§196ΣΩ. τί οὖν;
SOCRATES: What then?
οἴει τινὰ πώποτε αὐτὸν ἐν αὑτῷ πέντε καὶ ἑπτά, λέγω δὲ μὴ ἀνθρώπους ἑπτὰ καὶ πέντε προθέμενον σκοπεῖν μηδʼ ἄλλο τοιοῦτον, ἀλλʼ αὐτὰ πέντε καὶ ἑπτά, ἅ φαμεν ἐκεῖ μνημεῖα ἐν τῷ ἐκμαγείῳ εἶναι καὶ ψευδῆ ἐν αὐτοῖς οὐκ εἶναι δοξάσαι, ταῦτα αὐτὰ εἴ τις ἀνθρώπων ἤδη πώποτε ἐσκέψατο λέγων πρὸς αὑτὸν καὶ ἐρωτῶν πόσα ποτʼ ἐστίν, καὶ ὁ μέν τις εἶπεν οἰηθεὶς ἕνδεκα αὐτὰ εἶναι, ὁ δὲ δώδεκα, ἢ πάντες λέγουσί τε καὶ οἴονται δώδεκα αὐτὰ εἶναι;
Do you think anyone has ever in himself, 5 and 7—I mean, not setting before himself seven and five men to examine, nor any other such thing, but five and seven themselves, which we said are memories there in the waxen block and that it is impossible to opine falsely among them—if any human being has ever yet examined these themselves, saying to himself and asking how many they could possibly be, and one person said, thinking them to be eleven, and another twelve, or do all say and think that they are twelve?
ΘΕΑΙ. οὐ μὰ τὸν Δία, ἀλλὰ πολλοὶ δὴ καὶ ἕνδεκα· ἐὰν δέ γε ἐν πλείονι ἀριθμῷ τις σκοπῆται, μᾶλλον σφάλλεται.
THEAETETUS: No, by Zeus, but many indeed say eleven; and if anyone examines a larger number, he errs even more.
οἶμαι γάρ σε περὶ παντὸς ἀριθμοῦ λέγειν.
For I think you are speaking about every number.
ΣΩ. ὀρθῶς γὰρ οἴει· καὶ ἐνθυμοῦ μή τι τότε γίγνεται ἄλλο ἢ αὐτὰ τὰ δώδεκα τὰ ἐν τῷ ἐκμαγείῳ ἕνδεκα οἰηθῆναι.
SOCRATES: For you think correctly; and consider whether anything else happens then than that the twelve itself in the waxen block is thought to be eleven.
ΘΕΑΙ. ἔοικέ γε.
THEAETETUS: It seems so.
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν εἰς τοὺς πρώτους πάλιν ἀνήκει λόγους;
SOCRATES: Does it not, then, return to our first arguments?
ὁ γὰρ τοῦτο παθών, ὃ οἶδεν, ἕτερον αὐτὸ οἴεται εἶναι ὧν αὖ οἶδεν, ὃ ἔφαμεν ἀδύνατον, καὶ τούτῳ αὐτῷ ἠναγκάζομεν μὴ εἶναι ψευδῆ δόξαν, ἵνα μὴ τὰ αὐτὰ ὁ αὐτὸς ἀναγκάζοιτο εἰδὼς μὴ εἰδέναι ἅμα.
For the one who suffers this thinks that what he knows is another thing of those which he in turn knows, which we said was impossible, and by this very argument we were forced to say that false opinion does not exist, so that the same person would not be forced to know and not know the same things at the same time.
ΘΕΑΙ. ἀληθέστατα.
THEAETETUS: Most true.
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν ἄλλʼ ὁτιοῦν δεῖ ἀποφαίνειν τὸ τὰ ψευδῆ δοξάζειν ἢ διανοίας πρὸς αἴσθησιν παραλλαγήν.
SOCRATES: Must we not, then, show that to opine false things is something else than the mismatch of thought with perception?
εἰ γὰρ τοῦτʼ ἦν, οὐκ ἄν ποτε ἐν αὐτοῖς τοῖς διανοήμασιν ἐψευδόμεθα.
For if it were this, we would never have erred in thoughts themselves.
νῦν δὲ ἤτοι οὐκ ἔστι ψευδὴς δόξα, ἢ ἅ τις οἶδεν, οἷόν τε μὴ εἰδέναι.
But now, either there is no false opinion, or it is possible not to know what one knows.
καὶ τούτων πότερα αἱρῇ;
And which of these do you choose?
ΘΕΑΙ. ἄπορον αἵρεσιν προτίθης, ὦ Σώκρατες.
THEAETETUS: You propose a difficult choice, Socrates.
ΣΩ. ἀλλὰ μέντοι ἀμφότερά γε κινδυνεύει ὁ λόγος οὐκ ἐάσειν.
SOCRATES: But yet the argument is likely not to permit both.
ὅμως δέ—πάντα γὰρ τολμητέον—τί εἰ ἐπιχειρήσαιμεν ἀναισχυντεῖν;
Nevertheless—for we must dare everything—what if we should attempt to be shameless?
ΘΕΑΙ. πῶς;
THEAETETUS: How so?
ΣΩ. ἐθελήσαντες εἰπεῖν ποῖόν τί ποτʼ ἐστὶ τὸ ἐπίστασθαι.
SOCRATES: By willing to say what sort of thing indeed to know is.
ΘΕΑΙ. καὶ τί τοῦτο ἀναίσχυντον;
THEAETETUS: And how is this shameless?
ΣΩ. ἔοικας οὐκ ἐννοεῖν ὅτι πᾶς ἡμῖν ἐξ ἀρχῆς ὁ λόγος ζήτησις γέγονεν ἐπιστήμης ὡς οὐκ εἰδόσι τί ποτʼ ἐστίν.
SOCRATES: You seem not to notice that all our argument from the beginning has been a search for knowledge on the ground that we do not know what it is.
ΘΕΑΙ. ἐννοῶ μὲν οὖν.
THEAETETUS: I do notice, indeed.
ΣΩ. ἔπειτʼ οὐκ ἀναιδὲς δοκεῖ μὴ εἰδότας ἐπιστήμην ἀποφαίνεσθαι τὸ ἐπίστασθαι οἷόν ἐστιν;
SOCRATES: Then does it not seem shameless to declare what knowing is when we do not know knowledge?
ἀλλὰ γάρ, ὦ Θεαίτητε, πάλαι ἐσμὲν ἀνάπλεῳ τοῦ μὴ καθαρῶς διαλέγεσθαι.
But indeed, Theaetetus, for a long time we have been infected with arguing in an impure way.
μυριάκις γὰρ εἰρήκαμεν τὸ
γιγνώσκομεν
καὶ
οὐ γιγνώσκομεν,
καὶ
ἐπιστάμεθα
καὶ
οὐκ ἐπιστάμεθα,
ὥς τι συνιέντες ἀλλήλων ἐν ᾧ ἔτι ἐπιστήμην ἀγνοοῦμεν·
For ten thousand times we have said "we recognize" and "we do not recognize," and "we know" and "we do not know," as if we understood one another while we are still ignorant of knowledge.
εἰ δὲ βούλει, καὶ νῦν ἐν τῷ παρόντι κεχρήμεθʼ αὖ τῷ
ἀγνοεῖν
τε καὶ
συνιέναι,
ὡς προσῆκον αὐτοῖς χρῆσθαι εἴπερ στερόμεθα ἐπιστήμης.
And if you wish, even now in the present we use in turn "being ignorant" and "understanding," as if it were fitting for us to use them if indeed we are deprived of knowledge.
ΘΕΑΙ. ἀλλὰ τίνα τρόπον διαλέξῃ, ὦ Σώκρατες, τούτων ἀπεχόμενος;
THEAETETUS: But in what way will you argue, Socrates, if you keep away from these?