§193ΣΩ. ἰδὲ δὴ ἐάν τι μᾶλλον νῦν ἐπίσπῃ.
SOCRATES: See now if you can follow some more.
Σωκράτης εἰ γιγνώσκει Θεόδωρον καὶ Θεαίτητον, ὁρᾷ δὲ μηδέτερον, μηδὲ ἄλλη αἴσθησις αὐτῷ πάρεστι περὶ αὐτῶν, οὐκ ἄν ποτε ἐν ἑαυτῷ δοξάσειεν ὡς ὁ Θεαίτητός ἐστι Θεόδωρος.
If Socrates knows Theodorus and Theaetetus, but sees neither, nor is any other perception present to him about them, he would never in himself think that Theaetetus is Theodorus.
λέγω τὶ ἢ οὐδέν;
Am I saying something, or nothing?
ΘΕΑΙ. ναί, ἀληθῆ γε.
THEAETETUS: Yes, indeed, things that are true.
ΣΩ. τοῦτο μὲν τοίνυν ἐκείνων πρῶτον ἦν ὧν ἔλεγον.
SOCRATES: This, then, was the first of those cases of which I was speaking.
ΘΕΑΙ. ἦν γάρ.
THEAETETUS: It was indeed.
ΣΩ. δεύτερον τοίνυν, ὅτι τὸν μὲν γιγνώσκων ὑμῶν, τὸν δὲ μὴ γιγνώσκων, αἰσθανόμενος δὲ μηδέτερον, οὐκ ἄν ποτε αὖ οἰηθείην ὃν οἶδα εἶναι ὃν μὴ οἶδα.
SOCRATES: Second, then: knowing one of you, and not knowing the other, and perceiving neither, I could never again think that the one I know is the one I do not know.
ΘΕΑΙ. ὀρθῶς.
THEAETETUS: Correct.
ΣΩ. τρίτον δέ, μηδέτερον γιγνώσκων μηδὲ αἰσθανόμενος οὐκ ἂν οἰηθείην ὃν μὴ οἶδα ἕτερόν τινʼ εἶναι ὧν μὴ οἶδα.
SOCRATES: Third: knowing neither nor perceiving, I could not think that the one I do not know is some other of those I do not know.
καὶ τἆλλα τὰ πρότερα πάνθʼ ἑξῆς νόμιζε πάλιν ἀκηκοέναι, ἐν οἷς οὐδέποτʼ ἐγὼ περὶ σοῦ καὶ Θεοδώρου τὰ ψευδῆ δοξάσω, οὔτε γιγνώσκων οὔτε ἀγνοῶν ἄμφω, οὔτε τὸν μέν, τὸν δʼ οὐ γιγνώσκων·
And consider yourself to have heard all the other previous cases again in order, in which I will never opine falsely about you and Theodorus, whether knowing or not knowing both, or knowing the one and not knowing the other.
καὶ περὶ αἰσθήσεων κατὰ ταὐτά, εἰ ἄρα ἕπῃ.
And regarding perceptions in the same way, if you follow.
ΘΕΑΙ. ἕπομαι.
THEAETETUS: I follow.
ΣΩ. λείπεται τοίνυν τὰ ψευδῆ δοξάσαι ἐν τῷδε, ὅταν γιγνώσκων σὲ καὶ Θεόδωρον, καὶ ἔχων ἐν ἐκείνῳ τῷ κηρίνῳ ὥσπερ δακτυλίων σφῷν ἀμφοῖν τὰ σημεῖα, διὰ μακροῦ καὶ μὴ ἱκανῶς ὁρῶν ἄμφω προθυμηθῶ, τὸ οἰκεῖον ἑκατέρου σημεῖον ἀποδοὺς τῇ οἰκείᾳ ὄψει, ἐμβιβάσας προσαρμόσαι εἰς τὸ ἑαυτῆς ἴχνος, ἵνα γένηται ἀναγνώρισις, εἶτα τούτων ἀποτυχὼν καὶ ὥσπερ οἱ ἔμπαλιν ὑποδούμενοι παραλλάξας προσβάλω τὴν ἑκατέρου ὄψιν πρὸς τὸ ἀλλότριον σημεῖον, ἢ καὶ οἷα τὰ ἐν τοῖς κατόπτροις τῆς ὄψεως πάθη, δεξιὰ εἰς ἀριστερὰ μεταρρεούσης, ταὐτὸν παθὼν διαμάρτω·
SOCRATES: There remains, then, for false opinion to occur in this case: when, knowing you and Theodorus, and holding in that waxen block the signs of both of you like those of rings, and seeing both from afar and not sufficiently, I strive to assign the proper sign of each to the proper sight, and to fit it, introducing it into its own track, so that recognition may occur; and then, failing in these, and like those who put on shoes in reverse, swapping them, I apply the sight of each to the other's sign; or as in the affections of sight in mirrors, where the right flows to the left, suffering the same, I miss the mark.
τότε δὴ συμβαίνει ἡ ἑτεροδοξία καὶ τὸ ψευδῆ δοξάζειν.
It is then indeed that other-opinion and false opining occur.
ΘΕΑΙ. ἔοικε γάρ, ὦ Σώκρατες.
THEAETETUS: It seems indeed so, Socrates.
θαυμασίως ὡς λέγεις τὸ τῆς δόξης πάθος.
You describe the affection of opinion wonderfully.
ΣΩ. ἔτι τοίνυν καὶ ὅταν ἀμφοτέρους γιγνώσκων τὸν μὲν πρὸς τῷ γιγνώσκειν αἰσθάνωμαι, τὸν δὲ μή, τὴν δὲ γνῶσιν τοῦ ἑτέρου μὴ κατὰ τὴν αἴσθησιν ἔχω, ὃ ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν οὕτως ἔλεγον καί μου τότε οὐκ ἐμάνθανες.
SOCRATES: Furthermore, also, when knowing both, I perceive one in addition to knowing him, but not the other, and I do not have the knowledge of the other in accordance with the perception, which in the previous discussion I stated in this way, and you did not understand me then.
ΘΕΑΙ. οὐ γὰρ οὖν.
THEAETETUS: No indeed.
ΣΩ. τοῦτο μὴν ἔλεγον, ὅτι γιγνώσκων τὸν ἕτερον καὶ αἰσθανόμενος, καὶ τὴν γνῶσιν κατὰ τὴν αἴσθησιν αὐτοῦ ἔχων, οὐδέποτε οἰήσεται εἶναι αὐτὸν ἕτερόν τινα ὃν γιγνώσκει τε καὶ αἰσθάνεται καὶ τὴν γνῶσιν αὖ καὶ ἐκείνου ἔχει κατὰ τὴν αἴσθησιν.
SOCRATES: But this is what I was saying: that one who knows the other and perceives him, and has his knowledge in accordance with the perception, will never think that he is some other person whom he knows and perceives, and has his knowledge of that other likewise in accordance with the perception.
ἦν γὰρ τοῦτο;
Was this not so?
ΘΕΑΙ. ναί.
THEAETETUS: Yes.
§194ΣΩ. παρελείπετο δέ γέ που τὸ νῦν λεγόμενον, ἐν ᾧ δή φαμεν τὴν ψευδῆ δόξαν γίγνεσθαι τὸ ἄμφω γιγνώσκοντα καὶ ἄμφω ὁρῶντα ἤ τινα ἄλλην αἴσθησιν ἔχοντα ἀμφοῖν τὼ σημείω μὴ κατὰ τὴν αὐτοῦ αἴσθησιν ἑκάτερον ἔχειν, ἀλλʼ οἷον τοξότην φαῦλον ἱέντα παραλλάξαι τοῦ σκοποῦ καὶ ἁμαρτεῖν, ὃ δὴ καὶ ψεῦδος ἄρα ὠνόμασται. ΘΕΑΙ. εἰκότως γε.
SOCRATES: But what is now being said was, I suppose, omitted, in which we say that false opinion occurs: that one who knows both and sees both (or has some other perception of both) does not hold each of the two signs in accordance with its own perception, but, like a bad archer shooting, deviates from the target and misses, which indeed has been named "falsehood." THEAETETUS: Naturally.
ΣΩ. καὶ ὅταν τοίνυν τῷ μὲν παρῇ αἴσθησις τῶν σημείων, τῷ δὲ μή, τὸ δὲ τῆς ἀπούσης αἰσθήσεως τῇ παρούσῃ προσαρμόσῃ, πάντῃ ταύτῃ ψεύδεται ἡ διάνοια.
SOCRATES: And when, therefore, a perception of the signs is present to one, but not to the other, and one fits the sign of the absent perception to the present one, in every way the mind is deceived.
καὶ ἑνὶ λόγῳ, περὶ ὧν μὲν μὴ οἶδέ τις μηδʼ ἐπῄσθετο πώποτε, οὐκ ἔστιν, ὡς ἔοικεν, οὔτε ψεύδεσθαι οὔτε ψευδὴς δόξα, εἴ τι νῦν ἡμεῖς ὑγιὲς λέγομεν·
And in one word, about things which one does not know nor has ever perceived, it is not possible, it seems, either to be deceived or to have false opinion, if we are now saying anything sound.
περὶ δὲ ὧν ἴσμεν τε καὶ αἰσθανόμεθα, ἐν αὐτοῖς τούτοις στρέφεται καὶ ἑλίττεται ἡ δόξα ψευδὴς καὶ ἀληθὴς γιγνομένη, καταντικρὺ μὲν καὶ κατὰ τὸ εὐθὺ τὰ οἰκεῖα συνάγουσα ἀποτυπώματα καὶ τύπους ἀληθής, εἰς πλάγια δὲ καὶ σκολιὰ ψευδής.
But about things which we both know and perceive, in these very things opinion turns and twists, becoming false and true: when bringing together the proper imprints and types directly and straight, it is true; but when bringing them obliquely and crookedly, it is false.
ΘΕΑΙ. οὐκοῦν καλῶς, ὦ Σώκρατες, λέγεται;
THEAETETUS: Is this not well said, Socrates?
ΣΩ. ἔτι τοίνυν καὶ τάδε ἀκούσας μᾶλλον αὐτὸ ἐρεῖς.
SOCRATES: You will say so even more when you have heard this besides.
τὸ μὲν γὰρ τἀληθὲς δοξάζειν καλόν, τὸ δὲ ψεύδεσθαι αἰσχρόν.
For to opine the truth is beautiful, but to be deceived is ugly.
ΘΕΑΙ. πῶς δʼ οὔ;
THEAETETUS: How indeed not?
ΣΩ. ταῦτα τοίνυν φασὶν ἐνθένδε γίγνεσθαι.
SOCRATES: They say, then, that these things arise from the following.
ὅταν μὲν ὁ κηρός του ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ βαθύς τε καὶ πολὺς καὶ λεῖος καὶ μετρίως ὠργασμένος ᾖ, τὰ ἰόντα διὰ τῶν αἰσθήσεων, ἐνσημαινόμενα εἰς τοῦτο τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς
κέαρ,
ὃ ἔφη Ὅμηρος αἰνιττόμενος τὴν τοῦ κηροῦ ὁμοιότητα, τότε μὲν καὶ τούτοις καθαρὰ τὰ σημεῖα ἐγγιγνόμενα καὶ ἱκανῶς τοῦ βάθους ἔχοντα πολυχρόνιά τε γίγνεται καὶ εἰσὶν οἱ τοιοῦτοι πρῶτον μὲν εὐμαθεῖς, ἔπειτα μνήμονες, εἶτα οὐ παραλλάττουσι τῶν αἰσθήσεων τὰ σημεῖα ἀλλὰ δοξάζουσιν ἀληθῆ.
When the wax in someone's soul is deep, abundant, smooth, and moderately tempered, the things entering through the senses, making an impression upon this heart (waxen heart) of the soul—which Homer said, riddling at the similarity of the wax—then, in these people, the signs arising are clean, and having sufficient depth, they become long-lasting; and such people are, first, quick to learn, second, of good memory, and then they do not swap the signs of perceptions but opine things that are true.
σαφῆ γὰρ καὶ ἐν εὐρυχωρίᾳ ὄντα ταχὺ διανέμουσιν ἐπὶ τὰ αὑτῶν ἕκαστα ἐκμαγεῖα, ἃ δὴ ὄντα καλεῖται, καὶ σοφοὶ δὴ οὗτοι καλοῦνται. ἢ οὐ δοκεῖ σοι;
For, being clear and in wide space, they quickly distribute them to their own respective impressions, which indeed are called "beings," and these people are called "wise." Or does it not seem so to you?
ΘΕΑΙ. ὑπερφυῶς μὲν οὖν.
THEAETETUS: Exceedingly so.
ΣΩ. ὅταν τοίνυν λάσιόν του τὸ κέαρ ᾖ, ὃ δὴ ἐπῄνεσεν ὁ πάσσοφος ποιητής, ἢ ὅταν κοπρῶδες καὶ μὴ καθαροῦ τοῦ κηροῦ, ἢ ὑγρὸν σφόδρα ἢ σκληρόν, ὧν μὲν ὑγρὸν εὐμαθεῖς μέν, ἐπιλήσμονες δὲ γίγνονται, ὧν δὲ σκληρόν, τἀναντία.
SOCRATES: But when someone's heart is shaggy, which indeed the all-wise poet praised, or when it is muddy and of impure wax, or very moist or hard, those with moist wax are indeed quick to learn but become forgetful, while those with hard wax are the opposite.
οἱ δὲ δὴ λάσιον καὶ τραχὺ λιθῶδές τι ἢ γῆς ἢ κόπρου συμμιγείσης ἔμπλεων ἔχοντες ἀσαφῆ τὰ ἐκμαγεῖα ἴσχουσιν.
And those who have a shaggy and rough, stony heart, or one filled with mixed earth or mud, hold indistinct impressions.