§186ΘΕΑΙ. ἀλλὰ μὴν φαίνεταί γε.
THEAETETUS: Yes, indeed, it certainly seems so.
ΣΩ. ποτέρων οὖν τίθης τὴν οὐσίαν;
SOCRATES: In which of the two classes, then, do you place being?
τοῦτο γὰρ μάλιστα ἐπὶ πάντων παρέπεται.
For this, above all, accompanies everything.
ΘΕΑΙ. ἐγὼ μὲν ὧν αὐτὴ ἡ ψυχὴ καθʼ αὑτὴν ἐπορέγεται.
THEAETETUS: For my part, in the class of those things which the soul itself reaches out for by means of itself.
ΣΩ. ἦ καὶ τὸ ὅμοιον καὶ τὸ ἀνόμοιον καὶ τὸ ταὐτὸν καὶ ἕτερον;
SOCRATES: And do you include likeness and unlikeness, and sameness and difference?
ΘΕΑΙ. ναί.
THEAETETUS: Yes.
ΣΩ. τί δέ; καλὸν καὶ αἰσχρὸν καὶ ἀγαθὸν καὶ κακόν;
SOCRATES: And what about beautiful and ugly, and good and bad?
ΘΕΑΙ. καὶ τούτων μοι δοκεῖ ἐν τοῖς μάλιστα πρὸς ἄλληλα σκοπεῖσθαι τὴν οὐσίαν, ἀναλογιζομένη ἐν ἑαυτῇ τὰ γεγονότα καὶ τὰ παρόντα πρὸς τὰ μέλλοντα.
THEAETETUS: These too seem to me to be among the things whose being the soul examines above all in their relation to one another, calculating in herself the past and the present in relation to the future.
ΣΩ. ἔχε δή·
SOCRATES: Stay a moment.
ἄλλο τι τοῦ μὲν σκληροῦ τὴν σκληρότητα διὰ τῆς ἐπαφῆς αἰσθήσεται, καὶ τοῦ μαλακοῦ τὴν μαλακότητα ὡσαύτως;
Is it not true that she will perceive the hardness of what is hard through touch, and the softness of what is soft in the same way?
ΘΕΑΙ. ναί.
THEAETETUS: Yes.
ΣΩ. τὴν δέ γε οὐσίαν καὶ ὅτι ἐστὸν καὶ τὴν ἐναντιότητα πρὸς ἀλλήλω καὶ τὴν οὐσίαν αὖ τῆς ἐναντιότητος αὐτὴ ἡ ψυχὴ ἐπανιοῦσα καὶ συμβάλλουσα πρὸς ἄλληλα κρίνειν πειρᾶται ἡμῖν.
SOCRATES: But as for their being, and that they both are, and their opposition to each other, and again the being of this opposition, the soul itself attempts to judge for us by reverting to them and comparing them with each other.
ΘΕΑΙ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν.
THEAETETUS: Most certainly.
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν τὰ μὲν εὐθὺς γενομένοις πάρεστι φύσει αἰσθάνεσθαι ἀνθρώποις τε καὶ θηρίοις, ὅσα διὰ τοῦ σώματος παθήματα ἐπὶ τὴν ψυχὴν τείνει· τὰ δὲ περὶ τούτων ἀναλογίσματα πρός τε οὐσίαν καὶ ὠφέλειαν μόγις καὶ ἐν χρόνῳ διὰ πολλῶν πραγμάτων καὶ παιδείας παραγίγνεται οἷς ἂν καὶ παραγίγνηται;
SOCRATES: Therefore, while humans and beasts alike are by nature able to perceive, from the moment of birth, all the impressions which reach the soul through the body, yet the calculations about these with respect to being and utility are acquired, by those who do acquire them, only with difficulty and over time, through many troubles and education?
ΘΕΑΙ. παντάπασι μὲν οὖν.
THEAETETUS: Quite so.
ΣΩ. οἷόν τε οὖν ἀληθείας τυχεῖν, ᾧ μηδὲ οὐσίας;
SOCRATES: Is it possible, then, to attain truth for one who does not even attain being?
ΘΕΑΙ. ἀδύνατον.
THEAETETUS: Impossible.
ΣΩ. οὗ δὲ ἀληθείας τις ἀτυχήσει, ποτὲ τούτου ἐπιστήμων ἔσται;
SOCRATES: And if one misses the truth of something, can one ever be knowledgeable of it?
ΘΕΑΙ. καὶ πῶς ἄν, ὦ Σώκρατες;
THEAETETUS: How could he, Socrates?
ΣΩ. ἐν μὲν ἄρα τοῖς παθήμασιν οὐκ ἔνι ἐπιστήμη, ἐν δὲ τῷ περὶ ἐκείνων συλλογισμῷ· οὐσίας γὰρ καὶ ἀληθείας ἐνταῦθα μέν, ὡς ἔοικε, δυνατὸν ἅψασθαι, ἐκεῖ δὲ ἀδύνατον.
SOCRATES: In the impressions, then, there is no knowledge, but in the reasoning about them; for in the latter, as it seems, it is possible to grasp being and truth, but in the former it is impossible.
ΘΕΑΙ. φαίνεται.
THEAETETUS: So it appears.
ΣΩ. ἦ οὖν ταὐτὸν ἐκεῖνό τε καὶ τοῦτο καλεῖς, τοσαύτας διαφορὰς ἔχοντε;
SOCRATES: Do you, then, call that and this by the same name, when they have such great differences?
ΘΕΑΙ. οὔκουν δὴ δίκαιόν γε.
THEAETETUS: Certainly not with any justice.
ΣΩ. τί οὖν δὴ ἐκείνῳ ἀποδίδως ὄνομα, τῷ ὁρᾶν ἀκούειν ὀσφραίνεσθαι ψύχεσθαι θερμαίνεσθαι;
SOCRATES: What name, then, do you give to that other—to seeing, hearing, smelling, feeling cold, and feeling warm?
ΘΕΑΙ. αἰσθάνεσθαι ἔγωγε· τί γὰρ ἄλλο;
THEAETETUS: I call it perceiving; what else could it be?
ΣΩ. σύμπαν ἄρʼ αὐτὸ καλεῖς αἴσθησιν;
SOCRATES: You call the whole of it, then, perception?
ΘΕΑΙ. ἀνάγκη.
THEAETETUS: Necessarily.
ΣΩ. ὧι γε, φαμέν, οὐ μέτεστιν ἀληθείας ἅψασθαι· οὐδὲ γὰρ οὐσίας.
SOCRATES: And to this, we say, it is not granted to grasp truth, since it does not grasp being either.
ΘΕΑΙ. οὐ γὰρ οὖν.
THEAETETUS: No, indeed.
ΣΩ. οὐδʼ ἄρʼ ἐπιστήμης.
SOCRATES: Nor, then, of knowledge.
ΘΕΑΙ. οὐ γάρ.
THEAETETUS: No.
ΣΩ. οὐκ ἄρʼ ἂν εἴη ποτέ, ὦ Θεαίτητε, αἴσθησίς τε καὶ ἐπιστήμη ταὐτόν.
SOCRATES: Then, Theaetetus, perception and knowledge could never be the same thing.
ΘΕΑΙ. οὐ φαίνεται, ὦ Σώκρατες.
THEAETETUS: It seems not, Socrates.
καὶ μάλιστά γε νῦν καταφανέστατον γέγονεν ἄλλο ὂν αἰσθήσεως ἐπιστήμη.
And indeed, it has now become most completely clear that knowledge is something other than perception.
§187ΣΩ. ἀλλʼ οὔ τι μὲν δὴ τούτου γε ἕνεκα ἠρχόμεθα διαλεγόμενοι, ἵνα εὕρωμεν τί ποτʼ οὐκ ἔστʼ ἐπιστήμη, ἀλλὰ τί ἔστιν.
SOCRATES: But surely we did not begin our conversation for the sake of finding out what knowledge is not, but what it is.
ὅμως δὲ τοσοῦτόν γε προβεβήκαμεν, ὥστε μὴ ζητεῖν αὐτὴν ἐν αἰσθήσει τὸ παράπαν ἀλλʼ ἐν ἐκείνῳ τῷ ὀνόματι, ὅτι ποτʼ ἔχει ἡ ψυχή, ὅταν αὐτὴ καθʼ αὑτὴν πραγματεύηται περὶ τὰ ὄντα.
Still, we have progressed at least so far as not to look for it in perception at all, but in that name, whatever it is, which the soul has when it occupies itself, by itself, with the things that are.
ΘΕΑΙ. ἀλλὰ μὴν τοῦτό γε καλεῖται, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὡς ἐγᾦμαι, δοξάζειν.
THEAETETUS: But that, Socrates, is called, I believe, opining.
ΣΩ. ὀρθῶς γὰρ οἴει, ὦ φίλε.
SOCRATES: You think rightly, my friend.
καὶ ὅρα δὴ νῦν πάλιν ἐξ ἀρχῆς, πάντα τὰ πρόσθεν ἐξαλείψας, εἴ τι μᾶλλον καθορᾷς, ἐπειδὴ ἐνταῦθα προελήλυθας.
Now look again from the beginning, wiping out everything that went before, and see if you can see any more clearly, now that you have advanced to this point.
καὶ λέγε αὖθις τί ποτʼ ἐστὶν ἐπιστήμη.
Tell me once more: what is knowledge?
ΘΕΑΙ. δόξαν μὲν πᾶσαν εἰπεῖν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀδύνατον, ἐπειδὴ καὶ ψευδής ἐστι δόξα· κινδυνεύει δὲ ἡ ἀληθὴς δόξα ἐπιστήμη εἶναι, καί μοι τοῦτο ἀποκεκρίσθω.
THEAETETUS: To say all opinion, Socrates, is impossible, since there is also false opinion; but it is likely that true opinion is knowledge, and let this be my answer.
ἐὰν γὰρ μὴ φανῇ προϊοῦσιν ὥσπερ τὸ νῦν, ἄλλο τι πειρασόμεθα λέγειν.
For if, as we proceed, it does not appear so as it does now, we shall try to say something else.
ΣΩ. οὕτω μέντοι χρή, ὦ Θεαίτητε, λέγειν προθύμως μᾶλλον, ἢ ὡς τὸ πρῶτον ὤκνεις ἀποκρίνεσθαι.
SOCRATES: That is indeed how you ought to speak, Theaetetus, with more readiness than when you hesitated to answer at first.
ἐὰν γὰρ οὕτω δρῶμεν, δυοῖν θάτερα, ἢ εὑρήσομεν ἐφʼ ὃ ἐρχόμεθα, ἢ ἧττον οἰησόμεθα εἰδέναι ὃ μηδαμῇ ἴσμεν· καίτοι οὐκ ἂν εἴη μεμπτὸς μισθὸς ὁ τοιοῦτος.
For if we do so, one of two things will happen: either we shall find what we are going after, or we shall be less likely to think we know what we do not know at all; and indeed, such a reward would not be to be despised.
καὶ δὴ καὶ νῦν τί φῄς;
And so now, what do you say?
δυοῖν ὄντοιν ἰδέαιν δόξης, τοῦ μὲν ἀληθινοῦ, ψευδοῦς δὲ τοῦ ἑτέρου, τὴν ἀληθῆ δόξαν ἐπιστήμην ὁρίζῃ;
Since there are two kinds of opinion, the one true and the other false, do you define true opinion as knowledge?
ΘΕΑΙ. ἔγωγε· τοῦτο γὰρ αὖ νῦν μοι φαίνεται.
THEAETETUS: I do; for that is what seems to me now once again.
ΣΩ. ἆρʼ οὖν ἔτʼ ἄξιον περὶ δόξης ἀναλαβεῖν πάλιν—
ΘΕΑΙ. τὸ ποῖον δὴ λέγεις;
SOCRATES: Is it, then, worth our while to take up the subject of opinion again— THEAETETUS: What sort of thing do you mean?
ΣΩ. θράττει μέ πως νῦν τε καὶ ἄλλοτε δὴ πολλάκις, ὥστʼ ἐν ἀπορίᾳ πολλῇ πρὸς ἐμαυτὸν καὶ πρὸς ἄλλον γεγονέναι, οὐκ ἔχοντα εἰπεῖν τί ποτʼ ἐστὶ τοῦτο τὸ πάθος παρʼ ἡμῖν καὶ τίνα τρόπον ἐγγιγνόμενον.
SOCRATES: It disturbs me in a way, both now and often at other times, so that I have been in great perplexity both with myself and with others, not being able to say what this experience of ours is and in what way it arises in us.
ΘΕΑΙ. τὸ ποῖον δή;
THEAETETUS: What sort of thing indeed?
ΣΩ. τὸ δοξάζειν τινὰ ψευδῆ.
SOCRATES: That a person should hold a false opinion.
σκοπῶ δὴ καὶ νῦν ἔτι διστάζων, πότερον ἐάσωμεν αὐτὸ ἢ ἐπισκεψώμεθα ἄλλον τρόπον ἢ ὀλίγον πρότερον.
I am considering even now, still in doubt, whether we should let it go or examine it in a different way from how we did a little while ago.
ΘΕΑΙ. τί μήν, ὦ Σώκρατες, εἴπερ γε καὶ ὁπῃτιοῦν φαίνεται δεῖν;
THEAETETUS: How could we not, Socrates, if it appears necessary in any way at all?
ἄρτι γὰρ οὐ κακῶς γε σὺ καὶ Θεόδωρος ἐλέγετε σχολῆς πέρι, ὡς οὐδὲν ἐν τοῖς τοιοῖσδε κατεπείγει.
For just now you and Theodorus spoke very well about leisure—how in such matters there is nothing to press us.
ΣΩ. ὀρθῶς ὑπέμνησας·
SOCRATES: You have reminded me well.
ἴσως γὰρ οὐκ ἀπὸ καιροῦ πάλιν ὥσπερ ἴχνος μετελθεῖν.
For perhaps it is not out of place to go back on our track, as it were.
κρεῖττον γάρ που σμικρὸν εὖ ἢ πολὺ μὴ ἱκανῶς περᾶναι.
For surely it is better to accomplish a small thing well than a great deal insufficiently.
ΘΕΑΙ. τί μήν;
THEAETETUS: Certainly.
ΣΩ. πῶς οὖν;
SOCRATES: How then?
τί δὴ καὶ λέγομεν;
What indeed are we saying?
ψευδῆ φαμεν ἑκάστοτε εἶναι δόξαν, καί τινα ἡμῶν δοξάζειν ψευδῆ, τὸν δʼ αὖ ἀληθῆ, ὡς φύσει οὕτως ἐχόντων;
Do we say that there is in every case a false opinion, and that one of us opines falsely, and another truly, as if this were so by nature?
ΘΕΑΙ. φαμὲν γὰρ δή.
THEAETETUS: Yes, indeed we do.