§195ΣΩ. ἀσαφῆ δὲ καὶ οἱ τὰ σκληρά· βάθος γὰρ οὐκ ἔνι.
SOCRATES: And those of people who have hard hearts are also indistinct; for there is no depth in them.
ἀσαφῆ δὲ καὶ οἱ τὰ ὑγρά· ὑπὸ γὰρ τοῦ συγχεῖσθαι ταχὺ γίγνεται ἀμυδρά.
And those of people who have wet hearts are also indistinct; for because of being jumbled together they quickly become faint.
ἐὰν δὲ πρὸς πᾶσι τούτοις ἐπʼ ἀλλήλων συμπεπτωκότα ᾖ ὑπὸ στενοχωρίας, ἐάν του σμικρὸν ᾖ τὸ ψυχάριον, ἔτι ἀσαφέστερα ἐκείνων.
And if, in addition to all these things, they are fallen upon one another through lack of room, if someone's little soul is small, they are even more indistinct than those.
πάντες οὖν οὗτοι γίγνονται οἷοι δοξάζειν ψευδῆ.
All these people, then, become such as to opine false things.
ὅταν γάρ τι ὁρῶσιν ἢ ἀκούωσιν ἢ ἐπινοῶσιν, ἕκαστα ἀπονέμειν ταχὺ ἑκάστοις οὐ δυνάμενοι βραδεῖς τέ εἰσι καὶ ἀλλοτριονομοῦντες παρορῶσί τε καὶ παρακούουσι καὶ παρανοοῦσι πλεῖστα, καὶ καλοῦνται αὖ οὗτοι ἐψευσμένοι τε δὴ τῶν ὄντων καὶ ἀμαθεῖς.
For when they see or hear or think of something, being unable to assign quickly each to each, they are slow and, mismatching, they missee, mishear, and misthink in most cases, and these in turn are indeed called deceived about beings and ignorant.
ΘΕΑΙ. ὀρθότατα ἀνθρώπων λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες.
THEAETETUS: You speak most correctly of all men, Socrates.
ΣΩ. φῶμεν ἄρα ἐν ἡμῖν ψευδεῖς δόξας εἶναι;
SOCRATES: Shall we say, then, that false opinions exist in us?
ΘΕΑΙ. σφόδρα γε.
THEAETETUS: Most certainly.
ΣΩ. καὶ ἀληθεῖς δή;
SOCRATES: And true ones, too?
ΘΕΑΙ. καὶ ἀληθεῖς.
THEAETETUS: And true ones.
ΣΩ. ἤδη οὖν οἰόμεθα ἱκανῶς ὡμολογῆσθαι ὅτι παντὸς μᾶλλον ἐστὸν ἀμφοτέρα τούτω τὼ δόξα;
SOCRATES: Do we believe, then, that it has now been sufficiently agreed that both of these two opinions most certainly exist?
ΘΕΑΙ. ὑπερφυῶς μὲν οὖν.
THEAETETUS: Most extraordinarily so.
ΣΩ. δεινόν τε, ὦ Θεαίτητε, ὡς ἀληθῶς κινδυνεύει καὶ ἀηδὲς εἶναι ἀνὴρ ἀδολέσχης.
SOCRATES: It is a terrible thing, Theaetetus, and truly seems to be unpleasant, an babbling man.
ΘΕΑΙ. τί δέ;
THEAETETUS: Why so?
πρὸς τί τοῦτʼ εἶπες;
In regard to what did you say this?
ΣΩ. τὴν ἐμαυτοῦ δυσμαθίαν δυσχεράνας καὶ ὡς ἀληθῶς ἀδολεσχίαν.
SOCRATES: Disliking my own slowness of learning and, in truth, my babbling.
τί γὰρ ἄν τις ἄλλο θεῖτο ὄνομα, ὅταν ἄνω κάτω τοὺς λόγους ἕλκῃ τις ὑπὸ νωθείας οὐ δυνάμενος πεισθῆναι, καὶ ᾖ δυσαπάλλακτος ἀφʼ ἑκάστου λόγου;
For what other name could one put on it, when someone drags the arguments up and down out of sluggishness, unable to be persuaded, and is hard to clear away from each argument?
ΘΕΑΙ. σὺ δὲ δὴ τί δυσχεραίνεις;
THEAETETUS: But why indeed are you vexed?
ΣΩ. οὐ δυσχεραίνω μόνον ἀλλὰ καὶ δέδοικα ὅτι ἀποκρινοῦμαι ἄν τις ἔρηταί με· ὦ Σώκρατες, ηὕρηκας δὴ ψευδῆ δόξαν, ὅτι οὔτε ἐν ταῖς αἰσθήσεσίν ἐστι πρὸς ἀλλήλας οὔτʼ ἐν ταῖς διανοίαις ἀλλʼ ἐν τῇ συνάψει αἰσθήσεως πρὸς διάνοιαν; φήσω δὲ ἐγὼ οἶμαι καλλωπιζόμενος ὥς τι ηὑρηκότων ἡμῶν καλόν.
SOCRATES: I am not only vexed but also afraid of what I shall answer if someone asks me: "Socrates, have you indeed found false opinion, that it is neither in the perceptions in relation to one another nor in the thoughts, but in the juncture of perception with thought?" And I shall say, I suppose, putting on airs, as if we had found something beautiful.
ΘΕΑΙ. ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὐκ αἰσχρὸν εἶναι τὸ νῦν ἀποδεδειγμένον.
THEAETETUS: To me at least, Socrates, what has now been demonstrated does not seem to be ugly.
ΣΩ.
οὐκοῦν,
φησί,
λέγεις ὅτι αὖ τὸν ἄνθρωπον ὃν διανοούμεθα μόνον, ὁρῶμεν δʼ οὔ, ἵππον οὐκ ἄν ποτε οἰηθείημεν εἶναι, ὃν αὖ οὔτε ὁρῶμεν οὔτε ἁπτόμεθα, διανοούμεθα δὲ μόνον καὶ ἄλλʼ οὐδὲν αἰσθανόμεθα περὶ αὐτοῦ; ταῦτα οἶμαι φήσω λέγειν.
SOCRATES: "Is it not, then," he will say, "that you say we would never in turn think that the man whom we only think of, but do not see, is a horse, which in turn we neither see nor touch, but only think of and perceive nothing else about?" I suppose I shall say that we say these things.
ΘΕΑΙ. καὶ ὀρθῶς γε.
THEAETETUS: And correctly indeed.
ΣΩ.
τί οὖν,
φησί,
τὰ ἕνδεκα ἃ μηδὲν ἄλλο ἢ διανοεῖταί τις, ἄλλο τι ἐκ τούτου τοῦ λόγου οὐκ ἄν ποτε οἰηθείη δώδεκα εἶναι ἃ μόνον αὖ διανοεῖται; ἴθι οὖν δή, σὺ ἀποκρίνου.
SOCRATES: "What then," he will say, "could anyone ever think, according to this argument, that eleven, which one does nothing other than think of, is twelve, which in turn one only thinks of?" Come then indeed, you answer.
ΘΕΑΙ. ἀλλʼ ἀποκρινοῦμαι ὅτι ὁρῶν μὲν ἄν τις ἢ ἐφαπτόμενος οἰηθείη τὰ ἕνδεκα δώδεκα εἶναι, ἃ μέντοι ἐν τῇ διανοίᾳ ἔχει, οὐκ ἄν ποτε περὶ αὐτῶν ταῦτα δοξάσειεν οὕτως.
THEAETETUS: Well, I shall answer that anyone seeing or touching them might think eleven is twelve, but as for the things he holds in his thought, he would never opine these things about them in this way.