§197ΣΩ. οὐδένα ὤν γε ὃς εἰμί, εἰ μέντοι ἦ ἀντιλογικός· οἷος ἀνὴρ εἰ καὶ νῦν παρῆν, τούτων τʼ ἂν ἔφη ἀπέχεσθαι καὶ ἡμῖν σφόδρʼ ἂν ἃ ἐγὼ λέγω ἐπέπληττεν.
SOCRATES: In no way, being who I am, though indeed I might if I were an antilogician; if such a man were present even now, he would say that he kept away from these words, and he would severely rebuke us for what I am saying.
ἐπειδὴ οὖν ἐσμεν φαῦλοι, βούλει τολμήσω εἰπεῖν οἷόν ἐστι τὸ ἐπίστασθαι;
Since, therefore, we are mediocre, do you want me to dare to say what sort of thing to know is?
φαίνεται γάρ μοι προὔργου τι ἂν γενέσθαι.
For it seems to me that it would be of some use.
ΘΕΑΙ. τόλμα τοίνυν νὴ Δία.
THEAETETUS: Dare, then, by Zeus!
τούτων δὲ μὴ ἀπεχομένῳ σοι ἔσται πολλὴ συγγνώμη.
And there will be much indulgence for you if you do not keep away from these words.
ΣΩ. ἀκήκοας οὖν ὃ νῦν λέγουσιν τὸ ἐπίστασθαι;
SOCRATES: Have you heard, then, what they say to know is now?
ΘΕΑΙ. ἴσως· οὐ μέντοι ἔν γε τῷ παρόντι μνημονεύω.
THEAETETUS: Perhaps; however, I do not remember at the present moment.
ΣΩ. ἐπιστήμης που ἕξιν φασὶν αὐτὸ εἶναι.
SOCRATES: They say, I believe, that it is the having of knowledge.
ΘΕΑΙ. ἀληθῆ.
THEAETETUS: True.
ΣΩ. ἡμεῖς τοίνυν σμικρὸν μεταθώμεθα καὶ εἴπωμεν ἐπιστήμης κτῆσιν.
SOCRATES: Let us, then, make a small change and say the possession of knowledge.
ΘΕΑΙ. τί οὖν δὴ φήσεις τοῦτο ἐκείνου διαφέρειν;
THEAETETUS: In what way, then, will you say this differs from that?
ΣΩ. ἴσως μὲν οὐδέν· ὃ δʼ οὖν δοκεῖ ἀκούσας συνδοκίμαζε.
SOCRATES: Perhaps not at all; but listen to what seems to be and join in examining it.
ΘΕΑΙ. ἐάνπερ γε οἷός τʼ ὦ.
THEAETETUS: If indeed I am able.
ΣΩ. οὐ τοίνυν μοι ταὐτὸν φαίνεται τῷ κεκτῆσθαι τὸ ἔχειν.
SOCRATES: To have, then, does not seem to me to be the same as to possess.
οἷον ἱμάτιον πριάμενός τις καὶ ἐγκρατὴς ὢν μὴ φορῶν, ἔχειν μὲν οὐκ ἂν αὐτὸν αὐτό, κεκτῆσθαί γε μὴν φαῖμεν.
For example, if someone bought a cloak and was master of it but did not wear it, we would not say that he has it, but indeed we would say that he possesses it.
ΘΕΑΙ. ὀρθῶς γε.
THEAETETUS: Correct indeed.
ΣΩ. ὅρα δὴ καὶ ἐπιστήμην εἰ δυνατὸν οὕτω κεκτημένον μὴ ἔχειν, ἀλλʼ ὥσπερ εἴ τις ὄρνιθας ἀγρίας, περιστερὰς ἤ τι ἄλλο, θηρεύσας οἴκοι κατασκευασάμενος περιστερεῶνα τρέφοι, τρόπον μὲν ἄν πού τινα φαῖμεν αὐτὸν αὐτὰς ἀεὶ ἔχειν, ὅτι δὴ κέκτηται.
SOCRATES: See, then, whether it is possible in this way also for one who possesses knowledge not to have it, but just as if someone, having hunted wild birds—doves or something else—and having set up an aviary at home, should feed them, we would say in a certain way that he always has them, because indeed he possesses them.
ἦ γάρ;
Is it not so?
ΘΕΑΙ. ναί.
THEAETETUS: Yes.
ΣΩ. τρόπον δέ γʼ ἄλλον οὐδεμίαν ἔχειν, ἀλλὰ δύναμιν μὲν αὐτῷ περὶ αὐτὰς παραγεγονέναι, ἐπειδὴ ἐν οἰκείῳ περιβόλῳ ὑποχειρίους ἐποιήσατο, λαβεῖν καὶ σχεῖν ἐπειδὰν βούληται, θηρευσαμένῳ ἣν ἂν ἀεὶ ἐθέλῃ, καὶ πάλιν ἀφιέναι, καὶ τοῦτο ἐξεῖναι ποιεῖν ὁποσάκις ἂν δοκῇ αὐτῷ.
SOCRATES: But in another way, that he has none of them, but that a power has become available to him concerning them, since he has made them subject to his hand in his own enclosure, to take and hold them whenever he wishes, by hunting whichever one he always wants, and to let them go again, and that it is permitted to do this as many times as it seems good to him.
ΘΕΑΙ. ἔστι ταῦτα.
THEAETETUS: That is so.
ΣΩ. πάλιν δή, ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν κήρινόν τι ἐν ταῖς ψυχαῖς κατεσκευάζομεν οὐκ οἶδʼ ὅτι πλάσμα, νῦν αὖ ἐν ἑκάστῃ ψυχῇ ποιήσωμεν περιστερεῶνά τινα παντοδαπῶν ὀρνίθων, τὰς μὲν κατʼ ἀγέλας οὔσας χωρὶς τῶν ἄλλων, τὰς δὲ κατʼ ὀλίγας, ἐνίας δὲ μόνας διὰ πασῶν ὅπῃ ἂν τύχωσι πετομένας.
SOCRATES: Again indeed, just as in the preceding parts we set up some waxen thing—I know not what kind of mold—in our souls, now let us in turn make in each soul an aviary of all kinds of birds, some being in flocks apart from the others, some in small groups, and some solitary, flying wherever they happen through all of them.
ΘΕΑΙ. πεποιήσθω δή.
THEAETETUS: Let it be made indeed.
ἀλλὰ τί τοὐντεῦθεν;
But what from this?
ΣΩ. παιδίων μὲν ὄντων φάναι χρὴ εἶναι τοῦτο τὸ ἀγγεῖον κενόν, ἀντὶ δὲ τῶν ὀρνίθων ἐπιστήμας νοῆσαι· ἣν δʼ ἂν ἐπιστήμην κτησάμενος καθείρξῃ εἰς τὸν περίβολον, φάναι αὐτὸν μεμαθηκέναι ἢ ηὑρηκέναι τὸ πρᾶγμα οὗ ἦν αὕτη ἡ ἐπιστήμη, καὶ τὸ ἐπίστασθαι τοῦτʼ εἶναι.
SOCRATES: When we are children, we must say that this vessel is empty, and instead of birds we must think of pieces of knowledge; and whichever piece of knowledge one possesses and shuts up in the enclosure, we must say that he has learned or found the thing of which this was the knowledge, and that to know is this.
ΘΕΑΙ. ἔστω.
THEAETETUS: Let it be so.
§198ΣΩ. τὸ τοίνυν πάλιν ἣν ἂν βούληται τῶν ἐπιστημῶν θηρεύειν καὶ λαβόντα ἴσχειν καὶ αὖθις ἀφιέναι σκόπει τίνων δεῖται ὀνομάτων, εἴτε τῶν αὐτῶν ὧν τὸ πρῶτον ὅτε ἐκτᾶτο εἴτε ἑτέρων.
SOCRATES: Consider, then, what names it requires to hunt again whichever of the pieces of knowledge he wishes, and having taken it, to hold it, and again to let it go—whether the same names as at first when he was possessing it, or other ones.
μαθήσῃ δʼ ἐνθένδε σαφέστερον τί λέγω.
You will learn more clearly from this what I mean.
ἀριθμητικὴν μὲν γὰρ λέγεις τέχνην;
For do you call arithmetic an art?
ΘΕΑΙ. ναί.
THEAETETUS: Yes.
ΣΩ. ταύτην δὴ ὑπόλαβε θήραν ἐπιστημῶν ἀρτίου τε καὶ περιττοῦ παντός.
SOCRATES: Assume, then, this to be a hunt for pieces of knowledge of all that is even and odd.
ΘΕΑΙ. ὑπολαμβάνω.
THEAETETUS: I assume it.
ΣΩ. ταύτῃ δὴ οἶμαι τῇ τέχνῃ αὐτός τε ὑποχειρίους τὰς ἐπιστήμας τῶν ἀριθμῶν ἔχει καὶ ἄλλῳ παραδίδωσιν ὁ παραδιδούς.
SOCRATES: By this art, I think, he himself has the pieces of knowledge of numbers subject to his hand, and the one who hands them over hands them over to another.
ΘΕΑΙ. ναί.
THEAETETUS: Yes.
ΣΩ. καὶ καλοῦμέν γε παραδιδόντα μὲν διδάσκειν, παραλαμβάνοντα δὲ μανθάνειν, ἔχοντα δὲ δὴ τῷ κεκτῆσθαι ἐν τῷ περιστερεῶνι ἐκείνῳ ἐπίστασθαι. ΘΕΑΙ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν.
SOCRATES: And indeed we call the one who hands them over 'teaching,' and the one who receives them 'learning,' and the one who has them by possessing them in that aviary 'knowing.' THEAETETUS: Quite so, indeed.
ΣΩ. τῷ δὲ δὴ ἐντεῦθεν ἤδη πρόσσχες τὸν νοῦν.
SOCRATES: Now turn your mind to what comes next.
ἀριθμητικὸς γὰρ ὢν τελέως ἄλλο τι πάντας ἀριθμοὺς ἐπίσταται;
For being a perfect arithmetician, does he not know all numbers?
πάντων γὰρ ἀριθμῶν εἰσιν αὐτῷ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ἐπιστῆμαι.
For there are in his soul pieces of knowledge of all numbers.
ΘΕΑΙ. τί μήν;
THEAETETUS: Of course.
ΣΩ. ἦ οὖν ὁ τοιοῦτος ἀριθμοῖ ἄν ποτέ τι ἢ αὐτὸς πρὸς αὑτὸν αὐτὰ ἢ ἄλλο τι τῶν ἔξω ὅσα ἔχει ἀριθμόν;
SOCRATES: Would such a person, then, ever count anything, either those numbers themselves in himself or any of the external things that have number?
ΘΕΑΙ. πῶς γὰρ οὔ;
THEAETETUS: How indeed could he not?
ΣΩ. τὸ δὲ ἀριθμεῖν γε οὐκ ἄλλο τι θήσομεν τοῦ σκοπεῖσθαι πόσος τις ἀριθμὸς τυγχάνει ὤν. ΘΕΑΙ. οὕτως.
SOCRATES: And we shall set down counting as nothing else than examining how large a number happens to be. THEAETETUS: Just so.
ΣΩ. ὃ ἄρα ἐπίσταται, σκοπούμενος φαίνεται ὡς οὐκ εἰδώς, ὃν ὡμολογήκαμεν ἅπαντα ἀριθμὸν εἰδέναι.
SOCRATES: Therefore, what he knows, he appears to examine as if not knowing it, though we have agreed that he knows every number.
ἀκούεις γάρ που τὰς τοιαύτας ἀμφισβητήσεις.
For surely you hear of such disputes.
ΘΕΑΙ. ἔγωγε.
THEAETETUS: I do.
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν ἡμεῖς ἀπεικάζοντες τῇ τῶν περιστερῶν κτήσει τε καὶ θήρᾳ ἐροῦμεν ὅτι διττὴ ἦν ἡ θήρα, ἡ μὲν πρὶν ἐκτῆσθαι τοῦ κεκτῆσθαι ἕνεκα, ἡ δὲ κεκτημένῳ τοῦ λαβεῖν καὶ ἔχειν ἐν ταῖς χερσὶν ἃ πάλαι ἐκέκτητο.
SOCRATES: Shall we not, then, comparing it to the possession and hunt of doves, say that the hunt was double: one before possessing for the sake of possessing, and the other for the possessor to take and have in his hands what he had possessed long ago?
οὕτως δὲ καὶ ὧν πάλαι ἐπιστῆμαι ἦσαν αὐτῷ μαθόντι καὶ ἠπίστατο αὐτά, πάλιν ἔστι καταμανθάνειν ταὐτὰ ταῦτα ἀναλαμβάνοντα τὴν ἐπιστήμην ἑκάστου καὶ ἴσχοντα, ἣν ἐκέκτητο μὲν πάλαι, πρόχειρον δʼ οὐκ εἶχε τῇ διανοίᾳ;
In this way also, of those things of which there were pieces of knowledge in him long ago from learning, and he knew them, it is possible to learn these very things again by taking up and holding the knowledge of each, which he possessed indeed long ago, but did not have ready in his thought.
ΘΕΑΙ. ἀληθῆ.
THEAETETUS: True.
ΣΩ. τοῦτο δὴ ἄρτι ἠρώτων, ὅπως χρὴ τοῖς ὀνόμασι χρώμενον λέγειν περὶ αὐτῶν, ὅταν ἀριθμήσων ἴῃ ὁ ἀριθμητικὸς ἤ τι ἀναγνωσόμενος ὁ γραμματικός, ὡς ἐπιστάμενος ἄρα ἐν τῷ τοιούτῳ πάλιν ἔρχεται μαθησόμενος παρʼ ἑαυτοῦ ἃ ἐπίσταται;
SOCRATES: This, indeed, is what I was asking just now: how one must speak using names about them, when the arithmetician goes to count or the grammarian to read something, as if knowing indeed in such a situation he comes back again to learn from himself what he knows?
ΘΕΑΙ. ἀλλʼ ἄτοπον, ὦ Σώκρατες.
THEAETETUS: But that is absurd, Socrates.