρῇς γίγνεσθαι, ὦ Θεαίτητε, ἐάντε γίγνῃ, βελτιόνων ἔσῃ πλήρης διὰ τὴν νῦν ἐξέτασιν, ἐάντε κενὸς ᾖς, ἧττον ἔσῃ βαρὺς τοῖς συνοῦσι καὶ ἡμερώτερος σωφρόνως οὐκ οἰόμενος εἰδέναι ἃ μὴ οἶσθα.
SOCRATES: If, then, after this you should attempt to become pregnant with other things, Theaetetus, and if you do, you will be full of better things because of the present examination; and if you remain empty, you will be less heavy to your companions and gentler, soberly not thinking you know what you do not know.
τοσοῦτον γὰρ μόνον ἡ ἐμὴ τέχνη δύναται, πλέον δὲ οὐδέν, οὐδέ τι οἶδα ὧν οἱ ἄλλοι, ὅσοι μεγάλοι καὶ θαυμάσιοι ἄνδρες εἰσί τε καὶ γεγόνασιν·
For my art can do only this much, and nothing more; nor do I know any of the things that others know, who are and have been great and wonderful men.
τὴν δὲ μαιείαν ταύτην ἐγώ τε καὶ ἡ μήτηρ ἐκ θεοῦ ἐλάχομεν, ἡ μὲν τῶν γυναικῶν, ἐγὼ δὲ τῶν νέων τε καὶ γενναίων καὶ ὅσοι καλοί.
But this art of midwifery, both I and my mother received from God—she for women, and I for the young and noble and all who are beautiful.
νῦν μὲν οὖν ἀπαντητέον μοι εἰς τὴν τοῦ βασιλέως στοὰν ἐπὶ τὴν Μελήτου γραφὴν ἥν με γέγραπται· ἕωθεν δέ, ὦ Θεόδωρε, δεῦρο πάλιν ἀπαντῶμεν.
Now, indeed, I must go to the King's Porch to meet the indictment of Meletus which he has drawn up against me; but tomorrow morning, Theodorus, let us meet here again.