§188ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν τόδε γʼ ἔσθʼ ἡμῖν περὶ πάντα καὶ καθʼ ἕκαστον, ἤτοι εἰδέναι ἢ μὴ εἰδέναι;
SOCRATES: Is it not, then, the case for us, concerning everything and each individual thing, that we either know it or do not know it?
μανθάνειν γὰρ καὶ ἐπιλανθάνεσθαι μεταξὺ τούτων ὡς ὄντα χαίρειν λέγω ἐν τῷ παρόντι· νῦν γὰρ ἡμῖν πρὸς λόγον ἐστὶν οὐδέν.
For learning and forgetting, which lie between these, I bid goodbye to for the present; for at present they have nothing to do with our argument.
ΘΕΑΙ. ἀλλὰ μήν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἄλλο γʼ οὐδὲν λείπεται περὶ ἕκαστον πλὴν εἰδέναι ἢ μὴ εἰδέναι.
THEAETETUS: Indeed, Socrates, nothing else is left concerning each thing except knowing or not knowing.
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν ἤδη ἀνάγκη τὸν δοξάζοντα δοξάζειν ἢ ὧν τι οἶδεν ἢ μὴ οἶδεν;
SOCRATES: Therefore, is it not now necessary that one who opines must opine either about something of what he knows, or about what he does not know?
ΘΕΑΙ. ἀνάγκη.
THEAETETUS: Necessarily.
ΣΩ. καὶ μὴν εἰδότα γε μὴ εἰδέναι τὸ αὐτὸ ἢ μὴ εἰδότα εἰδέναι ἀδύνατον.
SOCRATES: And indeed, it is impossible for one who knows not to know the very same thing, or for one who does not know to know it.
ΘΕΑΙ. πῶς δʼ οὔ;
THEAETETUS: Of course.
ΣΩ. ἆρʼ οὖν ὁ τὰ ψευδῆ δοξάζων, ἃ οἶδε, ταῦτα οἴεται οὐ ταῦτα εἶναι ἀλλὰ ἕτερα ἄττα ὧν οἶδε, καὶ ἀμφότερα εἰδὼς ἀγνοεῖ αὖ ἀμφότερα;
SOCRATES: Does, then, the one who opines falsely think that these things which he knows are not these very things, but some other things of those which he knows, so that, knowing both, he is in turn ignorant of both?
ΘΕΑΙ. ἀλλʼ ἀδύνατον, ὦ Σώκρατες.
THEAETETUS: But that is impossible, Socrates.
ΣΩ. ἀλλʼ ἆρα, ἃ μὴ οἶδεν, ἡγεῖται αὐτὰ εἶναι ἕτερα ἄττα ὧν μὴ οἶδε, καὶ τοῦτʼ ἔστι τῷ μήτε Θεαίτητον μήτε Σωκράτη εἰδότι εἰς τὴν διάνοιαν λαβεῖν ὡς ὁ Σωκράτης Θεαίτητος ἢ Θεαίτητος Σωκράτης;
SOCRATES: But then, does he believe that the things which he does not know are some other things of those which he does not know? And is this like someone who knows neither Theaetetus nor Socrates conceiving in his mind that Socrates is Theaetetus or Theaetetus is Socrates?
ΘΕΑΙ. καὶ πῶς ἄν;
THEAETETUS: And how could that be?
ΣΩ. ἀλλʼ οὐ μήν, ἅ γέ τις οἶδεν, οἴεταί που ἃ μὴ οἶδεν αὐτὰ εἶναι, οὐδʼ αὖ ἃ μὴ οἶδεν, ἃ οἶδεν.
SOCRATES: But surely, one does not think that the things which he knows are the things which he does not know, nor, again, that the things which he does not know are the things which he knows.
ΘΕΑΙ. τέρας γὰρ ἔσται.
THEAETETUS: For that would be a monstrosity.
ΣΩ. πῶς οὖν ἂν ἔτι ψευδῆ δοξάσειεν;
SOCRATES: How then could one still opine falsely?
ἐκτὸς γὰρ τούτων ἀδύνατόν που δοξάζειν, ἐπείπερ πάντʼ ἢ ἴσμεν ἢ οὐκ ἴσμεν, ἐν δὲ τούτοις οὐδαμοῦ φαίνεται δυνατὸν ψευδῆ δοξάσαι.
For it is surely impossible to opine outside of these, since we either know or do not know all things, and within these limits it nowhere appears possible to opine falsely.
ΘΕΑΙ. ἀληθέστατα.
THEAETETUS: Most true.
ΣΩ. ἆρʼ οὖν οὐ ταύτῃ σκεπτέον ὃ ζητοῦμεν, κατὰ τὸ εἰδέναι καὶ μὴ εἰδέναι ἰόντας, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὸ εἶναι καὶ μή;
SOCRATES: Should we then examine what we are seeking, not by going along the line of knowing and not knowing, but along that of being and not being?
ΘΕΑΙ. πῶς λέγεις;
THEAETETUS: How do you mean?
ΣΩ. μὴ ἁπλοῦν ᾖ ὅτι ὁ τὰ μὴ ὄντα περὶ ὁτουοῦν δοξάζων οὐκ ἔσθʼ ὡς οὐ ψευδῆ δοξάσει, κἂν ὁπωσοῦν ἄλλως τὰ τῆς διανοίας ἔχῃ.
SOCRATES: May it not be simply that one who opines what is not about anything cannot fail to opine falsely, no matter how his mind may otherwise be disposed?
ΘΕΑΙ. εἰκός γʼ αὖ, ὦ Σώκρατες.
THEAETETUS: That indeed is likely, Socrates.
ΣΩ. πῶς οὖν;
SOCRATES: How then?
τί ἐροῦμεν, ὦ Θεαίτητε, ἐάν τις ἡμᾶς ἀνακρίνῃ· δυνατὸν δὲ ὁτῳοῦν ὃ λέγεται, καί τις ἀνθρώπων τὸ μὴ ὂν δοξάσει, εἴτε περὶ τῶν ὄντων του εἴτε αὐτὸ καθʼ αὑτό; καὶ ἡμεῖς δή, ὡς ἔοικεν, πρὸς ταῦτα φήσομεν· ὅταν γε μὴ ἀληθῆ οἴηται οἰόμενος·
What shall we say, Theaetetus, if someone questions us: "Is what is proposed possible for anyone, and will any human being opine what is not, whether about some of the things that are or by itself?" And we, as it seems, shall say in reply to this: "Yes, whenever one opines, and does not opine what is true." Or how shall we say?
ἢ πῶς ἐροῦμεν; ΘΕΑΙ. οὕτως.
THEAETETUS: Thus.
ΣΩ. ἦ οὖν καὶ ἄλλοθί που τὸ τοιοῦτόν ἐστιν;
SOCRATES: Is there, then, such a thing as this anywhere else?
ΘΕΑΙ. τὸ ποῖον;
THEAETETUS: What sort of thing?
ΣΩ. εἴ τις ὁρᾷ μέν τι, ὁρᾷ δὲ οὐδέν.
SOCRATES: If someone sees something, but sees nothing.
ΘΕΑΙ. καὶ πῶς;
THEAETETUS: How indeed?
ΣΩ. ἀλλὰ μὴν εἰ ἕν γέ τι ὁρᾷ, τῶν ὄντων τι ὁρᾷ.
SOCRATES: But surely, if he sees at least some one thing, he sees something of those things which are.
ἢ σὺ οἴει ποτὲ τὸ ἓν ἐν τοῖς μὴ οὖσιν εἶναι;
Or do you think that 'one' can ever be among the things that are not?
ΘΕΑΙ. οὐκ ἔγωγε.
THEAETETUS: Not I.
ΣΩ. ὁ ἄρα ἕν γέ τι ὁρῶν ὄν τι ὁρᾷ.
SOCRATES: Then he who sees at least some one thing sees something that is.
ΘΕΑΙ. φαίνεται.
THEAETETUS: So it appears.